IPO auctions and private information

IPO auctions, which provide an impartial way of determining IPO pricing and share allocations, offer a natural setting for examining whether institutional investors possess private information, and for measuring how valuable their information is. Analyzing detailed bidding data from Taiwan’s discriminatory (pay-as-bid) auctions, we find that, relative to retail investors, institutional investors tend to bid higher in auctions when IPO shares are more valuable, and that underpricing is larger in auctions with relatively higher institutional bids. These results imply that institutional investors are better informed about IPO value, and that they obtain higher information rents when they bid higher relative to retail investors. We estimate the value of institutional investors’ private information to be worth about 8.68% of return, which is the extra rate of return they command on their informational advantages over retail investors.     

Dealer behavior in the specials market for US Treasury securities

We assess dealer behavior in the specials market for US Treasury securities by comparing dealer participation in the Federal Reserve's securities loan auctions with prices in the private market. Dealer behavior is generally consistent with the law of one price and apparent violations can largely be explained by institutional differences between the private market and the Fed's program. However, for auctions that are effectively noncompetitive, dealers regularly pass up true arbitrage opportunities and frequently overpay to borrow securities. Dealers apparently do not realize that certain auctions are noncompetitive, even though the information needed to discern this fact is publicly available in advance.     

Word-of-mouth communication,noise-driven volatility,and public disclosure

This paper examines how a firm adjusts its disclosure quality in response to technological innovations that improve investors' private information. We show that more precise private information can endogenously amplify supply shocks and, hence, increase noise-driven (or non-fundamental) price volatility. We study how the firm reacts to such changes and derive a necessary and sufficient condition under which the firm improves its disclosure quality when investors are informed with better private signals. We then apply our model to study investors' private word-of-mouth communication. Our analysis highlights a “dark side” of word-of-mouth communication and a call for better public disclosure even if private communication is assumed to be unbiased and truthful. We provide empirical predictions regarding how price volatility, market depth, and firms’ disclosure qualities would change as technological innovations, such as social media, facilitate information sharing among investors.     

Home bias in portfolio choices: social learning among partially informed agents

Using an ‘incomplete information’ model, we explore the role of social learning in the global portfolio choices of stock market investors. When partially informed followers attempt to estimate true domestic (home) mean returns, they likely acquire private domestic signals from partially informed leaders. However, the calibration results indicate the existence of home bias when partially informed agents have poor quality information. Partially informed agents are prone to a learning bias; they overreact to new domestic information due to overconfidence in their domestic private signals, but they demonstrate a conservative response to new information in foreign markets. Links between the private signals of partially informed agents may lead to correlated foreign investment strategies among such agents through social learning. We suggest the acquisition of private signals, along with the dissemination of information, affect international portfolio decision rules and are determinants of the phenomenon of home bias.     

Private information flow and price discovery in the U.S. treasury market

Using intraday data, we identify the intensity of private information flow in the U.S. Treasury market. Our results show that the intensity of private information flow is highly correlated with public information shocks and higher for longer maturity bonds. More importantly, we find that bond price changes associated with high intensity of private information flow tend to be persistent, whereas those associated with low intensity of private information flow are more likely reversed. While public information and private information are the main determinants of bond price variations on days with news announcements, private information and liquidity shocks are important determinants of bond price variations on days with no significant events. Finally, we show that the depth of limit order book is inversely related to the intensity of private information flow. Nevertheless, informed dealers do not seem to use hidden orders to disguise their trading intentions.     

Optimal informed trading in the foreign exchange market

We formulate a market microstructure model of exchange determination that we employ to investigate the impact of informed trading on exchange rates and on foreign exchange (FX) market conditions. With our formulation, we show how strategic informed agents influence exchange rates via both the portfolio-balance and information effects. We outline the connection which exists between the private value of information, market efficiency, liquidity and exchange rate volatility. Our model is also consistent with recent empirical research on the micro-structure of FX markets.     

Competition among Trading Venues: Information and Trading on Electronic Communications Networks

This paper explores the competition between two trading venues, Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs) and Nasdaq market makers. ECNs offer the advantages of anonymity and speed of execution, which attract informed traders. Thus, trades are more likely to occur on ECNs when information asymmetry is greater and when trading volume and stock‐return volatility are high. ECN trades have greater permanent price impacts and more private information is revealed through ECN trades than though market‐maker trades. However, ECN trades have higher ex ante trading costs because market makers can preference or internalize the less informed trades and offer them better executions.     

