Disclosing to Informed Traders

We develop a model in which a firm's manager can voluntarily disclose to privately informed investors. In equilibrium, the manager only discloses sufficiently favorable news. If the manager is known to be informed but disclosure is costly, the probability of disclosure increases with market liquidity and the stock trades at a discount relative to expected cash flows. However, when investors are uncertain about whether the manager is informed, disclosure can decrease with market liquidity and the stock can trade at a premium relative to expected cash flows. Moreover, contrary to common intuition, public information can crowd in more voluntary disclosure.     

Are active fund managers collectors of private information or fast interpreters of public information?

Recent studies of fund manager performance find evidence of outperformance. However limited research exists as to whether such outperformance is because of privately collected information, or merely expedient interpretation of publicly released information. In this study, we examine the trade sequences of active Australian equity fund managers around earnings announcements to provide insights into the source of fund managers’ superior information. We document an increased occurrence of buy‐sell trade sequences around good‐news earnings announcements. The evidence is consistent with fund managers having both private information about forthcoming good‐news earnings announcements and being ‘short‐term profiteers’. We find no evidence that fund managers have private information about forthcoming bad‐news earnings announcements. However, we do find an increase in the frequency of fund managers not trading before bad‐news earnings announcements only to subsequently sell during announcements.     

A Wealth-Based Explanation for Earnings Conservatism

This study extends research on earnings conservatism – the degree to which the accounting system recognizes bad news regarding future cash flows in a more timely manner than good news – by arguing that heterogeneous executives' risk attitudes will influence the degree of conservatism. Prior research has demonstrated that differences in earnings conservatism are mainly the result of differences in institutional factors (Basu (1997) and Ball et al. (2000a)). We hypothesize that more risk-averse managers, who demand a risk premium that offsets the effects of the variance in their compensation, will report more conservative earnings. Earnings conservatism will temper expectations among stakeholders about the future cash flows to be distributed thereby diminishing the likelihood of disappointing outcomes and potential litigation or threats for executives of being fired. The more risk-averse manager would be more inclined to reduce such conflicts, since they will have a destabilizing effect on his future compensation. The empirical results for a sample of Dutch companies over the period of 1983 to 1995 confirm our hypothesis: more risk-averse managers report earnings more conservatively than do less risk-averse managers.     

Can “Big Bath” and Earnings Smoothing Co‐exist as Equilibrium Financial Reporting Strategies?

We study a model of financial reporting where investors infer the precision of reported earnings. Reporting a larger earnings surprise reduces the inferred earnings precision, dampening the impact on firm value of reporting higher earnings, and providing a natural demand for smoother earnings. We show that for sufficiently "bad" news, the manager under-reports earnings by the maximum, preferring to take a "big bath" in the current period in order to report higher future earnings. If the news is "good," the manager smoothes earnings, with the amount of smoothing depending on the level of cashflows observed. He either over-reports or partially under-reports for slightly good news, and gradually increases his under-reporting as the news gets better, until he is under-reporting the maximum amount for sufficiently good news. This result holds both when investors are "naïve" and ignore management's ability to manipulate earnings, or "sophisticated" and correctly infer management's disclosure strategy.     

Agency,Firm Growth,and Managerial Turnover

We study managerial incentive provision under moral hazard when growth opportunities arrive stochastically and pursuing them requires a change in management. A trade‐off arises between the benefit of always having the “right” manager and the cost of incentive provision. The prospect of growth‐induced turnover limits the firm's ability to rely on deferred pay, resulting in more front‐loaded compensation. The optimal contract may insulate managers from the risk of growth‐induced dismissal after periods of good performance. The evidence for the United States broadly supports the model's predictions: Firms with better growth prospects experience higher CEO turnover and use more front‐loaded compensation.     

INDIVIDUAL,INSTITUTIONAL, AND SPECIALIST TRADE PATTERNS BEFORE AND AFTER DISCLOSURE

We examine the trade response of individuals, institutional traders, and specialists to disclosures. We investigate reactions to good versus bad news and mandatory versus discretionary announcements. We find that individuals and institutions both have heightened trade activity before disclosures. Institutional trade runs counter to the price reaction to upcoming discretionary disclosures. Institutions' post‐announcement trade is consistent with the direction of the price reaction to the announcement, whereas individuals' post‐announcement trade runs counter to the price reaction. Although specialists face increased trade pressure both before and after announcements, strong directional imbalances in specialist trade are not observed. JEL classification: G14     

Motivating managers to make investment decisions

Owners of capital frequently lack knowledge about investment opportunities. One alternative is to turn to a manager for assistance. The owner's problem of contracting for the services of a manager is treated as a problem in buying information. The surprising result is that it is sometimes possible to trade information even when the owner is unable to form his own assessment of the information's value. Under some conditions it is possible to write a managerial compensation contract which will induce the manager to act in the best interests of the owner. These conditions require owner knowledge of the manager's employment and investment alternatives and risk preferences as well as some, but not all, of the characteristics of the investment opportunities.     

