Do insurers respond to active purchasing? Evidence from the Massachusetts health insurance exchange

Health insurance markets face continued challenges with high premiums and limited insurer competition. We describe a unique set of “active purchasing” policies used by Massachusetts' pioneer health insurance exchange to shape the rules of competition and reward lower-price insurers with additional customers. We provide evidence that these policies significantly influenced insurer pricing. Between 2010 and 2013, over 80% of insurer prices were set exactly at or within 1% of pricing thresholds created by active purchasing policies. A key “limited choice” policy was associated with a 16%–20% reduction in average insurance prices relative to comparison markets in 2012–2014. Insurers achieved these price cuts partly through cost reductions via narrower provider networks and partly through reduced profit margins.     

WHO WINS IN LARGE STOCK BUYBACKS – THOSE WHO SELL OR THOSE WHO HOLD?

Both fixed-price and dutch auction repurchases offer large premiums over current values to tendering shareholders. And, because announcements of such offers are generally accompanied by significant increases in stock prices, economists view selftender offers as mechanisms for signaling undervaluation. Using samples of fixed-price and dutch auction self-tender offers from the 1980s, this study attempts to answer the following questions: Are non-tendering shareholders fully compensated for the premium wealth transfer by the increase in the intrinsic value of their shares? Since fixed-price offers feature larger premiums, are they accompanied by larger increases in intrinsic value (or do insiders have a tendency to “overpay” in fixed-price offers)? Is the premium wealth transfer a big component of the returns to the two shareholder groups—and what percentage of firm value does the transfer represent? The findings of this study, unlike those reported by earlier research, suggest that the two types of offers generate roughly the same total returns (about 10–11%, on average, during the offering period) to shareholders who do not tender. Fixed-price offers involve considerably larger premiums (over the new, “full-information” price) and wealth transfers than dutch auctions. Reflecting the higher premiums, shareholders tendering into fixed-price offers receive higher returns than those tendering into dutch auctions (13.8% vs. 11.3% during the announcement period). But while fixed-price offers involve a considerably larger wealth transfer from non-tendering to tendering shareholders, fixed-price repurchases compensate the non-tendering shareholders for the larger wealth transfer with larger increases in “intrinsic value,” thus generating the same total return as dutch auctions. Moreover, despite the large premiums offered in both types of offers, the wealth transfer implicit in the premium represents a small cost (less than 1% in fixed-price offers, and less than 0.1% in dutch auctions) to non-tendering shareholders.     

The cost of disclosure regulation: evidence from D&O insurance and nonmeritorious securities litigation

This study examines whether the required disclosure of directors’ and officers’ (D&O) insurance premiums leads to nonmeritorious securities litigation. Our research setting uses a proprietary D&O insurance database that includes New York and non-New York firms, combined with the fact that New York firms must disclose D&O insurance premiums. We thus can exploit a natural experiment based on inter-state variation in disclosure regulation. Disclosed premiums may influence case selection in two ways. First, higher premiums signal higher limits, which plaintiffs’ lawyers likely believe enable higher settlements. Second, higher premiums indicate higher risk assessments from insurers and thus a higher likelihood that stock price drops signal misconduct rather than bad luck. We find that D&O insurance premiums for New York firms are associated with a higher dismissal rate. Offsetting this higher dismissal rate, plaintiffs’ lawyers can achieve higher settlements in the relatively few successful cases.     

Was spricht eigentlich gegen eine private Arbeitslosenversicherung?

This article wants to base the current discussion about the privatization of unemployment insurance on a perspective of insurance economics. The arguments against private unemployment insurance are separated in two prospects: insurance technique and social policy. Therefore, the mixing of objective-technical and normative arguments, which is widely spread in the literature, is broken down. It is shown that the only criterion, which holds against private unemployment insurance, is that of “relative poorness”. Consequently, from a social policy perspective the monetary burden of actuarial premiums on people at high and medium risk is not acceptable. Arguments like positively correlated risks, moral hazard, insufficient differentiation of premiums and collectively underestimated individual unemployment risks appear to be poorly valid. As a solution of the problem of “relative poorness” a new outline for privatization of unemployment insurance is presented. The proposal focuses on a combination of private unemployment and pension insurance.     

