商业银行参与融资融券业务模式的国际比较与借鉴

融资融券业务作为一种证券信用交易,已成为海外证券市场普遍实施的成熟交易制度。不同国家或地区根据金融体系和信用环境的完善程度,采用了适合自身实际情况的融资融券模式。该文介绍了商业银行在不同融资融券业务模式中所发挥的作用,及其在集中授信模式下证券金融公司运作中所扮演的角色,并借鉴国际经验对我国商业银行参与融资融券业务进行了初步探讨。     

Credit information sharing in the nexus between charter value and systemic risk in Asian banking

In this paper, we assess whether the link between charter value and systemic risk in banking is affected by credit information sharing at the country level. Using a sample of Asian listed banks, we document that banks with higher charter value exhibit lower systemic risk because these banks hold more capital. Nevertheless, we find that the self-disciplining role of charter value in banking is more pronounced for countries with lower depth of credit information sharing. Specifically, our findings also reveal that higher charter value alleviates systemic risk and increases capitalization, particularly in countries with lower quality of private credit bureaus. These findings suggest that higher charter value can be detrimental for financial stability due to an increase in bank systemic risk, particularly when private credit bureaus are of better quality. In order to overcome bank systemic risk, this paper advocates the importance of strengthening bank competition to limit charter value, in addition to promoting the development of private credit bureaus.     

The impact of state ownership on performance differences in privately-owned versus state-owned banks: An international comparison

This paper examines how government ownership and government involvement in a country’s banking system affect bank performance from 1989 through 2004. Our study uncovers an interesting pattern of changing performance differences between state-owned and privately-owned banks around the Asian financial crisis. We find that state-owned banks operated less profitably, held less core capital, and had greater credit risk than privately-owned banks prior to 2001, and the performance differences are more significant in those countries with greater government involvement and political corruption in the banking system. In addition, from 1997 to 2000, the 4-year period after the beginning of the Asian financial crisis, the deterioration in the cash flow returns, core capital, and credit quality of state-owned banks was significantly greater than that of privately-owned banks, especially for the countries that were hardest hit by the Asian crisis. However, state-owned banks closed the gap with privately-owned banks on cash flow returns, core capital, and nonperforming loans in the post-crisis period of 2001–2004. Our findings can best be explained by Shleifer and Vishny’s [Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1997. A survey of corporate governance. J. Finance 52, 737–783] corporate governance theory on state ownership of firms and Kane’s [Kane, E.J., 2000. Capital movement, banking insolvency, and silent runs in the Asian financial crisis. Pacific-Basin Finance J. 8, 153–175] life-cycle model of a regulation-induced banking crisis.     

地方政府财政压力与银行信贷资源配置效率--基于我国城市商业银行的研究证据北大核心

基于2005-2015年我国城市商业银行的样本,本文研究省级地方政府财政压力是否对商业银行信贷资金投向和信贷资源配置效率产生影响。研究发现,地方政府财政压力是影响城市商业银行信贷资源配置的重要因素。具体而言,省级地方政府的财政压力越大,省内城市商业银行投向地方国有经济部门的贷款比率越高。然而,信贷资源更多投向地方国有经济部门的银行有更高的不良贷款率和更差的会计业绩。进一步研究发现,在财政压力大的省份,城市商业银行投向地方国有经济部门的贷款比率越高,则贷款拨备率越低,这表明城市商业银行会通过盈余管理行为来应对监管压力。本文研究结论对商业银行监管以及防范化解金融风险有重要启示。     

Resaleable debt and systemic risk

Many debt claims, such as bonds, are resaleable; others, such as repos, are not. There was a fivefold increase in repo borrowing before the 2008–2009 financial crisis. Why? Did banks’ dependence on non-resaleable debt precipitate the crisis? In this paper, we develop a model of bank lending with credit frictions. The key feature of the model is that debt claims are heterogenous in their resaleability. We find that decreasing credit market frictions leads to an increase in borrowing via non-resaleable debt. Such borrowing has a dark side: It causes credit chains to form, because, if a bank makes a loan via non-resaleable debt and needs liquidity, it cannot sell the loan but must borrow via a new contract. These credit chains are a source of systemic risk, as one bank’s default harms not only its creditors but also its creditors’ creditors. Overall, our model suggests that reducing credit market frictions may have an adverse effect on the financial system and even lead to the failures of financial institutions.     

