Return on capital analysis: U.S.-based multinational corporations versus U.S. domestic corporations

We study the difference between U.S.-based multinational corporations (MNCs) and U.S. domestic corporations (DCs) in terms of management efficiency with return on capital as the measure of management efficiency. We use a fixed effect model to account for heterogeneity and/or the time-specific effect and find that MNCs have lower management efficiency than DCs, which holds after we control for the effects of firm size, GDP growth rate, and growth opportunity on management efficiency. One reason for the low efficiency is the MNCs’ inability to manage their assets well relative to DCs. We also find that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between return on capital and degree of internationalization, which implies an optimal degree of internationalization. Our result does not confirm the recently proposed three-stage model.     

The capital structure of multinational corporations: Canadian versus U.S. evidence

Contrary to the U.S. evidence, we show that Canadian multinational corporations (MNCs) display higher leverage than domestic firms (DCs). This higher leverage is due to lower agency costs of debt associated with MNCs' U.S. operations. We also find that the Canadian firms with international bond market access have higher leverage than firms without such access. Comparison with a U.S. matched sample shows that the sensitivity of leverage to firm-specific factors differs between the two countries, especially for the MNCs samples. Our evidence indicates that capital structures of MNCs are a complex interaction of both home and host country factors and differences in leverage determinants across countries.     

Do multinational and domestic corporations differ in their leverage policies?

This paper examines the leverage policies of multinational corporations (MNCs) in comparison to those of domestic corporations (DCs). Prior studies document that MNCs have lower leverage levels. However, our analysis of U.S. firms over the period 1981–2010 reveals that the leverage levels of MNCs are not significantly lower than those of DCs if we control for key firm characteristics related to leverage levels. We also find that MNCs and DCs do not differ significantly in terms of their debt maturity structure, the speed of leverage adjustments, or the propensity to issue debt vs. equity (or vs. not to issue debt). The results suggest that MNCs' financial policies at the corporate level are not significantly influenced by their greater exposures, in comparison to DCs, to market imperfections such as taxes and regulations. Interestingly, however, our additional analysis of MNCs from outside the U.S. reveals that non-U.S. MNCs issue securities more frequently and adjust leverage faster than their domestic peers.     

Capital structure of multinational and domestic corporations – a cross‐country comparison

This study investigates whether the determinants of capital structure between multinational corporations (MCs) and domestic corporations (DCs) vary across Australia, U.S., Japan, U.K. and Malaysia. Results show (i) the debt holding capacity and majority of the explanatory factors vary between DCs and MCs and also across countries; (ii) Australia, Japan, U.K. and Malaysian MCs hold significantly less long‐term debt relative to U.S. firms; (iii) DCs and MCs that operate under an imputation tax system hold significantly less short‐ and long‐term debt; and (iv) DCs and MCs operating under common law have significantly less short‐term debt and significantly higher long‐term debt.     

Does the use of tax haven subsidiaries by U.S. multinational corporations affect the cost of bank loans?

This study examines whether the use of tax haven subsidiaries by U.S. multinational corporations (MNCs) is associated with the cost of bank loans. We find that more intensive tax haven subsidiary use by MNCs is positively associated with the cost of bank loans. In cross-sectional analyses, we identify channels through which the positive association between tax haven intensity and bank loan costs is more pronounced, such as a weak information environment, poor corporate governance, high CEO pay-for-performance and corporation-related wealth, and low managerial ability. We also find that intensive tax haven use is positively (negatively) associated with non-price loan contract terms, such as collateralization and financial covenants (loan maturity and general covenants). Our main result holds when public bonds are substituted for bank loans. Finally, additional analysis shows that MNCs with high levels of tax haven intensity are more likely to rely on bank loan financing than on raising debt from the bond market. Overall, this study adds to an emerging body of literature on corporate taxation and debt policy.     

Convertible debt and asset substitution of multinational corporations

Internationalization enables multinational corporations (MNCs) to diversify their sources and types of debt, as well as earnings, although doing so can negatively impact firm risk and the agency costs of debt. Utilizing a primary sample of United States (US) based MNCs compared with domestic corporations (DCs), we find that MNCs are indeed riskier than DCs when considering systematic risk. Further, recognizing the heterogeneity of long-term debt, we find these MNCs consistently maintain a higher convertible debt ratio compared to DCs. We argue this is to mitigate the agency costs related to the asset substitution problem.     

The cost of capital to corporations in Japan and the U.S.A.

