Product Safety Provision and Consumers' Information

Economic mechanisms related to the provision of product safety are explored, with particular attention paid to the structure of consumers' information. The case of perfect information, of experience goods (for which consumers detect product safety after consumption) and of credence goods (where consumers cannot link a disease to a particular product consumed in the past) are explored. Imperfect competition is assumed in the supply sector. In the case of both perfect information and experience goods, market equilibrium is characterised by a less-than-socially optimal provision of safety, when the safety effort is costly. With credence goods, imperfect information leads to the absence of safety effort and to a market closure. Different types of public regulation aiming at increasing consumer protection and circumventing market failures are explored. Particular attention is paid to minimum safety standards, labels and liability enforcement. The relative efficiency of these instruments depends on the information structure. In the cases of perfect information and experience goods, a minimum safety standard can be an efficient instrument. Regulation is necessary but not sufficient to avoid market failure in the case of credence goods.     

Voluntary Provision of Public Goods and Technology

This paper highlights issues in the theory of voluntary provision of public goods, building on the investigation by Peacock in connection with the contributions by Coase and Buchanan. Our goal is twofold. We first draw attention to the early literature investigating the provision of public goods and to the successive theoretical analysis. We then focus on the impact of technology on supply and demand. Examples of different types of public goods are provided, with special attention to the cultural sector, to investigate whether and how technology affects the efficiency and the effectiveness of the related public goods provision. The implementation and exploitation of technological advancements are investigated in view of the role of different actors (public, private) at different levels of government.     

Tax Competition,Investment Irreversibility and the Provision of Public Goods

This article studies the effects of tax competition on the provision of public goods under business risk and partial irreversibility of investment. As will be shown, the provision of public goods changes over time and also depends on the business cycle. In particular, under source‐based taxation, in the short term, public goods can be optimally provided during a downturn. The converse is true during a recovery: in this case, they are underprovided. In the long term, however, tax competition does not affect capital accumulation. This means that the provision of public goods is unaffected by taxation.     

Toward an efficiency rationale for the public provision of private goods

Public provision of a private goods is justified on efficiency grounds in a model with no redistributive preferences. A government’s involvement in the provision of a private good generates information about preferences that facilitates more efficient revenue extraction for the provision of public goods. Public provision of the private good improves economic efficiency under a condition that is always fulfilled under independence and satisfied for an open set of joint distributions. The efficiency gains require that consumers cannot arbitrage the publicly provided private good, so our analysis applies to private goods where it is easy to keep track of the ultimate user, such as schooling and health care, but not to easily tradable consumer goods.     

Does Government Expenditure Crowd Out Private Consumption in Italy? Evidence from a Microeconomic Model

An abnormal expansion of the public sector may create serious problems to the market economy, as the literature suggests. This issue is quite important in countries such as Italy where the size of the public sector and of its debt are quite relevant. In this paper a model, in the microeconomic tradition, is developed and applied to the italian economy using a quite general utility function to represent consumer's behaviour. The aim of the article is to set up a methological framework in which to test for the hypothesis that the provision of public and impure public goods crowds out private consumption. The main result of the analysis is that, in Italy, traditional public goods play a neutral role in expenditure decisions while impure public goods crowd out private consumption. This crowding out is created by over-production of these services; merit goods are direct complements to a wide range of private goods, but this beneficial effect is more than offset by the negative income effect related to their financing.     

Publicly Provided Private Goods and Redistribution: A General Equilibrium Analysis

Public provision of private goods is examined within a self-selection framework where production depends on labour supply of different households and the level of public provision. It is shown that productivity and wage-structure effects can create a role for public provision, even if preferences are weakly separable between goods and leisure. Public provision of education may offer an intuitively appealing case for the production-side impacts. We also address the reasons for public provision in a dynamic, overlapping generations economy, whereby public provision may affect efficiency and social costs of redistribution of future generations as well.
JEL classification : H 23; H 42     

Consumer welfare from publicly supplemented private goods: age and income effects on demand for health care

In spite of major advances in the theoretical, positive and normative, literature analysing the welfare implications of public provision of private goods, empirical investigation is often limited to contingent valuation studies, for example, of health care programmes. In this article we argue that when a market for a (subsidised or free of charge) publicly provided good exists, a consumer demand approach can be used to construct a money metric of welfare corresponding to the consumption of public provision. We illustrate this approach in investigating age and income effects on household demand for health care in Cyprus, where free public provision is not universal and those entitled to it often resort to private supplementation. Our findings suggest that the money metric of welfare, which consumers attach to free access to publicly provided health care, varies with age and to a lesser extent with household income.     

