Nonlinear association between ownership concentration and leverage: The role of family control

The 2008–2009 global financial crisis and the European debt crisis have raised further questions on leverage decision making. In this regard, this study examines the association between concentration of controlling rights and leverage in the presence of families. This study also assesses the role played by families in moderating the nonlinear reversed U-shaped association between concentration of controlling rights and debt ratio. Publicly listed companies in Taiwan, which is a nation characterized by weak protection for minority shareholders, are studied for the period of 1999 to 2014. The effect of the nonlinear inverted U shape is confirmed, and the weakened effect of the existence of family control is presented. The results remain unchanged in several alternative tests, including addressing the endogeneity issue of ownership–decision studies. Overall, this study highlights the ownership–debt relationship in a nation with weak protection of minority shareholders.     

Ownership structure, family control, and acquisition decisions

We investigate how ownership and family control influence the decision to take part in M&As as an acquirer or as an acquired company in a sample of 777 large Continental European companies in the period 1998-2008. We find that ownership is negatively correlated with the probability of launching a takeover bid, and family firms are less likely to make acquisitions, especially when the stake held by the family is not large enough to assure the persistence of family control. On the passive side of M&A deals, the effect of the largest shareholders' ownership on the decision to accept an acquisition proposal depends non-linearly on the voting rights they hold, and family control reduces the probability of being acquired by an unrelated party. We do not find evidence that family-controlled firms destroy wealth when they acquire other companies. Finally, we document that ownership and family control, while being negatively correlated with M&A activity, are not negatively correlated with growth in firm size.     

Firm-level political risk and corporate leverage decisions

This study examines the effects of firm-level political risk on firm leverage decisions and speed of adjustment. We uncover that firm-level political risk has a negative impact on a firm's total and long-term leverage. We also find that firms facing high political risk tend to prefer debts with short-term maturity. However, firm-level political risk is positively related to debt specialisation, suggesting that firms are more inclined to adopt fewer debt types when they face high political risk. Further analysis reveals that firms with high political risk are associated with a faster speed of adjustment to target than those with low political risk. Our results are robust to endogeneity concerns and the effects of financial crisis.     

Controlling shareholder,expropriations and firm's leverage decision: Evidence from Chinese Non-tradable share reform

This paper examines the effect of excess control rights on the leverage decisions made by Chinese non-SOEs before and after the Non-tradable share reform (NTS reform). We find that firms with excess control rights have more excess leverage and their controlling shareholders use the resources for tunneling rather than investing in positive NPV projects. We also find that excess leverage in firms with excess control rights decreases and the market reaction to announcements of related party transactions are more positive after NTS reform. This confirms that tunneling by the controlling shareholders actually reduced. We argue that in emerging markets where legal protection for creditors and shareholders is weak, controlling shareholders borrow excess debt to tunnel through inter-corporate loans and related party transactions. Furthermore the privatization of these economies can reduce the controlling shareholders' tunneling activities and associated excess leverage which destroys firm value.     

How do family ownership,control and management affect firm value?

Using proxy data on all Fortune-500 firms during 1994–2000, we find that family ownership creates value only when the founder serves as CEO of the family firm or as Chairman with a hired CEO. Dual share classes, pyramids, and voting agreements reduce the founder's premium. When descendants serve as CEOs, firm value is destroyed. Our findings suggest that the classic owner-manager conflict in nonfamily firms is more costly than the conflict between family and nonfamily shareholders in founder-CEO firms. However, the conflict between family and nonfamily shareholders in descendant-CEO firms is more costly than the owner-manager conflict in nonfamily firms.     

Target CEO age,ownership decisions,and takeover outcomes

This paper examines the effect of target CEO age, in association with target corporate governance mechanisms, on the ownership decisions and takeover outcomes in eight East and Southeast Asian countries. The results show that acquirers are more likely to select partial-control acquisitions of target firms managed by older CEOs, and that the impact of target CEO age on the partial-control acquisition propensity is much stronger in emerging markets relative to developed economies. The study further finds that target CEO age leads to a lower probability of obtaining desired equity ownership levels compared to unmatched ownership achievements, controlling for target corporate governance structures. The findings also run robustness checks regarding variations in the compulsory acquisition cut-off in the sample countries. Overall, this paper adds to the growing of mainstream corporate governance literature regarding the relevance of CEO personal characteristics in agency problems for corporate decisions.     

