关于贷款五级分类管理工作的调查与思考

自1998年推行贷款五级分类工作以来,国有商业银行对实施贷款质量五级分类管理制度的认识逐渐提高,防范信贷风险的意识逐渐增强,开展了大量的基础性工作,进行了有益的尝试;但是,银行内部和外部仍然存在诸多制约因素,严重阻碍了五级分类管理工作的顺利推进,不利于客观真实地揭示银行的信贷资产质量.     

浅谈如何推行贷款质量五级分类管理

一、贷款质量五级分类的定义五级分类法是以风险为基础,其任务首先是暴露风险、量化风险,揭示贷款的真实价值。人民银行规定:根据贷款及时、足额回收的可能性,贷款划分为正常、关注、次级、可疑、损失五个不同类别,即"五级分类"。前两类为优良贷款,后三类称为不良贷款。二、目前贷款质量五级分类管理存在的问题从1998年试点到现在全面推行五级分类管理,存在许多问题,主要包括商业银行信贷工作基础管理比较薄弱,贷款的档案资料不全甚至遗失,给分类工作带来了困难。五级分类建立在大量的历史资料和数据分析基础上,对客户信息量的要求不仅是丰富、完善、翔实,而且要求要活、要新,更要动态监测、分析由表及里,由往而今、去伪存真。如果做不到这些,即使信贷员素质再高也不能准确判断五级分类的结果。五级分类由     

对实行贷款质量五级分类管理的思考

贷款五级分类制度是根据内在风险程度将贷款划分为正常、关注、次级、可疑、损失五类，其中后三类合称为不良贷款。这种分类方法主要依据借款人的还款可能性，即最终偿还贷款本金和利息的可能性，确定贷款遭受损失的风险程度，以此来揭示贷款真实价值的过程和结果。     

对做好贷款五级分类管理工作的思考

全面推行贷款五级分类管理办法，是农业银行为进一步提高信贷资产管理水平，适应现代企业管理制度改革的需要，与国际信贷资产管理惯例接轨，向现代商业银行迈进的重要步骤。在具体工作中，如何做好贷款五级分类管理工作呢？我认为应做好以下八个“相结合”：     

贷款五级分类工作的对策

我国各国有商业银行对贷款逐步实行了以风险为基础的五级分类管理.据调查,分类过程中潜伏着风险隐患,制约和影响了贷款分类管理水平,为此建议:     

实施贷款五级分类管理对农信社改革经营的影响

贷款五级分类制度是根据内在风险程度将商业贷款划分为正常、关注、次级、可疑、损失五类。这种分类方法是银行主要依据借款人的还款能力，即最终偿还贷款本金和利息的实际能力，确定贷款遭受损失的风险程度，其中后三类称为不良贷款。此前的贷款四级分类制度是将贷款划分为正常、逾期、呆滞、呆账四类。     

如何完善贷款五级分类管理办法

自1998年人民银行发布<贷款风险分类原则(试行)>以来,各商业银行在推行贷款"五级分类"管理方面做了大量工作,实践证明它较"一逾两呆"的分类方法能更科学地揭示贷款的质量状况和风险程度,能更有效地加强商业银行的贷款管理工作.但在具体实施过程中也遇到了一些问题或难题,尤其是在贷款分类标准的具体应用和贷款质量认定方面,业内人士普遍认为有些标准界限难以把握,有些定量标准计算较繁琐,与中国国情及企业管理现状尚有一定差距.为有效推进贷款"五级分类"管理办法的组织实施,迫切需要制订一套新的既适合我国国情又能与国际标准接轨的"以期限性标准为主,以判断性标准为辅"的贷款"五级分类"管理办法.     

Bank credit risk and structural credit models: Agency and information asymmetry perspectives

This work investigates the effects of agency and information asymmetry issues embedded in structural form credit models on bank credit risk evaluation, using American bank data from 2001 to 2005. Findings show that both the agency problem and information asymmetry significantly cause deviations in the credit risk evaluation of structural form models from agency ratings. Five independent factors explain a deviation of 42.6–78.3% and should be incorporated into future credit risk modeling. Additionally, both the effects of information asymmetry and debt-equity agency positively relate to the deviation while that of management-equity agency relates to it negatively.     

