Give and Take Between Households and the State: Development and Application of A Benefaction–Contribution Ratio

This study defines a “Benefaction–Contribution Ratio” (BCR), describing the extent to which households are net beneficiaries of or contributors to the economy in relation to income and consumption. Such issues are central to assessment and targeting of policies such as social welfare and taxation. We apply the ratio to 21,144 South African households. South Africa employs various taxation‐funded social grants and subsidized services. A central question is how such transfers affect real household income and consumption. We find that the constitution of social transfers as a function of tax adjusted earned income significantly augments household buying power. Furthermore, we hypothesize and find a negative curvilinear shape which has implications for design of taxation and welfare. This constitution and distribution of this ratio may be useful for international benchmarking and household planning, and as an economic predictor of outcomes such as job seeking, entrepreneurial behavior, family planning, migration, and tax evasion.     

An Economic Analysis of Public Transfers

This paper develops simple models of public transfers. The sources of income inequality are differences in ability and in luck. The government employs a redistribution policy that arises from altruistic motives in the case of ability differences. I consider the case where the government re-optimizes income transfers after it observes the outcome of private activities. When the source of income inequality is differences in luck, the economy creates a mutual insurance or provides public goods out of risk-sharing motives. I derive the paradoxical result that a more able individual would not enjoy higher welfare than a less able individual. I also investigate how public transfers react to increases in income level and income inequality.
JEL Classification Numbers: F21, F35.     

The influence of spouses on household decision making under risk: an experiment in rural China

We study household decision making in a high-stakes experiment with a random sample of households in rural China. Spouses have to choose between risky lotteries, first separately and then jointly. We find that spouses’ individual risk preferences are more similar the richer the household and the higher the wife’s relative income contribution. A couple’s joint decision is typically very similar to the husband’s preferences, but women who contribute relatively more to the household income, women in high-income households, and women with communist party membership have a stronger influence on the joint decision.     

Indeterminacy, underground activities and tax evasion

This paper introduces underground activities and tax evasion into a one-sector dynamic general equilibrium model with aggregate external effects. The model presents a novel mechanism driving the self-fulfilling prophecies, which is characterized by well behaved (downward sloping) labor demand schedules. This mechanism differs from the customary one, and it is complementary to it. Compared to traditional labor market income, the income derived from underground labor activity is subject to a lower expected tax rate when considering both the probability of detection and the evasion penalty. During a belief-driven expansion, the household allocates more time to both traditional and underground labor supply. In equilibrium, this action serves to lower the effective labor tax rate faced by the household, thus providing stimulus to aggregate labor supply so as to make the initial expansion self-fulfilling. The mechanism here is akin to a “regressive tax”; the household's effective tax rate depends negatively on the level of total labor income. We argue that an underground sector, and the associated tax evasion, offer a good economic rationale for a regressive tax rate.     

Voluntary Participation and Spite in Public Good Provision Experiments: An International Comparison

This paper studies voluntary public good provision in the laboratory, in a cross-cultural experiment conducted in the United States and Japan. Our environment differs from the standard voluntary contribution mechanism because subjects first decide whether or not to participate in providing this non-excludable public good. This participation decision is conveyed to the other subject prior to the subjects' contribution decisions. We find that only the American data are consistent with the evolutionary-stable-strategy Nash equilibrium predictions, and that behavior is significantly different across countries. Japanese subjects are more likely to act spitefully in the early periods of the experiment, even though our design changes subject pairings each period so that no two subjects ever interact twice. Surprisingly, this spiteful behavior eventually leads to more efficient public good contributions for Japanese subjects than for American subjects.     

Constrained Inefficiency and Optimal Taxation with Uninsurable Risks

When individuals' labor and capital income are subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic risks, should capital and labor be taxed, and if so how? In a two‐period general equilibrium model with production, we derive a decomposition formula of the welfare effects of these taxes into insurance and distribution effects. This allows us to determine how the sign of the optimal taxes on capital and labor depend on the nature of the shocks and the degree of heterogeneity among consumers' income, as well as on the way in which the tax revenue is used to provide lump‐sum transfers to consumers. When shocks affect primarily labor income and heterogeneity is small, the optimal tax on capital is positive. However, in other cases a negative tax on capital is welfare‐improving.     

In the wake of tsunami: Lessons learned from the household decision to replant mangroves in Thailand

The Indian Ocean tsunami has increased interest in replanting mangroves as natural storm barriers. This paper analyzes the household decision to replant mangroves in four case study villages in Thailand in line with existing studies on the voluntary contribution to step-level public goods and the decision by adult members of a household to devote some labor to an outside activity. The null hypothesis that dependency on mangrove-based income has no influence on participation in replanting is rejected. Awareness of community conservation efforts and of the environmental impacts of shrimp farms also motivates participation. Allocation of male and female labors to replanting is also found to be jointly determined.     

