养老保险统筹层次收入再分配系数及全国统筹类型研究

本文从社会统筹养老保险的收入再分配功能入手,根据养老金计发办法及约束因素,提出“基础养老金收入再分配系数”原理和数理模型,据此延伸出分层平均统筹类型与分比例统筹类型下全国统筹各方案,测算全国统筹各方案下的收入再分配系数并依据希克斯改进、生存公平、劳动公平三种检验,评估全国统筹各方案的收入再分配效果。研究表明：选择方案5（10%替代率中央统筹分比例统筹类型）作为养老保险全国统筹起步方案,实现了适度的收入再分配,可以稳妥地衔接地区之间的利益关系,实现省级统筹向全国统筹的合理对接。     

Local income redistribution: A club-theoretic analysis

This paper analyzes optimal income redistribution in a club model where interclub transfers are ruled out (redistribution must proceed on a local level in heterogeneous clubs). This assumption induces a trade-off between equity and efficiency in that the efficiency loss associated with club heterogeneity must be borne in order for redistribution to occur. The optimal club structure depends on society's evaluation of this trade-off.     

Business cycles and redistribution: The role of government quality

We study how government quality mediates the relationship between business cycles and redistribution. Our key hypothesis is that the potential of income redistribution to reduce rising inequality levels after an economic crisis depends on government quality. The empirical evidence based on a panel of 46 countries over the period 1996–2016 lends strong support to this hypothesis. We find that macroeconomic recessions promote redistribution of income in high government quality contexts, but they lead to wider economic inequalities in countries with poor quality of government.     

我国城镇居民初次分配和再分配收入差距的来源及贡献比较

本文测算了改革开放以来我国城镇居民收入差距,并利用收入来源分解基尼系数法对初次分配和再分配收入差距的来源及其对城镇居民收入差距的贡献进行了比较。研究表明,持续扩大的初次分配收入差距是城镇居民收入差距的主要因素,再分配收入对城镇居民收入差距逆向调节。城镇居民收入分配机制还有较大改革空间。本文对此作了实证分析并给出了政策建议。     

VOTING, INEQUALITY AND REDISTRIBUTION

Abstract.  This paper surveys models of voting on redistribution. Under reasonable assumptions, the baseline model produces an equilibrium with the extent of redistributive taxation chosen by the median income earner. If the median is poorer than average, redistribution is from rich to poor, and increasing inequality increases redistribution. However, under different assumptions about the economic environment, redistribution may not be simply rich to poor, and inequality need not increase redistribution. Several lines of argument are presented, in particular, political participation, public provision of private goods, public pensions, and tax avoidance or evasion.     

Family size and social utility: income distribution dominance criteria

"This paper generalizes previous results on income distribution dominance in the case where the population of income recipients is broken down into groups with distinct utility functions. The example taken here is that of income redistribution across families of different sizes. The paper first investigates the simplest assumptions that can be made about family utility functions. A simple dominance criterion is then derived under the only assumptions that family functions are increasing and concave with income and the marginal utility of income increases with family size."     

JUSTIFICATIONS FOR REDISTRIBUTION: A CRITIQUE

It is striking that there are so many theoretical justifications of redistribution by government. Is it because each single justification is weak? I review and criticise the various arguments advanced in the literature. The main distinctions are between (a) Paretian justifications asserting that all, including the net payers, benefit from redistribution, (b) theories of justice and (c) utilitarianism. My conclusion is that redistribution ought to be based on Paretian arguments as far as possible and that helping the poor is more likely to maximise the happiness of all than is a general levelling of income differences.     

A Syllogism for the Small Farm

A bstract . Access to the land for low-income households has long been considered a contributing factor to political stability. The reasoning behind this hypothesis can be given the form of a deductive argument whose premises assert implications that link greater real income with greater well-being for the poor ; greater well-being with greater political acquiescence of the poor; greater real income of the poor with a greater downward redistribution of wealth ; and greater political acquiescence with greater governability of the poor. The kinds of productive activities which will satisfy these implications are those involved in subsistence farming. From the premises the conclusion follows that greater governability of the poor is a consequence of the greater downward redistribution of wealth that accompanies subsistence farming.     

Are intellectual property rights unfair?

If redistribution is distortionary, and if the income of skilled workers is due to knowledge-intensive activities and depends positively on intellectual property, a social planner which cares about income distribution may in principle want to use a reduction in intellectual property rights (IPRs) rather than redistributive transfers. On the one hand, such a reduction reduces static inefficiency. On the other hand, standard redistribution also reduces the level of R and D because it distorts occupational choice. We study this possibility in the context of a model with horizontal innovation, where the government, in addition to taxes and transfers, controls the fraction of innovations that are granted patents. The model predicts that standard redistribution always dominates limitations to IPRs.     

Trust in government and its effect on preferences for income redistribution and perceived tax burden

This paper explores how trust in government shared by neighbors is associated with individual preferences for income redistribution and individual perceptions regarding income tax burden. Using individual-level data from Japan, a nation with shared homogenous racial and cultural backgrounds, this paper controls for unobservable heterogeneity among Japan’s population, thus reducing estimation bias. Three measures for trust in government are used: “trust in ministries and government agencies”, “trust in diet members”, and “trust in members of municipal councils”. After controlling for individual characteristics, the key findings are: (1) people are more likely to express preferences for income redistribution when trust in government in their residential area is high; (2) people are more likely to perceive their tax burden as low when trust in government in their residential area is high; and (3) when the sample is divided into people with above average income and those with below average income, these results are only clearly observed for people with above average income and not those with below average income.     

