The decentralization tradeoff for complementary spillovers

In this article, we examine how centralization and decentralization internalize positive spillovers of local public expenditures when a spill-in from foreign spending is not a substitute, but a complement to domestic spending. Specifically, we assume the production of two district-specific public goods out of two complementary district-specific inputs in a taste-symmetric two-district setting. We compare equilibria in non-cooperative decentralization and cooperative centralization for different spillovers, degrees of complementarity and cost-division rules, and control for the effects of strategic delegation and the feasibility of cross subsidies to the input in the foreign district. We find that centralization welfare-dominates decentralization in most institutional settings and for a wide range of parameters. Yet, we also identify conditions for decentralization to welfare-dominate centralization even in our setup where preferences are homogenous. The setup features three structural novelties: Strategic delegation improves provision and welfare in decentralization. In the absence of cross-district transfers, decentralized provision and welfare increase in spillovers. Welfare in centralization is generally non-monotonic in spillovers.     

Corruption, decentralization and yardstick competition

Several empirical studies have found a negative relationship between corruption and the decentralization of the powers to tax and spend. In this paper we explain this phenomenon using a model of Yardstick Competition. Using data on federal corruption-related convictions in U.S. states, we also provide new evidence that points to the existence of a spatial autoregressive component to explaining corruption. We interpret this as consistent with the theoretical findings.     

Non-Walrasian decentralization of the core

We show that in large finite economies, core allocations can be approximately decentralized as Nash (rather than Walras) equilibrium. We argue that this exercise is an essential complement to asymptotic core equivalence results, because it implies that in some approximate sense individual attempts to manipulate the decentralizing prices cannot be beneficial, which fits precisely the interpretation of asymptotic core convergence, namely the emergence of price taking.     

Complementarity,fiscal decentralization and economic growth

Theories of the voluntary provision of public goods and development economics have clarified that complementarity in the production process is a crucial ingredient to understanding how alternative economic environments affect economic performance. This paper examines how the structures of intra- and inter-regional complementarity affect the relationship between economic growth and fiscal decentralization. We provide a theory that describes how fiscal decentralization affects economic growth under various structures of regional complementarity. Our empirical analysis, based on a panel data set of the fifty states of the United States over the period of 1992–1997, supports our theoretical specification of the production function. Also, we observe a hump-shaped relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth that is consistent with our theoretical result. Our analysis also shows that the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization conducive to economic growth is higher than the average of the data in some cases, and hence further decentralization is recommended for economic growth. The previous version of the paper was presented at the 59th Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance (University of Economics in Prague, Prague), the 2003 Fall Meeting of the Japanese Economic Association (Meiji University, Tokyo), the 60th Annual Meeting of the Japanese Institute of Public Finance (Kansai University, Osaka), and in seminars at Yokohama National University and the University of California, Irvine. The authors acknowledge the comments and discussions by people including Timothy Goodspeed, Kiyoshi Mitsui, Motohiro Sato, Etsuro Shioji, Tsunao Okumura, and Craig Parsons. We are also grateful for the comments by the Editor (Amihai Glazer) and two anonymous referees. The usual disclaimer applies. Nishimura acknowledges the financial support from JSPS (Japan Society for the Promotion of Science) Postdoctoral Fellowships for Research Abroad.     

The welfare economics of city bigness

Money wages will vary among cities in an economy with perfect labor mobility, due to differences in costs of producing nontraded goods. Commuting costs contribute to making money wages higher in large cities. Increasing negative technological externalities, such as pollution and congestion, also make money wages higher in larger cities. Such externalities tend to make big cities too big, because marginal is greater than average externality. Internalizing the externalities would be likely to make a city larger if the externalities emanate from production of nontraded goods, but might make the city smaller if the externalities emanate from export production.     