Public–private partnerships for the provision of public goods: Theory and an application to NGOs

When will a public good or service be provided by the government, when will it be provided by a NGO, and when will we see a private–public partnership? This paper provides a model where a typical public good requires different inputs which raises the possibility of partnerships to exploit comparative advantages of different parties. But hold-up problems due to contractual incompleteness in specifying tasks discourage separation of ownership and management. The fact that public goods have the property of non-rivalry and non-excludability and that NGOs tend to be non-profits drives our key results. We apply the framework to NGOs in developing countries which, in the last few decades, have been increasingly involved in various capacities in the provision of a wide range of public goods and services.     

IMPROVING THE ANALYTICAL AND DATA FRAMEWORK OF THE GOVERNMENT SECTOR FOR NATIONAL GOALS ACCOUNTING*

Provision of “market goods” follows the decision rules of traditional microeconomics; pricing and resource allocation for such goods tend towards Pareto optimality. The provision of “collective goods,” by contrast, depends on political (or quasi-political) collective decision processes; beneficiaries often receive a share of collective goods free of charge or well below average or marginal (private or social) costs. No inherent tendency towards optimality may be presumed and separate analysis of collective goods becomes an essential part of national goals accounting. The national-income-accounts (NIA) distinction between personal consumption expenditures (PCE) and government purchases of goods and services corresponds roughly to a division between market goods bought by the consumer and a major category of “collective goods” (i.e. “public goods” provided by government). However, a significant proportion of PCE represents “collective goods” paid for by government, business, or nonprofit organizations and provided on behalf of the consumer, whereas a part of NIA government purchases represents services paid for by the consumer (i.e. “market goods”). This article develops operationally meaningful distinctions among “market goods,”“collective goods,” and “tied aid” (a mixed category with market-good and collective-good characteristics). These distinctions are determined by the nature of the decision processes–rather than by the characteristics of the beneficiary or the supplier. This classification is related to the national income accounts and major discrepancies are pinpointed. The blurring of the distinction among market goods, collective goods and tied aid is found to be most consequential in the NIA treatment of “education” and “medical care” services. NIA data for these two services are restructured for national goals accounting purposes in order to illustrate both the quantitative importance and the empirical feasibility of classifying benefits by their respective decision processes.     

The Provision of Language‐Specific Public Services

I consider the optimal provision of public services when individuals' effective consumption of the services depends on their proficiency in the language they are provided in. A social planner chooses levels of provision in both a dominant and minority language which are financed by a linear tax on labor income. Minority language speakers make a costly investment to increase their proficiency in the dominant language. In doing so they increase their wage and, possibly, gain access to higher levels of public services provided in the dominant language. The planner faces a trade‐off between compensating minority language speakers for their lower wages and encouraging their integration by rewarding higher levels of dominant language proficiency. Under majority voting, it is possible that the level of public services is increasing in the relative size of the minority language community. This result contrasts with what is typically assumed in the literature on fractionalization and public good provision—that cultural heterogeneity decreases the level of public goods.     

Direct democracy and local government efficiency

This paper studies the role of direct democracy in ensuring efficient and cost-effective provision of goods and services in the public sector. The sample consists of the population of municipalities in the German State of Bavaria, where in the mid-1990s considerable direct democratic reforms granted citizens wide opportunities to directly participate in local affairs through binding initiatives. Using information on the municipal resources and the municipal provision of public goods, and applying a fully non-parametric approach to estimate local government overall efficiency, the analysis shows that more direct democratic activity is associated with higher government efficiency. This result suggests that more inclusive governance through direct decision-making mechanisms may induce more accountable and less inefficient governments.     

Five proposals for a European model of the countryside

The inability of European institutions to reform the common agricultural policy is a landmark case of political failure. The CAP has led to several policy failures. It helps mainly the well-off farmers in a very wasteful way; it provides excessive incentives for non-competitive primary commodities, specialization and intensification, with adverse impacts on rural natural resources. Economic principles support long-term programmes aimed only at market failures: the respect of environmental norms and the provision of rural public goods in line with society's demands. While not interfering with market mechanisms, the instruments we propose acknowledge the diverse economic potential of European rural areas and the variety of goods and services provided by the rural space. Political feasibility and social concerns may require a transitory period of direct income support for current farmers. We argue, however, against any direct payments for new farmers in order to prevent future dependence on public support.
Large established farmers are those who stand to lose the most from our proposals. However, they and those who represent them have to face the inefficiencies of the current policy and society's demands. Farmers deserve rewards from public funds for the rural public goods they provide, but these rewards should be decoupled and targeted. A profound reform is required if we are to preserve a 'European model of the countryside'.     