Credit spread interdependencies of European states and banks during the financial crisis

We investigate the interdependence of the default risk of several Eurozone countries (France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) and their domestic banks during the period between June 2007 and May 2010, using daily credit default swaps (CDS). Bank bailout programs changed the composition of both banks’ and sovereign balance sheets and, moreover, affected the linkage between the default risk of governments and their local banks. Our main findings suggest that in the period before bank bailouts the contagion disperses from bank credit spreads into the sovereign CDS market. After bailouts, a financial sector shock affects sovereign CDS spreads more strongly in the short run. However, the impact becomes insignificant in the long term. Furthermore, government CDS spreads become an important determinant of banks’ CDS series. The interdependence of government and bank credit risk is heterogeneous across countries, but homogeneous within the same country.     

Specialization in Bank Lending: Evidence from Exporting Firms

We develop a novel approach for measuring bank specialization using granular data on borrower activities and apply it to Peruvian exporters and their banks. We find that borrowers seek credit from banks that specialize in their export destinations, both when expanding exports and when exporting to new countries. Firms experiencing country-specific export demand shocks adjust borrowing disproportionately from specialized banks. Specialized bank credit supply shocks affect exports disproportionately to countries of specialization. Our results demonstrate that firm credit demand is bank- and activity-specific, which reduces banking competition and affects the transmission and amplification of shocks through the banking sector.     

非银行金融科技与上市公司借贷成本——竞争压力还是信息溢出？

金融科技作为技术驱动的金融创新,是深化金融供给侧结构性改革、增强金融服务实体经济能力的重要引擎。基于我国A股上市公司数据,本文实证分析了针对中小微企业和个人的非银行金融科技发展对上市公司借贷成本的溢出效应。结果表明,非银行金融科技发展每提高10%,上市公司借贷成本平均下降1.6个百分点。进一步分析表明,这一结果同时受到“竞争压力”与“信息溢出”两种机制的作用:前者表现为在银行业竞争程度更高的地区,非银行金融科技的发展更能显著降低企业的借贷成本;后者表现为,非银行金融科技的发展能够显著降低商业银行不良贷款率,同时也能降低商业银行业务及管理费用开支。本文探索金融科技如何影响上市公司融资成本,为金融科技进一步增强金融服务实体经济能力提供了新的启示。     

国外信用风险度量方法及其适用性研究

信用风险是银行面临诸多风险中最重要的风险,如何量化和控制信用风险一直是金融研究的热点领域之一。本文在对国外现代主流信用风险度量模型进行比较研究的基础上,分析了它们各自的特征和适用性,结合中资银行的特点,提出了适合我国国情的信用风险度量模型选取原则,基于我国现状建议在国内推广应用Logistic模型,以期对我国信用风险管理实务有一定的参考价值。     

Macroprudential regulation,credit spreads and the role of monetary policy

We study the macroprudential roles of bank capital regulation and monetary policy in a borrowing cost channel model with endogenous financial frictions, driven by credit risk, bank losses and bank capital costs. These frictions induce financial accelerator mechanisms and motivate the examination of a macroprudential toolkit. Following credit shocks, countercyclical regulation is more effective than monetary policy in promoting price, financial and macroeconomic stability. For supply shocks, combining macroprudential regulation with a stronger anti-inflationary policy stance is optimal. The findings emphasize the importance of the Basel III accords in alleviating the output-inflation trade-off faced by central banks, and cast doubt on the desirability of conventional (and unconventional) Taylor rules during periods of financial distress.     

