AN ILLUSTRATIVE PRODUCTION FUNCTION FOR LABOUR-MANAGED FIRMS*

An illustration of the ambiguities in the behaviour of a labour-managed firm in the long run when both capital and labour are variable is provided by means of an example which can be completely solved. Input demand and output supply functions are derived from a suggested production function. The special case of a homothetic production function is yielded by one of five parameter sets identified.     

UNEMPLOYMENT IN AN EQUILIBRIUM MODEL WITH BARGAINING*

This paper develops a model which embeds the Nash-equilibrium version of McDonald and Solow's (1981) wage-bargaining model into an otherwise standard static equilibrium macro model. Equilibrium unemployment is possible. Real shocks to demand result in pro-cyclical employment and anti-cyclical real wage movements while money shocks are neutral. This is in some contrast to the results obtained by McDonald and Solow.     

CRIME,DETERRENCE AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN ENGLAND AND WALES: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS*

This paper uses aggregate data from 42 police-force areas over 12 years to test predictions of Becker's economic model of crime. The effects of measures for deterrence on the incidence of three types of acquisitive criminal activity (burglary, theft, robbery) in England and Wales are explored. Mixed support for the Becker model emerges. The growth in unemployment is seen to impact positively on two of the three types of criminal activity examined. Per capita household income is seen to have a negative effect on the recorded rates of burglary and theft, but there is some evidence that the income variable is a proxy for the effects of unemployment. Poor housing conditions and the relative youth of the population were also found to play a role in the determination of criminal activity.     

MONEY AND BANKING IN SEARCH EQUILIBRIUM*

We develop a new theory of money and banking based on the old story in which goldsmiths start accepting deposits for safe keeping, then their liabilities begin circulating as media of exchange, then they begin making loans. We first discuss the history. We then present a model where agents can open bank accounts and write checks. The equilibrium means of payment may be cash, checks, or both. Sometimes multiple equilibria exist. Introducing banks increases the set of parameters for which money is valued–thus, money and banking are complements. We also derive a microfounded version of the usual money multiplier.     

WINNER-HELP-LOSER GROUP FORMATION IN RENT-SEEKING CONTESTS*

We define a winner-help-loser group in a rent-seeking contest as follows: (a) the member players compete noncooperatively to win the rent, and (b) if a member player wins the rent, he helps the losing member players according to the previously written agreement. We demonstrate that one and only one winner-help-loser group is formed voluntarily. One important consequence of such group formation is that rent dissipation is small relative to individual rent seeking. Therefore, such group formation decreases the social cost associated with rent seeking and thus decreases the economic inefficiency of rent seeking.     

COMPETITION CAN HARM CONSUMERS*

Duopolists selling differentiated products can generate less consumer surplus than a monopoly selling one of the products. In a Hotelling‐type model where a monopoly supplies more than half of potential consumers, but not all, entry by a rival leads to a duopoly price that is higher than the monopoly price. Consumers in aggregate will be made worse off by such entry when the effect of the price increase outweighs the benefit of extra variety. When consumers have continuous demand functions and firms use two‐part tariffs, duopoly can also result in lower aggregate consumer surplus than monopoly.     

STABILITY AND INSTABILITY OF THE COUCRNOT EQUILIBRIUM*

Conditions for the Cournot equilibrium to be locally asymptotically stable or unstable are explored, which are still compatible with the second‐order condition for the optimum. The Cournot equilibrium may not be stable even if the condition owing to Fisher (1961 ), Hahn (1962 ), and Okuguchi (1964 , 1976, 1999 ) is satisfied, which was given as a sufficient condition for the Cournot equilibrium to be stable. However, as long as a game by symmetric players is concerned, the Cournot equilibrium is unstable whenever F‐H‐O condition is not satisfied. In this sense, that F‐H‐O condition is not satisfied is sufficient for the Cournot equilibrium to be unstable.     

EVOLUTIONARY DRIFT IN PREFERENCE AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION*

This paper studies the situation where myopic players repeatedly face a society with two actions where their common fitness exhibits economies of scale. Both states in which all players choose the same actions are equilibria. In each period, players adjust their actions based on their preferences, which are in turn shaped by natural selection. The preferences of the players need not match the underlying fitness. When rare mutations are introduced into the evolutionary process, their preferences may drift without affecting equilibrium behaviour. This paper shows that these drifts influence the results of equilibrium selection.     