The average 1962–1984 cost of capital was probably lower in Japan than in the U.S.A., but this was not necessarily true of the marginal cost, and in any case the difference was not large enough to explain the higher rate of investment in Japan. The combined tax impact on the average cost of capital does not seem to have been markedly different in the two countries and even the direction of the effect on the marginal cost is not clear. The apparently lower average cost of capital in Japan reflected lower real interest rates and greater reliance on corporate debt.     

International operations and voluntary disclosures by U.S.-based multinational corporations

This study uses analysts' ratings of firms' disclosures to examine how the differences between U.S. and foreign disclosure environments affects the voluntary disclosures of U.S.-based multinational corporations. We hypothesize that these different disclosure environments discourage U.S-based multinationals from releasing costly information to competitors. Examining how these differences impact U.S. MNCs' reporting may further our understanding of the relationship between voluntary disclosures and differences among countries' accounting standards. Furthermore, it may explain how convergence of mandated accounting standards might impact voluntary disclosures. Controlling for industry membership, firm size, profitability, earnings-return relations, and capital market activity, we find that U.S. firms with more extensive foreign operations tend to provide fewer voluntary disclosures. These results are most robust for informal and flexible disclosures, such as investor relations, where the findings indicate a negative relation between foreign operations and disclosure.     

An empirical study of equity agency costs and internationalization: Evidence from Taiwanese firms

Under methodologies of the event study procedure and the multiple regression analysis, this study investigates equity agency costs and internationalization, using a Taiwanese sample from 2000 to 2004. The evidence shows that the shareholder wealth effects of security offering announcements are unfavorable for higher equity agency costs, especially unfavorable for higher equity agency costs of foreign-exposed multinational corporations (MNCs) because internationalization renders monitoring more difficult in comparison to domestic corporations (DCs).This study suggests MNCs to increase their information transparency in order to achieve lowered equity agency costs, and help to reduce information asymmetry, thereby enable firms to raise capital on the best available terms.     

THE CHANGING RISK PROFILE OF U.S.-BASED MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS EXPOSED TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY MARKETS

In this study we investigate the risk characteristics of U.S.-based multinational corporations (MNCs) that conduct much of their business in the European Community. Specifically, we assess the efficacy of a multifactor return-generating model that incorporates the influence of U.S. and European markets. Our results demonstrate that the European market is a significant factor in explaining the time-series behavior of MNC returns, and that the European market influence is stronger since the adoption of the Single European Act. In addition, the reduction in the sensitivity of MNCs to the U.S. market since the Single European Act is cross-sectionally associated with changes in their proportional levels of European sales. The results suggest that the returns of other MNCs expanding into increasingly integrated regional blocs may experience similar changes in their systematic risk profile.     

INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND MULTINATIONALITY: EVIDENCE FROM CAPITAL STRUCTURE CHANGES

I examine shareholder valuation effects of capital structure changes for multinational (MNC) and domestic (DC) corporations. The internalization theory of foreign direct investment posits that MNCs create value by internalizing the market for their assets across national borders. If the financing decision is related to the rents from future investments, MNCs may have differential valuation effects to capital structure changes vis-à-vis DCs. I find that MNCs have lower (greater) excess returns for debt-for-equity (equity-for-debt) exchanges than DCs. The cross-sectional analyses show that the valuation effects are differentially related to the investment opportunities of MNCs and DCs.     

Foreign issuers in the U.S. PIPE market

We document that the use of private investment in public equity (PIPE) by foreign firms listed on U.S. exchanges is growing even faster than its use by U.S. firms. On average, foreign firm PIPE stock deals represent a similar proportion of the firm's market capitalization to U.S. firm PIPEs, but suffer less of a share price discount than U.S. firm PIPE issuances, a relation that is robust to consideration of exchange, deal size, share turnover and return volatility. We document that hedge funds are only small investors in foreign firm PIPEs issued in the U.S., which tend to be purchased by pensions, government funds and corporations. PIPE, in combination with the reverse merger method of going public, provides a cost-effective means for foreign firms to raise capital in the U.S. capital market.     

Economic Exchange Rate Exposure of U.S.-Based MNCs Operating in Europe

This study focuses on the economic exchange rate exposure of 168 U.S.-based multinational corporations (MNCs) with foreign operations primarily in Europe. The sampling plan and other refinements may improve the estimation of exposure and detection of relevant determinants. Operating characteristics that represent economic exposure are evaluated for their ability, to explain cross-sectional differences in exposure. More specifically, the degree of imbalance, which is a proxy for matching cash inflows and outflows, and proportion of export sales are able to explain differential exposure. Furthermore, shifts in the degree of imbalance and proportion of export sales are found to significantly explain shifts in exposure.     

