Transactions Costs and Holding Periods for Common Stocks

Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and Constantinides (1986) provide a theoretical basis for the proposition that assets with higher transactions costs are held by investors for longer holding periods, and vice versa. We examine average holding periods and bid-ask spreads for Nasdaq stocks from 1983 through 1991 and for New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) stocks from 1975 through 1989 and find strong evidence that, as predicted, the length of investors' holding periods is related to bid-ask spreads. We also find that the relation between holding periods and bid-ask spreads is much stronger on Nasdaq, where spreads are larger, than on the NYSE, where spreads are smaller.     

Market-Making in the Third Market for NYSE-Listed Securities

This paper empirically examines market making in the third market for common stocks that are listed on the NYSE. Although the same non-NYSE members make a market on both types of stocks, bid-ask spreads are wider on Rule 19c-3 stocks than on Rule 390 stocks. Market-making by NYSE members is minimal and spreads posted by NYSE members are wider than those posted on identical stocks by non-NYSE members. This suggests that NYSE members do not compete on the basis of spread but use methods such as price matching and the internalization of orders to attract order flow to the third market.     

Liquidity of the CBOE Equity Options

We examine the CBOE option market depth and bid-ask spreads. Absence of price effects surrounding large option trades suggests excellent market depth. However, bid-ask spreads for the CBOE options and the NYSE stocks are nearly equal, even though an average option is equivalent to less than half a stock plus borrowing. We explain this tradeoff between market depth and bid-ask spreads on the CBOE and the NYSE by differences in market mechanisms. We also show that the adverse-selection component of the option spread, which measures the extent of information-related trading on the CBOE, is very small.     

Tick size,market structure,and market quality

Large tick sizes imposed on high-priced stocks on the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) are significant binding constraints on bid-ask spreads. Nearly 60% of quoted spreads are equal to the tick size for stocks with the largest tick size and more than 87% of quoted spreads are equal to the tick size for stocks in the largest size portfolio. We also show that the average spread of KSE stocks with large tick sizes is greater than that of matched NYSE stocks, whereas the average spread of KSE stocks with the smallest tick size is smaller than the corresponding figure for the matched NYSE stocks. We interpret these results as evidence that traders on the KSE are paying large trading costs because of the artificially imposed large tick sizes.     

Liquidity in auction and specialist market structures: Evidence from the Italian bourse

Several studies find that bid-ask spreads for stocks listed on the NYSE are lower than for stocks listed on NASDAQ. While this suggests that specialist market structures provide greater liquidity than competing dealer markets, the nature of trading on the NYSE, which comprises a specialist competing with limit order flow, obfuscates the comparison. In 2001, a structural change was implemented on the Italian Bourse. Many stocks that traded in an auction market switched to a specialist market, where the specialist controls order flow. Results confirm that liquidity is significantly improved when stocks commence trading in the specialist market. Analysis of the components of the bid-ask spread reveal that the adverse selection component of the spread is significantly reduced. This evidence suggests that specialist market structures provide greater liquidity to market participants.     

Volatility increases Subsequent to NYSE and AMEX Stock Splits

The post-split increase in daily returns volatility is less for AMEX stocks than for NYSE stocks. The exchange trading location is a significant factor in explaining the volatility shift even after stock price and firm size are considered. Furthermore, when measured on a weekly basis, there is no increase in AMEX stocks' returns volatility. These results suggest that measurement errors created by bid-ask spreads and the 1/8 effect, and also one or more of the elements that make the NYSE different from the AMEX, explain why the estimated volatility of daily stock returns increases after the ex split date.     

Information,trading and stock returns: Lessons from dually-listed securities

This paper compares the intra-day patterns on the NYSE and AMEX of volatility, trading volume and bid-ask spreads for European and Japanese dually-listed stocks with American stocks of comparable average trading volume and volatility. It is shown that the intra-day patterns for these stocks are remarkably similar even though public information flows differ markedly across these stocks during the trading day. In the early morning, all stocks have higher volatility than later in the day, but this phenomenon is most pronounced for Japanese stocks and affects American stocks the least. We argue that these patterns are consistent with markets reacting to the overnight accumulation of public information but are inconsistent with the view that early morning volatility can be attributed to monopolistic specialist behavior.     

Intraday Variation in the Bid-Ask Spread: Evidence after the Market Reform

In this article we show that intraday variation in spreads for Nasdaq‐listed stocks has converged to intraday variation in spreads for NYSE‐listed stocks after the implementation of the new order‐handling rules. We attribute this convergence to the Limit Order Display Rule, which requires that limit orders be displayed in Nasdaq best bid and offer when they are better than quotes posted by market makers. Our findings suggest that the different patterns of intraday spreads between NYSE and Nasdaq stocks reported in prior studies can largely be attributed to the different treatment of limit orders between the NYSE and Nasdaq before the market reform.     

