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1.
STEPHEN M. CALABRESE 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2007,9(2):319-334
Federal, state, and many local governments make decisions that involve taxation, redistribution, and provision of public goods. Positive models to study these issues encounter the well‐known problem that majority‐voting equilibrium (MVE) may fail to exist in such multidimensional models. In this paper, with reasonable restrictions on preferences, I provide sufficient conditions for the existence of an MVE in a model with linear income tax and government expenditure policies that affect individual labor/leisure choices. My majority‐voting result takes account of the possibility that low‐skill individuals will drop out of the labor force under some tax and expenditure configurations. 相似文献
2.
In models of local public goods with mobile consumers, existence of equilibrium is problematic. Difficulties with existence of equilibrium that arise in models with discrete locations and in models with voting are compounded when both features are introduced into the same model. We present conditions under which equilibrium exists in a model where freely mobile households choose community of residence and amount of housing consumption, and vote on the level of public goods provision. These conditions involve restrictions on preferences and the technology of public goods supply. At least some of these conditions appear consistent with empirical observations. We discuss the implications of the conditions, and their role in assuring existence of equilibrium. A series of computational examples provide illustrations of the way these conditions interact, and the difficulties that must be confronted if they are to be relaxed. 相似文献
3.
Research on voting, particularly on legislative behavior, tends to focus on the choices of those casting ballots. Yet, intuitively, abstentions and vote choice should be jointly determined. As such, the relevance of participation depends upon both the extent to which it can be explained by the costs and the benefits of voting and on the nature of the interactions between participation and preferences. To this end, we provide a framework for explaining roll call behavior that simultaneously considers legislators' decisions about whether and how to vote. Application to roll call voting in the 104th Congress finds that abstention and voting choices are integrated; our approach generates sensible and substantively important results which yield important insights into legislative behavior and public policy. 相似文献
4.
文章采用一般均衡研究方法,通过构建一个参与式公共服务供给模型,从反面证明了我国目前公共服务供给模式低效的基本事实,而且在迁移成本很小或可忽略不计的假设下,居民会通过"用脚投票"自行配置公共服务资源。文章还使用上海某区4个街道的问卷调查数据,运用拉丁方方差分析法检验理论模型的结论,检验结果支持理论模型的结论。文章最后根据我国国情给出提高我国公共服务供给效率和质量的若干建议。 相似文献
5.
Endogenous Firm Objectives 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We analyze the behavior of a monopolistic firm in general equilibrium when the firm's decisions are taken through shareholder voting. We show that, depending on the underlying distribution, rational voting may imply overproduction as well as underproduction, relative to the efficient level. Any initial distribution of shares is an equilibrium, if individuals do not recognize their influence on voting when trading shares. However, when they do, and there are no short–selling constraints, the only equilibrium is the efficient one. With short–selling constraints typically underproduction occurs. It is not market power itself causing underproduction, but the inability to perfectly trade the rights to market power. 相似文献
6.
Bandwagons and Momentum in Sequential Voting 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
STEVEN CALLANDER 《The Review of economic studies》2007,74(3):653-684
In this paper I show that an equilibrium exists to the sequential voting game in which a bandwagon begins with probability 1. These bandwagons are driven by a combination of beliefs and the desire of voters to vote for the winning candidate. Significantly, in this equilibrium the pivot probability for each voter is non-zero, even in an infinite population. Consequently, the bandwagons do not always start after one (or at most two) favourable decisions (as do economic cascades) and varying levels of informative voting are observed, consistent with observations from sequential voting in U.S. presidential primaries. Further, voters are exposed to counterintuitive incentives, referred to as "buyers' remorse", that have been attributed to real primary voters.
I also derive equilibrium behaviour in this environment when voting is simultaneous and compare the quality of information aggregation within each mechanism. I relate the conclusions to U.S. presidential primaries and find they are consistent with a common conclusion about the front-loading of the primary process: that in tight elections (with no front-runner) simultaneous voting is preferred, whereas in lopsided elections sequential voting is preferred. The superior performance of sequential voting in lopsided races is precisely because bandwagons occur. 相似文献
I also derive equilibrium behaviour in this environment when voting is simultaneous and compare the quality of information aggregation within each mechanism. I relate the conclusions to U.S. presidential primaries and find they are consistent with a common conclusion about the front-loading of the primary process: that in tight elections (with no front-runner) simultaneous voting is preferred, whereas in lopsided elections sequential voting is preferred. The superior performance of sequential voting in lopsided races is precisely because bandwagons occur. 相似文献
7.