Collateral pricing

We examine how collateral affects the cost of debt capital. Using a novel data set of secured debt issued by U.S. airlines, we construct industry-specific measures of collateral redeployability. We show that debt tranches that are secured by more redeployable collateral exhibit lower credit spreads, higher credit ratings, and higher loan-to-value ratios—an effect which our estimates show to be economically sizeable. Our results suggest that the ability to pledge collateral, and in particular redeployable collateral, lowers the cost of external financing and increases debt capacity.     

Book-tax conformity and capital structure

We examine the effect of increased book-tax conformity on corporate capital structure. Prior studies document a decrease in the informativeness of accounting earnings for equity markets resulting from higher book-tax conformity. We argue that the decrease in earnings informativeness impacts equity holders more than debt holders because of the differences in payoff structures between debt and equity investments such that increases in book-tax conformity lead to increases in firms’ reliance on debt capital. We exploit a natural experiment in the U.S. and find that firms facing an increase in required book-tax conformity increase leverage relative to other firms. We also provide evidence of an increase in the cost of equity (but not of debt) capital for firms facing an increase in required book-tax conformity, relative to control firms, and show that these increases in cost of equity capital are positively associated with an increase in leverage. Our findings are consistent with firms substituting away from equity and toward more debt in the presence of higher book-tax conformity.     

Geographic diversification and agency costs of debt of multinational firms

This paper examines the agency conflicts between shareholders and bondholders of multinational and non-multinational firms and provides an explanation for the puzzle that multinational firms use less long-term debt, but more short-term debt than domestic firms. Using a sample of 6951 firm–year observations for multinational and domestic firms over the 1988–1994 period, we find that alternative measures of agency costs have statistically significant negative effects on the firm's long-term leverage. The results, however, also show that the negative effects of agency costs of debt on long-term leverage are significantly greater for multinational than non-multinational firms. It is documented that the effect of the agency costs of debt on leverage are increased by the firm's degree of foreign involvement. The evidence shows that firm's increasing foreign involvement exacerbates agency costs of debt leading to lower (greater) use of long-term (short-term) debt financing. This result is also confirmed using alternative measures of foreign involvement. The evidence is consistent with the view that multinational corporations (MNCs) are susceptible to higher agency costs of debt than domestic corporations because geographic diversity renders active monitoring more difficult and expensive in comparison to domestic firms. The results fail to support the view that MNCs' lower long-term debt ratios are due to the advantages of the internal capital markets.     

Social capital and entrepreneurial financing choice

This paper investigates the influence of social capital on young firms' financing arrangements. Using a sample of U.S. start-ups, I find that social capital, as captured by secular norms and social networks in the entrepreneur's county, increases access to outside financing and reduces reliance on owner equity to finance the new venture. Financing to entrepreneurs located in counties with greater social capital involves higher amounts of leverage in the form of outside debt. This finding persists in a difference-in-difference test that controls for unobservable geographic determinants of capital structure.     

THE COSTS OF RAISING CAPITAL

We report the average costs of raising external debt and equity capital for U.S. corporations from 1990 to 1994. For initial public offerings (IPOs) of equity, the direct costs average 11.0 percent of the proceeds. For seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), the direct costs average 7.1 percent. For convertible bonds, the direct costs average 3.8 percent. For straight debt issues, the direct costs average 2.2 percent, although they are strongly related to the credit rating of the issue. All classes of securities exhibit economies of scale, although they are less pronounced for straight debt issues. IPOs also incur a substantial indirect cost due to short-run underpricing. Most large equity offers include an international tranche, although debt issues do not.     

How Risky Are U.S. Corporate Assets?

We use market data on corporate bonds and equities to measure the value of U.S. corporate assets and their payouts to investors. In contrast to equity dividends, total corporate payouts are highly volatile, turn negative when corporations raise capital, and are acyclical. At the same time, corporate asset returns are similar to returns on equity, and both are exposed to fluctuations in economic growth. To reconcile this evidence, we argue that acyclical but volatile net repurchases mask the exposure of total payouts' cash components to economic growth risks. We develop an asset pricing framework to quantitatively illustrate this economic channel.