Nonparametric analysis of returns to scale in the US hospital industry

This paper presents new estimates of scale economies for US hospitals. We show that the common translog specification of hospital costs is a misspecification, and employ nonparametric, local linear estimation with both continuous and discrete covariates. A bootstrap method is used to provide inferences regarding ray scale economies and expansion path scale economies for a large sample of hospitals covering 1984–1996. We find evidence of changes in the structure of hospital costs over the sample period, as well as evidence of locally optimal hospital sizes. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Economies of diversification in the US credit union sector

Significant scale economies have been recently cited to rationalize a dramatic growth in the US retail credit union sector over the past few decades. In this paper, we explore another plausible supply‐side explanation for the growth of the industry, namely economies of diversification. We focus on the fact that credit unions differ among themselves in the range of financial services they offer to their members. Since larger credit unions tend to offer a more diversified financial service menu than credit unions of a smaller size, the incentive to grow in size may be fueled not only by present scale economies but also by economies of diversification. This paper provides the first robust estimates of such economies of diversification for the credit union sector. We estimate a flexible semiparametric smooth coefficient quantile panel data model with correlated effects that is capable of accommodating a four‐way heterogeneity among credit unions. Our results indicate the presence of non‐negligible economies of diversification in the industry. We find that as many as 27–91% (depending on the type and the cost quantile) of diversified credit unions enjoy substantial economies of diversification; the cost of most remaining credit unions is invariant to the scope of services. We also find overwhelming evidence of increasing returns to scale in the industry.     

Public spending and economies of scale in partial fiscal decentralized governments: The case of Chile

This article evaluates economies of scale in local public spending in Chile, emphasizing the country's geographical features and high fiscal heterogeneity. We leverage balanced panel data for ten years and 307 municipalities in order to estimate the population level at which a reduction in the average cost of local public goods provision occurs and to differentiate between levels of market potential. We follow a theoretical model of cost efficiency that considers spatial interactions and spillover effects among neighboring jurisdictions. Our findings suggest that Chilean municipalities reach an optimum population level at around 700,000 inhabitants, which is high considering that only two cities qualify. When differentiating for levels of economies of scale according to levels of market potential, municipalities with a low potential reach their optimum at around 28,000 inhabitants, those with a medium potential reach it at approximately 124,000, and those with a high potential reach it at approximately 680,000.     

The interaction between public and private governments: An empirical analysis

Private governments, found in planned developments and condominiums, are increasingly common methods of delivering local services to residents. This paper provides the first empirical study of their impact on local public finance. A novel data set of homeowners' associations allows construction of a panel of private governments in California. Panel methods test whether public expenditures respond to private government prevalence. Estimates indicate that local governments lower spending moderately in response to private government activity, consistent with strategic substitution. The paper then examines various mechanisms to explain this downloading and shows that the substitutability between public and private providers is key to which services are downloaded. Evidence also suggests that the economies of scale in service production in small cities temper the offloading of public services to private governments.     

Reviewing Oates' insights in a repeated game setting

This paper analyzes the optimal assignment of public good policies to layers of a federal system in a repeated game setting. Under a centralized regime, public goods are financed jointly across regions, and a federal legislature decides on the regional quantities. Under a decentralized regime, public goods are financed locally, and governments play a non-cooperative provision game. We find that a centralized (decentralized) regime is more likely to provide the efficient public good policies in case spillovers are small (large). Received: September 2003, Accepted: October 2004 JEL Classification: H11, H41 I wish to thank Clemens Fuest, Anke Kessler, Christoph Lülfesmann, and an anonymous referee for valuable comments on this paper. Financial support by the DFG (SPP 1142) is gratefully acknowledged.     

The Henry George Theorem in a second-best world

The Henry George Theorem (HGT) states that, in first-best economies, the fiscal surplus of a city government that finances the Pigouvian subsidies for agglomeration externalities and the costs of local public goods by a 100% tax on land is zero at optimal city sizes. We extend the HGT to distorted economies where product differentiation and increasing returns are the sources of agglomeration economies and city governments levy property taxes. Without relying on specific functional forms, we derive a second-best HGT that relates the fiscal surplus to the excess burden expressed as an extended Harberger formula.     

