The Cost of Living and Terror: Does Consumer Price Volatility Fuel Terrorism?

Do fluctuations of consumer prices prompt terrorist activity? A latent assumption among conflict scholars is that price volatilities for basic consumer goods produce hardships for people that increase popular grievances, damage government legitimacy, and raise the chances for terrorism. In this study, I use a series of regression estimations to test volatility in consumer price indices for energy, housing, and foods as predictors of domestic and transnational terrorism in a cross section of countries. I produce several findings. First, food price fluctuations are significant predictors of multiple measures of terrorism, while energy and housing prices are not. Second, rapid food price increases, not decreases, promote terrorist attacks. Third, the relationship between food price volatility and terrorism is most consistently present in nondemocratic and “hybrid” political regimes and in medium human development countries rather than in democracies or in countries characterized by very high or very low economic development.     

Economics: Friend or Foe of Politics to Support Strategically Important Domestic Industries?

Strategic goods (e.g., food and energy) are defined as necessary prerequisites for the consumption of all other goods in the economy. Private markets fail to provide efficient domestic supply because of externalities. Individuals do not consider that the consumption of a domestically produced strategic good increases domestic supply available to society if international supply is disrupted in a future crisis. Hence, there is a purely economic rationale for government support to domestic strategic industries. But political factors, such as lobbying and political short-termism, also critically influence the actual provision of strategic goods and the case for support.     

SECTORAL ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION AND RETURNS TO SCALE IN SOUTH AFRICA

Elasticity of substitution and returns to scale are estimated on a sectoral basis for South Africa using panel-based generalised least square procedure. Apart from sectoral differences in terms of elasticity of substitution, the study found that elasticity of substitution is below unity in all of the sectors. Most of the sectors studied are found to have increasing returns to scale in production. The study further explores the implications of elasticity of factor substitution and returns to scale on growth and employment creation. It is argued that a greater number of jobs can be created from growth of sectors with constant or decreasing returns to scale than from the same level of output growth generated by sectors with increasing returns to scale. This is the case when the employment-creating potential of the same amount of additional output is compared in all the sectors examined. By virtue of scale economies, a sector like finance, insurance, real estate and business services generates more output with less proportional increase in inputs, which means growth in this sector may not have the desired impact on job creation. However, given the sector's large share (20%) of the country's total output and employment, it may generate more jobs, even if sectors like utilities and construction experience the same level of output growth. Given its importance for growth and employment, the study recommends further investigation into the reasons why elasticity of substitution is lower in sectors like utilities, mining and trade, catering and accommodation services.     

TO PREY OR NOT TO PREY? WELFARE AND INDIVIDUAL LOSSES IN A CONFLICT MODEL1

We analyse a generalised form of the Hirshleifer‐Skaperdas predation model. In such a model agents have a choice between productive work and appropriation. We suggest that such a model can usefully be thought of as a continuous form of the Prisoners' Dilemma. We present closed form solutions for the interior equilibria and comparative statics for all Cournot equilibria and analyse the social welfare losses arising from predation. We show that predation is minimised under two quite different regimes, one in which claiming is very ineffective and another in which one of the players becomes marginalised. The worst outcomes seem to arise when claiming is effective, but inequality in power is significant but not extreme. This, arguably, is the situation in a number of transition societies.     

Do People Accurately Anticipate Sanctions?

We provide lab data from four different games that allow us to study whether people have accurate expectations regarding monetary sanctions (punishment/reward) and nonmonetary sanctions (disapproval/approval). Although the strength of the sanction is always predicted with some error (particularly in the case of monetary sanctions), we observe that (i) most subjects anticipate correctly the sign of the average sanction, (ii) expectations covary with sanctions, (iii) the average expectation is very often not significantly different than the average actual sanction, and (iv) the errors exhibit no systematic bias, except in those situations where rewards are frequent. In this line, we find some evidence that punishment is better anticipated than rewards.     

Are Homegrown Islamic Terrorists Different? Some UK Evidence

We compare the characteristics of 77 homegrown Islamic terrorists in the UK to a representative sample of 1363 UK Muslims. UK Muslims are more likely to participate in terrorist acts if they are better educated and young. Other predictors of UK Muslims being involved in terrorism are employment status, UK citizenship, and ethnic origin.