BENJAMIN ZYCHER 《Contemporary economic policy》1988,6(3):42-59
The various deregulation proposals for the electric utility sector rely on market forces to provide incentives. Even within the traditional regulatory framework, using market behavior instead of regulators' views as a criterion for regulatory decisions is part of the spectrum of deregulation proposals. This paper proposes such an implicit deregulation of rate base decisions. It presents an efficiency standard with which public utility commissions (PUCs) should conduct their "prudence" analyses of power plant construction costs. Prudence reviews, as typically conducted by PUCs, are likely to change the risk structure in regulated sectors so as to make both ratepayers and shareholders worse off. Moreover, the correct perspective for such analyses is ex ante rather than ex post. This means that the expected costs and benefits of alternative actions are the correct parameters for evaluating prudence, and that the interests of ratepayers are consistent only with this economic efficiency approach to prudence analysis. Average industry behavior is the correct standard for implementing the efficient prudence criterion. This paper describes an alternative procedure that PUCs can use to conduct prudence reviews correctly. 相似文献
8.
This paper constructs a simple model to examine decisions on public and private health spending under majority voting. In the model, agents with heterogeneous incomes choose how much to consume and spend on health care and vote for public health expenditure. The health status of an agent is determined by a CES composite of public and private health expenditure. The existence and uniqueness of the voting equilibrium are established. A quantitative exercise reveals the importance of the relative effectiveness of public and private health expenditure and their substitutability in determining the public‐private mix of health expenditure and in accounting for the observed differences across a sample of 22 advanced democratic countries. 相似文献
9.
Arianna Degan 《International Economic Review》2007,48(2):457-482
This article develops and estimates a dynamic spatial model of voting. The distribution of voters' policy positions and candidates' valence are recovered using individual‐level data on voting decisions in two consecutive presidential elections. The estimated model is used to provide an equilibrium interpretation of observed individual voting profiles and aggregate electoral outcomes as well as to conduct counterfactual experiments that assess the impact of candidates' policy positions, valence, and voters' information on electoral outcomes. 相似文献
10.
Anders Olofsgård 《The Scandinavian journal of economics》2012,114(1):200-227
To avoid strikes and to curb labour militancy, some governments have introduced legislation stating that union leadership as well as wage offers should be decided through union‐wide ballots. This paper shows that members still have incentives to appoint militant union leaders, if these leaders have access to information critical for the members’ voting decisions. Furthermore, conflicts may arise in equilibrium even though the contract zone is never empty and there is an option to resolve any incomplete information. Ballot requirements hence preclude neither militant union bosses nor inefficient conflicts. 相似文献
11.
Existence of equilibrium and stratification in local and hierarchical Tiebout economies with property taxes and voting 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Thomas. J. Nechyba 《Economic Theory》1997,10(2):277-304
Summary. This paper present the first fully closed general equilibrium model of hierarchical and local public goods economies with
the following features: (i) multiple agent types who are endowed with both some amount of private good (income) and a house,
who are mobile between houses and jurisdictions, and who vote in local and national elections; (ii) multiple communities that
finance a local public good through property taxes which are set in accordance with absolute majority rule; and (iii) a national
government that produces a national public good financed through an income tax whose level is determined through majority
rule voting. In contrast to previous models, no overly restrictive assumptions on preferences and technologies are required
to prove the existence of an equilibrium in the presence of property taxation and voting. Thus, the existence of an equilibrium
is proved without any of the major restrictions used in the past, and sufficient conditons for stratification of agents into
communities based on their public good preferences and their wealth levels are found. This model lays the groundwork for a
positive applied analysis of local public finance and intergovernmental relations. It furthermore builds the foundation for
the first parameterized computable general equilibrium model of local public goods and fiscal federalism.
Received: February 1, 1996; revised version August 9, 1996 相似文献
12.
Most of the voting models limit their analysis to the investigation of symmetric equilibria where “similar” voters make “similar” voting decisions. In this paper we examine the validity of this restriction in a model with costly plurality voting. We first show that in any pure strategy equilibrium every two individuals who have the same preferences and participate in elections, would vote for the same candidate. However, this result does not hold for mixed strategies equilibria. 相似文献
13.
Mass Media Competition, Political Competition, and Public Policy 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
David Strömberg 《The Review of economic studies》2004,71(1):265-284
If better informed voters receive favourable policies, then mass media will affect policy because mass media provide most of the information people use in voting. This paper models the incentives of the media to deliver news to different groups. The increasing-returns-to-scale technology and advertising financing of media firms induce them to provide more news to large groups, such as taxpayers and dispersed consumer interests, and groups that are valuable to advertisers. This news bias alters the trade-off in political competition and therefore introduces a bias in public policy. The paper also discusses the effects of broadcast media replacing newspapers as the main information source about politics. The model predicts that this change should raise spending on government programmes used by poor and rural voters. 相似文献
14.
《Journal of public economics》2006,90(6-7):959-981
Few empirical strategies have been developed that investigate public provision under majority rule while taking explicit account of the constraints implied by mobility of households. The goal of this paper is to improve our understanding of voting in local communities when neighborhood quality depends on peer or neighborhood effects. We develop a new empirical approach which allows us to impose all restrictions that arise from locational equilibrium models with myopic voting simultaneously on the data generating process. We can then analyze how close myopic models come in replicating the main regularities about expenditures, taxes, sorting by income and housing observed in the data. We find that a myopic voting model that incorporates peer effects fits all dimensions of the data reasonably well. 相似文献
15.