Estimation of Housing Price Jump Risks and Their Impact on the Valuation of Mortgage Insurance Contracts

Housing price jump risk and the subprime crisis have drawn more attention to the precise estimation of mortgage insurance premiums. This study derives the pricing formula for mortgage insurance premiums by assuming that the housing price process follows the jump diffusion process, capturing important characteristics of abnormal shock events. This assumption is consistent with the empirical observation of the U.S. monthly national average new home returns from 1986 to 2008. Furthermore, we investigate the impact of price jump risk on mortgage insurance premiums from shock frequency of the abnormal events, abnormal mean and volatility of jump size, and normal volatility. Empirical results indicate that the abnormal volatility of jump size has the most significant impact on mortgage insurance premiums.     

Research in collective risk theory

Abstract

An insurance company can be considered as an adjustment institution for the policyholders. The individual risks of the policyholders are taken over by the company at the price of a comparatively small stake, the premium. This is so calculated that the premiums from all the policyholders will, according to statistical experience, on the average cover the company's payments for claims. With respect to unfavourable random deviations from the average, the premiums contain security loadings. For the same purpose the company also makes other precautions. The most important of these are reinsurance and the building up of adjustment funds. On the other hand, extensive precautions increase the price of the insurance. Therefore the objective fixing of the precautions in order to get a satisfactory solidity as well as a reasonable price constitutes a weighing problem, demanding a measure of the effect of diverse precautions.     

Insurance economics

Abstract

Background

Insurance accounting is generally speaking based upon the idea that a comparison shall be made between “premiums earned” and “claims incurred”. Even if there are exceptions in different countries and in different classes of business the method where premiums earned and claims incurred are compared is so widely used that we will take this method as our starting point for a discussion of the shortcomings, if any, of insurance accounting.     

“好”的不确定性、“坏”的不确定性与股票市场定价——基于中国股市高频数据分析

不确定性并不是都是“坏”的,“好”的不确定性也同样存在。本文采用Barndorff-Nielsen et al.(2010)提出的已实现半方差作为股票市场“好”的不确定性和“坏”的不确定性的代理指标,并在此基础上构建了相对符号变差(RSV),分析RSV对中国股市定价的影响。基于2007-2017年中国A股5分钟高频数据的实证研究发现:(1)与理论解释相一致,RSV与股票收益之间呈现负相关关系。无论是基于单变量分组、双变量分组还是公司层面的截面回归,这种影响在经济上和统计上都显著。(2)RSV是独立于已实现偏度的一个重要定价因子,且RSV对股票的定价能力强于已实现偏度的定价能力。(3)RSV对中国股市的影响是状态依存的,相对于经济景气程度高的状态,在经济景气程度低的状态下RSV定价影响更大。(4)基于RSV构建的投资组合的表现明显优于市场超额收益率组合、SMB组合和HML组合的表现。     

Sickness experience of Framtiden

Abstract

Introduction.

Livförsäkringsbolaget Framtiden, ömsesidigt (the Life Insurance Co. “The Future”, Mutual), to the policyholders of which I have the honour of devoting my actuarial work, is a relatively new enterprise. It was founded in 1911. Its main work is industrial life insurance with monthly premiums. All industrial policies include the waiver of premiums on disablement by sickness or accident for at least four weeks. Disablement lasting more than four weeks involves the waiver of premiums from the beginning of the disablement. For industrial policies issued in late years, the payment of premiums is limited to 65 years of age. Besides ordinary endowment (or whole life) policies, many childrens' insurances are written, including some or other insurance of the bread-winner, at all events the waiver of premiums till the 20th birthday of the child, if the supporter should die before that time, and for the periods during this time when the supporter is disabled by sickness or accident for at least four weeks. It has been tried to propagate more protective forms of children's policies, but it has partly failed, owing to lack of interest from agents and public. Nevertheless, it has been possible to exclude pure childrens' tariffs, and so in almost every policy issued, there is a moment of sickness insurance. In late years, this holds true also for the ordinary branch. The mass of experience collected is thus by no means unimportant, despite the smallness of the Company, as compared with foreign Companies. The experience is, moreover, collected during a relatively short period of time, giving a rather homogeneous material.     