TRADING COSTS AND QUOTE CLUSTERING ON THE NYSE AND NASDAQ AFTER DECIMALIZATION

We examine execution costs and quote clustering on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and NASDAQ using 517 matching pairs of stocks after decimalization. We find that the mean spread of NASDAQ stocks is greater than the mean spread of NYSE stocks when spreads are equally weighted across stocks, and the difference is greater for smaller stocks. In contrast, the mean NASDAQ spread is narrower than the mean NYSE spread when spreads are volume weighted, and the difference is statistically significant for large stocks. Both NYSE and NASDAQ stocks exhibit high degrees of quote clustering on nickels and dimes, and quote clustering has a significant effect on spreads in both markets.     

The flash crash: An examination of shareholder wealth and market quality

We investigate stock returns, market quality, and options market activity around the flash crash of May 6, 2010. Abnormal returns are negative on the day of and the day after the flash crash for stocks that had trades that executed during the crash subsequently cancelled by either Nasdaq or NYSE Arca. Consistent with studies that suggest that other sources of liquidity withdrew from the markets during the flash crash, we find that the fraction of trades executed by the NYSE increases during this volatile period. Market quality deteriorates following the flash crash as bid-ask spreads increase and quote depths decrease. Evidence from the options markets indicates that investor uncertainty increased around the time of the crash and remained elevated for several days.     

The Impact of the Reduction in Tick Increments in Major U.S. Markets on Spreads,Depth, and Volatility

This study presents an analysis of the impact of the introduction of quotes in sixteenths of a dollar on the AMEX, Nasdaq, and NYSE in mid-1997 on select market characteristics such as spreads, effective spreads, quoted depth, and volume. The findings of the study document reductions in the bid-ask spread, effective spread, and a statistically significant increase in the number of quotes. Interestingly, we find that liquidity, as measured by the total depth at the bid and ask, declines significantly on the AMEX and NYSE, but increases on the Nasdaq. Trading volume increases on the NYSE, but remains unchanged for the AMEX and Nasdaq. We also find that the proportion of even-increment quotes is a relevant factor affecting percentage spreads for Nasdaq both before and after and for the NYSE only after the change in quoting increments.     

WINNERS AND LOSERS ON NYSE: A RE-EXAMINATION USING DAILY CLOSING BID-ASK SPREADS

We study a sample of NYSE stocks that experienced a large one-day price change during 1992 and were reported as daily largest percentage gainers and largest percentage losers in the Wall Street Journal. The sample indicates significant reversals during the immediate post-announcement period. We test for market efficiency by using bid-ask spreads obtained from the transactions data for the days immediately after the announcement. The overall results indicate that the returns during the reversal period are less than the average bid-ask spread during the same time. We also find that major losers, firms with ?20 percent to ?50 percent event-date abnormal returns, experience price reversals generating returns that are significantly greater than the average bid-ask spread during that period. We interpret this result as consistent with the overreaction hypothesis. A test of a trading rule to exploit this overreaction is not profitable, providing support for weak-form market efficiency.     

Forecasting liquidity-adjusted intraday Value-at-Risk with vine copulas

We propose to model the joint distribution of bid-ask spreads and log returns of a stock portfolio by using Autoregressive Conditional Double Poisson and GARCH processes for the marginals and vine copulas for the dependence structure. By estimating the joint multivariate distribution of both returns and bid-ask spreads from intraday data, we incorporate the measurement of commonalities in liquidity and comovements of stocks and bid-ask spreads into the forecasting of three types of liquidity-adjusted intraday Value-at-Risk (L-IVaR). In a preliminary analysis, we document strong extreme comovements in liquidity and strong tail dependence between bid-ask spreads and log returns across the firms in our sample thus motivating our use of a vine copula model. Furthermore, the backtesting results for the L-IVaR of a portfolio consisting of five stocks listed on the NASDAQ show that the proposed models perform well in forecasting liquidity-adjusted intraday portfolio profits and losses.     

Market structure and microstructure, in international interest rate futures markets

We examine the role of market structure in identifying microstructure features of the NYSE.Euronext-LIFFE STIR futures market by comparing the ability of two bid-ask spread component models to explain bid-ask spreads. These two models differ only in their assumptions about whether or not market makers are present. The period we analyze includes data from pit-based trading alongside electronic market data. We explore how market structure affects the way private information influences bid-ask spreads and return volatility. A second part of our study employs intraday correlation to investigate these links in greater depth, while a third part looks at how private information and trading noise contribute to price evolution.     

