Does takeover activity affect stock price crash risk? Evidence from international M&A laws

We exploit the staggered initiation of merger and acquisition (M&A) laws across countries as a plausibly exogenous shock to the threat of takeover to examine whether the market for corporate control has a real effect on firm-level stock price crash risk. Using a difference-in-differences regression on a large sample of firms from 32 countries, we find that stock price crash risk significantly decreases following the passage of M&A laws. This effect is stronger for firms domiciled in countries with poorer investor protection and information environments and for firms with weaker firm-level governance. Further, financial reporting opacity and overinvestment significantly decrease in the post-M&A law periods. Our study suggests that an active takeover market has a disciplining effect on managerial bad news hoarding and leads to lower future crash risk.     

FOREIGN INVESTOR PARTICIPATION IN PRIVATIZATIONS: DOES THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT MATTER?

We examine the determinants of foreign investors' participation in the privatization process of developing countries. First, we estimate the probability that foreign investors target privatized firms in a given country. We show that a favorable legal environment where investor protection is higher enhances foreign investors' participation. Foreigners also prefer large, strategic firms from high‐growth economies and socially stable countries with low political risk. Second, we restrict our analysis to privatized firms that foreign investors actually choose and show that the stakes foreigners hold are larger if the firms are privatized by private sales as opposed to public offerings.     

Economic policy uncertainty and cross-border mergers and acquisitions

We examine the impact of policy uncertainty on cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Using a sample of 23 countries worldwide over the period from 2003 to 2016, we provide evidence that when a country has high policy uncertainty, the volume of inbound acquisition decreases whereas the total number of outbound deals increase significantly. Policy uncertainty also encourages acquirers to use stock as a method of payment and offer lower premium to targets. We also find that the percentage of full control cross-border M&A deals is negatively correlated to the level of policy uncertainty. Further evidence suggests that policy uncertainty complicates the takeover process by increasing the probability of withdrawn and pending deals as well as requiring longer time periods to complete deals.     

Investor mood and the determinants of stock prices: an experimental analysis

We examine, in a controlled experimental setting, whether changes in investor mood cause changes in the determinants of stock prices. Our results show that a deterioration in mood, reflected in the negative dimensions of mood state, increases the level of risk aversion in male, but not female, investors. We find no evidence to suggest that a change in mood impacts on investors' forecasts of future earnings or future cash flows. By establishing the causal impact of a change in mood on risk aversion, our study provides support for archival research that relates various market anomalies to investor mood.     

Institutional investor’ proportions and inactive trading

We focus on a typical market anomaly-inactive trading: trading volume shrinks while stock price abnormally jumps. We calibrate a theoretical model with variance ambiguity heterogeneous among investors and illustrate that ambiguity averse investors' proportions enhance trading volume shrinkage and abnormal price jumps. We provide a cross-section analysis of stocks' inactive trading by introducing institutional investors' proportions to measure investor structures' differences among stocks. We also empirically measure relative inactive trading for constituent stocks in S&P 500 from 2014 to 2019 and demonstrate that institutional investors' proportion is negatively related to inactive trading. Finally, we demonstrate that higher proportions of institutional investors lead to less inactive trading anomalies.     

What is the relationship between investor protection legislation and target takeover returns? Evidence from Europe

We show that investor protection legislation is an important determinant of the returns of target companies that are subject to takeovers within Europe. Announcement and post-announcement returns are higher in strong investor protection countries, which indicates that bidders are forced to offer larger premiums when the original offer is made, and are more likely to have to revise their offer higher before a takeover is successful. This is consistent with targets having relatively greater bargaining power in strong investor protection environments. Our findings are robust to the inclusion of common determinants of takeover returns.     

Investor Protection and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Worldwide CEO Turnover

Recent research asserts that an essential feature of good corporate governance is strong investor protection, where investor protection is defined as the extent of the laws that protect investors' rights and the strength of the legal institutions that facilitate law enforcement. The purpose of this study is to test this assertion by investigating whether these measures of investor protection are associated with an important role of good corporate governance: identifying and terminating poorly performing CEOs. Our tests indicate that strong law enforcement institutions significantly improve the association between CEO turnover and poor performance, whereas extensive investor protection laws do not. In addition, we find that in countries with strong law enforcement, CEO turnover is more likely to be associated with poor stock returns when stock prices are more informative. Finding that strong law enforcement institutions are associated with improved CEO turnover‐performance sensitivity is consistent with good corporate governance requiring law enforcement institutions capable of protecting shareholders' property rights (i.e., protecting shareholders from expropriation by insiders). Finding that investor  protection laws are not associated with improved CEO turnover‐performance sensitivity is open to several explanations. For example, investor protection laws may not be as important as strong law enforcement in fostering good governance, the set of laws we examine may not be the set that are most important in promoting good governance, or measurement error in our surrogate for extensive investor protection laws may reduce the power of our test of this variable.     

