Strategic Bidding for Multiple Units in Simultaneous and Sequential Auctions

A buyer in an electronic marketplace may be interested in buying a bundle of items, where any one item in the bundle may not be of particular interest. The emergence of online auctions allow such users to obtain bundles by bidding on different simultaneous or sequentially run auctions. Because the number of auctions and the number of combinations to form the bundles may be large, the bundle bidding problem becomes intractable and the user is likely to make sub-optimal decision given time constraints and information overload. We believe that an automated agent that takes user preferences and budgetary constraints and can strategically bid on behalf of a user can significantly enhance user profit and satisfaction. Our first step to developing such an agent is to consider bundles containing many units of a single item to be bought from auctions that sell only multiple units of one item type. We assume that users obtain goods over several days. Expectations of auctions and their outcome in the future allow the agent to bid strategically on currently open auctions. We present an expected utility based strategy to decide how many items to bid for in the current auctions, and the maximum price to bid for each item. We evaluate our proposed strategy in different configurations by varying the number of items sold per auction, number of concurrently running auctions, expected closing prices, etc. We simulate several multiple unit English auctions per day, over multiple days, where most of the bidders bid their true utilities drawn from a distribution. The strategic bidding agent has knowledge of this distribution and uses it to determine its bids. A strategic agent who looks farther ahead into the future produces larger returns when there are few strategic bidders. We also evaluate the effect of risk attitudes on the relative performance of the bidders.     

Bidding Strategies and Consumer Savings in NYOP Auctions

We investigate how bidding strategies of successful bidders influence the savings they derive from a Name Your Own Price (NYOP) retailer relative to buying the same product from a retailer who posts prices. Utilizing bidding data for hotel room purchases we demonstrate that consumer savings rate depends positively on consumer decision to haggle (# bids ≥3) and on the shape of the bid function. Relative to non-hagglers (# bids ≤2), hagglers who employ a constant bid increment (i.e., a linear) strategy and a decreasing bid increment (i.e., concave) strategy save more, while those who employ an increasing bid increment strategy (i.e., convex) fare no better. A post hoc analysis also shows that hagglers place many bids in the pursuit of higher quality products, while non-hagglers save friction costs by sacrificing quality (e.g., targeting lower star hotels and adjusting the days of travel).     

An Empirical Analysis of Bidding Fees in Name-your-own-price Auctions

Interactive pricing mechanisms integrate customers into the price-setting process by letting them submit bids. Name-your-own-price auctions are such an interactive pricing mechanism, where buyers' bids denote the final price of a product or service in case they surpass a secret threshold price set by the seller. If buyers are given the flexibility to bid repeatedly, they might try to incrementally bid up to the threshold. In this case, charging fees for the option to place additional bids could generate extra revenue and reduce incremental bidding behavior. Based on an economic model of consumer bidding behavior in name-your-own-price auctions and two empirical studies, we analytically and empirically investigate the effects bidding fees have on buyers' bidding behavior. Moreover, we analyze the impact of bidding fees on seller revenue and profit based on our empirical results.     

Economics, Psychology, and Social Dynamics of Consumer Bidding in Auctions

With increasing numbers of consumers in auction marketplaces, we highlight some recent approaches that bring additional economic, social, and psychological factors to bear on existing economic theory to better understand and explain consumers' behavior in auctions. We also highlight specific research streams that could contribute towards enriching existing economic models of bidding behavior in emerging market mechanisms. This paper is based on the special session at the 6th Triennial Invitational Choice Symposium, University of Colorado Boulder, June 2004 (co-chaired by the first two authors).     

A Network Bidder Behavior Model in Online Auctions: A Case of Fine Art Auctions

The marketing literature provides a solid understanding of auctions regarding final sales prices and many aspects of the processes that unfold to result in those outcomes. This research complements those perspectives by first presenting a new bidder behavior model that shows the role of emergent network ties among bidders on the auction outcome. Dyadic ties are identified as the bid and counter-bid patterns of interactions between bidders that unfold throughout the duration of an auction. These structures are modeled using network analyses, which enables: (1) a richer understanding of detailed auction processes, both within auctions and across auctions of multiple lots, (2) a mapping of the processes to the forecast of prices and the trajectory toward final sales prices, (3) the clear and early identification of key bidders who are influential to the bidding action and who impact final auction sales prices, and (4) the results clearly show that the network exchange patterns are significant and contribute to an understanding of auction processes and outcomes above and beyond simple economic predictors such as the number of bids or bidders or the bidders’ economic status. We conclude by providing some managerial implications for online auction houses and bidders.     