并购重组前的知情交易行为研究

并购重组中基于内幕信息的知情交易行为既是监管重点,也是学术界关注的热点问题。本文以2006—2020年我国上市公司并购重组事件为样本,考察并购重组前的知情交易行为对并购公告收益的影响。研究发现：并购重组前的知情交易行为引发了主并公司股价的提前反应,从而降低了并购公告时的市场反应,这一现象是由内幕信息泄露引起,且内幕信息主要来源于包括员工在内的公司内部人,而非机构投资者。进一步分析表明,改善信息环境可以有效缓解并购重组的信息泄露问题,体现为知情购买交易的信息泄露效应受到分析师跟踪、审计质量和问询函制度的有效制约。本文研究深化了现有的并购重组内幕交易行为研究,为实施精准监管和防范内幕交易等政策提供了一定参考和依据。     

The effect of sequential information releases on trading volume and price behaviour

This paper examines a two-period setting in which each trader receives a private signal, possibly different, in each period before he trades. The principal objectives are threefold. First, we describe the risky asset demands and price reactions in a noisy rational expectations equilibrium where the time 1 average private signal is not revealed by the price sequence but the time 2 average private signal is. Secondly, we analyse how informed trading volume is affected by the revealed information and supply shocks when pure noise trading volume is uncorrected with observable market variables. Our result indicates that no trade occurs for informed traders when net supply remains fixed across rounds of trade. And, when supply shocks are random, trading volume is induced by the informed and the noise traders, but noise trading is not predictable. Finally, we investigate these properties in the case when pure noise trading volume is correlated with observable market variables. It is shown that no informed trading takes place when there is no supply shock. However, when net supply contains random shocks, trading volume consists of noise and informed trading, both of which can be estimated.     

Informed Futures Trading and Price Discovery: Evidence from Taiwan Futures and Stock Markets

This article focuses on the information effects between the futures market and its spot market. Intraday data are used to investigate the lead-lag relationships between the returns and trading activity of Taiwan stock index futures and the spot returns. We focus on the transmission direction and the sources of information. Consistent with most previous studies, our results show that other than the contemporaneous relationship predicted by carry-cost theory and efficient market theory, futures returns significantly lead spot returns, which implies that informed trades may occur in the futures market. Using private transaction information, net open buy, as a proxy for futures trading activity and distinguishing different types of futures traders, we find that foreign institutional traders are the major source of informed trades because their trading has predictive power for future movements in both spot and futures prices. Traders in other categories are information laggards.     

The strategic specialist and imperfect competition in a limit order market

The empirical literature suggests that the limit order book contains information that might be used by the specialist to his own advantage. I develop a model where there is a strategic specialist who competes against a limit order book and has information about supply. The presence of a strategic specialist in an imperfectly competitive limit order book market induces non-monotonicity of market indicators with respect to the variance of liquidation value. Moreover, the existence of private information about supply significantly affects market performance as it induces, among other effects, lower market liquidity. Finally, this model suggests another link between Kyle’s (1985, 1989) [Kyle, A., 1985. Continuous auctions and insider trading. Econometrica 53, 1315–1336, Kyle, A., 1989. Informed speculators with imperfect competition. Review of Economic Studies 56, 317–356] and Glosten and Milgrom’s (1985) [Glosten, L., Milgrom, P., 1985. Bid, ask and transaction prices in a specialist market with heterogeneously informed markets. Journal of Financial Economics 14, 71–100] models by allowing for strategic behaviour of the specialist.     

Information and the Cost of Capital

We investigate the role of information in affecting a firm's cost of capital. We show that differences in the composition of information between public and private information affect the cost of capital, with investors demanding a higher return to hold stocks with greater private information. This higher return arises because informed investors are better able to shift their portfolio to incorporate new information, and uninformed investors are thus disadvantaged. In equilibrium, the quantity and quality of information affect asset prices. We show firms can influence their cost of capital by choosing features like accounting treatments, analyst coverage, and market microstructure.     

Cross-market informed trading in the CDS and option markets

This paper analyzes how informed traders balance leverage and liquidity in making cross-market trading decisions. Our findings are three-fold. Using daily data on the actively traded North American CDX Investment Grade and High Yield indexes from 2010 to 2017, first, we find robust evidence that, when the credit default swap (CDS) market is illiquid, informed traders do not hesitate to exploit their information advantage in the option market, and this manifests mainly for negative credit news. Second, we find that informed trading occurs predominantly in the option market for low-rated firms due to high adverse selection risk in the CDS market. Third, there is strong evidence of informed trading taking place in the CDS market for financial firms and we argue that this is due to the interdealer network through which CDS dealers obtain private information about other financial firms and their privileged position as market makers to be able to disguise their informed trades as ordinary market-making activities. Finally, we propose re-thinking market efficiency and how to advance it in a direction which does not privilege a small circle of financiers or create monopoly while keeping the markets liquid and tranquil at all times.     