The economics of diamond price movements

Diamonds are traditionally classified into three different market segments —industrial, jewellery and investment. The empirical findings support the argument that diamond prices of these three group types respond differently to business cycles. Industrial diamond prices, especially those of natural stones, have been found to be influenced by the level of economic activity in general and the volume of manufacturing production in partiular. However, the price of synthetic diamonds, especially in grit form, have declined irrespective of the business cycle as a result of technological developments and the expansion of the market which enabled producers to gait scale advantages. Prices of jewellery diamonds have been found to be most highly correlated with disposable income. As could be expected, these price have also been found to be positively correlated with inflation rates and negatively correlated with real interest rates. Prices of investment diamonds have been found to be particularly sensitive to real interest rates, to the value of the exchange rates of the US dollar and, like other gems, to disposable income. The paper also describes and discusses the activity in various diamond markets and the business policy of De Beers, the ‘king’ of the rough diamonds.     

The public economics of self control

This paper analyzes self-control problems in intertemporal consumption of a sin good where current consumption imposes a negative externality on one’s future selves due to the existence of present-biased preferences. We introduce the negative externality dubbed ‘internality’, which is augmented by the cumulative distribution function of the sum of previous consumption. We show that the shot-run self with self-control problem over consumes the sin good compared to that of the long-run self without present-biased preferences. Further, we investigate the effectiveness of self-bargaining with the presence of an external control devise as possible punishment. The short-run self faces three possible options: do nothing, accept the long-run self’s offer, or reject the offer. In the latter case an external control devices is implemented. It is shown that successful self-bargaining depends on the efficiency of the control device.

The greening of British politics?

The spectacular success of the British Greens in winning 15% of the vote in the 1989 elections for the European parliament contrasts starkly with their previous failures. The turnaround in their fortunes is attributable in part to increasing awareness of environmental issues, both domestic and global, but especially to changes in the state of party competition: the collapse of the Liberal and Social Democratic Alliance, the unpopularity and negative campaign of the Conservative party, and the Labour party's abandonment of unilateral nuclear disarmament, all exacerbated by low turnout in an election for a parliament few Britons knew or cared much about. It is likely, however, that in a general election more usual conditions of political competition will obtain and that, because of the disciplines of the British electroal system, the Greens' success of 1989 will not be repeated in national elections.     

The politics of Europe 2002: flexibility and adjustment

The European Union entered a new phase of integration in 2002. The single currency, the European Convention, and enlargement signalled progress. The conflict over the Stability and Growth Pact, the tensions between the member states, and the political turmoil in a number of core countries suggested retreat. This paper examines the resulting pattern of integration. It argues that the European Union is becoming more legalistic than leader‐oriented, and that it rests on common principles rather than accepting the imposition of some grand design. Such a European Union cannot challenge the United States for global leadership. But it is likely to prove stable nonetheless.     

The economics of netting in financial networks

Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination - Can the netting of on-balance-sheet interbank assets and liabilities be useful in thwarting financial contagion during a systemic crisis episode?...     

The economics of defence g labour markets

This article considers recent trends in the size of the Armed Forces and reviews the economics of military manpower. The transition from military to civilian employment and the employment experience of redundant defence workers are considered.     

财经法纪审计的重点与方法

在我国经济高速发展的过程中,重大违法违纪行为不断发生,加强财经法纪审计具有重大的意义。财经法纪审计主要是揭发、清查、处理违法违纪行为,这需要审计人员掌握一定的审计方法,具备特别的技能。     

The economics of defence industry mergers and J c divestitures

High profile mergers in the 1990s have reduced major defence competitors to three in the USA and may evoke corresponding European consolidation and international mergers. The mergers may reduce capacity and help achieve economies of scale, but pose cost, quality and innovation concerns and have undermined diversification, conversion and civil/military integration. Expectations of enhanced political influence and short-term financial returns as well as new, perverse government incentives help to explain why the mergers have occurred. Greater international cooperation, specialisation and trade and better analysis of the defence industrial base are recommended as antidotes for the negative impacts of the mergers.