Interenterprise Credit and Adjustment during Financial Crises: The Role of Firm Size

Small and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs) suffered a sharp contraction in their borrowing from banks during the Great Recession. Analyzing a large firm‐level database for European countries, the paper shows that trade credit amplified the liquidity squeeze on SMEs, with adverse effects on their real activity. SMEs sharply increased their net trade credit and thus transferred financial resources to larger firms. Given the large weight of SMEs in the economy of European countries, the liquidity squeeze of SMEs likely contributed to the depth of the output fall and the slow recovery in Europe during the Great Recession.     

Relationship lending,hierarchical distance and credit tightening: Evidence from the financial crisis

This paper examines the firms’ credit availability during the 2007–2009 financial crisis using a dataset of 5331 bank–firm relationships provided by borrowers’ credit folders of three Italian banks. It aims to test whether a strong lender–borrower relationship can produce less credit rationing for borrowing firms even during a credit crunch period. The results show that exclusivity of the relationship can mitigate the firm credit rationing. We also verify the influence of lending organizational structure during crisis. A new measure of distance in lending technologies has been introduced: the hierarchical distance calculated as the distance between the branch that originates the loan and the location of the hierarchical level responsible for financing decision. Our findings document a negative impact of distance on credit availability, consistent with the idea that proximity facilitates the transmission of soft information.     

Banks' Liquidity and the Cost of Liquidity to Corporations

We consider the liquidity shock banks experienced following the collapse of the asset‐backed commercial paper (ABCP) market in the fall of 2007 to investigate whether banks' liquidity conditions affect their ability to provide liquidity to corporations. We find that banks that borrowed more from the Federal Home Loan Bank system or the Federal Reserve's discount window following that liquidity shock passed a larger portion of their borrowing costs onto corporations seeking access to liquidity when compared to the precrisis period. This increase is larger among banks with a bigger exposure to the ABCP market, credit lines that pose more liquidity risk to banks, and borrowers that are likely dependent on the credit‐line provider. Our findings show that the crisis that affected the banking system had a negative effect not only on the price of credit to corporations, but also on the price corporations pay to guarantee access to liquidity.     

Understanding liquidity and credit risks in the financial crisis

This paper develops a structured dynamic factor model for the spreads between London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and overnight index swap (OIS) rates for a panel of banks. Our model involves latent factors which reflect liquidity and credit risk. Our empirical results show that surges in the short term LIBOR-OIS spreads during the 2007-2009 financial crisis were largely driven by liquidity risk. However, credit risk played a more significant role in the longer term (twelve-month) LIBOR-OIS spread. The liquidity risk factors are more volatile than the credit risk factor. Most of the familiar events in the financial crisis are linked more to movements in liquidity risk than credit risk.     

Female leadership and borrowing constraints: Evidence from an emerging economy

This study investigates the differences in credit access between male-managed and female-managed firms using two Enterprise Censuses in Vietnam. Our findings reveal that women-managed firms are less likely to borrow from commercial banks than their male counterparts, even when controlling for other determinants such as CEO education and experience, firm size, and ownership. No difference in credit access is documented for firms borrowing from non-commercial banks. Once we control for firm characteristics and CEO demographic factors, approved loan size is higher for firms managed by female CEOs regardless of the borrowing source. Using decomposition analysis, we find firm size contributes most in explaining the difference in credit access between female and male-managed companies.     

Islamic versus conventional banks in the GCC countries: A comparative study using classification techniques

This paper contributes to the empirical literature on Islamic finance by investigating the feature of Islamic and conventional banks in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries over the period 2003–2010. We use parametric and non-parametric classification models (Linear discriminant analysis, Logistic regression, Tree of classification and Neural network) to examine whether financial ratios can be used to distinguish between Islamic and conventional banks. Univariate results show that Islamic banks are, on average, more profitable, more liquid, better capitalized, and have lower credit risk than conventional banks. We also find that Islamic banks are, on average, less involved in off-balance sheet activities and have more operating leverage than their conventional peers. Results from classification models show that the two types of banks may be differentiated in terms of credit and insolvency risk, operating leverage and off-balance sheet activities, but not in terms of profitability and liquidity. More interestingly, we find that the recent global financial crisis has a negative impact on the profitability for both Islamic and conventional banks, but time shifted. Finally, results show that Logit regression obtained slightly higher classification accuracies than other models.     