Partial Revelation of Information in Experimental Asset Markets

We develop a model of market efficiency assuming private information is partially revealed to uninformed traders via the behavior of those who are informed. This partial revelation of information (PRE) model is tested in fourteen computerized double auction laboratory markets. It explains the market value and allocation of purchased information, and asset allocations, better than either a fully revealing information model (FRE strong-form efficiency) or a nonrevealing expectations model; but it takes second place to FRE in explaining asset prices. We conjecture that refined versions of PRE may provide insight into “technical analysis” and minibubbles in securities markets.     

Marketwide Private Information in Stocks: Forecasting Currency Returns

We present a model of equity trading with informed and uninformed investors where informed investors trade on firm‐specific and marketwide private information. The model is used to identify the component of order flow due to marketwide private information. Estimated trades driven by marketwide private information display little or no correlation with the first principal component in order flow. Indeed, we find that co‐movement in order flow captures variation mostly in liquidity trades. Marketwide private information obtained from equity market data forecasts industry stock returns, and also currency returns.     

Optimal Disclosure Policy in Oligopoly Markets

This paper examines the private and social optimality of full disclosure of private information in a two-period oligopoly model. An incumbent firm is privately informed about the market demand and its production cost after operating as a monopolist in the first period, and then competes against an entrant in the second period. Two main results are derived. First, it is shown that the incumbent is best off by pre-committing to disclose both the demand and cost information. By disclosing full information, the incumbent nullifies its self-defeating intertemporal incentives, which arise whenever it has private information about the market demand, its cost efficiency, or both. In addition, the equilibrium output variance is the largest under full disclosure, which benefits the incumbent ex ante. Second, the paper shows that the incumbent's full disclosure of the demand and cost information may or may not be desirable from a social efficiency standpoint. In particular, the correlation between the firms' production costs is crucial to the rank of disclosure policies in terms of their impact on social efficiency.     

Differential informational and dynamic behavior of stock trading volume

This article develops a multiperiod rational expectations modelof stock trading in which investors have differential informationconcerning the underlying value of the stock. Investors tradecompetitively in the stock market based on their private informationand the information revealed by the market-clearing prices,as well as other public news. We examine how trading volumeis related to the information flow in the market and how investors'strading reveals their private information.     

Hidden Liquidity: Some New Light on Dark Trading

Using a laboratory market, we investigate how the ability to hide orders affects traders’ strategies and market outcomes in a limit order book environment. We find that order strategies are greatly affected by allowing hidden liquidity, with traders substituting nondisplayed for displayed shares and changing the aggressiveness of their trading. As traders adapt their behavior to the different opacity regimes, however, most aggregate market outcomes (such as liquidity and informational efficiency) are not affected as much. We also find that opacity appears to increase the profits of informed traders but only when their private information is very valuable.     

Market structure and microstructure, in international interest rate futures markets

We examine the role of market structure in identifying microstructure features of the NYSE.Euronext-LIFFE STIR futures market by comparing the ability of two bid-ask spread component models to explain bid-ask spreads. These two models differ only in their assumptions about whether or not market makers are present. The period we analyze includes data from pit-based trading alongside electronic market data. We explore how market structure affects the way private information influences bid-ask spreads and return volatility. A second part of our study employs intraday correlation to investigate these links in greater depth, while a third part looks at how private information and trading noise contribute to price evolution.     

The role of private information in return volatility,bid–ask spreads and price levels in the foreign exchange market

Trading volume and order flow have both been closely associated with informed trader activity in the market microstructure literature. Using theory that explains regular intraday patterns in trading data, we transform these two variables into proxies for private information and examine their relationships with bid–ask spreads and return volatility. We use a unique and unusually rich high-frequency intraday dataset from the world's largest financial market, namely, the electronic inter-dealer spot foreign exchange market. Our analysis takes account of institutional features peculiar to this order-driven market. Our empirical results strongly affirm our theoretical understanding of how these markets work. They also reveal how the structure of the inter-dealer spot FX market affects exchange rate volatility. Finally, we also explore how private information contributes to the evolution of prices.