COMPETITIVE PRICING AND EFFICIENCY IN SEARCH EQUILIBRIUM*

We consolidate and generalize some results on price determination and efficiency in search equilibrium. Extending models by Rubinstein and Wolinsky and by Gale, heterogeneous buyers and sellers meet according to a general matching technology and prices are determined by a general bargaining condition. When the discount rate r and search costs converge to 0, we show that prices in all exchanges are the same and equal the competitive, market clearing, price. Given positive search costs, efficiency obtains iff bargaining satisfies Hosios' condition and r=0. When prices are set by third‐party market makers, however, we show that search equilibrium is necessarily efficient.     

SUNK COSTS OF CAPITAL AND THE FORM OF ENTERPRISE: INVESTOR‐OWNED FIRMS AND WORKER‐OWNED FIRMS*

ABSTRACT ** : This paper examines implications of sunk costs of capital for efficient forms of enterprise. It is assumed that firm owners and outside traders are asymmetrically informed of venture risks, and that there are sunk costs associated with investment in physical and human capital. We then make an efficiency comparison between investor‐owned and worker‐owned firms. We find that the firm is efficient when it is owned by the input supplier (the investor or worker) who incurs large sunk costs. This is because such an input supplier can credibly signal to the other input supplier that he in fact has a safe project. An empirical study based on the Japanese manufacturing industry seems to support the theoretical result.     

INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND COURNOT EQUILIBRIUM: EXISTENCE,UNIQUENESS AND COMPARATIVE STATICS *

This paper proves the existence and uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium in models of international trade under oligopoly. The existence of Cournot equilibrium is established without the usual assumption that profit functions are concave. Instead the proof uses a weaker‘aggregate concavity’condition. A simple proof is used to establish the uniqueness of the equilibrium. And, the paper considers the implications of the assumptions, used to prove the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium, on the comparative static results.     

QUANTITY AND PRICE EFFECTS IN AN ANALYSIS OF WORLD TRADE BASED ON AN ACCOUNTING MATRIX*

This paper describes the construction of an accounting matrix for the world economy in 1977, cast along similar lines to SNA National Accounts, but one in which trade flows replace inter-industry flows as intermediate demand. The matrix distinguishes ten regions. Institutional accounts are presented for three of these, the European Community, North America and Japan. This matrix is used to provide the basis of a linear model in which average propensities to import and consume are replaced by estimated marginal propensities. Use is made of standard estimates of the income effects of terms of trade changes in order to distinguish substitution from income effects in the model, and a means is suggested for separating the full as well as the impact effects of a terms of trade change into income and substitution effects. The estimated import equations are used to derive estimates of regional growth rates compatible with external balance in each region. Multiplier matrices are calculated from the model showing regional interdependence of the world economy reflecting the pattern of trade which is identified in the marginal propensities to import. The effects of various aid policies are calculated using the model. It is shown that the cost of aid to any region is radically altered by taking into account the feedback effects of changes in demand. A policy of tied aid pursued by EEC, North America and Japan can actually lead to an improvement in Japan's balance of payments position. Finally the effects of movements in relative prices are illustrated by means of two examples.     

GENERAL AND PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY IN BORK'S ANTITRUST ANALYSIS

In applying economic theory to evaluate antitrust laws, Judge Robert Bork explicitly favors a partial equilibrium over a general equilibrium approach. He believes the general model assumes away too many real-world aspects to be usefully employed as a criterion by which to judge real-world laws.
However, Bork's partial equilibrium replacement, the Oliver Williamson trade-off model, implicitly contains many of the same assumptions as general equilibrium theory. Equilibrium prices in all industries, an absence of external effects, and well-defined demand curves are assumptions of both general equilibrium theory and the Williamson trade-off model. If one theory is judged inadequate because of these assumptions, so should the other.
Bork's analysis is more consistent with market process theory than with his own partial equilibrium approach. Market process theory assumes neither the absence of externalities, nor the presence of well-defined demand and equilibrium prices in all industries.