Risk-based capital standards, deposit insurance, and procyclicality

This article shows that risk-based deposit insurance premiums generate smaller procyclical effects than do risk-based capital requirements. Thus, Basel II's procyclical impact can be reduced by integrating risk-based deposit insurance. If deposit insurance is structured as a moving average of contracts, its procyclical effects can be decreased further. Empirical illustrations of this are presented for 42 banks over the period 1987 to 1996. The results confirm that lengthening the contracts' maturities intertemporally smooths premiums but raises the average premium level needed to compensate the insurer for greater systematic risk. The distribution of risk-based premiums across banks is skewed.     

基于Logit模型对新型农业经营主体农业保险购买偏好的特征研究

新型农业经营主体对农业保险的购买偏好与传统小农户存在明显的区别.运用二分类Logit回归模型,以对8个省份的问卷调查为基础,实证分析新型农业经营主体农业保险的购买偏好特征.结果表明:对市场价格反映较为敏感;更愿意提高保额的同时提高保费,对保费支出意愿较强;更迫切需要高保障型产品,提高损失补偿度;对政府提高保费补贴意愿强;对收入保险需求更迫切;补偿或救助发挥着正向作用.     

Identifying M&A targets and the information content of VC/PEs

The information gap in the M&A market hinders acquirers from effectively identifying high-quality targets. We examine whether VC/PEs convey information content in the M&A market and whether acquirers can use such information to identify high-quality targets. We show that VC/PEs have significant information content and can signal high-quality target companies via “certification”. When acquirers lack acquisition experience and targets are located in inferior information environments, VC/PE “certification” is more significant. The better reputation a VC/PE has, the more information it conveys. Syndicate VC/PEs convey stronger information than independent VC/PEs. We also find that acquirers do not pay higher premiums for high-quality targets. Overall, our results suggest that VC/PEs have value relevance in the M&A market, confirming their “certification” role. We present means for acquirers to select high-quality targets and investors to build efficient portfolios.     

The Effects of Regulated Premium Subsidies on Insurance Costs: An Empirical Analysis of Automobile Insurance

State regulation of rates is sometimes used as a means to make automobile insurance more affordable to consumers by restricting insurer profits and pricing practices. Incentive distortions arising from this type of rate regulation might lead to higher accident rates and higher insurance loss costs. Annual state‐level panel data for the time period 1980–1998 are used to investigate these effects, using empirical methods that recognize the endogenous determination of states’ regulatory choices. Results suggest that rate regulation that systematically suppresses (some or all) drivers’ insurance premiums is associated with significantly higher average loss costs and higher insurance claim frequency.     

Optimal Risk Financing in Large Corporations through Insurance Captives

A captive is an insurance or reinsurance company established by a parent group to finance its own risks. Captives mix internal risk pooling between the business units of the parent group and risk transfer towards the reinsurance market. We analyse captives from an optimal insurance contract perspective. The paper characterises the vertical contractual chain that links firstly business units to insurance captives or to “fronters” through insurance contracts, secondly fronters to reinsurance captives through the cession of risks and thirdly insurance or reinsurance captives to reinsurers through cessions or retrocessions. In particular, the risk cession by fronters to a reinsurance captive trades off the benefits derived from recouped premiums and from the risk-sharing advantage of an “umbrella reinsurance policy”, against the risks that result from the captive liabilities.     

Commodity Bonds and Consumption Risks

This paper analyzes the economic role of commodity bonds by examining the nature of the demand for these securities. I show that while commodity bonds protect against relative price changes, they do so by introducing variability into the future real income stream. This variability limits the desirability of using commodity bonds to provide “price insurance” for future consumption. However, this variability may allow commodity bonds to hedge risks to consumption caused by stochastic changes in income. The analysis also suggests that it is this “income insurance” rather than “price insurance” that is important in hedging risks to future consumption.     

