利他性惩罚的演化

实验和现实数据均显示,即使在一次性的交往过程中人类也会惩罚非合作者.即使这种利他性惩罚可以解释人类社会较高水平的合作行为,但是它也会产生一个演化悖论:现有模型认为非亲缘个体之间的利他性合作只有在小规模群体中才可以稳定地演化,因而用这一模型来解释利他性惩罚的演化时就会产生一个结果,即人们不会自己承担成本去惩罚别人,并为大量非亲缘的成员提供利益.然而,本文认为,利他性合作与利他性惩罚之间是不对称的,这就使得利他性惩罚可以在一次性和匿名交往中演化,并使利他性惩罚和利他性合作都得以维持.     

EMU: Optimal Fiscal Strategy and the Punishment Effectiveness

This paper investigates the ability of the Stability and Growth Pact to prevent governments in the euro zone from running excessive budget deficits. It is shown that in a static two-country game, the Pareto-optimal strategy of no excess deficits cannot be systematically enforced, whatever the toughness of the sanction under the Pact. However, in a multiperiod setting, the Pareto-optimal configuration of no excess deficits would prevail even if no sanctions were applied to deviant governments. In this case, neither a heavily punitive SGP, nor a centralized budget appears to be helpful in the EMU context.     

Debt and Punishment: Market Discipline in the Eurozone

This article challenges the conventional wisdom of weak market discipline in Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). In so doing, we empirically analyse the dynamics of market discipline for all 27 EU member states between 1992 and 2007. The existing literature tends to assert that markets discipline governments, without measuring whether the interest punishment markets impose actually has the purported effect on government policy. To better grasp the dynamics of market discipline it is essential to consider both sides. Market discipline is thus understood as a two-sided phenomenon. On the one hand, financial investors react to policy developments. On the other hand, policy-makers react to market signals. We find strong evidence that although the impact of fiscal policy developments on market punishment slightly decreases with monetary integration, government responsiveness to market punishment increases. This runs counter to the conventional narrative of policy-makers banking on bailout from fellow EMU members.     

The shading and distancing of commerce: When internalization is not enough

A political economy of degradation and of sustainability should account not only for the full range of production costs but the sources of those costs. It should consider how the pursuit of wealth can, deliberately or not, lead to uncounted costs and unaccountable actors. This article explores the conditions of cost generation and externalization, especially those that are largely unintended and inadvertent. It shows how the pursuit of wealth, the expansion of markets, the mobility of capital, and the entanglements of production processes can lead to the unwitting generation and displacement of costs. It analyzes competitive business strategy and patterns of production and consumption for their contribution to such costs. Business strategy and state policy tend to create a never-ending search for frontiers, however simulated and however unecological they may be. The costs generated in those frontiers are a function of shading, that is, obscuring of costs, and distancing, the separation of production and consumption decisions, both of which impede ecological and social feedback and create cognitive, institutional, and ethical lags between initial benefits and eventual full costs. As distance increases along dimensions of geography, culture, bargaining power, or agency, negative feedback loops are severed, stakeholders expand while decision making contracts, environmental problems are displaced, and shading and cost externalization increase. The likelihood of sustainable resource use increases as distance is lowered, as institutions locate decision authority in those who receive negative ecological feedback and who have the capacity and incentives to act on that feedback, and as the burden of proof for economic interventions shifts to the interveners.     

日本禁止垄断法中的征缴"课征金"制度

日本禁止垄断法在其不断的修正和发展中,逐渐形成了其特有的法律制度,"征缴‘课征金'"就是其中之一.本文从考察日本征缴"课征金"制度的意义、缴纳"课征金"的客体范围、"课征金"的计算方法和征缴"课征金"的程序等方面对这一制度进行了较为细致和深入的分析,以期为建立适合我国需要的相应法律制度作些有益的探讨.     

Production externalities: internalization by voting

We study internalization of production externalities in perfectly competitive markets where production plans are decided by majority voting. Since shareholders want firms to maximize dividends of portfolios rather than profits, they are interested in some internalization. Two governances, namely the shareholder governance (one share, one vote) and the stakeholder democracy (one stakeholder, one vote), are compared. We argue that perfect internalization is more likely to be the outcome of the stakeholder democracy than the shareholder governance.     

