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1.
The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
We consider the partitioning of a society into coalitions in purely hedonic settings, i.e., where each player's payoff is completely determined by the identity of other members of her coalition. We first discuss how hedonic and nonhedonic settings differ and some sufficient conditions for the existence of core stable coalition partitions in hedonic settings. We then focus on a weaker stability condition: individual stability, where no player can benefit from moving to another coalition while not hurting the members of that new coalition. We show that if coalitions can be ordered according to some characteristic over which players have single-peaked preferences, or where players have symmetric and additively separable preferences, then there exists an individually stable coalition partition. Examples show that without these conditions, individually stable coalition partitions may not exist. We also discuss some other stability concepts, and the incompatibility of stability with other normative properties. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, A14, D20. 相似文献
2.
An apex game consists of one apex player and a set of minor players. We identify two key properties of apex games and use them to introduce the class of general apex games. We derive players' preferences over winning coalitions by applying strongly monotonic power indices on such a game and all its subgames and investigate whether there are core stable coalitions in the induced hedonic coalition formation game. Besides several general results, in particular, we develop conditions on the game for the Shapley–Shubik index, the Banzhaf index, and the normalized Banzhaf index. 相似文献
3.
MATTHEW McGINTY 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2011,13(2):311-325
This paper presents a rule to allocate a coalition’s worth for superadditive games with positive externalities. The allocation rule awards each member their outside payoff, plus an equal share of the surplus. The resulting allocation maximizes coalition stability. Stable coalitions are Strong Nash equilibria since no subset of members has an incentive to leave. Similarly, no subset of non‐members has an incentive to join a stable coalition if the game is concave in this region. The allocation is risk‐dominant. All stable coalitions are robust to the maximum probability of 50% that players’ deviate from their individual best‐responses. The paper compares the allocation to the Shapley value and the Nash bargaining solution, and illustrates why these traditional rules result in small coalitions when applied to issues such as international environmental agreements. 相似文献
4.
We show that collusion and wrong beliefs may cause a dramatic efficiency loss in the Vickrey mechanism for auctioning a single good in limited supply. We thus put forward a new mechanism guaranteeing efficiency in a very adversarial collusion model, where the players can partition themselves into arbitrarily many coalitions, exchange money with each other, and perfectly coordinate their actions. Our mechanism bypasses classic impossibility results (such as those of Green and Laffont, and of Schummer) by providing the players with a richer set of strategies, making it dominant for every coalition C to instruct each of its members to report truthfully not only his own valuation, but also his belonging to C. Our mechanism is coalitionally rational, which implies being individually rational for independent players. 相似文献
5.
Gabrielle Demange 《Games and Economic Behavior》2009,65(1):83-104
In coalitional games with side payments, the core predicts which coalitions form and how benefits are shared. The predictions however run into difficulties if the core is empty or if some coalitions benefit from not blocking truthfully. These difficulties are analyzed in games in which an a priori given collection of coalitions can form, as the collection of pairs of buyer–seller in an assignment game. The incentive properties of the core and of its selections are investigated in function of the collection. Furthermore the relationships with Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanisms are drawn. 相似文献
6.
Joseph Greenberg 《Journal of Economic Theory》1979,21(2):213-221
In many social and economic situations the optimal solution requires the formation of coalitions that partition the set of players. When the individual player is small relative to the size of the existing coalitions, it seems realistic to assume that the prevailing coalition structure dictates the set of possible blocking coalitions. Specifically, it is assumed that an individual does not consider forming any coalition, but rather joining an already existing one. Two solution concepts for these games are investigated: structural equilibrium and stable payoffs, which are derived from the application of ψ-stability to the core and to the bargaining set, respectively. To this end an extension of the bargaining set to games without side payments is offered. Both solution concepts are shown to exist for some coalition structure. However, while structural equilibrium may fail to exist for any non trivial coalition structure, for every coalition structure there exists a stable payoff. 相似文献
7.
A Theory of Gradual Coalition Formation 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
We study noncooperative multilateral bargaining games, based on underlying TU games, in which coalitions can renegotiate their agreements. We distinguish between models in which players continue to bargain after implementing agreements ("reversible actions") and models in which players who implement agreements must leave the game ("irreversible actions"). We show that renegotiation always results in formation of the grand coalition if actions are reversible, but that the process may otherwise end with smaller coalitions. On the other hand, we show that the grand coalition cannot form in one step if the core of the game is empty, irrespective of the reversibility of actions. 相似文献
8.
Licun Xue 《Economic Theory》1998,11(3):603-627
Summary. We analyze strategic social environments where coalitions can form through binding or nonbinding agreements and actions of
a coalition may impose externalities upon the welfare of the rest of the players. We define a solution concept that (1) captures
the perfect foresight of the players that has been overlooked in the literature (e.g., Harsanyi [10] and Chwe [6]) and (2) identifies the coalitions
that are likely to form and the “stable” outcomes that will not be replaced by any coalition of rational (and hence farsighted)
players. The proposed solution concept thereby offers a notion of agreements and coalition formation in complex social environments.
