The promoter's role in ticket pricing: Implications of real options for optimal posted prices and rationing

We consider the problem of pricing event tickets for initial sale when demand is uncertain. It is a standard industry practice for a performer to contract with a promoter who underwrites the event and offers the tickets for sale at a posted price that is sticky in that it is either fixed or costly to adjust once sales begin. Promoters, therefore, bear price risk, and we show that bearing the risk associated with posting a sticky offer price amounts to writing a put option on the ticket revenue. Further, we show that optimal posted-offer prices can be expected to result in rationing (surpluses) if price uncertainty and price elasticity of demand are material (immaterial), even when the demand forecast is accurate. Our results have implications for a more general set of pricing problems in which items are offered for sale at sticky posted prices.     

Some implications of search and switching costs for the price dynamics of electronic markets

This article develops a model, based on switching costs and technological uncertainty, which explains some aspects of the price dynamics of e‐commerce. Switching costs and intertemporal cost correlation lock‐in consumers. Firms initially charge low prices to build a customer base. If firms fail to reduce costs, and reservation prices are low, firms exit the industry. Over time, prices increase if no exit occurs, and decrease if exit occurs. Prices may also decrease over time, if the proportion of low search cost consumers increases.