企业三层面激励与约束机制系统结构

管理的实质是通过激励和约束方式协调人的行为,以有效达成组织的目标。因此,企业管理绩效评价的标准就是企业达成组织目标的效率,而达成企业目标的效率取决于企业员工尽职尽责的努力程度和实现目标的方法。 经济效益则是企业的经营和管理两个方面的状况的综合反映。同时,企业的管理水平是决定企业发展的基础。我们对企业管理似乎一直存在着较大误区,如以企业经济直接评价企业管理水平,要么将管理仅仅看成是各项专业性的管理方法（质量管理、成本管理等）,或者夸大经营的地位和作用,而忽视企业对于企业发展的重要基础性作用。企业员工尽职尽责的努力程度从根本上说主要是由企业激励与约束机制系统的设计与运行状况决定。而要科学设计和建立企业激励与约束机制系统,首先要系统设计企业激励与约束机制的系统结构。本文将从整体上、结构上论述企业员工的激励与约束机制结构体系,为我国企业管理科学进行探索。     

Let the Punishment Fit the Crime: Enforcement with Error

Given an externality function that implements a social objective, this paper examines the possibility of implementing the social objective when the action is observed with error. Provided that the signal is informative in the sense that it separates certain distributions of actions and agents are risk‐neutral, the social objective remains implementable even with observational error. In addition, when errors are small, there is a closed form second‐order approximation for the penalty function that depends only on first and second moments and two derivatives of the externality function. The formula is applicable when activity is measured reasonably accurately, which is necessary for an acceptable implementation. This formula is simple enough to lend itself to actual implementation.     

Punishment and the potency of group selection

It is known that altruism can be sustained in an evolving population by a process of group selection. There is also existing research on the role that punishment can play in inducing selfish agents to behave more co-operatively or in preventing selfish agents from evolving, and the limitations upon this mechanism. This paper embeds a simple model of a punishment system within an indirect cultural evolution framework. The use of punishment is shown to reduce the potency of the group selection mechanism, and thus the level of evolved altruism. This presents a novel reason why the use of punishment may have negative dynamic welfare implications.     

Coordinated Punishment and the Evolution of Cooperation

In this paper, we analyze a team trust game with coordinated punishment of the allocator by investors and where there is also a final stage of peer punishment. We study the effect of punishment on the reward and the investment decisions, when the effectiveness and cost of coordinated punishment depend on the number of investors adhering to this activity. The interaction takes place in an overlapping‐generations model with heterogeneous preferences and incomplete information. The only long‐run outcomes of the dynamics are either a fully cooperative culture (FCC) with high levels of trust and cooperation and fair returns or a non‐cooperative culture with no cooperation at all. The basin of attraction of the FCC is larger; the higher the institutional capacity of coordinated punishment, the higher the level of peer pressure and the smaller the individual cost of coordinated punishment.     

Merchant internalization and tax evasion

Merchant internalization has been used to explain why merchants may accept high fees to accept card payments. However, merchants seem to be more resistant in some economic activities or countries; in particular, when the shadow economy is sizeable. Cash payments are usually associated with tax evasion, and therefore the analysis of card industry should take it in to consideration. This paper explores the role of tax evasion in the merchant internalization condition; first, considering it as exogenous, and then, as a strategic reason.     

The West Bank Apartheid/Separation Wall: Space,Punishment and the Disruption of Social Continuity

Through the use of survey data from the West Bank, this paper explores the effects of the Apartheid/Separation Wall in the occupied territory of the West Bank on Palestinian society. How has the Wall separated a population from their loved ones, their orchards and crops, homes, and overall livelihood? How have these relationships transformed? Place and space have special meanings in Palestinian experience and consciousness, and yet Palestinians remain vulnerable to punishment through control of access to spaces and places.

The inability to reach one’s home or land has serious ramifications on the psyche of individuals and communities. Not only do physical barriers hinder social interactions, but they also impact society in numerous ways. The effects on Palestinian society are largely invisible and have long-term and far-reaching consequences. These consequences run deeper than the physical barriers that have created them.