Dynamic Optimization of Long-Term Growth Rate for a Portfolio with Transaction Costs and Logarithmic Utility

We study the optimal investment policy for an investor who has available one bank account and n risky assets modeled by log-normal diffusions. The objective is to maximize the long-run average growth of wealth for a logarithmic utility function in the presence of proportional transaction costs. This problem is formulated as an ergodic singular stochastic control problem and interpreted as the limit of a discounted control problem for vanishing discount factor. The variational inequalities for the discounted control problem and the limiting ergodic problem are established in the viscosity sense. The ergodic variational inequality is solved by using a numerical algorithm based on policy iterations and multigrid methods. A numerical example is displayed for two risky assets.     

(Un)expected Bidder Behavior in Spectrum Auctions: About Inconsistent Bidding and Its Impact on Efficiency in the Combinatorial Clock Auction

The combinatorial clock auction is a two-stage auction format, which has been used to sell spectrum licenses worldwide in the recent years. It draws on a number of elegant ideas inspired by economic theory. A revealed preference activity rule should provide incentives to bid straightforward, i.e., consistent with the bidders’ valuations on a payoff-maximizing package, in each round of the clock phase. A second-price rule should set incentives to bid truthfully in both phases. If bidders respond to these incentives and bid straightforward in the clock phase and truthful in the second sealed-bid stage, then the auction is fully efficient. Unfortunately, bidders might neither bid straightforward in the clock phase nor truthful on all packages in the second sealed-bid stage due to strategic reasons or practical limitations. We introduce metrics based on Afriat’s Efficiency Index to analyze straightforward bidding and report on empirical data from the lab and from the field in the British 4G auction in 2013 and the Canadian 700 MHz auction in 2014, where the bids were made public. The data provides evidence that bidders deviate significantly from straightforward bidding in the clock phase, which can restrict the bids they can submit in the supplementary phase. We show that such restrictions can have a significant negative impact on efficiency and revenue.     

The Transaction Index: A Method for Standardizing Comparisons of Transaction Characteristics Across Different Contexts

This article develops a transaction index (TI), a new method that facilitates comparisons of pricing behavior between reference and target groups of transactors across different types of transactions. The TI compares the target price, derived from the target group, to a transaction zone, which is a range of plausible prices in a negotiation established by the reference groups. These two groups should be conceptually related, for example, through a social association. Statistically, the index can bring transactions at widely differing price levels to a common level and standardize price volatility to facilitate comparisons across transactions. Conceptually, it incorporates a comparison of two groups into a single measure so that their relationship can be analyzed in terms of other variables. An application of a TI to friends' and strangers' pricing decisions reveals richer associations than those observed through more traditional analytic approaches.     

区域经济一体化组织形态比较研究——一个交易成本经济学的视角

文章将交易成本概念引入区域一体化组织形态比较这一领域中.根据交易成本经济学的基本理论构建的理论分析框架,用中间性组织的竞合关系演变以及事前交易成本和事后交易成本概念分析了选择不同组织形态的原因.指出深层次一体化组织以合作为主,虽然事后交易成本小,但是事前交易成本过高.随后结合中国选择区域一体化组织形态的目标和现实约束建议中国从组建浅层次、双边的、灵活的一体化组织入手,坚持制度化、封闭型的原则,尽快实施一体化战略.     

A Discrete‐Time Intertemporal Asset Pricing Model: GE Approach with Recursive Utility

This paper studies the equilibrium characterization of asset pricing in a discrete‐time Lucas exchange economy (Lucas 1978) with the intertemporal recursive utility function of Epstein and Zin (1989). A general formulation of equilibrium asset pricing is presented. It is shown that risk aversion of a certainty equivalent corresponds to risk aversion in the intertemporal asset pricing model. The discrete‐time analogue of Ma's (1993) option pricing formula is derived in an i.i.d. environment, with which we prove an observational nonequivalence theorem in distinguishing the differences of the betweenness recursive utility functions and the expected utility functions. Additionally, when the consumption growth rate follows a first-order Markov process, it is shown that the observational nonequivalence result holds for Kreps–Porteus expected utility. Finally, as by-products, this paper also contains derivations of closed-form formulas for the aggregate equity (with endogenously determined yields), the term structure of interest rates, and European call options on the aggregate equity in a Markov setting.     

