Corporate cash holdings and total factor productivity – A global analysis

Studies concerning total factor productivity (TFP) have investigated the effect of TFP on economic growth from a country-level perspective, which is a critical issue in the macroeconomics field. Few studies have examined how corporate financial decisions influence TFP from a firm-level perspective. Specifically, no extant studies have investigated how cash holdings affect firm productivity. This study utilizes data for firms in 65 countries during 1993–2017 to investigate the effect of cash holdings on TFP from a corporate perspective. The findings show that firms with higher cash holdings can enhance TFP. The results hold after considering endogenous problems, financial constraints, financial crises, corporate governance, institutional quality, and financial development as well as various robustness tests. Furthermore, we examine whether firms consistently invest their cash holdings into research and development (R&D) expenditures enhances firm productivity. The evidence indicates that higher cash holdings lead to steady increases in R&D expenditure, which improves firms’ TFP.     

Narcissistic leaders and corporate cash Holdings: Evidence in China

We use a sample of Chinese firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong over the period 2007–2018 to examine the relationship between narcissistic leadership and corporate cash holdings. We find that narcissistic leaders seek to attract public attention and promote self-image by overinvestments that reduce cash holdings. We also show that narcissistic leaders have better access to bank loans and lower loan cost, prompting them to hold less cash. The negative effect of narcissistic leaders on cash holdings is more pronounced at private firms than at SOEs. In addition, narcissistic leaders negatively affect the firm value. We contribute to the literature on leader narcissism, cash holdings, and corporate governance in emerging market contexts.     

客户集中度、现金持有与公司竞争优势

以2007—2013年沪深A股制造业上市公司为样本,实证检验了客户集中度对公司竞争优势的影响以及现金持有在其中的调节效应。研究发现,客户集中度与公司竞争优势显著负相关,尤其是在高竞争行业,客户集中度对公司竞争优势的负面影响更加显著;充裕的现金储备可以通过其风险管理职能和竞争效应显著降低客户集中度对公司竞争优势的负面影响,在高竞争行业,现金持有更有助于缓解客户集中度对公司竞争优势的负面影响。本研究从客户集中度视角揭示了公司竞争优势的影响因素,丰富了现金持有经济效应的研究。     

International takeover laws and corporate cash holdings

We examine the impact on corporate cash holdings of international merger and acquisition (M&A) laws, which facilitate corporate takeovers. We use the staggered enactment of M&A laws from 1992 to 2005 and a sample spanning 34 jurisdictions, and find that levels of corporate cash holdings increase after passage of M&A laws. We also find that firms with better operating performance, higher earnings volatility, higher P/E ratio, and in jurisdictions with high M&A intensity hoard more cash after the enactment of M&A laws. These firms decrease dividends and capital expenditure and increase cash-based acquisitions in the post-M&A law period. Additional analysis shows that the effect is manifested in the subsample of firms in jurisdictions with better institutional environments. Lastly, we find that investor valuations of cash holdings decrease after the enactment of M&A laws. Collectively, our results suggest that managers hoard cash to finance M&A activities after the enactment of M&A laws, driven by the motive of empire-building, and that cash hoarding behaviors are viewed by investors as value-decreasing.     

The role of the board and the audit committee in corporate risk management

This paper examines the impact of corporate governance on corporate risk-management activities in S&P 500 firms over the period 2004–2010 by measuring the characteristics of the board directors and audit committee. Our results show that the board of directors, especially the audit committee, plays an important role in the firm’s hedging decisions, including whether to hedge and to what extent. Such evidence is even stronger in high-leveraged firms with large risk-shifting incentives. These results are robust to the consideration of endogenous concerns, a board corporate governance index, and industrial effects. Our study contributes to the literature by showing the influential role of the audit committee on corporate risk management.     

Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure and the Value of Cash Holdings

This study investigates whether corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports mitigate the value destruction associated with increases in cash holdings. We find that the issuance of a standalone CSR report increases the marginal value of cash holdings and this effect is more pronounced for firms in a less transparent information environment and for firms with weaker external monitoring. Our results suggest that information in CSR reports can facilitate monitoring and thus induce more efficient use of cash holdings.     

Anti-corruption,government intervention,and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from China

We use China as an example to examine how anti-corruption and government intervention shape corporate cash holding decisions. The findings show that firms in provinces with less government intervention (weak anti-corruption intensity) hold smaller (larger) cash reserves than those in provinces with more government intervention (strong anti-corruption intensity). Furthermore, we find that the positive relationship between government intervention and corporate cash holdings is alleviated as the anti-corruption intensity increases, and this alleviation effect is more prominent for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), firms in high intervention areas and firms without political connections. These findings support the argument that corruption-free and low intervention governments can benefit firms in making more profitable corporate decisions.     