Inequity-averse preferences in general equilibrium

We study the stability with respect to the introduction of opportunity-based inequity aversion à la Dufwenberg et al. (2011) of three welfare properties satisfied by competitive equilibria in self-regarding economies: (i) Pareto efficiency may not be a stable property; (ii) undomination with respect to income redistribution is a stable property whenever the marginal indirect utility of income has no extreme variations; and (iii) generically (endowment-wise) market-constrained efficiency is a stable property.     

Fairness,One's Source of Income,and Others' Decisions: An Ultimatum Game Experiment

In an ultimatum game experiment, this paper studies the effects of the proposer's source of income, earned income and unearned income, on the responder's decision to accept or reject the proposer's offer. The results show that as the earned‐income fraction increases, the responder tends to accept a lower offer. The results have implications for other types of behavior such as the demand for redistribution. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A principal-agent model of altruistic redistribution,with some implications for fiscal federalism

Economists may have taken an unduly limited view of the role that subnational governments (states, counties, cities) ought to play in the redistribution of income. When information is incomplete, subnational redistribution may reduce agency costs. A principal-agent model is proposed, in which taxpayers want to redistribute only to the deserving poor, where deservingness is defined in terms of an unobservable, effort, and an imperfectly observed stochastic shock. In the resulting equilibria, the taxpayer’s optimal benefit strategies are shown to be inconsistent with uniformity of benefit in a large country.     

Redistribution and the Nature of Altruism: Should Welfare Programs be Centralized or Decentralized?

Decentralization of income redistribution may lead to policy competition between jurisdictions and therefore underprovision of redistribution. The ability to carry out redistribution programs is therefore an argument in favor of allocating this responsibility to some higher level authority. On the other hand, empirical results show that the taste for redistribution is lower in multi-ethnic jurisdictions than in more homogenous ones. Centralized redistribution may encompass a larger number of ethnic minorities, and thereby negatively affect redistribution programs. The present paper models the trade-off between these two forces and argues that this trade-off will depend on the nature of altruistic preferences. We would like to thank two anonymous referees for constructive comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies. We would also like to thank Ruhrgas AG for financial support, and Wissenschaftzentrum Berlin (WZB) for hosting us during the summer of 2003, when this paper was written.     

Property Tax Circuit-breakers: Good Causes but Bad Economics

A bstract . Since 1965, 30 states and the District of Columbia have enacted programs designed to reduce the effective rate of property taxation for some low income households and for the elderly. Most often this relief is provided by so-called "circuit-breakers." It is contended that the economic arguments favoring circuit-breakers are empirically unproven and theoretically suspect. The tax may be progressive , not regressive , and the device may transfer income from low to high income households. Any short run redistribution of income to favor the poor or the elderly would, in the long run, merely shift the timing of their tax payments. Circuit-breakers encourage over-consumption of housing and misallocation of housing resources. Reducing the tax base, they produce higher rates and so increase the tax burden.     

Universal Basic Income and Work in Catholic Social Thought

Catholic social thought (CST) has obvious resonance with universal basic income proposals, due to the tradition’s insistence on basic needs as human rights, comfort with government redistribution, and preference for programs that promote the agency of individuals and local communities, among other similarities. However, some CST scholars believe basic income challenges dearly held values of the tradition. This essay examines both views, concluding that basic income can comport with CST’s view of work, correctly understood.     

Look before you leap: Why politicians may have a point to be hesitant about the gains from trade

Economists emphasize the welfare gains of unrestricted trade, but politicians worry about the income distribution effects of increased competition. We show that the welfare gains of a trade shock become ambiguous if inaccurate information hinders optimal income redistribution with distortionary policy instruments. To be sure about the net welfare outcome of a compensated trade shock, the government must know the size of the trade shock and the corresponding size of the policy instrument that is needed to generate a balanced budget. If this is not the case, politicians may have a point when being hesitant about the gains from trade.     

Bilateral redistribution

We explore the implications of three basic and intuitive axioms for income redistribution problems: continuity, no transfer paradox and stability. The combination of the three axioms characterizes in the two-agent case a large family of rules, which we call threshold rules. For each level of total income in society, a threshold is considered for each agent. It is impossible for both agents to be below their respective thresholds. If an agent’s income is below the threshold, the difference is redistributed from the other agent; otherwise, the rule imposes laissez-faire.     

Central-city income redistribution and the flight to the suburbs: A stylized model

This paper characterizes the optimal tax policy of a central-city government whose goal is to redistribute income from the rich to the poor to maximize the intertemporal utility of the latter group. Since redistribution erodes the tax base by stimulating suburban flight on the part of the rich, choosing the optimal path for the income tax rate is a problem in optimal control. The nature of the solution to the problem is shown to depend crucially on the level of the discount rate and the time path of exogenous income for the poor.     

Welfare targeting in networks

This paper investigates welfare targeting for public goods in networks. First, we show that a tax/subsidy scheme (not necessarily budget-balanced) affects each consumer only insofar as it affects his neighbourhood. Second, we show that either a Pareto-improving income redistribution can be found or there exist Negishi weights, which we relate to the network structure. Third, in the case of Cobb–Douglas preferences, we show that a Law of Welfare Targeting holds and links two well-known notions of the comparative statics of policy interventions: neutrality and welfare paradoxical effects. Collectively, our findings uncover the importance of the $-1$ eigenvalue to economic and social policy: it is an indication of how consumers absorb the impact of income redistribution.