Investment climate and firm productivity: an application to Vietnamese manufacturing firms

The fundamental aspect of a national competitive advantage is a good investment climate. Understanding the role of the investment climate in generating firm productivity has received extensive attention by policymakers and economists in many countries. The article studies the effect of different dimensions of the investment climate on firm productivity. Using a large dataset of Vietnamese manufacturing firms, the article finds that deficiencies in the investment climate are prejudicial to firm productivity and competition. Furthermore, in examining the effect of corruption in association with the quality of the business environment, the study also investigates the possibility that corruption may compensate firms for a bad investment climate or at least may neutralize the negative impact of inefficient government regulations. In other words, corruption acts as ‘speed money’ to improve the efficacy of the provision of public services or provides leeway for entrepreneurs to bypass the inefficient regulations. This situation, however, is extremely harmful to the economy in the long run because it distorts the market and erodes the incentives for productive investments. Developing countries therefore need to put much more effort into institutional reforms, especially fighting corruption and efficiency in the provision of public goods and services.     

论公共产品的市场提供

一般而言，满足消费者需求的消费品划分为两类，一类是用货币收入等价交换的消费品，即私人产品；一类是不以货币交换的消费品，即公共产品。私人产品只能由私人提供，公共产品只能由政府提供，这一分析结论所包含的政策含义往往导致公共产品供给决策绝对化和“一刀切”的倾向，把许多行业和商品纳入公共产品范畴由政府垄断性供给，由此导致资源配置效率和使用效率较低，因此。中国应加大公共产品提供的市场化改革步伐。     

A generalized impure public good and linear characteristics model of green consumption

This paper provides a general framework for understanding consumer behavior related to goods and services that may be considered environmentally friendly, ethically produced, fairly traded, or some combination thereof. We generalize the impure public good model and derive its comparative static properties. The model accounts for any number of impure public (green) goods and joint production of any number of both private and public characteristics. The generalization provides a bridge between the impure public good model and the well-known linear characteristics model, both of which are special cases of the model developed here. The results show how demand for green goods and characteristics such as environmental quality depends on wealth, exogenously given levels of public goods, and the technologies of joint production. The effects of changes in technology depend critically on whether jointly produced characteristics are complements or substitutes in consumption. Several of the results are rather counterintuitive and differ in meaningful ways from existing models of impure public goods and linear characteristics. The results also illuminate several reasons for greater caution about whether it is reasonable to assume that green goods and services are necessarily beneficial for the provision of public goods.     

Clubs as a case of competitive industry with goods of variable quality

The paper provides a new proof for the optimality of market provision for Buchanan's club goods where club goods are treated as goods of variable quality. This approach extends the theory of clubs, and introduces congestion to the analysis of competitive equilibrium with goods of variable quality.     

Tiebout with Politics: Capital Tax Competition and Constitutional Choices

This paper examines how capital tax competition affects jurisdiction formation. We describe a non-cooperative locational model of public goods provision choices, where the levels of taxation and the local public good varieties provided within jurisdictions are selected by majority voting, and where equilibrium jurisdictions consist of consumers with similar tastes. We show that interjurisdictional tax competition results in an enlargement of jurisdictional boundaries, and, even in the absence of intrajurisdictional transfers, can raise welfare for all members of a jurisdiction.     

Compensation for environmental services and intergovernmental fiscal transfers: The case of India

This paper studies mechanisms to compensate local government for the public provision of environmental services using the theory of optimal fiscal transfers in India. Especially, we analyzed the role of intergovernmental fiscal transfers in achieving the environmental goal. Simply assigning the functions at appropriate levels does not ensure optimal provision of environmental services. Optimality in resource allocation could be achieved by combining the assignment system with an appropriate compensation mechanism. Intergovernmental fiscal transfers would be a suitable mechanism for compensating the local governments and help in internalizing the spillover effects of providing environmental public goods. Illustrations are also provided for India.     

Compensation for environmental services and intergovernmental fiscal transfers: The case of India

This paper studies mechanisms to compensate local government for the public provision of environmental services using the theory of optimal fiscal transfers in India. Especially, we analyzed the role of intergovernmental fiscal transfers in achieving the environmental goal. Simply assigning the functions at appropriate levels does not ensure optimal provision of environmental services. Optimality in resource allocation could be achieved by combining the assignment system with an appropriate compensation mechanism. Intergovernmental fiscal transfers would be a suitable mechanism for compensating the local governments and help in internalizing the spillover effects of providing environmental public goods. Illustrations are also provided for India.     

公共产品提供的逻辑

从市场失效推导出来的公共产品理论不能有效地区分公共与私人产品,也不能解释公共提供的事实。本文试图从另一个角度讨论什么是决定产品公共提供的根本原因,并以外部性—效用相互依存性—公共提供这样的顺序来推导公共产品提供的逻辑。