The effect of bond rating changes on common stock prices

The evidence in this paper suggests that downgrades by both Moody's and Standard and Poor's are associated with negative abnormal stock returns in the two-day window beginning the day of the press release by the rating agency. Significant negative abnormal performance can still be detected after eliminating observations containing obvious concurrent (potentially contaminating) news releases. There is little evidence of abnormal performance on announcement of an upgrade. Significant abnormal returns are associated with announcements of additions to the Standard and Poor's Credit Watch List, if either a potential downgrade or a potential upgrade is indicated.     

The Effect of Bond Rating Changes and New Ratings on UK Stock Returns

This is the first study to use daily data from a major capital market outside of the US to examine the role of corporate bond and commercial paper rating changes on common stock returns. Using data published by Standard and Poors' credit rating agency between 1984 and 1992, we examine the impact of new credit ratings, credit rating changes and Credit Watch announcements on UK common stock returns. We find significant negative excess returns around the date of a downgrade and positive returns close to the date of a positive CreditWatch announcement. Hence, the financial markets would appear to place some importance on rating agency pronouncements in the UK. New ratings, whether short or long-term, have no significant impact on returns. We also attempt to quantify the impact of a new credit rating upon firm cost of capital through measures of conditional volatility and systematic risk. However, we find only weak evidence to suggest that a stock's cost of capital is reduced after a long-term credit rating is awarded for the first time.     

The intraday timing of rating changes

Using time stamps of Standard & Poor's rating changes, we examine the timing of rating changes in an intraday setting. Our evidence shows that although most rating changes occur during trading hours, the proportion of downgrades announced after regular trading hours is higher than that of upgrades. In addition, unexpected after-hour downgrades are associated with more negative stock returns and lower trading volume in comparison to those announced during trading hours. We also find that Standard & Poor's is more likely to announce downgrades after hours when downgrades are released on busy days with many concurrent rating announcements, when they concern financial firms, and when they are unexpected. In addition, Egan-Jones Ratings (EJR), an investor-paid credit rating agency, demonstrates a similar tendency in announcing downgrades after trading hours. This is the first study to document systematic differences in the timing of credit rating changes announced before and after the market closes. Our findings suggest that Standard & Poor's announces downgrades after trading hours to better disseminate information, and thus have important policy implications.     

Effect of credit rating changes on Australian stock returns

We study the impact credit rating revisions have on stock returns of Australian firms rated by Standard & Poor's and Moody's. Our evidence is consistent with that documented in the USA showing that only downgrades contain price‐relevant information. The reaction is most significant when the downgrade: (i) is unanticipated; (ii) is for an unregulated firm; and (iii) reduces the firm's rating by more than one category.     

PRICE AND VOLUME EFFECTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE CREATION OF STANDARD & POOR'S MIDCAP INDEX

In this paper we explore price and volume effects associated with the 1991 creation of Standard & Poor's MidCap 400 index. Prior work on changes in the composition of existing indices finds a significant price response to the announcement. Various authors link the effect to price pressure, information, an outwardly shifting demand curve for securities, and the increased attention that comes with inclusion in an index. Using event study methodology, we find significant price and volume effects during the two weeks leading up to the Standard & Poor's announcement, but no significant effect in the two-day interval around the event. Apparently, information leakage and/or anticipation preceded the creation of the index. The price run-up is permanent since the positive abnormal returns leading up through the announcement are not associated with significantly negative abnormal returns after the announcement. In addition, MidCap stocks significantly outperform the market during the fifty-two weeks following the announcement. Using cross-sectional regressions, we show that these prior-period abnormal returns are positively related to abnormal volume and institutional holdings. We also find that firms trading over-the-counter had larger price run-ups than NYSE or AMEX firms.     

Preferred Stock Returns, CreditWatch, and Preferred Stock Rating Changes

This paper examines the announcement effects of CreditWatch placement and reratings upon a sample of preferred stock issues that were placed on CreditWatch and later rerated or affirmed by Standard & Poor's. Results indicate that CreditWatch provides information to market participants and may have reduced the surprise associated with subsequent reratings. CreditWatch placement may be an erroneous signal, however, since nearly 50 percent of the issues placed for negative reasons were not downgraded, but affirmed, upon removal from Credit Watch.     

