Immigration,Public Education Spending,and Private Schooling

This article examines the impact of immigration on private school enrollment through the mechanism of public education spending. It finds that the immigrant share of population raises private school enrollment across countries by leading to a decrease in the share of public education spending. The decrease is driven by responses to immigrants from culturally similar and developed countries. This suggests that the role of public schools in promoting social cohesion among diverse populations is weighted against other concerns in education funding decisions in places with immigrant populations. The endogeneity of immigrant share is accounted for by using an instrument constructed from gravity model estimates.     

Public investment and reelection prospects in developed countries

A growing body of literature suggests that office‐motivated politicians manipulate fiscal policy instruments to enhance their reelection prospects. This article directly examines the impact of fiscal policy on incumbents’ reelection prospects by focusing on the impact of public investment. This impact is estimated using a panel of 20 countries belonging in Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development over the period 1972–1999. We find that the level of public investment in the earlier years of an incumbent's term in office improves their reelection prospects, whereas election year manipulation of public investment is neither rewarded nor punished. Our evidence also suggests that, after controlling for the level of deficit and public investment, the level of government revenue both in the election and nonelection years does not seem to affect reelection prospects. Moreover, we find that deficit creation during elections and in nonelection years are not rewarded by voters.     

Party Politics,Governors, and Economic Policy

In this article, we evaluate the role of elections in governors' state tax policy making. Does it matter for state taxes whether the governor is a Democrat or Republican and whether she is eligible for re‐election or faces a binding term limit? Using a Regression Discontinuity Design and a panel of U.S. states, we find that the manner in which governors of different parties implement different tax policies turns crucially on the incumbent's eligibility for re‐election. Re‐electable Democratic governors increase income taxes relative to similarly situated Republicans, yielding divergence between party policy positions. However, governors facing a binding term limit exhibit the reverse policy difference, resulting in a movement of policy back together.     

The Max‐Min Group Contest: Weakest‐link (Group) All‐Pay Auction

We investigate a group all‐pay auction in which each group's effort is represented by the minimum among the effort levels exerted by the group members and the prize is a group‐specific public good. We fully characterize the symmetric equilibria for two groups. There are four types of equilibria: the pure strategy equilibria in which all (active) players exert the same effort; the semi‐pure strategy equilibria in which the players in a group play the same pure strategy whereas those in the other group play the same mixed strategy; the nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibria with continuous support; and the nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibria with discontinuous support. We then analyze a general contest with n groups.     

The Impact of Political Influence on Appointees: Evidence from the Small Business Administration Disaster Loan Program

Presidential disaster declarations provide disaster aid through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and are known to be motivated by political factors as well as by need. The extent to which politics influence the Small Business Administration (SBA) disaster declaration decision, made by a presidential appointee, has not been previously measured. We use new data covering 1960–2013 to show that SBA declarations are subject to the same political influences as presidential declarations. Disasters occurring during reelection years, as well as those occurring in electorally important states, are more likely to receive SBA declarations. The effect of politics is stronger in the period prior to the passage of the Stafford Act in 1988, showing that the two types of declarations are substitutes for political purposes.     

Regulating the Anticommons: Insights from Public‐Expenditure Theory

This article offers a new interpretation of the traditional Cournot complements problem, or anticommons, by using the theory of public goods to gain a perspective on the problem. Specifically, I examine the pricing strategies and regulation of multiple monopolies that produce products which consumers view as perfect complements. I show that collusion by the firms increases total social welfare and that the collusion problem can be reinterpreted as a problem of provision of public goods from the point of view of the firms. I take this insight further and derive the familiar concepts of the Samuelson marginal condition and the ratio equilibrium for the firms. I compare these outcomes to the first best solution and then apply incentive‐compatible mechanisms to strategically implement the Pareto superior ratio‐equilibrium outcome and the optimal marginal‐cost pricing outcome. Finally, I show how this methodology can be applied to the more familiar Cournot model of oligopoly.     

Does Allocation of Public Spending Matter in Poverty Reduction? Evidence from Thailand*

The present paper uses a panel dataset to estimate the marginal returns to different types of government expenditure on agricultural growth and rural poverty reduction in Thailand. The study finds that additional government spending on agricultural research provides the largest return in terms of agricultural productivity and has the second largest impact on rural poverty reduction. Increased investment in rural electrification has the largest poverty reduction impact, mainly through improved nonfarm employment. Rural education has the third largest impact on both productivity and poverty reduction. Irrigation has a positive impact on agricultural productivity, but regional variation is considerable. Government spending on rural roads has no significant impact on agricultural productivity and its poverty reduction impact ranks last among all investment alternatives considered. Additional investment in the Northeast Region has a greater impact on poverty reduction than in other regions.     