Foreign institutional ownership and the speed of leverage adjustment: International evidence

Employing a large sample of 7246 firms across 38 economies from 2000 to 2013, we show a positive relation between foreign institutional ownership (FIO) and firms' speed of leverage adjustment. This positive relation is concentrated for over-leveraged firms that need to decrease financial leverage to rebalance their capital structures. We validate our findings using a 2SLS regression and a DiD estimation to exploit the exogenous variations in FIO generated by the inclusion of MSCI membership and the passage of the JGTRRA. These results suggest that foreign institutional investors play an important monitoring role in mitigating agency conflicts between shareholders and managers. Overall, this paper lends support to the dynamic trade-off theory.     

The influence of growth opportunities on the relationship between equity ownership and leverage

This study investigates whether the association between ownership structure and leverage varies with the magnitude of growth opportunities. According to the free cash flow hypothesis, managers receive utility from increasing firm size and the over-investment problem is more severe for firms with fewer growth opportunities. Considering the disciplinary role of leverage on the over-investment problem and ownership structure as a control mechanism to affect financing decisions, we hypothesize that the association between ownership structure and leverage is stronger for firms with fewer growth opportunities. We find that the association between equity ownership and leverage is significant for low-growth firms, but not for high-growth firms. The results mostly hold when sample firms are partitioned into large and small firms to directly control for the effect of firm size on the association between ownership structure and leverage.

Size,ownership and the market for corporate control

This paper is written with two goals in mind. The first is to offer a critical discussion of papers by Bauguess, Moeller, Schlingemann, and Zutter [Bauguess, Scott, Moeller, Sara, Schlingemann, Frederich and Zutter, Chad, 2009. Ownership structure and target returns. Journal of Corporate Finance, this issue], and Offenberg [Offenberg, David, 2009. Firm size and the effectiveness of the market for corporate control. Journal of Corporate Finance, this issue], both of which appear in this special issue. The second goal is to offer some perspectives about new questions that these papers bring to light.     

Shareholder litigation rights and capital structure decisions

We exploit the staggered adoption of the universal demand (UD) laws across U.S. states, which impedes shareholder rights to initiate derivative lawsuits, as a quasi-natural experiment to examine the relation between shareholder litigation rights and firm capital structures. We find that weaker shareholder litigation rights due to the UD laws adoption lead to higher financial leverage, which enhances firm value. Furthermore, the positive relation between the UD laws adoption and financial leverage is more pronounced for firms exposed to higher shareholder litigation risk ex ante or financially constrained firms. Our evidence is consistent with lower shareholder litigation threats motivating firms to increase financial leverage.     

Operating leverage,financial leverage,and equity risk

The analysis investigates the combined leverage effect of a fixed capacity decision (fixed cost) plus debt on the risk of equity returns. It is argued that the traditional DOL-DFL calculation is incorrect. A correct calculation is given, using the fact that the capacity decision is endogenous to the firm's decision process. The analysis reveals that the capacity decision partially offsets the effect on equity risk of increasing business risk or debt. However, this ability is lost at high levels of debt.     

Heterogeneous beliefs and optimal ownership in entrepreneurial financing decisions

Our setting comprises one entrepreneurial firm with a growth opportunity seeking for external funding from a venture capitalist, where the entrepreneur and venture capitalist have homogeneous or heterogeneous beliefs about its growth prospects. We developed a real options model to determine the optimal ownership structure that triggers the simultaneous exercise of the growth option on the entrepreneurial firm by entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. Our results show that the more optimistic any of the parties is, the lower the post-money firm ownership that party will retain. However, optimism leads parties to delay their decision to invest in the entrepreneurial firm, by demanding higher profit triggers and investing only in more valuable entrepreneurial firms. The combination of these two effects leaves perceived returns on investment unchanged and not dependent on their own optimism.     