Information Production, Insider Trading, and the Role of Managerial Compensation

We analyze the information production decision of a manager who can trade on this information and whose compensation is increasing in the stock price. The amount of information produced increases with the stock's volatility and liquidity and decreases with the manager's pay-performance sensitivity. Insider trading regulations that symmetrically inhibit the manager's ability to buy and sell stock cause her to produce less information. But asymmetric insider trading regulations like the short sales prohibition have an ambiguous effect inducing her to produce more or less information depending on her pay-performance sensitivity. This contradicts the standard argument made by opponents of insider trading regulations that such regulations always reduce information production.     

To believe or not to believe

This paper explains how the actions of skeptical traders can make manipulable earnings reports informative. Our model consists of a price-maximizing manager who chooses a cheap talk report, a profit-maximizing trader who may then seek costly information, and competitive market makers. Since the manager can influence the trader's information acquisition decision, the manager may choose to reveal even bad news to decrease the impact of order flows on prices. The paper provides foundations for treating positive and negative earnings surprises as good news and bad news respectively, even when external auditing cannot constrain opportunistic managers. Testable implications are derived.     

The economics of earnings manipulation and managerial compensation

This article examines managerial compensation in an environment where managers may take a hidden action that affects the actual earnings of the firm. When realized, these earnings constitute hidden information that is privately observed by the manager, who may expend resources to generate an inflated earnings report. We characterize the optimal managerial compensation contract in this setting, and demonstrate that contracts contingent on reported earnings cannot provide managers with the incentive both to maximize profits and to report those profits honestly. As a result, some degree of earnings management must be tolerated as a necessary part of an efficient agreement.     

THE EFFECT OF U.S. TRADE DEFICIT ANNOUNCEMENTS ON THE STOCK PRICES OF U.S. AND JAPANESE AUTOMAKERS

The existing literature on the trade news effect on asset prices generally looks at exchange rates and stock market indexes. We focus on individual stocks: the U.S. and Japanese “Big Three” automobile stocks. We examine Japanese automobile American Depositary Receipts (ADRs), not the stocks per se, to avoid the time lag problem. First, we find deficit news shocks, especially the positive shocks, have a negative effect on the Japanese automobile ADRs. Second, we find only weak evidence that the news effect is different under different economic conditions. Third, trade news is found to be a competitive shock to the automakers in the sense of Karolyi and Stulz (1996) . Last, statistically generated U.S.–Japan bilateral trade deficit news and bilateral auto trade deficit news have no effect on the automobile stock in general.     

Optimal Contracts with Performance Manipulation

We study optimal compensation contracts that (1) are designed to address a joint moral hazard and adverse selection problem and that (2) are based on performance measures, which may be manipulated by the agent at a cost. In the model, a manager is privately informed about his productivity prior to being hired by a firm. In order to incentivize the manager to exert productive effort, the firm designs a compensation contract that is based on reported earnings, which can be manipulated by the manager. Our model predicts that (1) the optimal compensation contract is convex in reported earnings; (2) the optimal contract is less sensitive to reported earnings than it would be absent the manager's ability to manipulate earnings; and (3) higher costs of manipulating reported earnings (e.g., due to higher governance quality) are associated with higher firm value, lower expected level of earnings management, and higher output.     

Risk aversion,prudence, and compensation

In a standard principal-agent setting, we use a comparative approach to study the incentives provided by different types of compensation contracts, and their valuation by managers with utility function u who are risk averse (u″<0) and prudent (u″′>0). We show that concave contracts tend to provide more incentives to risk averse managers, while convex contracts tend to be more valued by prudent managers. This is because concave contracts concentrate incentives where the marginal utility of risk averse managers is highest, while convex contracts protect against downside risk. Thus, managerial prudence can contribute to explain the prevalence of stock-options in executive compensation. However, convex contracts are not optimal when the principal is sufficiently prudent relative to the manager.     

Impact of macro-economic surprises on carry trade activity

Can official news and policy announcements affect foreign exchange speculation? A widespread speculative strategy in foreign exchange markets is carry trade. This paper explores the links between macro-economic news and foreign exchange options to identify macro-economic fundamentals most relevant to the pricing of downside risk – measured by risk reversals options contracts – to carry trade activity. Focusing primarily on the Japanese yen carry trade, we identify a significant impact of macro-economic surprises on dollar/yen risk reversals. The effect is sizeable, with news related to bilateral trade balance of particular concern. Moreover, there is a close link between risk reversals and speculative futures positions in Japanese yen. This allows us to quantify a substantial effect of macro-economic news on carry trade activity, with the cost of hedging as the transmission mechanism.     