Contests and the Private Production of Public Goods

The private provision of public goods generally suffers from two types of efficiency failures: sorting problems (the wrong individuals contribute) and quantity problems (an inefficient amount is provided). Embedding the provision game into a contest that rewards larger contributions with higher probabilities of winning a prize may remedy such failures. Applications include tenure decisions at universities, electoral competition among politicians, etc. We identify a tradeoff between the value of the prize and the decisiveness of the contest. High‐powered incentives in contests may cause an overprovision of the public good or wasteful participation of unproductive individuals in the contest.     

Strong Presidential Approval or Disapproval Influencing the Expected Benefits of Voting and the Voter Participation Rate

This empirical study seeks to broaden the interpretation of the rational voter model so as to identify and better understand key determinants of the expected benefits from voting and hence key determinants of the aggregate voter participation rate in the US. Using annual data for all years in the 1960–1997 study period, this study finds that the voter participation rate has been positively impacted by strong public approval or strong public disapproval of the incumbent President, a finding unique to this literature and study period. In addition, the aggregate voter participation rate has been positively impacted by such factors as the Gulf War, which is generally regarded as having been popular among the US electorate, and a rising unemployment rate. This study also finds the voter participation rate to have been negatively impacted by the publics dissatisfaction with government, as well as by the Watergate scandal.The author is indebted to Cassandra Copeland for helpful information, comments, and guidance.     

Corruption Via Media Capture: The Effect of Competition

In this article, we compare a government's optimal choice of whether to engage in corruption by capturing the media outlets through bribery in two alternative media market structures: monopoly versus duopoly. While there is an extra bribe claimant in a media duopoly relative to monopoly, it may also be harder for each firm to individually expose corruption when the rival co‐opts with the government. We find that when the latter effect is stronger than the former, media is captured at lower bribes under duopoly relative to monopoly and in such instances media competition facilitates rather than hindering corruption.     

Compensation for Regulatory Takings with a Redistributive Government

Richard Epstein has argued that governments should pay compensation for regulatory actions that impose costs on a subset of society. I develop a model in which there are two groups, one of whom benefits from a regulation, and one of whom bears the costs. A potentially biased government sets the level of the regulation and also redistributes income across the two social groups via the tax system. When taxes are nondistortionary, the government chooses the efficient level of the regulation to maximize wealth and then uses the tax system to distribute this wealth according to its preferences. If the government is forced to pay compensation for the costs of the regulation, it simply undoes this via the tax and transfer system. When taxes are distortionary, societal wealth is monotonically decreasing in the degree of compensation to be paid, so that the optimal level of compensation is zero.     

Local Intergovernmental Competition and the Law of 1/n

This article proposes an empirical framework based on a synthesis of the seminal “Law of 1/n” and “Leviathan” theories, which models the relationship between government spending and the number of jurisdictions in a federal system as determined by the interplay of the costs related to centralized government (which fall as the number of jurisdictions increases) and the costs of distributive politics (which rise as the number of jurisdictions increases). Using a panel of U.S. state and local government spending data, empirical tests based on this combined framework show that the effect of intergovernmental competition predicted by the Leviathan model is partially offset by the Law of 1/n. This result helps explain the inconsistent findings in the previous empirical literature.     

Determinants of Geographic Differentials in the Voter Participation Rate

Voter participation rates vary widely across the 50 states. This empirical study seeks, within the context of a broadened version of the ‘rational voter model,’ to identify determinants of this interstate variation. Using the 2004 general election as the study period, it is found that the voter participation rate in a state is positively related to the percent of the state's adult population with at least a high school education, the state's unemployment rate, the percent of the state's population age 65 and older, and the female labor force participation rate in the state. In addition, it is found that voter turnout in a state is negatively related to the state's median family income and the percentage of its population that is Hispanic.     

Some Thoughts on the Voting Process

Since the rational voter model was first introduced, the issue of voting determinants has been the subject of extensive study. Moreover, the significance of the democratic process has long been a subject of extensive study and controversy. This study addresses a related pair of issues and offers some challenges for students of voting, the voting process, and the nature of democracy to ponder. The two issues are: (1) what does democracy mean? and (2) which is the best or least bad of these various choices.     