A two-part fractional regression model for the financial leverage decisions of micro,small, medium and large firms

In this paper we examine the following two hypotheses, which traditional theories of capital structure are relatively silent about: (i) the determinants of financial leverage decisions are different for micro, small, medium and large firms; and (ii) the factors that determine whether or not a firm issues debt are different from those that determine how much debt it issues. Using a binary choice model to explain the probability of a firm raising debt and a fractional regression model to explain the relative amount of debt issued, we find strong support for both hypotheses. Confirming recent empirical evidence, we find also that, although larger firms are more likely to use debt, conditional on their having some debt, firm size is negatively related to the proportion of debt used by firms.     

State ownership and adjustment speed toward target leverage: Evidence from a transitional economy

Using a quantile regression approach and 5,374 Vietnamese firm-year observations from 2000 to 2016, this paper examines the effect of state ownership on the speed of adjustment SOA toward target leverage across various levels of capital structure. The findings consistently show that these effects on SOA vary depending on the leverage level. The relationship is negative for low-leveraged firms, positive for high-leveraged firms, but insignificant in the central area of leverage distribution. Moreover, the negative effects are greater than the positive effects.     

Capital and ownership structures, and the market for corporate control

I analyze optimal capital and ownership structures as resultingfrom anticipated future control contests. I focus on leverageas a device that enables the incumbent management to extractthe maximum value from the rival. I show that firm value dependson both capital and ownership structures. The analysis leadsto the following predictions: (i) more efficient managers useless debt, (ii) firms facing better rivals for control issuemore debt, and (iii) firms with supermajority rules issue lessdebt. Several predictions are consistent with known empiricalregularities.     

Founding family ownership and the agency cost of debt

We investigate the impact of founding family ownership structure on the agency cost of debt. We find that founding family ownership is common in large, publicly traded firms and is related, both statistically and economically, to a lower cost of debt financing. Our results are consistent with the idea that founding family firms have incentive structures that result in fewer agency conflicts between equity and debt claimants. This suggests that bond holders view founding family ownership as an organizational structure that better protects their interests.     

Control/ownership structure,creditor rights protection,and the cost of debt financing: International evidence

We explore the effect of governance on bond yield-spreads and ratings in a multinational sample of firms. We find strong evidence that ultimate ownership (i.e., the voting/cash-flow rights wedge) and family control have a positive and significant effect on bond yield-spreads, and a negative and significant effect on bond ratings. Control in the hands of widely held financial firms has a positive effect on bond ratings only, while State control has no effect on either bond yield-spreads or ratings. We also find that a higher protection of debtholders’ rights generally reduces bond yield-spreads and increases bond ratings. Our results additionally show that, for both bondholders and rating agencies, the enforcement of debt laws is crucially important. Finally, we document a negative effect of debt covenants on debt costs when there is a high expropriation risk and poor creditor rights protection.     

Effects of family ownership and family management on the performance of entrepreneurial firms

Extending past research, this paper proposes that the quadratic inverse-U relationship between family ownership and the performance of entrepreneurial firms when moderated by the presence of family management and external blockholding. Specifically, it proposes that both factors exacerbate the decline in performance when the proportion of family ownership in entrepreneurial firms remains high. The proposed hypotheses are tested on ten years of panel data from a sample of European firms. Analysis of data supports the hypotheses. Implications for the theory and practice of entrepreneurial firms are discussed.     

Ultimate ownership and control in Russia

I investigate ultimate control and ownership patterns in Russian publicly traded companies. I show that these companies are controlled either by the state or by anonymous private owners. Federal and regional governments’ control is exercised through extensive use of pyramids. Private owners widely exploit legal loopholes that allow them to mask their holdings and identities through nominee and foreign offshore arrangements. The comparison of formal and informal ownership disclosure reveals that the typical anonymous owners are insiders and that in virtually all cases the market participants “know” who the real owners are. Collectively, the evidence suggests that the legal weaknesses in disclosure requirements are important determinants of country-specific ownership and control structures.