THE IMPACT OF CREDITWATCH PLACEMENT ON EQUITY RETURNS AND BOND PRICES

This paper examines the equity returns and bond prices of firms around the dates of their placement on CreditWatch by Standard and Poor's. Bond prices and equity returns for companies listed on CreditWatch are compared with a set of firms whose debt was rerated during the same time period but were never placed on CreditWatch. The evidence indicates no market reaction when firms are listed on CreditWatch with subsequent rating affirmations, but a significant reaction exists in those cases where the listing was followed by downgradings. Furthermore, the bond market does not appear so efficient as the stock market since relative bond prices continue to decline as long as seven months after a rating change.     

The Role of Default Risk in Determining the Market Reaction to Debt Announcements

The stock price reaction to straight debt announcements is examined by differentiating firms on the basis of any subsequent change in their overall default risk. Results indicate that firms that will within six months of straight debt announcements undergo debt rating downgrades experience significant negative abnormal stock returns at the time of the new debt announcements, while firms with bond ratings that are later upgraded exhibit significant positive abnormal returns. Multiple regression analysis shows these results to be robust to the influence of filing size, tax shield effects, relative pre-announcement long-term debt levels, and subordination effects.     

THE EFFECT OF BOND RATING AGENCIES ON BOND RATING MODELS

This paper addresses the problem of bond rating discrepancies and their effect on bond rating prediction models. Both Moody's and Standard & Poor's now use modified ratings. Results of this study indicate that the two agencies disagree 58 percent of the time and that Moody's rates bonds significantly lower than S & P. In addition, the classification rates of the multiple discriminant analysis models decrease approximately 24 percentage points when the modified ratings are used.     

Firms' Off-Balance Sheet and Hybrid Debt Financing: Evidence from Their Book-Tax Reporting Differences

We match large U.S. corporations' tax returns during 1989–2001 to their financial statements to construct a firm‐level proxy of firms' use of off‐balance sheet and hybrid debt financing. We find that firms with less favorable prior‐period Standard & Poor's (S&P) bond ratings or higher leverage ratios in comparison to their industry report greater amounts of interest expense on their tax returns than to investors and creditors on their financial statements. These between‐firm results are consistent with credit‐constrained firms using more structured financing arrangements. Our within‐firm tests also suggest that firms use more structured financing arrangements when they enter into contractual loan agreements that provide incentives to manage debt ratings. Specifically, we find that after controlling for S&P bond rating and industry‐adjusted leverage, our sample firms report greater amounts of interest expenses for tax than for financial statement purposes when they enter into performance pricing contracts that use senior debt rating covenants to set interest rates. Furthermore, we find that the greatest book‐tax reporting changes occur when firms become closer to violating these debt rating covenants. These latter findings are consistent with firms' contractual debt covenants influencing their use of off‐balance sheet and hybrid debt financing.     

Lack of consumer confidence and stock returns

This paper investigates the link between the lack of consumer confidence and stock returns during market fluctuations. Using a Markov-switching framework, we first focus on whether the shock to consumer confidence has asymmetric effects on stock returns. We also examine whether the decreased confidence pushes the stock market into bear territory. Empirical evidence using monthly returns on Standard & Poor's S&P 500 price index suggests that market pessimism has larger impacts on stock returns during bear markets. Moreover, the lack of consumer confidence leads to a higher probability of switching to a bear market regime.     

Characteristics and Information Value of Credit Watches

We analyze credit watch and rating actions to better understand the role of credit watches in the credit rating process. We find that watch actions are more frequently prompted by specific, publicly known events than are rating actions. The likelihood that a watch action precedes a rating action varies systematically with proxies for investor demand for credit quality information and the adverse consequences of issuing a rating change prematurely. Credit watches occur more often in response to deterioration in credit quality, and issuers make concerted efforts to address the concerns that prompted down watches. Down watches are less likely than up watches to indicate the direction of the subsequent rating change. Watch announcements are associated with abnormal stock returns, indicating that credit watch actions are significant information events. Our results suggest that credit watches are informative and facilitate the stability of ratings by allowing firms to correct deficiencies and prevent downgrades.     