Deregulation of short selling and corporate cash dividend policy: A quasi-natural experiment from China

This study takes China’s short selling deregulation as a quasi-natural experiment, employs a sample of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2007 to 2017, and tests the impact of a short selling pilot on firms’ cash dividends using a difference-in-differences model (DID). We find that China’s short selling pilot significantly increases the pilot firms’ cash dividends. The mechanism test shows that short selling can improve the pilot firms’ cash dividends by playing a corporate governance role to restrain dual agency costs such as management fees and major shareholders’ tunneling. Furthermore, we identify that short selling restrains the behavior of “large stock dividends” and increases the cash dividends of “large stock dividends” firms. Moreover, the governance effect of short selling is complementary to the external governance environment. The higher the degree of marketization and government quality, the more significant the governance effect of short selling to increase the pilot firms’ cash dividends. This study enriches not only the research related to cash dividends in emerging economies, but also provides new empirical evidence for the evaluation of China’s short selling deregulation and offers valuable lessons to other emerging economies.     

Corporate cash holdings and dividend payments: evidence from simultaneous analysis

This study explores the simultaneous relationship between corporate cash holdings and dividend policy using a large sample of around 400 non‐financial firms for the period from 1991 to 2008. The results show that cash holdings are affected by dividends, leverage, growth, size, risk, profitability, and working capital ratio. Dividend policy is affected by cash, leverage, growth, size, risk, and profit. When controlling for simultaneity, dividend payments do not appear to significantly affect cash holdings, nor do cash holdings affect dividend policy. The empirical analysis suggests that simultaneity is crucial in analyzing corporate cash holdings and dividend policy. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Forecasting corporate default risk in China

Default risk prediction can not only provide forward-looking and timely risk measures for regulators and investors, but also improve the stability of the financial system. However, the determinants of corporate default risk in China have not been well-identified. An empirical analysis was conducted using a unique dataset of default events in the Chinese market to fill this gap. First, we demonstrated that the default probability estimated by a structural model, which is widely used in the literature, do not fully reveal the default risk of firms in China. Second, we classified default events into minor and major defaults for empirical analysis. We found that firms that survive minor defaults behave differently from other bankrupt firms. Our results suggest that the determinants of corporate default risk in China and the United States differ. We also found that a firm’s continued increase in cash holdings is one of the most important signs of default. Overall, our study significantly improves the accuracy of forecasting corporate default risk in China.     

Cultural and macroeconomic determinants of cash holdings management

This study examines patterns in cash management, particularly cash holdings speed of adjustment (CH‐SOA), across 48 countries. I find that managerial cultural characteristics and country‐level macroeconomic factors influence the persistence of cash reserve levels, deviation from target, and the speed with which firms in different countries adjust their cash holdings. The findings support the idea that agency costs as well as market frictions influence CH‐SOA and other aspects of cash management. The findings are robust to the inclusion of a wide range of firm‐level characteristics, country‐level corporate‐governance variables, and an alternative cultural index.     

Cash holding dynamics and competition intensity: Evidence from UK firms

Using a quasi-natural experiment and various measures of competition intensity, we examine whether an increase in product market competition is a key driver of firm cash holdings. We find that firms increase cash holdings when competition is intense. The results suggest that the degree of increase in cash holdings is magnified among firms exposed to high predatory threat and financing friction. In addition, we examine if increasing cash holdings offers a competitive advantage in the product market. Our results indicate that firms with large cash reserves make gains in market share at the expense of their rivals. Gains in the product market are more pronounced among firms with low exposure to predatory risk and financing frictions.     

It is not a flat world after all: Tax repatriation costs and cash value

US corporations have accumulated record‐high amounts of cash, and most of it is trapped in foreign accounts. This study tests the hypothesis that the marginal value of cash decreases in the presence of tax repatriation costs, as these costs are a strong indication that part of the cash is trapped abroad. Cash abroad is not readily available to the company because it is subject to an additional layer of tax before it can be used or distributed. Moreover, uncertainty surrounds the potential use of foreign cash, and research documents that firms holding high amounts of cash abroad are likely to invest in negative net present value activities. Finally, possible changes in tax regulation are an additional source of uncertainty. Consequently, foreign cash should be worth less than domestic cash. Using a large sample of US firms drawn from COMPUSTAT during the 1991–2012 period, the analysis suggests that shareholders value an extra dollar of cash at $1.086. However, this result changes dramatically when the change in cash is interacted with the tax cost of repatriating the earnings. That is, the marginal value of cash decreases significantly in the presence of tax repatriation costs, and shareholders discount cash when it is likely to be held abroad. This study contributes to the literature on cash holding by investigating whether tax repatriation costs affect the value of corporate cash. Moreover, the findings show that there are important economic consequences linked to the phenomenon of cash accumulation in foreign countries and therefore provide regulators with a sound foundation on which to take additional actions to require more disclosure of and transparency in the actual location of firms’ cash holdings.     