The effect of spillovers on the provision of local public goods

This paper analyzes the provision of local public goods with positive spillovers across jurisdictions. If spillovers are symmetric, the non-cooperative game played by jurisdictions admits a unique equilibrium, and an increase in spillovers reduces the total provision of public goods. Smaller jurisdictions always reduce their contribution, but larger jurisdictions can increase their contribution. When spillovers are asymmetric, equilibrium is unique if spillovers are low, while multiple equilibria exist for high spillover values. In the case of two jurisdictions, an increase in the flow of spillovers to one jurisdiction benefits agents from that jurisdiction but harms agents in the other jurisdiction. Beyond the case of two jurisdictions, the effect of changes in spillovers cannot be signed. An increase in the spillovers flowing to a jurisdiction can actually result in an increase in the supply of public goods by that jurisdiction and harm agents residing in it, while benefiting agents in the other jurisdictions. The results of the paper reveal the complexity of interactions that will plague the design of institutions for multijurisdictional local public good economies with spillovers.      

Efficiency in Third Sector Partnerships for Delivering Local Government Services: The role of economies of scale,scope and learning

Abstract

Third sector partnerships are under pressure to change in the light of the increasing cost pressures on local public services. The literature throws doubt on the level of economies of scale and suggests that more attention should be given to economies of scope and learning. The common conflation of economies of size with economies of scale has led policymakers to overemphasize larger scale providers and has distorted the strategies which third sector organizations have adopted, pushing them towards mergers and consortia based on scale.     

Efficiency of Regional Public Investment: An NPV-Based Spatial Econometric Approach

This paper develops a new methodology of spatial econometric modelling for regional public investment in local economies. The approach, based on the financial concept of net present value of cash flows, can be applied in the analysis of regional public investment with long-term financial inputs and outputs. With local public revenues related to spending in the model, one can observe economies of scale of investment with possible saturation effects and a marginal investment multiplier, explaining the extent to which public investment costs translate into public revenues. The main advantage of the proposed model is to behave counter-cyclically due to accumulation over the periods and to cover multi-period investments as well as postponed effects. This paper gives an example of public investment efficiency in Polish NUTS-5 municipalities regions.     

New Public Management and Citizens' Perceptions of Local Service Efficiency,Responsiveness, Equity and Effectiveness

Abstract

We examine the relationship between a range of new public management (NPM) practices and citizens' perceptions of service efficiency, responsiveness, equity and effectiveness in English local governments. We find that public–private relationships have a negative relationship with citizens' perceptions of all four dimensions of local service performance, but an entrepreneurial strategic orientation exhibits a positive association with all four. Performance management is also likely to positively influence rather than negatively influencing citizens' perceptions of local public services. Further analysis revealed that the impact of NPM practices varies according to the level of socio-economic disadvantage confronted by local governments.     

考虑强势零售商压价和投资行为的供应链协调

中国流通产业的零供矛盾日益凸显,针对强势零售商的压价问题构建博弈模型并分析其对供应链协调的影响。在由单制造商和单零售商构成的二级供应链中,考虑零售商在主导产品零售价格的同时,通过增加广告投入或提高服务水平等市场投资措施刺激产品需求,探讨当零售商运用其较强的议价能力对制造商提出的批发价进行强制压价时,双方如何通过合作博弈寻找最佳策略。发现在一定的条件下,强势零售商的压价行为不仅可以提升品牌商誉,更能帮助实现供应链协调。     

The response of decentralized health services to demand uncertainty and the role of political parties in the Spanish public health system

Decentralization of the public health system should lead to health resources being managed more in line with citizens’ preferences. A decentralized system is more flexible in that it can better adapt resources to local needs. Moreover, if regional political parties have responsibility for public health policies, citizens will be able to elect those parties whose positions are more in line with their preferences. However, the role of political parties in public health management has received little attention in the literature. Focusing on the decision to provide reserve service capacity to deal with demand uncertainty, we analyse whether there have been differences between central and decentralized health authorities in Spain and whether these can be explained to some extent by the way different political parties manage the trade-off between being able to cover demand and the economic costs involved. Using data on Spanish public hospitals for the period 1996–2006, we model the difference between observed and potential output using an output-oriented distance function. Reserve capacity is modelled as a function of demand uncertainty, economic costs and the political party in power. We find differences in the way resources are managed by central government and decentralized authorities, even within the same political party. We also find differences between the decentralized authorities themselves according to the political party in power. We conclude that decentralization of public health in Spain has provided regional political authorities with greater flexibility to manage reserve capacity in line with citizens’ needs and preferences.     