The Political Economy of Public Expenditures in Agriculture: Applications of Concepts to Mozambique

This paper undertakes an investigation of agricultural public investments in Mozambique, drawing on insights from qualitative field interviews conducted in Mozambique, secondary data analysis and examination of the existing empirical literature, and by situating these insights within a political economy conceptual framework. We explore the driving factors behind the amount and allocation of public funds to agriculture, and behind the differential attention that various types of public investments receive in the process of making decisions on resource allocation. Agricultural public investments are more likely to be made that have two key features: higher attributability to politicians and donors of the output of public spending, and a shorter lag time between expenditures incurred and outputs produced. Evidence on geographical targeting of agricultural public funds corresponds more closely with theories suggesting that resources are used to sway communities opposed to the ruling party, rather than to reward political supporters. Examination of the effect of actors' and organisations' incentives and constraints on resource allocation in agriculture points to the importance of not treating “government,” “the ruling party” and other institutions as monolithic bodies; the paper instead highlights how differentiated interests within seemingly coherent institutions drive what gets public expenditure attention in the agricultural sector.     

Public Spending Management and Macroeconomic Interdependence

This paper studies the domestic and international effects of “public competition policies” aimed at improving the efficiency of public spending. Such measures are modeled as an increase in the price elasticity of public consumption. The paper finds that public competition policies significantly affect macroeconomic interdependence across countries, both through the impact of the international elasticity of substitution and of mark-up effects. The paper also develops an extension in which fiscal shocks are stochastic. In welfare terms, countries with a larger government sector have an incentive to promote global public competition policies regardless of whether fiscal policy is modeled as deterministic or stochastic.

Contribution Limits and Transparency in a Campaign Finance Experiment

We experimentally compare electoral outcomes when donor contribution limits are varied. The effect of contribution limits is studied under three levels of transparency: one where donors' preferences and donations are unobserved by the candidate and public; one where they are observed by the candidate but not the public; and one where they are observed by all. We find that a combination of stricter contribution limits and full transparency is most successful at limiting donors' influence on policy choice. We also find that stricter contribution limits improve social welfare in some treatments. We further find that the partial and no anonymity settings lead to “centrist bias,” whereby implemented policies, on average, are more centrist than the candidate's preferences in most treatments.     

When Identifying Contributors is Costly: An Experiment on Public Goods

Studies show that identifying contributors increases contributions to public goods. In practice, viewing identifiable information is costly, which may discourage people from accessing it. We design a public goods experiment in which participants can pay to view information about identities and contributions of group members. We compare this to a treatment in which there is no identifiable information, and a treatment in which all contributors are identified. Our main findings are that: (i) contributions in the treatment with costly information are as high as those in the treatment with free information, (ii) participants rarely choose to view the information, and (iii) being a high contributor is correlated with choosing to view information about others.     

WTO规则中的“贸易悖论”及其内在机理分析

依据国际贸易中的比较优势理论，WTO坚持自由贸易原则，认为只要以比较优势为基础进行自由贸易，就可以使本国国民的福利增加，产生“蛋糕增大效应”。但在现实的国际贸易中存在各种各样的限制，形成了贸易规则中的悖论。文章在分析贸易悖论的形成及其表现的基础上，从国家利益、利益集团、强权政治等方面揭示贸易悖论存在的根源，为我们清楚认识WTO规则提供一种批判的视角。     

Does Manufacturer Advertising Crowd‐in or Crowd‐out Retailer Advertising? An Application of an Endogenous Prize Contest with Asymmetric Players

When a manufacturer advertises, what is the impact on retailer advertising? I analyze a contest model of advertising where total advertising by the manufacturer and by retailers determines market size, and the relative level of advertising by each retailer determines market share. If retailers are symmetric I show that there is a crowding‐in effect so increased manufacturer advertising increases retail advertising. But if one retailer is stronger, then marginal increases in manufacturer advertising have a crowding‐out effect on retailer advertising, while sufficiently large increases have a crowding‐in effect by “jump‐starting” competition between retailers for the larger market. Furthermore, asymmetric abilities in such contests can lead the weaker player to effectively drop out of the contest, thereby undermining the ability of increased prizes to increase effort by intensifying competition.