Equilibrium earnings management and managerial compensation in a multiperiod agency setting

To investigate how the possibility of earnings manipulation affects managerial compensation contracts, we study a two-period agency setting in which a firm’s manager can engage in window-dressing activities to manipulate reported accounting earnings. Earnings manipulation boosts the reported earnings in one period at the expense of the reported earnings in the other period. We find that the optimal pay-performance sensitivity may increase and expected managerial compensation may decrease as the manager’s cost of earnings management decreases. When the manager is privately informed about the payoff of an investment project to the firm, we identify plausible conditions under which prohibiting earnings management can result in a less efficient investment decision for the firm and more rents for the manager.     

Information disclosure and liquidity crisis

We analyze a model in which a firm’s manager privately learns about the expected return on the firm’s project and strategically discloses it to investors (i.e., discretionary disclosure). Based on the manager’s disclosure, investors decide whether to withdraw their investments from the firm. Our analysis indicates that investors’ optimistic prior beliefs in the firm reduce the possibility of their withdrawals and the manager’s incentive of discretionary disclosure, whereas pessimistic beliefs increase them. We further examine the effects of a commitment to reporting of bad news, namely, the conservative disclosure rule. This rule always suppresses the manager’s incentive of discretionary disclosure; however, it increases (reduces) investors’ withdrawals when they are optimistic (pessimistic) about the firm’s project.     

Financial guarantors’ executive compensation,charter value and risk-taking

Financial guarantees have been extensively used recently as part of rescue packages to bail out troubled institutions and governments around the world. We propose a new incentive compensation model for studying agency conflict between the shareholders and the manager of a typical financial guarantor. In our model, the manager chooses the guarantor's risk level, with disutility to reduce risk (i.e., reducing the risk of the guarantor incurs a direct cost to the manager). Moral hazard causes the manager to select a level of risk that is higher than the level chosen in an otherwise first-best environment with no conflict of interest between the shareholders and the manager. However, in our proposed framework, charter value plays a self-disciplining role on the manager's appetite for risk, therefore it helps mitigate the extent of the deviation from first best with agency conflict found previously (e.g., 0055, 0015 and 0020). This suggests that researchers should study charter value, managerial compensation and risk decisions within a unified framework and not separately, as all studies have done in the past.     

Housing market dynamics in a small open economy: Do external and news shocks matter?

We study the sources of fluctuations in the housing market of a small open economy. We use an estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model and data from seven small open economies to assess the quantitative effects of both contemporaneous and news shocks to domestic and external fundamentals on housing market dynamics. External shocks and news shocks have significant effects. Cyclical fluctuations in housing prices and housing investment are mainly driven by contemporaneous shocks related to foreign housing preferences and terms of trade, and by news shocks related to domestic consumption-goods technology, housing preferences and terms of trade. The spillover effects of external shocks on housing prices are notably larger than those of domestic shocks.     

Financial guarantors’ executive compensation,charter value and risk-taking

Financial guarantees have been extensively used recently as part of rescue packages to bail out troubled institutions and governments around the world. We propose a new incentive compensation model for studying agency conflict between the shareholders and the manager of a typical financial guarantor. In our model, the manager chooses the guarantor's risk level, with disutility to reduce risk (i.e., reducing the risk of the guarantor incurs a direct cost to the manager). Moral hazard causes the manager to select a level of risk that is higher than the level chosen in an otherwise first-best environment with no conflict of interest between the shareholders and the manager. However, in our proposed framework, charter value plays a self-disciplining role on the manager's appetite for risk, therefore it helps mitigate the extent of the deviation from first best with agency conflict found previously (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Cadenillas et al., 2004, Cadenillas et al., 2007). This suggests that researchers should study charter value, managerial compensation and risk decisions within a unified framework and not separately, as all studies have done in the past.     

Production and hedging implications of executive compensation schemes

This paper connects executive compensation with hedging and analyzes a crucial shareholders and managers agency source that evolves from the pricing of the hedging device. The shareholders are risk-neutral, while the risk-averse manager hedges the price risk of the manufactured quantity, and his compensation package includes equity-linked compensation-stock grants. Only when the hedging instrument's pricing includes a risk premium, hedging is costly to the shareholders, while it is costless to the manager. Then from the owners' point of view, we observe managerial over-hedging, increasing in the equity-linked compensation level. This result leads to a violation of the classical production and hedging separation theorem. We conclude that, in the case where the hedging device's pricing bears a risk premium, shareholders can regulate the corporate value diversion to managers through diminishing the managerial equity-linked compensation scheme or by putting restrictions on the extent of hedging activities of executives.