GROWTH,BETA AND AGENCY COSTS AS DETERMINANTS OF DIVIDEND PAYOUT RATIOS

A model of optimal dividend payout is presented in which increased dividends lower agency costs but raise the transactions cost of external financing. The optimal dividend payout minimizes the sum of these two costs. A cross-sectional test of the model relates dividend payout to the fraction of equity held by insiders, the past and expected future revenue growth of the firm, the firm's beta coefficient, and the number of common stockholders. The coefficients of all variables are significant in the predicted directions. The results indicate that investment policy influences dividend policy.     

A TEST OF THE EASTERBROOK HYPOTHESIS REGARDING DIVIDEND PAYMENTS AND AGENCY COSTS

Easterbrook (1984) argues that dividend payments may be an ambiguous signal unless the market can distinguish growing firms from disinvesting firms. Shares of growing firms that announce both financing and dividend increases are predicted to rise more in value than shares of firms announcing a dividend increase alone. We examine the relation between prior financing activity and the market response to initial dividends and find evidence consistent with the Easterbrook agency cost model.     

FURTHER EVIDENCE ON DIVIDEND YIELDS AND THE EX-DIVIDEND DAY STOCK PRICE EFFECT

Ex-dividend day stock price behavior supports a tax clientele effect. This effect is still found after the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Results reflect an effective tax advantage for capital gains taxes payable at realization, versus dividend taxes due quarterly. Evidence also supports short-term trader participation in the ex-day phenomenon when the difference between dividend income and the ex-dividend-day price decrease exceeds transactions costs to trade. Results contradict prior research where a tax clientele effect is not found, but align with this prior research when including a small number of contaminated observations.     

FURTHER EVIDENCE ON THE LIQUIDITY EFFECTS OF STOCK SPLITS AND STOCK DIVIDENDS

Currently, there is a limited amount of empirical evidence suggesting that stock splits are associated with a decline in trading liquidity. This evidence directly contrasts with managements' professed intentions for undertaking a split. The evidence to date, however, is of a short-run nature. This study reexamines the liquidity effects of stock splits and stock dividends by assessing both their short- and long-term effects on trading liquidity (i.e., proportional trading volume and percentage bid-ask spreads). The results suggest that stock dividends are associated with decreased proportional trading volume in both the short term and long term, but stock splits are not. The results also indicate that neither stock splits nor stock dividends have an effect on percentage bid-ask spreads.     

USING DIVIDEND POLICY AND MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP TO REDUCE AGENCY COSTS

In this study we examine dividends and chief executive officer (CEO) stock ownership as interrelated mechanisms that may be used to reduce agency costs. We find a significant nonmonotonic relation between dividend yield and CEO stock ownership. Our evidence shows that until the CEO becomes entrenched, increased executive stock ownership reduces agency costs and decreases dividend yield. Beyond that point, increased stock ownership increases dividend yield. Whether additional stock ownership can reduce agency costs depends upon the CEO's degree of control in the firm.     

ANNOUNCEMENT EFFECTS OF WITHDRAWN SECURITY OFFERINGS: EVIDENCE ON THE WEALTH REDISTRIBUTION HYPOTHESIS

This paper employs the comparison period returns approach to examine issuance and withdrawal announcement effects for stock portfolios of firms announcing equity or debt issues that are subsequently withdrawn. In contrast to previous literature, which generally attributes financing announcement effects to capital structure changes, the conclusion of this paper is that security price changes at the time an issue is announced or withdrawn prevent wealth redistributions between insiders and outsiders. Empirical findings are inconsistent with the interpretation of announcement effects as capital structure effects.     

THE EFFECTS OF INSIDER TRADING RESTRICTIONS: EVIDENCE FROM HISTORICAL DIVIDEND INITIATIONS AND OMISSIONS

We investigate whether insider trading restrictions had their intended effects during the 1960s and 1970s. We examine insider trading and stock market behavior before dividend initiations and omissions announced between 1935 and 1974. Contrary to existing research and commentary, we show that restrictions had meaningful effects. During the 1960s and 1970s, insiders sold less frequently before dividend omissions, and the average profitability of insider trades declined. In addition, the positive (negative) stock price runup before dividend initiations (omissions) decreased after 1961. The results provide some vindication for the Securities and Exchange Commission's adjudicative approach toward insider trading regulation.     

TESTING THE FISHERIAN HYPOTHESIS: SOME METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES AND FURTHER EVIDENCE FOR THE UK

The relationship between common stock returns and actual, expected and unexpected inflation has been subject to considerable scrutiny recently. The objectives of this paper are threefold. First, it is suggested that the Fisherian hypothesis of anticipated stock market returns has been subjected to inappropriate tests in some previous work. Second, the Fisherian hypothesis is developed into an ex post form which is suitable for estimation and which will avoid the difficulties in previous work. Thirdly, estimates of the model are reported using UK data which give some support to the hypothesis.     

THE EFFECTS OF THE ANNOUNCEMENTS OF DIVIDEND INCREASES ON STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY: THE EVIDENCE FROM THE OPTIONS MARKET

This paper examines the impact of the announcements of dividend increases on the volatility of underlying stock returns implied by option prices, and analyses whether the impact is related to the label associated with the dividend increase. The results suggest that the announcements of labelled dividend increases are accompanied by a decrease in implied volatility, while the announcements of unlabelled increases in dividends are associated with no change in implied volatility. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that signal implicit in the announcements of dividend increases provides noisy information about the firm's volatility.     

TRANSACTION COSTS AND DAY-OF-THE-WEEK EFFECTS IN THE OTC/NASDAQ EQUITY MARKET

A potential explanation is examined here for the observed day-of-the-week effect in equity returns—systematic daily patterns in percentage bid-ask spreads. Using OTC/NASDAQ data over 1973–1985, strong return day-of-the-week effects are documented while mean dealer percentage spreads are essentially unchanged over the week. These results provide evidence that systematic percentage spread changes do not contribute to the observed return anomaly.     

FURTHER EVIDENCE ON INSIDER TRADING AND THE MERITS OF SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS

To provide further evidence on the merits of securities class actions, we examine insider transactions immediately before and during the class period, using a larger and newer data set. We show that insiders reduce their stock sales by an abnormal amount immediately before the class period. Alternative measures of insider transactions and analysis of data before the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 provide consistent results. These new findings indicate that class actions, on average, have merit. Our data also reestablish a previous empirical result that there is no abnormal selling during the class period.