A Combination Rule for Portfolio Selection with Transaction Costs

We propose a new portfolio rule for portfolio selection problems in the presence of transaction costs. The new portfolio rule is formed by combining an extant portfolio rule with the no‐rebalancing portfolio rule, which specifies the current portfolio weights before rebalancing as the desired portfolio weights. The new portfolio rule can be applied into most extant portfolio rules. Simulation and out‐of‐sample evidence show that the new portfolio rule can greatly improve portfolio performance, in comparison with the extant portfolio rules to be combined.     

时间压力对网络冲动性购买的影响研究：交易效用和感知风险的调节

以往关于时间压力对冲动性购买影响的研究结论具有两面性,即促进或抑制。文章引入交易效用和感知风险两个调节变量,通过两个实验探讨了时间压力对网络冲动性购买倾向影响的边界条件。首先,当交易效用较高时,时间压力的增加会导致其网络冲动性购买倾向的提高;而当交易效用较低时,时间压力的增加会导致其网络冲动性购买倾向的降低(实验一)。其次,当人们感知风险较低时,时间压力的增加会导致其网络冲动性购买倾向的提高;而当人们感知风险较高时,时间压力的增加会导致其网络冲动性购买倾向的降低(实验二)。研究结论可以帮助电商企业进一步了解消费者的冲动性购买行为,充分利用时间压力的影响,制定更灵活有效的促销策略。     

Mergers in Sealed versus Oral Auctions

In this paper, we study mergers in oral or second-price auctions and compare them to mergers in sealed-bid or first-price auctions. We use an adaptation of the logit qualitative choice model to characterize the underlying bidder value distributions. In second-price auctions, this model has a closed-form relationship between winning bids (prices) and the probabilities of winning (shares), and this relationship gives rise to a Herfindahl-like formula that predicts merger effects. We compare mergers in second-price auctions to mergers in first-price auctions. Despite their differences, sealed-bid merger effects are predicted by the oral Herfindahl-like formula.The source of this curious similarity is not apparent.     

An Anticipating Calculus Approach to the Utility Maximization of an Insider

In this paper we consider a financial market with an insider that has, at time   t = 0  , some additional information of the whole developing of the market. We use the forward integral, which is an anticipating integral, and the techniques of the Malliavin calculus so that we can take advantage of the privileged information to maximize the expected logarithmic utility from terminal wealth.     

农户交易中介化——概念界定与经济合理性论证

目前我国绝大多数农户采用直接化的交易方式,近年来,出现了一种新的交易方式,即"交易中介化",到底是哪种交易方式更有效?哪种方式更能节省交易成本?所以必须对其内涵进行界定,以"交易成本"为分析工具,借助一个关于基础交易成本与交易方式选择的模型。由于农户的有限理性、不确定性、交易频率、资产的专用性等因素影响,农户的基础交易成本是相当高的。从微观经济学的角度来看,直接化的交易还会使农户的福利受到损失。换言之,中介化交易是一项有效的制度安排。     

Halal Certification for Financial Products: A Transaction Cost Perspective

We argue that although halal certification could potentially reduce the high transaction costs related to buying Islamic financial products, in practice these costs are just replaced by transaction costs relating to the certification itself. It takes considerable time (2–3 months) and money (USD 122.000) to obtain a halal certification. Partially, this is because the market is highly concentrated and non-contestable. About 20 individual Sharia scholars control more than half the market, with the top 3 earning an estimated USD 4.5 million in fees per year. Moreover, this market seems plagued with problems, most notably a strong incentive for excessively lenient certification, lack of consensus on what is considered halal and sub-standard governance practices. We discuss solutions to these problems and conclude that a neutral non-profit government entity should assume the role of halal certifiers.     

交易性金融资产及其会计处理

<正>交易性金融资产是指企业为了交易目的而持有的金融资产,如企业利用闲置资金以赚取差价为目的从二级市场上购买的股票、债券、基金等。此外,企业持有的直接指定为以公允价值计量且其变动计     

交易成本:外包现象的一个解释视角

企业的外包决策实际上包含着对不同治理机制下的交易成本的比较和权衡。威廉姆森的交易成本框架的外包现象,能够最大限度地节省交易成本。企业基于生产成本和交易成本计算和比较应以外包关系治理作为企业在不同交易维度组合下的治理机制选择。