Recent trade models determine the equilibrium distribution of firm‐level efficiency endogenously and show that freer trade shifts the distribution towards higher average productivity because of entry and exit of firms. These models ignore the possibility that freer trade also alters the firm‐size distribution via international firm migration (offshoring); firms must, by assumption, produce in their “birth nation.” We show that when firms are allowed to switch locations, new productivity effects arise. Freer trade induces the most efficient small‐nation firms to move to the large nation. The large country gets an “extra helping” of the most efficient firms while the small nation's firm‐size distribution is truncated on both ends. This reinforces the large‐nation productivity gain while reducing or even reversing the small‐nation productivity gain. The small nation is nevertheless better off allowing firm migration. 相似文献
16.
This paper develops a dynamic structural model of migration decisions that is aggregated to describe the behavior of interregional migration. Our structural approach allows us to deal with dynamic self-selection problems that arise from the endogeneity of location choice and the persistence of migration incentives. The self-selection problem is solved by keeping track of the distribution of migration incentives over time. This econometric treatment has important consequences for the estimation of structural parameters such as migration costs. For US interstate migration, we obtain a cost estimate of roughly two-thirds of an average annual household income. We also show that the treatment of income persistence has important consequences for comparative statics of the model as well as microeconomic age patterns of migration. 相似文献
17.
通过构建不完全契约理论下的一般均衡模型,对比分析了PPP模式中的融资约束和融资激励对公共产品提供效率和社会福利的影响,并探讨了融资约束条件下的效率损失。结果显示:私人融资的专业性可以提高公共产品合意程度,但是私人部门的融资约束会抵消其专业性带来的好处,导致社会福利损失。最后针对民营企业参与PPP项目对政府提出建议:必须打破融资约束和制度歧视,完善和规范金融市场,在公平、竞争的市场环境下引入专业机构参与公共产品提供的各个领域。 相似文献
18.
Kirill Borissov Joseph Hanna Stphane Lambrecht 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2019,21(6):1221-1265
We study a parametric politico‐economic model of economic growth with productive public goods and public consumption goods. The provision of public goods is funded by a proportional tax. Agents are heterogeneous in their initial capital endowments, discount factors, and the relative weights of public consumption in overall private utility. They vote on the shares of public goods in gross domestic products (GDP). We propose a definition of voting equilibrium, prove the existence and provide a characterization of voting equilibria, and obtain a closed‐form solution for the voting outcomes. Also we introduce a “fictitious” representative agent and interpret the outcome of voting as a choice made by a central planner for his benefit. Finally, we undertake comparative static analysis of the shares of public goods in GDP and of the rate of balanced growth with respect to the discount factors and the preferences for public consumption. The results of this analysis suggest that the representative‐agent version of our model is capable of capturing the interaction between many voting heterogeneous agents only if the heterogeneity is one‐dimensional. 相似文献
19.
This paper examines whether the voter with the median income is decisive in local spending decisions. Previous tests have relied on cross-sectional data while we make use of a pair of California referenda to estimate a first difference specification. The referenda proposed to lower the required vote share for passing local educational bonding initiatives from 67 to 50% and 67 to 55%, respectively. We find that voters rationally consider future public service decisions when deciding how to vote on voting rules. However, the empirical evidence strongly suggests that an income percentile below the median is decisive for majority voting rules, especially in communities that have a large share of high-income voters with attributes that suggest low demand for public services. Based on a model that explicitly recognizes that each community contains voters with both high and low demand for public school spending, we also find that an increase in the share of low demand voters is associated with a lower decisive voter income percentile for the high demand group. This two type model implies that our low demand types (individuals over age 45 with no children) have demands that are 45% lower than other voters. Collectively, these findings are consistent with high-income voters with weak preferences for public educational services voting with the poor against increases in public spending on education. 相似文献
20.
Kent D. Messer Gregory L. Poe Daniel Rondeau William D. Schulze Christian A. Vossler 《Journal of public economics》2010,94(3-4):308-317
Public referenda are frequently used to determine the provision of public goods. As public programs have distributional consequences, a compelling question is what impact, if any, do social preferences have on voting behavior. This paper explores this issue using laboratory experiments wherein voting outcomes lead to a known distribution of net benefits across participants. Preferences are elicited using a novel Random Price Voting Mechanism (RPVM), which is more efficient in eliciting preferences than a dichotomous choice referendum but gives consistent results. Results suggest that social preferences, in particular a social efficiency motive, lead to economically meaningful deviations from selfish voting choices and increase the likelihood that welfare-enhancing programs are implemented. 相似文献