The effect of transfers on household expenditure patterns and poverty in South Africa

This paper uses household level unit record data from South Africa to examine the behavioural and welfare impacts of private and public transfers. We allow for joint endogeneity of resource variables and the expenditure shares. Our results show that crowding out of private transfers as a result of the introduction of public pensions holds only for poor households and not for the non-poor. Both private transfers and public pensions significantly reduce poverty but private transfers have a larger impact on expenditure patterns. The results also reject the hypothesis of income pooling underlying the conventional unitary model by finding that the marginal impact on expenditures are different for public pension received, private transfer received and other resources flowing into the household. The principal conclusions are robust to changes in specification.     

Environment,public debt,and epidemics

We study whether fiscal policies, especially public debt, can help to curb the macroeconomic and health consequences of epidemics. Our approach is based on three main features: we introduce the dynamics of epidemics in an overlapping generations model to take into account that old people are more vulnerable; people are more easily infected when pollution is high; public spending in health care and public debt can be used to tackle the effects of epidemics. We show that fiscal policies can promote convergence to a stable disease-free steady state. When public policies are not able to permanently eradicate the epidemic, public debt, and income transfers could reduce the number of infected people and increase capital and GDP per capita. As a prerequisite, pollution intensity should not be too high. Finally, we define a household subsidy policy that eliminates income and welfare inequalities between healthy and infected individuals.     

Free‐Riding and the Provision of Public Goods in the Family: A Laboratory Experiment*

We examine the provision of family public goods using experimental economics methods. With sufficient altruism and shared resource arrangements, families can provide the efficient level of family public goods. Becker's Rotten Kid Theorem asserts that transfers from altruistic parents will induce children to maximize family income even if children are not altruistic toward other family members. Consistent with altruism, parents and children contributed more to a public good when in groups with family members than when in groups with strangers. In contrast to the predictions of the Rotten Kid Theorem, however, children's behavior fell short of maximizing family income.     

FINDING THE POOR

As a basis for judging how public policy affects the poor, this article explores how "poor" families may be defined and how well such families can be distinguished from other families in the less developed countries. This is done by seeking proxies for poverty which are relatively easy to measure, accurate in discriminating between the poor and the non-poor, and relevant to public policy. To this end, a highly parsimonious model is developed, based on truncation and regression procedures, using only family size and number of wage earners in addition to either income or an education-age combination. Application of this model to data from household surveys in three major cities of Latin America shows that the model is highly effective in pinpointing poverty households, although the pattern of errors is not random, the most frequent type of error being to classify poverty households as non-poor.
Especially significant is that the model is nearly as effective for discriminating poverty households from others when financial variables are excluded as when they are included. This would suggest that a good deal of flexibility exists in deciding what variables to include in future studies of this type. The results also suggest that even better results should be possible if more complete information is obtained on the employment status of the different members of the household and on the contribution of each to household income. Ideally, the data collection and model development should proceed in an iterative manner since there are numerous possible variables as well as alternative model formulations.     

Optimal taxes on wealth and consumption in the presence of tax evasion

This article incorporates tax evasion into an optimum taxation framework with individuals differing in earning abilities and initial wealth. We find that despite the possibility of its evasion a tax on initial wealth should supplement the optimal nonlinear income tax, given a positive correlation between initial wealth and earning abilities. Further, even if income and initial wealth are taxed optimally, it is still desirable to levy a tax on commodities, though it can be evaded as well. Thus, our result provides a rationale for a comprehensive tax system. Optimal tax rates on commodities differ in general, however for the special case of a uniform evasion technology equal rates are optimal if preferences are homothetic and weakly separable.     

Saving and the intra-household distribution of income: an empirical investigation

This paper presents an empirical analysis of the relationship between household saving and the distribution of income within the household. Various theoretical reasons why the level of saving might depend on the latter are given. Some of these can be rationalized within the usual “unitary” model of household decision but others recognize explicitly that different members of the household may have different preferences about how much to save.Particular attention is paid to saving for retirement since the facts that wives are, on average, younger than their husbands and women have longer life expectancies means that wives typically anticipate a longer retirement period than their husbands. Thus wives may prefer to save more for retirement than their husbands.The empirical analysis uses a sample of Canadian households from five Family Expenditure Surveys. These surveys include measures of financial saving as well saving in retirement accounts. After accounting for many of the other influences on saving (for example: age, household composition, occupation and education levels but not household income) we find some effects of the intra-household distribution of income on savings rates. The parameter estimates suggest that the household saving rate decreases with the share of the wife in household income.     