数字金融如何影响企业现金持有？

基于2011—2020年中国上市企业数据和城市层面的数字普惠金融指数,考察了数字金融对企业现金持有的影响。研究发现,数字金融发展显著增加了区域内企业的现金持有,且数字金融分指标中除了覆盖广度和数字化程度外,二级指标中的数字支付和互联网信贷业务均会显著增加企业现金持有。进一步分析发现,数字金融通过提高经营活动现金流、抑制企业杠杆率和降低债务融资等机制增加了企业现金持有。此外,对于规模较小、民营和弱银企关系的企业而言,数字金融对企业现金持有的影响更显著。研究结论丰富了数字金融发展的经济后果,也拓展了现金持有理论的分析框架。     

Creditor Rights,Country Governance,and Corporate Cash Holdings

This study examines the impact of creditor rights and country governance on cash holdings using a sample of firms from 47 countries. We hypothesize that cash holdings are smaller when both creditor rights and country governance are high. In these circumstances firms will not need to hold as much cash for future investments needs (precautionary funds) because firms will expect that funds will be available in the future. Our findings support our hypothesis and hold for alternative definitions for cash holdings, different country samples, different definitions of governance and concerns about endogeneity.     

Democracy,rule of law,and corporate governance—a liquidity perspective

This study examines whether and how democracy and rule of law—two overarching country-level governance variables—influence corporate governance. Given that corporate liquidity (cash holdings) is a good channel for examining the quality of corporate governance, the effects of democracy and rule of law on corporate governance can be identified using the liquidity approach. A review of 67 countries from 1996 to 2010 demonstrates that democracy and rule of law indeed have bearings on corporate governance. More specifically, results indicate that firms are more inclined to hoard cash to take advantage of growth opportunities when the level of democracy is higher or rule of law is stronger, suggesting that agency costs are lower and interests of managers and shareholders are more aligned under such circumstances. In addition, the negative effect of debt issuance and dividend payment on cash is more pronounced when the level of democracy is higher or rule of law is stronger, suggesting that these two approaches become more effective in reducing agency costs and transitively cash holdings under such circumstances. Moreover, the positive effect of democracy and rule of law on corporate governance appears to be reinforced when rule of law is stronger and the level of democracy is higher, respectively. Furthermore, higher level of economic development helps reap the benefit of democracy and rule of law in terms of improving corporate governance and reducing agency costs.     

股价崩盘风险、信息环境与企业现金调整

以我国2009—2016年沪深上市公司数据为样本,探究了股价崩盘风险、信息环境对企业现金调整的影响。研究发现：股价崩盘风险越大,企业现金调整速度越快,且这种正相关关系对于分析师跟踪数量较少、机构投资者持股比例少的企业而言更为显著。进一步考察股权性质在企业现金调整速度中的影响,发现国有企业与民营企业面对股价崩盘风险的现金调整速度并不具有显著差异,但是对于民营企业而言,更多的分析师跟踪和机构投资者持股将显著降低企业应对股价崩盘风险的现金调整速度,信息环境对于国有企业的作用并不显著。     

Pension Funding Constraints and Corporate Expenditures*

This paper examines the impact of a company's pension contributions (PCs) on its dividend and investment policies. The effects of shocks to cash flows on these corporate expenditures are identified by changes to pension funding regulations. Using a sample of DB pension schemes in FTSE350 UK‐listed firms we find a strong negative relation between PCs and corporate dividends even after controlling for the correlation between funding status and unobserved investment opportunities. We find that the more stringent funding requirements under the Pensions Act 2004 had a more pronounced effect on both dividend and investment sensitivities to PCs.     

董事会计师事务所工作背景与企业现金持有水平——来自中国资本市场的经验证据

基于2004—2012年我国上市公司数据,考察了董事会计师事务所工作背景对企业现金持有水平的影响。研究发现,董事会会计师事务所工作背景（董事会中是否有成员具有会计师事务所工作背景、董事会中拥有会计师事务所工作背景的董事人数、董事会中拥有会计师事务所工作背景的董事比例等）显著降低了企业的现金持有水平。进一步的分组检验结果还发现董事会计师事务所工作背景带来的现金方面的治理效应仅仅体现在高成长企业和管理层权力较大的企业之中,因为这两类企业面临的潜在代理冲突或信息不对称问题更为严重。     

Board internationalization and corporate social responsibility

This study examines the association between board internationalization and firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance in China during 2009–2019. Using a large dataset of director nationalities and CSR scores, we find that foreign directors promote CSR performance as evidenced by higher CSR scores. We further document that this relationship is more pronounced among government-controlled firms, firms with better corporate governance, and firms operating under stricter institutional environments. These findings remain valid after sequential robustness checks. Overall, our findings imply that foreign directors motivate the board of directors and their firms to actively pursue and practice social responsibility. Our study enriches the literature on the outcomes of board internationalization and determinants of CSR and provides the internationalization of corporate governance mechanisms a reasonable basis.