机构投资者、所有权性质与权益资本成本

本文考察机构投资者与所有权性质如何影响公司的资本成本。我们发现,第一,机构投资者参与显著降低了公司的资本成本,且长期投资者发挥的作用更为明显;第二,相对于民营企业而言,机构投资者的作用在国有企业中更为明显;第三,机构投资者降低企业权益资本成本的作用机制主要体现在公司治理与信息解读两个方面,并在不同产权性质企业中存在一定差异。总体而言,机构投资者能够通过监督公司的治理行为以及提高公司的信息披露降低公司的资本成本。本文为机构投资者在我国资本市场上所扮演的角色提供了新的证据,同时建议监管部门应注重管理机构投资者参股交易行为中的规范性。     

资本监管与银行最优资本结构

资本监管已成为现代商业银行监管体系的核心,而现有研究对资本监管的重要性缺乏系统的理论研究。基于此,本文从MM理论出发,逐步分析并得出:银行自身经营的特殊性、银行作为一般企业所追求的企业价值最大化行为以及银行作为特殊企业所得到的银行安全网保护等因素使得银行形成不断提高最优资产负债率和降低资本充足率的内在机制,逐步分析不同情形下的银行最优资本结构,进而说明资本监管对于维系银行经营的稳健性和审慎性以及减少银行破产而导致的负外部性等方面的重要作用。     

Optimal Capital Structure and Industry Dynamics

This paper provides a competitive equilibrium model of capital structure and industry dynamics. In the model, firms make financing, investment, entry, and exit decisions subject to idiosyncratic technology shocks. The capital structure choice reflects the tradeoff between the tax benefits of debt and the associated bankruptcy and agency costs. The interaction between financing and production decisions influences the stationary distribution of firms and their survival probabilities. The analysis demonstrates that the equilibrium output price has an important feedback effect. This effect has a number of testable implications. For example, high growth industries have relatively lower leverage and turnover rates.     

Bankruptcy Risk and Optimal Capital Structure

This study finds shortcomings in empirical tests of the capital structure irrelevance hypothesis. The alternative hypothesis is that firms choose value maximizing mixes of debt and equity on account of bankruptcy costs and the tax deductibility of interest payments. Based upon the cross-sectional implications of the tax shelter-bankruptcy cost hypothesis, an alternative test of the irrelevance hypothesis is performed. The test examines the relationship between failure rates and leverage ratios for 36 lines of business. The results are inconsistent with the irrelevance hypothesis.     

混合型资本工具与商业银行资本结构优化

资本管理是银行风险管理的核心内容,银行通过资本结构的合理安排,不仅能有效覆盖风险,满足资本监管要求,还能同时提高财务效率。本文结合混合型资本工具的特点及各国监管规定,分析了商业银行的最佳资本结构选择,并提出了我国商业银行的应对策略。     

机构投资者与资本市场波动

本文对机构投资者如何引起和加剧金融市场波动的原因进行了分析,这些原因既有机构投资者自身的投资行为方面的,也有委托-代理问题所引起的,还有由投资者推动的,以及由监管和制度设计方面的缺陷所造成的问题。本文还对国际机构投资者投资新兴市场所引起的金融动荡进行了分析,并对如何引导机构投资者向有利于金融市场稳定的方向发展提出了建议。     

基于心理契约破裂的企业与员工非对称性互惠共生建模与仿真研究

运用企业与员工非对称性互惠共生Logistic基本模型与引入心理契约破裂参数的扩展模型进行企业与员工共生关系研究,并通过Matlab数值仿真验证模型研究结果。结果表明:能量的非独立性生成、非对称性分配是企业与员工非对称性互惠共生关系的典型表现;工作发展型心理契约破裂在企业与员工共生关系协调阶段对非对称性互惠共生有较大的阻滞;会导致企业与员工非对称性互惠共生关系真正的破裂。     

How Investment Opportunities Affect Optimal Capital Structure

This article addresses the question of how competition for investments among companies in a certain industry affects their capital structure. The authors develop a new modelling framework that simulates financial variables of a set of firms in a given sector, and uses the framework to analyze how such firms compete for new investments. The leverage of companies affects their flexibility to react to and take advantage of investment opportunities, and the authors show how such flexibility can be optimized to maximize the firm’s growth. As an illustration, they apply the model to a set of European airlines and global pharmaceutical companies. The novelty introduced by this paper is the explicit modelling of the interaction between several companies. The literature on optimal capital structure focuses on individual companies optimizing their capital structure in a world in which the actions of their competitors are exogenous. The authors’ results show how to incorporate the competitive position of the firm as well as the availability of investment opportunities into the capital structure decison.     