BEHIND THE CORPORATE HEDGE: INFORMATION AND THE LIMITS OF "SHAREHOLDER WEALTH MAXIMIZATION"

The article begins by setting out three alternative conceptions of the corporate objective function. Relying on this framework, it shows that legal analyses tend to neglect conflicts between the interests of the corporate entity and the interests of shareholders over the amount of corporate risk-taking. Financial analyses tend to ignore both constraints on managerial discretion imposed by law and a fundamental ambiguity the author identifies in the “shareholder wealth maximization” assumption that underlies such analyses. This ambiguity arises in part from market “frictions”–particularly, the investor uncertainty and heightened price volatility that stem from informational “asymmetry.” Such an information gap between management and outside investors (along with market “irrationality”) can cause material disparities between the actual trading price and the intrinsic value (or what the author calls the “blissful price”) of a company's shares. As a consequence, corporate hedging that maximizes actual share values may not maximize intrinsic values (and vice versa), thus giving rise to a managerial dilemma. Previous analyses have also failed to give adequate consideration to the expectations of shareholders. If, for example, the shareholders of a natural resource company are seeking a relatively “pure play” on that resource–in part because they believe the company's management has no comparative advantage in managing price risks–corporate hedging that increases shareholder wealth may re-duceshareholder welfare. In this sense, the usual “shareholder wealth maximization” directive is not only ambiguous, but also incomplete. These problems stem not only from informational asymmetry, but from other institutional realities (such as the “political” taint associated with reported derivative losses of any kind) that raise the information costs of using derivatives. The article concludes with some suggestions for improving disclosure of corporate risk management “philosophy.” Better disclosure may not only help reduce such information costs, but could also encourage corporations to find–and stick to–their derivatives niche.     

行驶里程数对车险净保费的影响研究 ——基于公路里程对交通事故损失的影响视角

目前国内几乎所有财险公司的数据库中还没有行驶里程数的统计数据。文章首次研究了行驶里程数对车险净保费的影响,即利用我国2000年～2009年31个省、市、自治区10年的面板数据单位根检验、协整检验等计量经济学方法来研究交通事故损失额与公路里程数之间长期稳定的均衡关系,得出事故损失额与公路里程数之间存在显著正相关关系。本研究的应用价值在于,该相关关系可以作为车险净保费与行驶里程数之间关系的有效参考,并提出了考虑车险净保费与行驶里程数之间关系的三种可行方案。这些研究为将行驶里程数这一影响因素纳入我国车险GLM定价提供了重要的理论支持和实践参考,也对解决我国交通、能源和环境问题具有一定的借鉴作用。     

The Determination of Fair Profits for the Property-Liability Insurance Firm

Single period and dynamic valuation models in continuous time, under certainty and uncertainty, are developed for a property-liability insurance contract to determine the “fair” (competitive) premium and underwriting profit. The intertemporal stochastic model assumes that the claim frequency and the price index of claim settlements are functions of a set of underlying state variables which follow a multivariate Wiener process. The competitive premium is shown to be proportional to the claim frequency and the price index for claim settlements at the time the policy is issued. The factor of proportionality varies directly with the claim settlement rate and the length of coverage, and inversely with the risk-adjusted real interest rate on the dollar-valued claim rate.     

The Role of Agents and Brokers in the Market for Health Insurance

Health insurance markets in the United States are characterized by imperfect information, complex products, and substantial search frictions. Insurance agents and brokers play a significant role in helping employers navigate these problems. However, little is known about the relations between the structure of the agent/broker market and access and affordability of insurance. This article aims to fill this gap by investigating the influence of agents/brokers on health insurance offering decisions of small firms, which are particularly vulnerable to problems of financing health insurance. Using a unique membership database from the National Association of Health Underwriters together with a nationally representative survey of employers, we find that small firms in more competitive agent/broker markets are more likely to offer health insurance and at lower premiums. Moreover, premiums are less dispersed in more competitive agent/broker markets.     

Fairly Priced Deposit Insurance and Bank Charter Policy

The thrust of current deposit insurance reform—risk-based insurance premiums and capital requirements—is an effort to price deposit insurance more fairly. Fairly pricing deposit insurance eliminates inequitable wealth transfers, but it does not lead to an efficient equilibrium. This paper shows that an alternative charter policy results in an efficient separating equilibrium.