经济中最优私有比重——经济体制改革的模型描述

文章通过构建混合寡头竞争博弈模型,在封闭经济、具有外来竞争者的封闭经济和开放经济情形下,证明经济中最优私有比重的存在性。模型假定随着私有化的深入,国有企业的生产边际成本会降低。基本结论是:(1)在封闭经济、具有外来竞争者的封闭经济和开放经济情形下,最优私有比重都是存在的;(2)在任意固定的私有比重下,存在最优关税;(3)在具有外来竞争者的封闭经济或者开放经济下,本国关税对本国企业起到了保护作用,随着关税的增加,本国企业的产量会增加,进口和市场产品总量会减少;(4)随着我国私有经济在经济总量中比例的增大,我国企业将向国外市场出口更多的产品,而且国外市场中的产品总量也随着我国私有化水平的提高越来越大。我们的结论可为我国政府进行经济体制改革提供一定的理论依据。     

The effect of foreign competition on UK employment and wages: Evidence from firm-level panel data

The Effect of Foreign Competition on UK Employment and Wages: Evidence from Firm-Level Panel Data. —This paper contributes to the sparse empirical literature on the effects of foreign competition on domestic employment and wages. The authors estimate a structural labour demand equation on UK firm-level panel data between 1982 and 1989 and several wage equations. When they restrict the sample to the manufacturing sector only, they find for the unionized firms that foreign competition has a negative effect on both wages and on employment. However, when UK manufacturing firms face only a few rivals, foreign competition has a positive effect on wages, but no effect on employment.     

Antidumping jumping: Reciprocal antidumping and industrial location

Antidumping Jumping: Reciprocal Antidumping and Industrial Location. — Antidumping policies are often justified as legitimate actions by governments in their efforts to protect domestic producers from unfair foreign competition. The authors investigate the impact of antidumping rules on firms’ production decisions as to how much and where to produce. Antidumping measures may have unforeseen effects if they induce direct foreign investment and consequently increase domestic competition. The authors therefore focus on location choice and consider the strategies of national governments attempting to advance the interests of their citizens through antidumping legislation. The analysis also has implications for the effects of market integration policies, such as Europe 1992.     

Foreign entry and domestic welfare

Foreign Entry and Domestic Welfare. — This paper discusses the consequences for domestic welfare of entry by foreign firms into a domestic market. A simple Bertrand model with differentiated products and a Cournot model with homogeneous goods are investigated and it is shown that welfare is non-monotonic in foreign entry in both cases. A “little” entry is harmful but a “lot” is beneficial. It is shown that this depends on the number of domestic firms in the industry.     

Lobbying paradox of strategic export policy in a differentiated duopoly

This paper presents an analysis of lobbying based on imperfect competition by using three-stage game. It seeks to explain why lobbying efforts might be influenced by a home government’s viewpoint. Endogenously determined lobbying may distort the outcomes of strategic export policy, so that the results would differ from that generated by exogenously set lobbying. The lobbying paradox results in the domestic firm being worse off than if it could credibly commit to not engage in lobbying. Moreover, in the presence of foreign firm lobbying, the desired tax level is as the same as that of the benchmark case without lobbying.     

Spatial Spillovers from Foreign Direct Investment: Evidence from the Yangtze River Delta in China

This paper examines the spatial externality from foreign direct investment on domestic firms. Using Chinese firm‐level data for 2004, and after accounting for an endogeneity problem, we find that foreign firms generate a significantly positive spillover effect on the regional productivity of domestic firms in similar counties and industries. Estimating a spatial‐autoregressive model, we further show that such local spillovers could transmit to domestic firms in other counties and industries through interactions among domestic firms. However, these spatial multiplier effects decline with distance, thereby reducing the foreign direct investment spillover effects for domestic firms in distant locations.     

Endogenous timing in trade policy games: Should governments use countervailing duties?

Endogenous Timing in Trade Policy Games: Should Governments Use Countervailing Duties? - Trade policy under oligopoly is analysed in two multistage games with endogenous timing of trade policy. At the beginning of the games, the domestic and foreign governments choose whether to set trade policy at stage one or two. It is shown that in the subgame perfect equilibrium of both games, the domestic government will set its tariff (and production subsidy) at stage one and the foreign government its export subsidy at stage two. The domestic country commits not to use a countervailing duty in both games, and both countries are better off than when they set trade policy simultaneously.     

PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION: AN ALTERNATIVE TO CVDS

By using a Cournot model where a domestic firm competes with a foreign firm in the domestic market, this paper suggests that, in addition to countervailing duty measures allowed by the World Trade Organization, product differentiation between the goods produced by the domestic and foreign firms could be considered as a way of eliminating foreign export subsidies.     