IPO Pricing in “Hot” Market Conditions: Who Leaves Money on the Table?

This paper explores the impact of investor sentiment on IPO pricing. Using a model in which the aftermarket price of IPO shares depends on the information about the intrinsic value of the company and investor sentiment, I show that IPOs can be overpriced and still exhibit positive initial return. A sample of recent French offerings with a fraction of the shares reserved for individual investors supports the predictions of the model. Individual investors' demand is positively related to market conditions. Moreover, large individual investors' demand leads to high IPO prices, large initial returns, and poor long‐run performance.     

Fund managers' herding and the sensitivity of fund flows to past performance

This study provides a new explanation for the weak sensitivity of investors' flows to poor fund performance based on fund managers' incentives to herd from career concerns. We show that a manager's decision to trade with (against) the herd decreases (increases) significantly investors' willingness to redeem capital from underperforming funds. We argue that this differential investor reaction to poor performance conditional on herding explains the lower termination risk identified among herding managers. We also find that financial intermediaries do not mitigate this sub-optimal investors' response. Our findings support the view that underperforming funds can retain larger payoffs if they herd.     

Kidnapped mutual funds: Irrational preference of naive investors and fund incentive distortion

This study documents that mutual fund investors in Chinese stock markets confuse factor-related returns (FRR) with active alpha. This revealed preference “kidnaps” mutual funds to chase FRR instead of alpha. The observed distorted incentive is intensified among less sophisticated groups as evidenced by investor type and fund-rating heterogeneity. Investors' biased skill assessment is irrational, even if FRR is a vital part of investors' utility function, as there is performance reversal for funds assessed as top performers. We further showed that a distorted incentive to chase FRR undermines mutual funds' willingness to generate alpha by combating fundamental mispricing. Mutual funds cater to investors' preferences by creating more speculative short-term factor timing and holding more lottery-like stocks. Our findings question the widely held belief of the sophisticated Bayesian-agent paradigm in household financial decision-making and cast doubt on institutions' willingness to address mispricing, as suggested by the efficient market hypothesis.     

CULTURE,CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,AND DIVIDEND POLICY: INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE

We find that Hofstede's cultural dimensions—uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, and long‐term orientation—remain significant in the determination of firms’ dividend policies, even after controlling for corporate governance. We also show that this association varies with the strength of corporate governance, measured by the degree of investor protection. Hence, national culture and investor protection independently affect firms’ dividend payouts but also interact with each other, such that strong investor protection induces higher dividend payouts in high uncertainty avoiding and/or highly masculine cultures. Our results provide strong evidence that cultural differences matter and offer additional power in explaining variations in dividend policies.     

Postprivatization corporate governance: The role of ownership structure and investor protection

We investigate the role of ownership structure and investor protection in postprivatization corporate governance. Using a sample of 209 privatized firms from 39 countries over the period 1980 to 2001, we find that the government relinquishes control over time to the benefit of local institutions, individuals, and foreign investors, and that private ownership tends to concentrate over time. Firm size, growth, and industry affiliation, privatization method, as well as the level of institutional development and investor protection, explain the cross-firm differences in ownership concentration. The positive effect of ownership concentration on firm performance matters more in countries with weak investor protection.     

The diligent effect of investor relation officers in conference calls: Evidence from China

This study explores the determinants of investor relations (IR) officers’ diligence in conference calls and the impact of their diligence on capital markets. We apply IR officers' attendance in conference calls as a proxy variable for their diligence. We find that the age, gender, salary, and tenure of IR officers and the start time of conference calls are determinants of IR officers' diligence in conference calls. Their diligence significantly increases institutional ownership and reduces returns volatility. Further analysis shows that IR officers' diligence facilitates the growth of domestic institutional investors' ownership significantly more than that of foreign institutional investors. In addition, information transparency significantly facilitates the relationship between IR officers' diligence and return volatility. Finally, the change in institutional ownership and return volatility also varies with firm size and state ownership. In conclusion, we find that IR officers' diligence plays a positive role in IR management, as it significantly improves firms' institutional ownership and lowers return volatility.     

Stakeholder relations and stock returns: On errors in investors' expectations and learning

A significant number of institutional investors publicly state the belief that corporate stakeholder relations are associated with firm value in a manner that the financial market fails to understand. We investigate whether stakeholder information predicted risk-adjusted returns due to errors in investors' expectations and ultimately ceased to do so as attention for such information increased. We build a stakeholder-relations index (SI) for a wide range of U.S. firms over the period 1992–2009 and provide evidence that the SI explained errors in investors' expectations about firms' future earnings. The SI was positively associated with long-term risk-adjusted returns, earnings announcement returns, and errors in analysts' earnings forecasts over the period 1992–2004. However, as attention for stakeholder issues became more widespread, subsequently, these relationships diminished considerably. The results are consistent with the idea that increased investor attention for stakeholder issues eventually eliminates mispricing.     