Social continuity has repeatedly been disrupted due to the geopolitical transformation of land control and roads network, which favours one group (Israeli Jews) over another (Palestinian Arabs—Christian and Muslim). The policies of separation, through the wall, checkpoints, and the permit regime, have actually separated Palestinians from other Palestinians, and not Palestinians from Israelis.     

Grime and Punishment: Job Insecurity and Wage Arrears in the Russian Federation

Using information from two complementary household survey data sets, we show that the dominant form of labor market adjustment in the Russian transition process has been the delayed receipt of wages. More than half the work force is experiencing some form of disruption of their pay. Wage arrears are found across the private, state, and budgetary sectors. Workers in the metropolitan center are less affected by delayed and incomplete wage payments than are workers in the provinces. There is less evidence that individual characteristics contribute much toward the incidence of wage arrears, but the persistence of arrears is concentrated on a subset of the working population. We show that workers can only exercise the exit option of a job quit from a firm not paying wages in full or on time if the outside labor market is sufficiently dynamic. J. Comp. Econom., December 1999, 27(4), pp. 595–617. Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh EH14 4AS, United Kingdom, IZA, Bonn, Germany, and WDI, Ann Arbor, Michigan; Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics, London WC2AE 2AE, England, and Royal Holloway College, University of London, Egham, TW20 1TQ, England; School of Information Management and Systems, University of California, 102 South Hall, Berkeley, California 94720-4600.     

Punishment paths and cartel size

Using a ‘Dominant-group-fringe’ model, we show that the choice of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) punishment path in the event that unilateral defection occurs depends upon the common discount parameter, and that when the discount parameter is given the punishment path may depend upon the size of the dominant group. The choice of punishment path is thus endogenous. A striking result is that only for sufficiently small dominant groups in sufficiently small industries are there cases where costs affect these choices. Consequently, costs are irrelevant to the choice of punishment in industries with a large number of firms.     

协调性惩罚与人类合作的演化

虽然惩罚可以维持合作的演化,却给惩罚者带来自然选择的适应性劣势,从而形成新的演化之谜。人类在漫长的发展中逐渐演进出各种巧妙的协调性惩罚行为,这无疑会降低惩罚成本或增加惩罚力度,当它们改变惩罚行为的成本劣势,使其达到成功演化的阈值范围时,反对惩罚的选择性压力就消失,从而可以支持利他性惩罚在大规模群体中演化。本文不再遵循惩罚者同质性假设,从而能够讨论各种协调性惩罚对群体合作秩序演进的影响。本文构建动态演化模型,模拟了人类祖先的一个典型狩猎采集社会,在其他参数不变的情况下,设置了各种协调性惩罚的环境,并对比分析了它们对合作演化的影响。仿真结果表明,在规模较大的情况下,非协调性惩罚很难维持群体合作的演化,而协调性惩罚则会明显提高群体合作水平,特别是在一致行动和权威惩罚的情景中,群体可以实现高水平的合作。     

论行政处罚的归责原则

行政处罚归责原则法学界存在四种不同的观点。主观归责原则存在其合理性,已渐成学界主流。我国行政处罚归责制度存在缺陷,应进一步完善。     

Punishment in a Regulatory Setting: Experimental Evidence from the VCM

To analyze the effectiveness of punishment in inducing regulatory compliance, we modify a standard public goods experiment to include a financial penalty for free riding. The design allows us to vary both punishment probability and severity. We introduce the punishment mechanism in both a one-time and a repeated treatment and find that compliance (contributing to the public good) is increasing in expected punishment cost in both treatments. We also find that punishment severity has a larger effect on behavior than punishment probability. In the repeated treatment, we find that past punishment has a negative rather than positive effect on compliance.     

资本市场独立审计信用惩罚效应的实证检验

本文采集沪、深两市2003-2005年的相关数据,以财政部第十一号<会计信息质量检查公告>为研究事件,观测检查公告对受处罚会计师事务所未来收益与客户市场价值波动的影响,映射其中蕴含的资本市场独立审计信用惩罚效应.结果表明,市场对处罚公告回应并不强烈,验证了我国资本市场"弱势"独立审计信用惩罚效应的存在性,而监管机构协调化、监督检查常规化与制度化,以及公众信用意识与监管手段有待进一步提升.