Automating german equity trading: Bid-ask spreads on competing systems

As a result of automating trading in the most active German stocks, data on bid-ask spreads on three competing system—IBIS, MATIS, and SEAQ International—have become available. The intraday pattern of spreads suggests a mid-session effect and a home-market effect. Contrary to what one might expect, the spreads for identical stocks differ substantially from system to system. Paradoxically, the system with the lowest spreads, MATIS, did not attract most of the volume. Actually, its market share declined. In an attempt to explain the MATIS paradox we hypothesize that bid-ask spreads compensate the market maker for a bundle of several transaction services of which providing immediacy is merely one. This complicates both national and international spread comparisons and has implications for the decomposition of observed bid-ask spreads.     

Bid-Ask Spreads,Information Asymmetry,and Abnormal Investor Sentiment: Evidence from Closed-End Funds

Using a sample of closed-end equity funds listed on the NYSE from 1994 to 1999, we investigate differences in spreads and adverse selection costs between the closed-end funds and a matched sample of common stocks. We find that spreads and adverse selection costs for the closed-end funds are significantly lower than those of control stocks. The results are consistent for the subperiods both before and after the minimum tick size change on NYSE on June 24, 1997. The differences of spreads and adverse selection costs cannot be attributed to the differences in the characteristics of the closed-end funds and the matched sample of common stocks. Lastly, we find that abnormal investor sentiment and adverse selection costs of closed-end funds are positively correlated over time.     

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OTC BID-ASK SPREADS AND DEALER SIZE: THE IMPACT OF ORDER-PROCESSING AND DIVERSIFICATION COSTS

The effects of large transactions on OTC security dealers' bid-ask spreads are analyzed for stocks with different price levels. Because overhead expenses vary little with the value of transactions, economies of scale exist for dealers in higher-priced stocks. Thus, percentage bid-ask spreads decline with the price level of the stock. However, larger transactions entail larger order-clearing and inventory-adjustment costs. These costs may be particularly burdensome for smaller dealers with limited purchasing powers and abilities to diversify inexpensively. Consequently, smaller dealers charge higher spreads for trading high-priced stocks.     

Removing biases in computed returns

This paper presents a straightforward method for asymptotically removing the well-known upward bias in observed returns of equally-weighted portfolios. Our method removes all of the bias due to any random transient errors such as bid-ask bounce and allows for the estimation of short horizon returns. We apply our method to the CRSP equally-weighted monthly return indexes for the NYSE, Amex, and NASDAQ and show that the bias is cumulative. In particular, a NASDAQ index (with a base of 100 in 1973) grows to the level of 17,975 by 2006, but nearly half of the increase is due to cumulative bias. We also conduct a simulation in which we simulate true prices and set spreads according to a discrete pricing grid. True prices are then not necessarily at the midpoint of the spread. In the simulation we compare our method to calculating returns based on observed closing quote midpoints and find that the returns from our method are statistically indistinguishable from the (simulated) true returns. While the mid-quote method results in an improvement over using closing transaction prices, it still results in a statistically significant amount of upward bias. We demonstrate that applying our methodology results in a reversal of the relative performance of NASDAQ stocks versus NYSE stocks over a 25 year window.     

Market structure and bid-ask spreads: IBIS vs Nasdaq

A comparison is made between the bid-ask spreads of 30 high volume German stocks traded on IBIS and 30 high volume US stocks traded on Nasdaq. IBIS and Nasdaq are best described as agency and dealer auction markets, respectively. On average, the market spread for these IBIS and Nasdaq stocks is the same, but for the 10 most active stocks in each market, IBIS spreads are considerably lower. For these latter stocks, IBIS spreads change in a predictable manner throughout the day. Nasdaq spreads do not. The critical factor appears to be the unrestricted access of suppliers of immediacy that is distinctive for agency auction markets.     

Trading Mechanisms and the Components of the Bid-Ask Spread

We compare the relative magnitudes of the components of the bid-ask spread for New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)/American Stock Exchange (AMEX) stocks to those of National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ)/National Market System (NMS) stocks. We find that the order-processing cost component is smaller, and the adverse selection component is greater on the NYSE/AMEX trading systems than on the NASDAQ/NMS system. The inventory holding component is also greater for exchange-traded stocks than for NASDAQ/NMS stocks, but this may be attributable to differences in the characteristics of the firms whose stocks trade on the respective systems.