Received: February 12, 1996; revised version: March 3, 1997 相似文献
9.
The stability of International Environmental Agreements (IEA) is analyzed by using game theory. The integrated assessment model FUND provides the cost-benefit payoff functions of pollution abatement for sixteen different world regions. The farsighted stability concept of Chwe (1994) is used and solved by combinatorial algorithms. Farsighted stability assumes perfect foresight of the players and predicts which coalitions can be formed when players are farsighted. All farsightedly stable coalitions are found, and their improvement to environment and welfare is considerable. The farsightedly stable coalitions are refined further to preferred farsightedly stable coalitions, which are coalitions where the majority of coalition members reach higher profits in comparison with any other farsightedly stable coalitions. Farsightedly stable coalitions contribute more to the improvement of environment and welfare in comparison to D'Aspremont et al.'s (1983) stable ones. Considering multiple farsighted stable coalitions, participation in coalitions for environmental protection is significantly increased, which is an optimistic result of our game theoretical model. 相似文献
10.
Leif Johansen 《Journal of economic behavior & organization》1982,3(1):1-37
The paper develops the use of the core as a solution concept in game theory in two interrelated directions. In the first place, an indicator of aggressiveness of claims is introduced in a modified definition of the core. The modified core may be smaller than the usual core, and may fail to exist if aggressiveness increases beyond some critical level. In the second place the article gives a formulation of a mixed cooperative/non-cooperative game, in which the game will be played cooperatively within coalitions, but non-cooperatively as between coalitions. A mixed cooperative/non-cooperative solution obtains if the grand coalition of all players fail to materialize because the various claims are incompatible. The two directions referred to are interrelated because the level of aggressiveness may be decisive for whether or not the grand coalition, and possibly other coalitions, will break down. The final section of the paper draws some general conclusions and relates the approach to other ideas in the literature. 相似文献
11.
Mark Melatos 《European Economic Review》2007,51(4):901-924
This paper investigates how variations in endowments and the structure of preferences impact on the coalition formation decisions of asymmetric countries. There exist relatively few general results on the relationship between country characteristics and trade bloc formation. Here, new light is shed on this issue by systematically simulating bloc formation and by explicitly analysing the blocking behaviour of coalitions. A general equilibrium model of world trade is implemented with equilibrium coalition formation being modelled using the equilibrium concept of the core. It is found that global free trade is observed when all countries are similar. Customs unions tend to form between countries with ‘adjacent’ consumer preferences or with ‘adjacent’ endowments of their export commodity. Finally, in contrast to the existing literature but consistent with observed behaviour, it is found that free trade areas often Pareto dominate customs unions, provided consumer preferences differ sufficiently. 相似文献
12.
A status game is a cooperative game in which the outcomes are rank orderings of the players. They are a good model for certain situations in which players care about how their "status" compares with that of other players.
We present several formal models within this class. Included are authoritarian status games (where coalitions may assign positions in the rank ordering to nonmembers) and oligarchic status games (where they are unableto do so). We consider the issues of a value concept for authoritarian games and that of core existence for oligarchic games. We then add a transferable resource to the models, obtaining "games of wealth and status."
Finally, we consider an interesting variant, called a "secession game," where coalitions have the right to secede from the grand coalition and form their own smaller "subsocieties," each with its own hierarchy. 相似文献
We present several formal models within this class. Included are authoritarian status games (where coalitions may assign positions in the rank ordering to nonmembers) and oligarchic status games (where they are unableto do so). We consider the issues of a value concept for authoritarian games and that of core existence for oligarchic games. We then add a transferable resource to the models, obtaining "games of wealth and status."
Finally, we consider an interesting variant, called a "secession game," where coalitions have the right to secede from the grand coalition and form their own smaller "subsocieties," each with its own hierarchy. 相似文献
13.
We model the process of coalition formation in the 16th German Bundestag as a hedonic coalition formation game. In order to
induce players' preferences in the game we apply the Shapley value of the simple game describing all winning coalitions in
the Bundestag. Using different stability notions for hedonic games we prove that the ``most' stable government is formed
by the Union Parties together with the Social Democratic Party. 相似文献
14.
In a series of papers, Aumann and Roth discussed a game in which players can cooperate in pairs and two of them prefer to form a coalition with each other. Roth argued that the only rational outcome is that the players who prefer each other form a coalition; Aumann argued that all three coalitions are possible because the players have a problem of expectation coordination. A non‐cooperative analysis provides additional support for Aumann's arguments and shows that the difference between Aumann's and Roth's views can be traced back to a difference (risky versus/riskless) in the bargaining procedure. 相似文献
15.