Optimal commercial policy with imperfect foreign supply

Conclusion Maximizing social welfare when there is one foreign firm requires the imposition of fixed domestic price, which results in increased imports from the foreign firm until it engages in marginal cost pricing. A license fee captures (replaces) the foreign firm's economic profit (loss). Extension to the case where foreign supply consists of more than one firm differs from the one-firm analysis in that, while optimale policy consists of the setting of both a license fee and price level for the import, this may entail levying a tariff on imports from the foreign firms. The fee or tariff, but not both, may be negative.     

The Impact of Multinational Presence on Domestic Investment: Firm‐Level Evidence from South Korea

In order to analyze the effects of foreign multinationals' presence on domestic firms' investment, we use a detailed firm level data set from South Korea for the 2006–2014 period. We combine it with the input‐output tables provided by the Bank of Korea to construct industry level measures of multinational presence in sectors that are horizontally and vertically linked, and estimate dynamic investment equations that are augmented with these foreign presence measures. We find a positive and significant effect of foreign presence in both horizontally and vertically linked industries on domestic firm's investment rate, with larger effects arising from multinational presence in the supplying sectors. Quantitatively, a 2 percentage point increase in the presence of multinational suppliers increases the domestic firm's investment rate by 3.24 percentage points. We also find that this effect is larger for small and medium firms, private firms, nonexporters, firms that are not part of a chaebol, and for firms in external finance dependent industries. A similar 2 percentage point increase in the foreign presence in downstream sectors increases the investment rate of domestic suppliers by 0.55 percentage points. This effect is larger if the domestic firm is part of a chaebol, or is in a less external finance dependent industry. Investment increase by 0.53 percentage points following a 2 percentage point increase in horizontal linkages.     

The choice between a tariff and a quota under uncertainty

Conclusions The results concerning the choice between a tariff and a quota under the assumption of perfect competition and three kinds of uncertainty are summarized in the table. An analysis of the uncertainty, under which a government using a tariff or a quota can determine the value of imports or the quantity domestically supplied (i.e. employment), gives neither the same result for the two instruments (equivalence) nor the same result for the three situations considered. Therefore the choice between a tariff and a quota in case of uncertainty depends on the purpose, and whether the initial uncertainty concerns domestic demand, foreign or domestic supply. This conclusion corresponds to the well-known phenomenon that in case of a disturbance to an open economy the choice between a change in the rate of exchange and a change in the demand policy depends both on the goal and on the kind of disturbance.     

Toward an institutional ecology of establishment of foreign firms in the Chinese construction industry

In the current study, an integration of insights from institutional theory and organization ecology is used to explain the relationship between industry-level ownership structure and the establishment of foreign invested firms in the Chinese construction industry. It is argued that in a stated-owned enterprises dominated environment, where the market forces are weak, legitimation is the major driving force harming the proliferation of foreign firms, whereas in a private-enterprise dominated environment, where the market forces are strong, competition is the major driving force inhibiting the viability of foreign firms. Thus, concentration of either state ownership, implying lower legitimation of the foreign firm form, or concentration of private ownership, triggering tough competition from domestic private firms, is hypothesized to have a negative impact on the number of foreign firms. Using a regional data set from 1994 to 2007, estimation of a cross-section–time series model largely confirms our theoretical claims.     

Tax policy on foreign direct investment in the presence of cross-hauling

Tax Policy on Foreign Direct Investment in the Presence of Cross-Hauling. — The authors develop a partial equilibrium model of foreign direct investment (FDI) in which identical foreign firms locate themselves in a host country to compete with internationally mobile domestic firms in non-tradeable oligopolistic markets for two differentiated commodities. The host country, which is small in the market for FDI, uses lumpsum subsidy (tax) to encourage (discourage) FDI. There is unemployment in the host country. Under this framework, the authors analyse the effect of discriminatory and uniform subsidies on the inflow/outflow of domestic and foreign firms and on employment. They also derive some properties of optimal subsidies.     

Does Aid for Roads Attract Foreign or Domestic Firms? Evidence from Cambodia

Less developed countries have received substantial foreign aid for transport infrastructure, making its quantitative assessment important. To investigate the effect of aid for road infrastructure on the location of foreign and domestic firms, this study employs the first comprehensive census on all business establishments in Cambodia for 2011 and measures the geographical distribution of aid disbursements in roads. Estimating a negative binomial model, we find that aid disbursements in roads have little influence on the entry of foreign and domestic firms across communes. Compared with the aid effect, the location of firms is more strongly influenced by other determinants such as population size, electricity access, and labor supply.     