Motives for household private transfers in Burkina Faso

Resource transfers among households have received considerable interest among economists in recent years. Two of the main reasons for the surge of interest in household transfers are the information on human nature conveyed by transfer behavior and the implication on income redistribution policy that private transfer might have. Empirical studies, however, provide mixed results on transfer behavior. This is because previous inquiries were confronted with several estimation issues and have focused on data from developed countries where private transfers are already small. This paper contributes to the literature on transfer behavior by using a multifaceted econometric approach to examine the motives of household transfers in Burkina, a low-income country with a well-documented tradition of gift exchanges. The findings suggest that risk sharing is not central to transfers. Altruistic transfers are apparent for the middle income class, but not at low income level. The evidence implies that crowding out may be minimal at low income level, suggesting that public transfers targeting poor households may be effective.     

Favor trading in public good provision

Favor trading is common. We do something nice for someone and they do something nice in return. Several motives might underlie such behavior, including altruism, strategic motives, and direct or indirect positive reciprocity. It is not yet well-understood how these fit together to affect behavior, how they interact in various institutional structures, and how they play out over time. We use a laboratory experiment to study the elements and dynamics of favor trading in a particular setting: the private provision of a public good. In our experiment, giving subjects the ability to practice targeted reciprocity by making a simple, low-cost change in information provision increases contributions to the public good by 14 %. Subjects reward group members who have previously been generous to them and withhold rewards from ungenerous group members. Strategic concerns cannot explain all of this behavior, and it must be at least partly due to direct reciprocity. When someone cannot directly benefit from favor trading, he gives much less to the public good. People thus excluded from the “circle of reciprocity” provide a clean and strict test of indirect reciprocity. Contrary to previous studies in the literature, we do not observe indirect reciprocity.     

Employer pay policies, public transfers and the retirement decisions of men and women in Denmark

The empirical retirement literature measures individual responses to variations in income flows due to public transfers, private individual or employer-provided pensions. We estimate a model accounting for the incentive effects from these sources. A dynamic structural model is extended to allow both individual and employer heterogeneity. This is applied to a Danish matched panel of workers and establishments, spanning a period of reforms to a public early retirement programme. Employer-specific compensation is found to be an important determinant of work and retirement income flows. Employer effects on retirement age are only found among sub-samples where access to public transfers is limited.     

The Distribution of Economic Well-being in Urban Russia at the End of the Soviet Era

Assessing the extent of inequality and how various groups in the population were faring in the former Soviet Union is difficult. There are conceptual problems and severe data limitations. Here we analyse the distribution at the household level using unique microdata. The sample was collected for the Russian city Taganrog in 1989. We portray inequality in equivalent income terms, investigate income packaging, decompose inequality by population subgroups and relate equivalent income to household characteristics. The results indicate that inequality in living standards for urban Russia was small, but not extremely small. Public sector transfers and income taxes played a smaller role than in several advanced Western countries. The income situation of a household in the former Soviet Union was very strongly linked to its work efforts and dependency burden. Thus, aged persons and families with a newborn child were much worse off than people of active ages. Persons in households with a female head had considerably lower income than those with male head of households. The results also shows a clear positive relation between length of education and living-standard.     

Spain is different: Falling trends of inequality

In this article we characterize the evolution of inequality in hourly wages, hours of work, labor earnings, household disposable income and household consumption for Spain between 1985 and 2000. We look at both the Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos Familiares and the European Household Community Panel. Our analysis shows that inequality in individual net labor earnings and household net disposable income has decreased substantially. The decreases in the tertiary education premium and in the unemployment rate have been key ingredients to understand this falling trend. Public transfers have played a crucial role in smoothing out the inequality arising in the labor market, but instead the Spanish family does not seem to have been an important insurance mechanism. Regarding household consumption, inequality has fallen much less than inequality in household net disposable income, with the decrease mostly concentrated in the second half of the eighties. This suggests that the reduction in income inequality has affected the sources of permanent differences between households only during the second half of the eighties. Our estimates of the earnings process for the period are consistent with this view.     

Tests of Income Pooling in Household Decisions

Using the Progresa data from Mexico, we investigate intrahousehold decision making using a variety of outcomes. We exploit both the experimental nature and the (short) panel dimension of the data to measure the impact of exogenous changes in the intrahousehold distribution of resources on household decisions. We test for global pooling of resources within households, which would correspond to the unitary model of household decision making. We also exploit a set of questions about power and the decision making process in the household to investigate aspects of strategic interactions between household members. Our findings confirm previous rejections of income pooling. We also cannot reject that the wife's relative income share is a significant determinant of the wife's decision making power in the household, with a higher share of income associated with more decision making power. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: J12, D13, H31.