We explore the implications of the farsightedness assumption on the conjectures of players in a coalitional Great Fish War
model with symmetric players, derived from the seminal model of Levhari and Mirman (Bell J Econ 11:649–661, 1980). The farsightedness assumption for players in a coalitional game acknowledges the fact that a deviation from a single player
will lead to the formation of a new coalition structure as the result of possibly successive moves of her rivals in order
to improve their payoffs. It departs from mainstream game theory in that it relies on the so-called rational conjectures, as opposed to the traditional Nash conjectures formed by players on the behavior of their rivals. For values of the biological parameter and the discount factor more plausible
than the ones used in the current literature, the farsightedness assumption predicts a wide scope for cooperation in non-trivial
coalitions, sustained by credible threats of successive deviations that defeat the shortsighted payoff of any prospective
deviator. Compliance or deterrence of deviations may also be addressed by acknowledging that information on the fish stock
or on the catch policies actually implemented may be available only with a delay (dynamic farsightedness). In that case, the
requirements are stronger and the sizes and number of possible farsighted stable coalitions are different. In the sequential
move version, which could mimic some characteristics of fishery models, the results are not less appealing, even if the dominant
player or dominant coalition with first move advantage assumption provides a case for cooperation with the traditional Nash
conjectures. 相似文献
16.
We report an experiment on the Probabilistic Serial (PS) mechanism for allocating indivisible goods. The PS mechanism, a recently discovered alternative to the widely used Random Serial Dictatorship mechanism, has attractive fairness and efficiency properties if people report their preferences truthfully. However, the mechanism is not strategy-proof, so participants may not truthfully report their preferences. We investigate misreporting in a set of simple applications of the PS mechanism. We confront subjects with situations in which the theory suggests that there is an incentive or no incentive to misreport. We find little misreporting in situations where misreporting is a Nash equilibrium. However, we also find a significant degree of misreporting in situations where there is actually no benefit to doing so. These findings suggest that the PS mechanism may have problems in terms of truthful elicitation. 相似文献
17.
Stable governments and the semistrict core 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We consider the class of proper monotonic simple games and study coalition formation when an exogenous weight vector and a solution concept are combined to guide the distribution of power within winning coalitions. These distributions induce players' preferences over coalitions in a hedonic game. We formalize the notion of semistrict core stability, which is stronger than the standard core concept but weaker than the strict core notion and derive two characterization results for the semistrict core, depending on conditions we impose on the solution concept. A bounded power condition, which connects exogenous weights and the solution, turns out to be crucial. It generalizes a condition termed “absence of the paradox of smaller coalitions” that was previously used to derive core existence results. 相似文献
18.
This paper studies the impact of pragmatic and optimal transfer schemes on the incentives for regions to join international climate agreements. With an applied model that comprises twelve world regions we investigate: (i) a benchmark without transfers, (ii) scenarios with allocation-based rules where coalition members receive tradable emission permits proportional to initial or future emissions, (iii) scenarios with outcome-based rules where the coalition surplus is distributed proportional to emissions, and (iv) a scenario based on an optimal sharing rule where the coalition surplus is distributed proportional to outside option payoffs.We find that well-designed transfer schemes can stabilise larger coalitions and increase global abatement levels. In our applied setting we find that for allocation-based and outcome-based rules only small coalitions are stable, and, in the case of grandfathered emission permits, there is no stable coalition at all. Some obstacles associated with grandfathered emission permits can be overcome by incorporating the expected growth of emissions in developing countries in the distribution of emission permits. For the optimal transfer scheme we find that larger coalitions, which include key players such as the United States and China, can be stable, but no transfer scheme is capable of stabilising the Grand Coalition. 相似文献
19.
Summary. By a cooperative game in coalitional structure or shortly coalitional game we mean the standard cooperative non-transferable
utility game described by a set of payoffs for each coalition being a nonempty subset of the grand coalition of all players.
It is well-known that balancedness is a sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the core of such a cooperative non-transferable
utility game. In this paper we consider non-transferable utility games in which for any coalition the set of payoffs depends
on a permutation or ordering upon any partition of the coalition into subcoalitions. We call such a game a cooperative game
in permutational structure or shortly permutational game. Doing so we extend the scope of the standard cooperative game theory
in dealing with economic or political problems. Next we define the concept of core for such games. By introducing balancedness
for ordered partitions of coalitions, we prove the nonemptiness of the core of a balanced non-transferable utility permutational
game. Moreover we show that the core of a permutational game coincides with the core of an induced game in coalitional structure,
but that balancedness of the permutational game need not imply balancedness of the corresponding coalitional game. This leads
to a weakening of the conditions for the existence of a nonempty core of a game in coalitional structure, induced by a game
in permutational structure. Furthermore, we refine the concept of core for the class of permutational games. We call this
refinement the balanced-core of the game and show that the balanced-core of a balanced permutational game is a nonempty subset
of the core. The proof of the nonemptiness of the core of a permutational game is based on a new intersection theorem on the
unit simplex, which generalizes the well-known intersection theorem of Shapley.
Received: October 31, 1995; revised version: February 5, 1997 相似文献
20.
We show that every binary and Paretian method for passing from preference profiles to lotteries over preferences is associated with a subadditive function on the set of coalitions of individuals. This function gives the power of each coalition to secure its preference for any x over any y. 相似文献