FDI and the Export Performance of Chinese Indigenous Firms: a Regional Approach

The primary purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) on the export performance of Chinese indigenous firms. A panel data analysis is employed using data across 29 provinces over the 1985–99 period. Owing to the exceptionally uneven distribution of FDI, the analysis compares the impact of FDI on all provincial exports and exports of indigenous firms over the three macro-regions of China. While the findings of the empirical analysis should be viewed with caution, they do show that FDI has less influence on the export performance of indigenous firms than on all firms (foreign and indigenous). The findings imply that linkages between the foreign and domestic sectors need to be improved if FDI is to be a vehicle for improving the competitiveness of domestic firms. Alternatively, policies may have to be directed towards the indigenous firms themselves to enhance their export performance.     

Antidumping as Strategic Trade Policy under Asymmetric Information

Trade liberalization under GATT/World Trade Organization (WTO) has been partly offset by an increase in antidumping protection, possibly due to the inclusion of sales below cost in the definition of dumping. This article investigates the domestic government's antidumping duty choice in an asymmetric information framework, in which the foreign firm's cost is observed by the domestic firm, but not by the government. We show that by designing a tariff schedule contingent on firms' cost reports and accompanied by a threat to collect additional information for report verification, the domestic government may not only be able to extract the true cost information, but also succeed in implementing the full‐information, governmental welfare‐maximizing duty. The antidumping framework within GATT/WTO may thus not only offer the means to pursue strategic trade policy disguised as fair trade policy, but it also helps overcome informational problems with regard to correctly determining the optimal strategic trade policy.     

Endowments vs. market potential: What explains the relocation of industry after the Polish reunification in 1918?

How did the location of industry across interwar Poland react to the Polish reunification? After more than 120 years of political and economic separation, Poland was reunified at the end of 1918. In consequence, the removal of internal tariff barriers and improved infrastructure strengthened the domestic market, while foreign market relations were cut off. Similarly, the geographical distribution of factor endowments was changed, for example, through internal migration. How did these forces interact to determine the location of industry? We survey the dynamics of industrial location between 1902 and 1925-1937 and estimate a specification that nests market potential and comparative advantage to quantify their respective impact during the interwar years. The results point to a role for both, comparative advantage and access to markets. We show that both statistically and economically the most important factors were the endowment with skilled labour and inter-industry-linkages.     

Impact of Outward Foreign Direct Investment on Domestic R&D Activity: Evidence from Taiwan's Multinational Enterprises in Low‐wage Countries

This paper theoretically and empirically investigates the home‐country effects of a firm's outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) activity, specifically OFDI motivated by lower labor costs in the host country. A two‐country imperfect competition model is developed, and the interaction between a firm's R&D spending and its OFDI is examined. It is found that the relationship between a firm's OFDI and its domestic R&D is indeterminate because there is a complementary effect as well as a substitution effect induced by OFDI activity. Panel data on Taiwanese manufacturing firms from 1992–2005 are applied to test the validity of the theoretical results. The propensity score matching method is used to construct a comparison group without selection bias. Our empirical evidence reveals that a Taiwanese firm's OFDI is positively related to its domestic R&D spending, particularly in R&D‐intensive industries.     

Does Foreign Direct Investment Affect the Growth of Local Firms？ The Case of China＇s Electrical and Electronics Industry

Does foreign direct investment(FDI) into developing countries affect the growth of local firms in host countries? Using a dataset of 38 sectors in China’s electrical and electronics industry,in this paper,we analyze whether FDI has a positive effect on local firms,with technology spillovers,added value and increasing total factor productivity,or a negative, market stealing,effect.Estimating the relationship between growth of local firms and investment of foreign firms,our results show that FDI is likely to have a negative impact on the growth of local firms in sectors with large disparities in technology and less experience in business.Therefore,local firms lacking in technology need to find markets with no competition from foreign firms or determine strategies to compensate technology disparities.     

THE ECONOMICS OF IMPORT PARITY PRICING: A PEDAGOGICAL NOTE

This paper demonstrates that pricing to import parity is not necessarily prima facie evidence of the exercise of market power. It is shown that in the presence of imports both market structures, perfect competition and monopoly, can price to import parity. If markets can be segmented enabling the firm to discriminate between the export and domestic market it is shown that the imperfectly competitive firm can differentially price. Furthermore, as the number of domestic firms is increased, and if these firms are able to segment the market, the differential between domestic and foreign prices is reduced. The import parity price may or may not be charged in the domestic market. A measure of the exercise of market power is therefore the differential between export parity and the domestic price.