Credit Risk in Two Institutional Regimes: Spanish Commercial and Savings Banks

Although credit risk is an important factor that financial institutions must cope with, the determinants of bank problem loans have been little studied. Using panel data, we compare the determinants of problem loans of Spanish commercial and savings banks in the period 1985–1997, taking into account both macroeconomic and individual bank level variables. The GDP growth rate, firms, and family indebtedness, rapid past credit or branch expansion, inefficiency, portfolio composition, size, net interest margin, capital ratio, and market power are variables that explain credit risk. However, there are significant differences between commercial and savings banks, which confirm the relevance of the institutional form in the management of credit risk. Our findings raise important bank supervisory policy issues: the use of bank level variables as early warning indicators, the advantages of bank mergers from different regions, and the role of banking competition and ownership in determining credit risk.     

Government interventions and default risk: Does one size fit all?

We examine the effectiveness of the financial sector rescue packages provided by the national governments during the 2008 financial crisis. This study questions the implicit assumption that government interventions have an uniform effect on the default risk of individual banks. After testing the results for sensitivity, our main findings suggest that there exists a significant negative relationship between the announcement of the financial sector rescue packages and the daily change of the credit default premium. However, quantile regressions show that the effectiveness of these packages differs across banks: most interventions do not decrease the risk of intermediate to low-risk banks, while they do reduce the risk of high-risk banks. Besides, we find that interventions aimed at specific financial institutions are more effective in restraining banking risk than broad interventions taken to stabilize the financial market as a whole.     

Interbank funding,bank risk exposure and performance in the UK: A three-stage network DEA approach

Operating on unsecured interbank markets exposes banks to various risks which trigger changes in bank strategic outcomes such as risk management and performance. This paper proposes a novel three-stage network data envelopment approach with feedback and alliance to examine the importance of bank risk exposures through interbank funding on bank efficiency levels. Our results show that overall bank performance management is achieved via a complement of good alliance between risk and funding, and financial performance. In addition, high financial or overall performance may not imply better risk management or allied process performance. Rather, banks are inherently performance-driven institutions whose performance objectives are independently optimal but aggregately suboptimal. Further analyses show that, for international banks, high financial or overall performance may not necessarily limit high allied process and risk management. Moreover, risk governance in large banks has not improved despite the increased regulatory pressure induced after the 2007–2008 credit crisis. Our results remain robust regardless of whether the alliance or financial performance stage is given priority in the overall efficiency decomposition, and when the novel resource imbalance index is used to assess and enhance the discriminatory power of performance.     

In Banking,Is Small Beautiful?

The state‐led resolution of the 2007‐2009 financial crisis has proven to be costly. Calls are being heard in Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland to cap the size of domestic banks. Is small beautiful? In this policy paper, we first match bailing out cost data to the relative size of banks for a sample of 14 countries and 29 banks. An important observation is that some countries with relatively small banks faced large bailout cost when correlated systemic risk affected many banks. Secondly, we call to the attention that capping the size of banks can have an unintended effect: a lack of credit risk diversification. Risk diversification is needed to reduce the costs of financial distress, which are quite significant in the banking industry. If reducing public bail out costs is the right objective, capping the size of banks is not the best tool. So as to keep large banks that provide highly skilled employment opportunities in a services economy, we discuss four policy options that help to ensure financial stability: independence and accountability of bank supervisors, prompt corrective action mechanisms, burden sharing across countries, and an end to the too‐big‐to‐fail doctrine.