International Corporate Governance and Finance: Legal,Cultural and Political Explanations

We investigate the disparity and the determinants of investor protection around the world and their impact on financial market development. More specifically, we build on Williamson's (2000) new institutional economic model to explain this disparity using legal, political and cultural variables. In 2006, the World Bank established an index to measure the disparity of investor protection regulations across 81 emerging and developed countries. Our results confirm that combining classifications based on legal systems, cultures and polities is important in explaining the disparity of investor protection and market capitalization around the world. In particular, we show that the classical regression analysis is not well suited to approach this question because it gives mitigated results. However, the mediation analysis is more cohesive with our conceptual model: we confirmed an indirect effect through a path analysis involving investor protection as a mediator of the relationship between legal systems and culture on the one hand and stock market capitalization on the other hand. Nevertheless, the polity factor was shown to have only a direct effect on stock market capitalization.     

Consolidation and value creation in the insurance industry: The role of governance

We examine the long run performance of M&A transactions in the property–liability insurance industry. We specifically investigate whether such transactions create value for the bidders’ shareholders, and assess how corporate governance mechanisms, internal and external, affect such performance. Our results show that M&A create value in the long run as buy and hold abnormal returns are positive and significant after 3 years. While tender offers appear to be more profitable than mergers, our multivariate evidence does not support the conjecture that domestic transactions create more value than cross-border transactions. Furthermore, positive returns are significantly higher for frequent acquirers and in countries where investor protection is weaker. Internal corporate governance mechanisms, such as board independence, and CEO share ownership, are also significant determinants of the long run positive performance of bidders.     

Institutional investors and post-ICO performance: an empirical analysis of investor returns in initial coin offerings (ICOs)

We examine the role of institutional investors in initial coin offerings (ICOs). Taking a financial investor's perspective, we assess the determinants of post-ICO performance via buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) in a sample of 565 ICO ventures. Conceptually, we argue that institutional investors' superior screening (selection effect) and coaching abilities (treatment effect) enable them to partly overcome the information asymmetry of the ICO context and extract informational rents from their ICO investments. We find that institutional investor backing is indeed associated with higher post-ICO performance. Disentangling selection and treatment effects econometrically, we find that both of these effects explain the positive impact institutional investors have on post-ICO performance. Overall, our results highlight the importance of institutional investors in the ICO context.     

Long-term performance of mergers and acquisitions in ASEAN countries

The study looks at mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in ASEAN countries and examines the post-M&A performance using data from 2001 to 2012. The industry-adjusted operating performance tends to decline in the 3 years following an M&A. Yet, the results suggest that M&As completed during the financial crisis are more profitable than those implemented before and/or after the crisis. We argue that this is mainly due to the synergies created between the firms’ resources during the crisis which augur well for firms’ economic performance. We find that, during the crisis, certain characteristics of the firms like the relative size of the target, cross-border nature of deals, acquirer's cash reserves and friendly nature of deals are important determinants of long-term post-M&A operating performance. However, for M&As during the crisis, there appears to be no relationship between performance and firms’ characteristics linked to M&A activity such as payment method, industry relatedness and percentage of target's share acquired.     

EARNINGS CONFERENCE CALLS AND INSTITUTIONAL MONITORING: EVIDENCE FROM TEXTUAL ANALYSIS

We document the effects of institutional investors on the qualitative information disclosure of firms during earnings conference calls. Using conference call and institutional ownership data between 2005 and 2016, we find that aggregate institutional ownership dampens conference call tone. The effects of institutional investors on tone are causal based on results from indexed firms. Consistent with hypotheses regarding investors' horizons, short-term institutional investors are associated with a more positive conference call tone, as well as more opportunistic trading, whereas long-term investors are associated with a more negative tone. Market participants can generally disentangle the impact of institutional investors on tone based on investor type.     

When it pays to be a friend: Investigating nonprofessional investors' judgments toward CSR companies following an accounting restatement

Prior literature suggests that engagement in corporate social responsibility (CSR) creates an insurance effect that shields companies from the negative consequences of corporate missteps. We experimentally examine whether this protection extends to an accounting restatement and whether investors' attributions of the underlying reasons for this restatement affect their judgments. Results indicate that when a restatement occurs, non-professional investors evaluate high-performing CSR companies more favorably than their average-performing peers, but only when the misstatement appears unintentional. We also incorporate the Stereotype Content Model to test whether feelings of warmth and competence toward the company affect non-professional investor judgments. We document that absent a restatement, feelings of warmth mediate the relationship between CSR performance and investor judgments through competence. Following a misstatement, however, warmth directly mediates that relationship. Our results provide insights into specific psychological mechanisms and boundary conditions of the previously documented insurance effect of CSR performance.