THE INFORMATIONAL CONTENT OF BOND RATINGS

This paper explores the risk structure of interest rates. The focus is on whether yields on industrial bonds indicate that market participants base their evaluations of a bond issue's default risk on agency ratings or on publicly available financial statistics. Using a non-linear least squares procedure, the yield-to-maturity is related to Moody's rating, Standard and Poor's (S&P) rating, and accounting measures of creditworthiness such as coverage and leverage. Market yields are found to be significantly correlated with both the ratings and a set of readily available financial accounting statistics. These results indicate (1) that market participants base their evaluations of an issue's creditworthiness on more than the agencies' ratings and (2) that the ratings bring some information to the market above and beyond that contained in the set of accounting variables. The paper also asks whether the market views Moody's and Standard and Poor's ratings as equally reliable measures of risk or whether the market attaches more weight to one agency's ratings than the other. Finally, the hypothesis that the market pays more attention to the accounting measures and less to the ratings if the rating has not been reviewed recently is tested.     

Do Demand Curves for Stocks Slope Down?

Since September, 1976, stocks newly included into the Standard and Poor's 500 Index have earned a significant positive abnormal return at the announcement of the inclusion. This return does not disappear for at least ten days after the inclusion. The returns are positively related to measures of buying by index funds, consistent with the hypothesis that demand curves for stocks slope down. The returns are not related to S & P's bond ratings, which is inconsistent with a plausible version of the hypothesis that inclusion is a certification of the quality of the stock.     

Initial Evidence on the Role of Accounting Earnings in the Bond Market

We document that: (1) the incidence of bond trade increases during the days surrounding earnings announcements, (2) there is a bond‐price reaction to the announcement of earnings, and (3) there is a positive association between annual bond returns and both annual changes in earnings and annual analysts' forecast errors. All of these effects are larger when earnings convey bad news or when the underlying bond is more risky. Taken together, our results suggest that the nonlinear payoff structure of bond securities affects the role of accounting earnings in the bond market.     

Why Do Markets Move Together? An Investigation of U.S.-Japan Stock Return Comovements

This article explores the fundamental factors that affect cross-country stock return correlations. Using transactions data from 1988 to 1992, we construct overnight and intraday returns for a portfolio of Japanese stocks using their NYSE-traded American Depository Receipts (ADRs) and a matched-sample portfolio of U. S. stocks. We find that U. S. macroeconomic announcements, shocks to the Yen/Dollar foreign exchange rate and Treasury bill returns, and industry effects have no measurable influence on U.S. and Japanese return correlations. However, large shocks to broad-based market indices (Nikkei Stock Average and Standard and Poor's 500 Stock Index) positively impact both the magnitude and persistence of the return correlations.     

Does it matter who pays for bond ratings? Historical evidence

We test whether Standard and Poor's (S&P) assigns higher bond ratings after it switches from investor-pay to issuer-pay fees in 1974. Using Moody's rating for the same bond as a benchmark, we find that when S&P charges investors and Moody's charges issuers, S&P's ratings are lower than Moody's. Once S&P adopts issuer-pay, its ratings increase and no longer differ from Moody's. More importantly, S&P only assigns higher ratings for bonds that are subject to greater conflicts of interest, measured by higher expected rating fees or lower credit quality. These findings suggest that the issuer-pay model leads to higher ratings.     

Risk and Return Around Bond Rating Changes: New Evidence From the Spanish Stock Market

Abstract:  This study analyzes the effect of corporate bond rating changes on stock prices in the Spanish stock market. We explore their effects on excess of returns and systematic risk. Rating changes by Moody's, Standard and Poor's and FitchIBCA are analyzed. On an efficient market, these changes will only have some effect if they contain some new information or if they are associated to a redistribution of wealth between shareholders and bondholders. We use an extension of the event study dummy approach. Our results support the redistribution of wealth hypothesis in the abnormal returns behavior. We also find that changes in both directions cause a rebalancing effect in the total risk of the firm, with significant reductions on their systematic component.     

INFORMATION OPACITY AND FITCH BOND RATINGS

We examine the marginal impact of Fitch ratings on the at‐issuance yields of industrial and utility bonds rated by Moody's and Standard & Poor's. We find that Fitch ratings reduce the yield premiums on information‐opaque bonds by about 30%, or 15 basis points. The finding is robust even when a Fitch rating exactly equals the two major ratings or their average. The findings suggest that Fitch ratings are not redundant but bring additional information to investors. Increased competition in the rating industry enhances the information efficiency of the bond market, and the existence of smaller rating agencies is economically justified.