EFA AND PRIVATE EDUCATION: SOME REGIONAL EXPERIENCES AND FINDINGS

Many developing and transitional countries do not have sufficient resources or capacities to meet the Education for All goals. Given that private education is a growing reality around the world, partnerships between governments and private providers may support attempts to meet the goals of EFA. This article uses recent empirical research from a variety of regions to examine the appropriate roles of the government and the private sector in the provision of primary, basic and secondary levels of instruction.     

THE QUALITY AND EFFICIENCY OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC EDUCATION: A CASE-STUDY OF URBAN INDIA†

Recent evidence of a substantial link between quality of schooling and individual productivity suggests that, from an economic efficiency perspective, quality aspects of education deserve attention. This paper presents empirical evidence on the relative quality and efficiency of private and government-funded schools in urban India, using data from Uttar Pradesh. The results suggest that standardizing for home background and controlling for sample selectivity greatly reduces the raw average achievement advantage of private school students over public school students, but does not wipe it out. Private schools' standardized achievement advantage (or better quality) is complemented by their lower unit costs to enable them to be more efficient. The results support much of the existing international evidence on the relative efficiency of private and public schools.     

EDUCATING AMARETCH: PRIVATE SCHOOLS FOR THE POOR AND THE NEW FRONTIER FOR INVESTORS

The accepted wisdom says that the poor need billions of dollars more in donor aid for state education. But this ignores the reality that poor parents are abandoning government schools to send their children to 'budget' private schools that charge very low fees, affordable to parents on minimum wages. Recent research shows that private schools for the poor are superior to government schools – teachers are more committed, the provision of inputs better and educational outcomes better – even after controlling for background variables. All this is accomplished for a fraction of the per-pupil teacher cost of government schools. The development community could therefore assist the poor by extending access to private schools through targeted vouchers. There are also opportunities for investors to contribute through microfinance-type loans, dedicated education investment funds and joint ventures with educational entrepreneurs, including the development of brands of budget private schools to help solve the information problem facing poor parents.     

PRIVATE EDUCATION AND'EDUCATION FOR ALL'- OR HOW NOT TO CONSTRUCT AN EVIDENCE-BASED ARGUMENT: A REPLY TO TOOLEY

The poor cannot afford education if they are left to pay for it themselves. Furthermore, given the right political structures government schools can deliver accountability and a good quality of education.     

PRIVATE POLICING AND PRIVATE ROADS: A COASIAN APPROACH TO DRUNK-DRIVING POLICY

Alcohol-related traffic accidents are externalities, not because of drinking, but because of relatively free access to public roads. Access limits are Coasian (property-rights) policies, but more effective limits will arise if road owners are liable for failing to provide safe roads. This can be achieved by privatising roads, thereby creating strong incentives to employ innovative private traffic policing.     

EDUCATION AND MODERNITY

Modernity is the combination of capitalism and democracy. Its economic core is based on property rights, which mobilise the organisation of resources. It also requires mass education to select intellectual talent for a complex division of labour. Western education paradoxically lacks developed property rights and a class of owners who seek profits through the satisfaction of consumer (educational) demand. Most of the intellectual ills in our society reflect this absence of modernity in our educational arrangements.     

INFRASTRUCTURE: OPTIMAL PRIVATE AND GOVERNMENTAL FUNDING AND PROVISION

The excess burden of taxation, which in the US is over $1 trillion, could be reduced by transferring responsibility for funding infrastructure to the private sector, with a corresponding cut in taxes. While governments may resist optimal taxation, private communities are induced to do so by competition. A promising approach to efficient funding of civic infrastructure is its transfer to private enterprise     

IS THERE A CONFLICT BETWEEN COMMERCIAL GAIN AND CONCERN FOR THE POOR? EVIDENCE FROM PRIVATE SCHOOLS FOR THE POOR IN INDIA AND NIGERIA

In many developing countries, private unaided schools are serving the poor in large numbers. Some commentators view their presence as undesirable - in particular assuming that there is a conflict between'commercial gain' and 'concern for the poor'. We show one way in which there is no conflict - the private unaided schools offer free or concessionary places to the poorest of the poor. Using data from a random sample of schools in Hyderabad, India, and a smaller sample in Makoko, Nigeria, we show that such places range from 10–20% of all places offered.     

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RELATIVE RISK AVERSION AND THE LEVEL OF EDUCATION: A SURVEY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DEMAND FOR LIFE INSURANCE

The expected utility hypothesis has been widely used in the construction of economic models and numerous difficulties are encountered in attempting to take into account preferences toward risk in a real‐world setting. More recently, attention has focused on comparative studies in economics and business in an international framework and problems related to the hypothesis of relative risk aversion (RRA). One ambiguous hypothesis is the relationship between the level of RRA and the level of education, which has been found either positive or negative. From a causality point of view, it may be argued that investors with a high level of education are less risk averse, but it may also be argued that less risk‐averse individuals choose to pursue a higher level of education. The purpose of this paper is to survey the empirical literature on this subject. It provides evidence that risk aversion is negatively correlated with higher education and human development. The results have important implications for macroeconomic empirical studies and the demand for financial assets and more specifically on the demand for life insurance. Assuming the same degree of RRA for utility‐maximizing consumers should be limited to homogeneous samples.     

SHARING THE BURDEN OF FINANCING: GOVERNMENT AND HOUSEHOLD PARTNERSHIPS FOR BASIC EDUCATION1

If the goal of achieving education for all is to be met consideration has to be given to how it is financed. States in which there is least primary education are often those with unstable governments and poor tax collection systems. In such circumstances, education for all is often best achieved by partnerships between governments, families and other bodies in both the provision and funding of education.     

MARKETS, TACIT KNOWLEDGE AND EDUCATION

James Tooley argues that markets in education are both feasible and desirable. Focusing on compulsory schooling he advocates liberalisation organised around individual learning accounts and competing suppliers. He argues his views are implicitly informed by Hayek's economic analysis. I build on this here by drawing particular attention to Hayek's distinction between tacit and codifiable knowledge. I argue this makes Tooley's theoretical critique of compulsory schooling even more far-reaching, as well as pointing to additional policy reforms. I compare these implications with actual schools policy under New Labour.     

NEW LABOUR, PUBLIC–PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS AND RAIL TRANSPORT POLICY

The New Labour government has favoured the deployment of Public–Private Partnerships (PPPs) to provide investment in transport infrastructure. The results of this policy on the railways have, however, been disappointing in terms of cost and efficiency. Public transport PPPs require complex contracts underpinned by regulatory mechanisms in order to maintain performance and safety standards. Moreover, risk transfer is difficult to achieve, as essential infrastructure cannot be left to the ultimate market discipline of bankruptcy.