多智能体的公租房选址决策体系分析--以武汉市为例

在介绍武汉公租房建设现状的基础上建立一个基于多智能体的公租房选址决策体系,研究地方政府、低收入租户、开发商在武汉市公租房选址建设上的效用函数,模拟出公租房选址决策中各智能体博弈互动最终得到选址方案的过程,为评估公租房选址方案的效果提出了新的途径。     

Big and beautiful? On non-parametrically measuring scale economies in non-convex technologies

Knowledge on the scale economies drives the incentives of regulators, governments and individual utilities to scale-up or scale-down the scale of operations. This paper considers the returns to scale (RTS) in non-convex frontier models. In particular, we evaluate RTS assumptions in a Free Disposal Hull model, which accounts for uncertainty and heterogeneity in the sample. Additionally, we provide a three-step framework to empirically analyze the existence and extent of RTS in real world applications. In a first step, the presence of scale (and scope) economies is verified. Secondly, RTS for individual observations are examined while in a third step we derive the optimal scale for a sector as a whole. The framework is applied to the Portuguese drinking water sector where we find the optimal scale to be situated around 7–10 million m³.     

The challenges of police-community collaboration: identity manoeuvres and power struggles in a neighbourhood based meeting

The turn to collaborative governance is a key feature of the New Public Governance environment in many Western economies. Within the UK, successive governments have mandated policing organizations to engage in public service partnerships and collaborate with communities. This paper examines one such collaborative arrangement, namely, neighbourhood public meetings. Drawing on a theoretical framing of the dynamic relationship between identities, agency and power, we critically explore how individuals seek to persuade, defend and legitimate their values, beliefs and practices in collaborative situations. The paper provides a nuanced exploration of the challenges of collaboration for both public servants and community members.     

Product differentiation,monopolistic competition and city size

Traditionally, the formation of cities has been explained by such supply-side phenomena as scale economies in production or such demand-side phenomena as public goods. This paper presents an integrated demand and supply approach to the formation of cities in spatial economy. Demand considerations, in the form of consumer agglomeration economies (i.e., product variety), are presented as a major cause of urban agglomeration. On the supply side, scale economies are introduced. Both aspects are examined by using the Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition to characterize the equilibrium and optimum city size. We also discuss a subsidy scheme that produces an equilibrium city size corresponding to a first-best optimum. Then we analyze the distribution of population in a system of two cities.     

Debt contracts and cooperative improvements

In this paper, we consider a dynamic game with imperfect information between a borrower and lender who must write a contract to produce a consumption good. In order to analyze the game, we introduce the concept of a coalitional perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (cPBNE). We prove that equilibria exist and are efficient in a precise sense, and that deterministic contracts that resemble debt are optimal for a general class of economies. The cPBNE solution concept captures both the non-cooperative aspect of firm liquidation and the cooperative aspect of renegotiation.     

Aspects of growth in a system of cities

This paper explores and develops the modeling of growth in a system of cities in two alternative settings. First, we examine a large growing economy with a fully developed system of cities with perfectly malleable private and public capital. Local scale economies in production and diseconomies in consumption in equilibrium offset each other at the margin so that from a national point of view we have a constant returns to scale economy. We show that at the steady state the number of cities grows exponentially at the rate of growth of the population. We then examine the impact of technological change, considering a case where public capital is not perfectly malleable. In the second setting, we consider the problem of growth for a small economy and discuss problems associated with the transition to the steady state. We modify the previous model to describe a system of cities that is just starting to develop. Investment in public infrastructure capital is subject to sharp indivisibilities and as a result new cities are built at discrete points in time.     

Technical efficiency,specialization and ownership form: evidences from a pooling of Italian hospitals

We evaluate how the productive structure and level of specialization of a hospital affect technical efficiency by analyzing a six-year panel database (2000/2005) drawn from hospital discharge records and Ministry of Health data. We adopt a distance function approach, while measuring the technical efficiency level with stochastic frontier techniques. After controlling for environmental variables and hospital case-mix, inefficiency is negatively associated with specialization and positively associated with capitalization. Capitalization is typical of private structures which, on average, use resources less efficiently with respect to public and not-for-profit hospitals. Finally, by looking at scale elasticities, we find some evidence of unexploited economies of scale, leaving room for centralization.     

Collaborative cost-cutting: productive efficiency as an interdependency between public organizations

Collaboration between public sector organizations is typically understood as a response to complexity. Agencies collaborate in order to address complex, cross-cutting policy needs that cannot be met individually. However, when organizational size is a constraining factor in public service efficiency, collaboration can also reduce costs by capturing scale economies unavailable to organizations of sub-optimal size. Using organization theory, the article conceptualizes these two different triggers for public sector collaboration, and builds a framework for tracing their wider impact upon the formation, operation, and outcome of inter-agency partnerships. The framework is illustrated, and its implications for future research are explored.