A Dynamic Model of Optimal Capital Structure

This paper presents a continuous time model of a firm that candynamically adjust both its capital structure and its investmentchoices. In the model we endogenize the investment choice aswell as firm value, which are both determined by an exogenousprice process that describes the firm's product market. Withinthe context of this model we explore cross-sectional as wellas time-series variation in debt ratios. We pay particular attentionto interactions between financial distress costs and debtholder/equityholderagency problems and examine how the ability to dynamically adjustthe debt ratio affects the deviation of actual debt ratios fromtheir targets. Regressions estimated on simulated data generatedby our model are roughly consistent with actual regressionsestimated in the empirical literature.     

An Empirical Model of Optimal Capital Structure1

The authors provide a reasonably user‐friendly and intuitive model for arriving at a company's optimal, or value‐maximizing, leverage ratio that is based on the estimation of company‐specific cost and benefit functions for debt financing. The benefit functions are downward‐sloping, reflecting the drop in the incremental value of debt with increases in the amount used. The cost functions are upward‐sloping, reflecting the increase in costs associated with increases in leverage. The cost functions vary among companies in ways that reflect differences in corporate characteristics such as size, profitability, dividend policy, book‐to‐market ratio, and asset collateral and redeployability. The authors use these cost and benefit functions to produce an estimate of a company's optimal amount of debt. Just as equilibrium in economics textbooks occurs where supply equals demand, optimal capital structure occurs at the point where the marginal benefit of debt equals the marginal cost. The article illustrates optimal debt choices for companies such as Barnes & Noble, Coca‐Cola, Six Flags, and Performance Food Group. The authors also estimate the net benefit of debt usage (in terms of the increase in firm or enterprise value) for companies that are optimally levered, as well as the net cost of being underleveraged for companies with too little debt, and the cost of overleveraging for companies with too much. One critical insight of the model is that the costs associated with overleveraging appear to be significantly higher, at least for some companies, than the costs of being underleveraged.     

节税收益、破产成本与最优资本结构

本文在正确定义债务的节税收益和破产成本的基础上,运用实物期权定义并定量描述了破产成本,进而建立了确定最优资本结构的ZZ杠杆模型。将自变量的典型值代入模型得出的最优债务比率与以往的实际调查数据非常接近,从而使一些长期难以解释的"资本结构之谜",例如"财务保守行为"等得到了一个合理的解释。     

资本结构与股权价值关系研究

本文通过理论分析和实证检验发现净资产收益率与资本结构之间的关系依赖于整体宏观经济环境和公司特征变量,当公司治理水平上升、增长机会增大、赢利能力增强、行业竞争程度下降时,净资产收益率与资本结构之间的相关系数上升。这表明净资产收益率与资本结构之间的关系并非绝对的正相关或负相关关系,有助于解释为什么学者在研究两者之间的关系时结论大相径庭。因此,提升经济发展水平、加强对投资者的保护、建立基于资本供求关系的利率体系有助于优化资本市场资本配置的基础性功能。     

Corporate Debt Value,Bond Covenants,and Optimal Capital Structure

This article examines corporate debt values and capital structure in a unified analytical framework. It derives closed-form results for the value of long-term risky debt and yield spreads, and for optimal capital structure, when firm asset value follows a diffusion process with constant volatility. Debt values and optimal leverage are explicitly linked to firm risk, taxes, bankruptcy costs, risk-free interest rates, payout rates, and bond covenants. The results elucidate the different behavior of junk bonds versus investment-grade bonds, and aspects of asset substitution, debt repurchase, and debt renegotiation.     

Optimal Capital Structure,Endogenous Bankruptcy,and the Term Structure of Credit Spreads

This article examines the optimal capital structure of a firm that can choose both the amount and maturity of its debt. Bankruptcy is determined endogenously rather than by the imposition of a positive net worth condition or by a cash flow constraint. The results extend Leland's (1994a) closed-form results to a much richer class of possible debt structures and permit study of the optimal maturity of debt as well as the optimal amount of debt. The model predicts leverage, credit spreads, default rates, and writedowns, which accord quite closely with historical averages. While short term debt does not exploit tax benefits as completely as long term debt, it is more likely to provide incentive compatibility between debt holders and equity holders. Short term debt reduces or eliminates “asset substitution” agency costs. The tax advantage of debt must be balanced against bankruptcy and agency costs in determining the optimal maturity of the capital structure. The model predicts differently shaped term structures of credit spreads for different levels of risk. These term structures are similar to those found empirically by Sarig and Warga (1989). Our results have important implications for bond portfolio management. In general, Macaulay duration dramatically overstates true duration of risky debt, which may be negative for “junk” bonds. Furthermore, the “convexity” of bond prices can become “concavity.”