Institutional ownership and credit spreads: An information asymmetry perspective

Recent literature has documented a link between institutional equity ownership (IO) and cost of debt capital, and interpreted it as a corporate governance effect. However, institutional equity investors may also affect cost of debt through their influence on information asymmetry condition of firms. To distinguish between the two effects, we break down institutional investors into different groups: transient institutional investors (TRA who are sensitive to information asymmetry but unlikely to participate in corporate governance, and the dedicated ones (DED) who act oppositely. Based on a most up-to-date and comprehensive bond data spanning the past 20 years, we find that credit spreads narrow (widen) with an increase in equity ownership by TRA (DED). The effects are most prominent among short-term bonds, bonds with lower ratings, higher leverage and higher volatilities. The results persist after controlling for potential endogeneity and other information asymmetry measures, and are unlikely due to an asset substitution effect. Overall, our findings provide strong support for the effect of information asymmetry on credit spread, and highlight the importance of distinguishing various types of institutional investors.     

征信体系建设与商业银行信用风险管理

征信体系是社会信用体系的核心,也是现代金融体系运行和稳定的基石,征信体系健全与否将直接影响金融机构的风险控制水平。商业银行作为经营货币和风险的特殊企业,在目前我国征信体系尚不完善的情况下,承担了大部分的信用缺失成本,对建立完善的社会征信体系的需求更为迫切。     

基层人行计算机信息安全管理的短板剖析与矫正

自2005年开始，人民银行信息化建设全面提速，项目建设力度加大，数据集中快速推进，客观上需要高度重视和深入研究计算机信息安全问题。作为市县两级人民银行，既是人民银行组织体系中最基层的分支机构，也是新形势下维护和确保计算机信息安全的前沿阵地和薄弱环节。因此，如何加强和保障计算机信息安全，对基层人行来说比以往任何时候更显得重要和突出。     

Optimal credit limit management under different information regimes

Credit limit management is of paramount importance for successful short-term credit risk management, even more so when the situation in credit and financial markets is tense. We consider a continuous-time model where the credit provider and the credit taker interact within a game-theoretic framework under different information structures. The model with complete information provides decision-theoretic insights into the problem of optimal limit policies and motivates more complicated information structures. Moving to a partial information setup, incentive distortions emerge that are not in the bank’s interest. We discuss how these distortions can effectively be reduced by an incentive-compatible contract. Finally, we provide some practical implications of our theoretical results.     

Accounting irregularities,management compensation structure and information asymmetry

The discovery of accounting irregularities is an important negative event for a company. The restatement resulting from the irregularity represents an average of 364 per cent of net income for the 152‐firm sample and the irregularities are predominantly revenue enhancing. The irregularity firms exhibit both lower transparency and visibility compared to a matched sample of non‐irregularity firms. Furthermore, prior to the announcement, these firms experienced poorer operating performance and their executive compensation structure is found to be significantly more equity‐based. Therefore, firms that have greater opportunity and incentive are shown to be more likely to commit accounting irregularities.     

The effect of economic policy uncertainty on investor information asymmetry and management disclosures

Investor uncertainty about firm value drives investors’ information collection and trading activities, as well as managers’ disclosure choices. This study examines an important source of uncertainty that likely cannot be influenced by most managers and investors: uncertainty about government economic policy. We find that this uncertainty is associated with increased bid-ask spreads and decreased stock price reactions to earnings surprises. Managers respond to this uncertainty by increasing their voluntary disclosures, but these disclosures only partly mitigate the bid-ask spread increase. We conclude that government economic policy uncertainty is an important component of firms’ information environments and managers’ voluntary disclosure decisions.     

维护征信信息准确性防范征信信息失真

市场经济在某种意义上是契约经济,诚信是契约的灵魂,是市场经济的基石.随着我国市场经济的进一步发展,诚信对人们的生活,特别是商事活动的影响随处存在,个人信息作为诚信的载体也日益受到人们的重视.     

Disclosure frequency and information asymmetry

The main purpose of this paper is to investigate whether more frequent disclosure by firms is associated with lower levels of information asymmetry among investors. Using a panel of 386 firms in the US retail sector, I find that the practice of regularly providing monthly revenue disclosures is not associated with reduced information asymmetry. In contrast, I find that more detailed (greater quantity) disclosure is associated with reduced information asymmetry. I provide preliminary evidence that the distinction between disclosure frequency and disclosure quantity is due to more frequent disclosure providing an incentive for increased private information acquisition by sophisticated investors. The results indicate that the relation between disclosure and information asymmetry is multi-dimensional and varies depending on the disclosure attribute being studied.