Are speed limit policies robust?

Both price level targeting and speed limit policies have been suggested as alternatives to inflation targeting that may confer benefits when a central bank operates under discretion, even if society’s loss function is specified in terms of inflation volatility. Here we show that price level targeting dominates a speed limit policy under perfect credibility and rational expectations. However, a speed limit policy is more robust than a price level target. Even for small deviations from either rational expectations or perfect credibility, a speed limit policy dominates a price level target.     

ROBUST MONETARY POLICY UNDER UNCERTAINTY ABOUT CENTRAL BANK PREFERENCES

In this paper, we study the impact of central bank opacity on macroeconomic performances in a new Keynesian framework with model uncertainty using robust control techniques. We identify a new source of central bank opacity, which refers to the lack of information about the central bank's preference for robustness in the sense of Hansen and Sargent . We find closed‐form solutions for the robust control problem, analysing the impact of the lack of transparency about the central bank's preferences for robustness. We show that an increased transparency about the central bank's preference for robustness makes monetary policy respond less aggressively to cost‐push shocks, thus reducing the inflation and output gap variability. As a consequence, inflation and output gap are less volatile than under central bank opacity about its preference for robustness.     

Long-run scarring effects of meltdowns in a small-scale nonlinear quadratic model

We build a small-scale nonlinear quadratic (NLQ) model in which credit feedback and regime switches in the output gap affect the adjustment path of the economy towards a steady state. The central bank solves a finite-horizon decision problem where the policy rate also can be zero or negative. We estimate this model by nonlinear seemingly unrelated regression method (NLSUR) and using the parameters to explore policy scenarios. The latter projects long-run dynamics after a large demand contraction leading to scarring effects on the economy. We point out three main results. First, while scars are dominant when the central bank follows a standard Taylor rule, unconventional monetary policy (UMP) – such as Quantitative Easing – mitigates the output decline in both the short and the long run. Second, a zero natural interest rate curtails the central bank’s ability to adjust the economy and mitigate scars. Third, financial constraints leave the deepest scars even if UMP is active.     

Transparency and central bank losses in developing countries

Recent evidence shows central banks suffering from losses in some developing countries. This is a surprise to economists and policymakers. At the same time, these banks are asked to conduct monetary policy within a more transparent framework. Therefore, this paper seeks to answer the following question: Would more transparency in developing countries suffering from central bank losses be beneficial?This paper shows that the cost constraints of conducting monetary policy, central bank losses, in both transparency and opacity alike is significant and affects positively the error of the private sector in expected inflation rate and the output gap. In a country suffering from central bank losses, the expected benefits of transparency and the existence of cost constraint move in two opposite directions. As a result, it is unwise for developing countries suffering from central bank losses to focus on transparency. Priority should be given to fixing monetary policy and to developing financial markets.     

Optimal Degrees of Transparency in Monetary Policymaking

According to most academics and policymakers, transparency in monetary policymaking is desirable. I examine this proposition in a small theoretical model emphasizing forward–looking private sector behavior. Transparency makes it easier for price setters to infer the central bank's future policy intentions, thereby making current inflation more responsive to policy actions. This induces the central bank to pay more attention to inflation rather than output gap stabilization. Then, transparency may be disadvantageous. It may actually be a policy–distorting straitjacket if the central bank enjoys low–inflation credibility, and there is need for active monetary stabilization policy.
JEL classification : E 42; E 52; F 58     

Commitment or discretion? An empirical investigation of monetary policy preferences in China

This paper offers a first attempt to estimate the policy preferences of China’s central bank by confronting a small-scale microfounded New Keynesian model in which monetary policy is described by commitment or discretion with the Chinese macroeconomic data over the period from 1992Q2 to 2017Q4. Bayesian model comparison reveals that the data favor discretionary monetary policy. Estimates of the loss function weights under both cases show that the leading policy goal is price stability, followed by output stability and then interest rate smoothing. Finally, through counterfactual analyses we assess how macroeconomic outcomes might improve, had the Chinese central bank been able to commit. These findings shed new light on the opaque Chinese monetary policy, and are robust to subsample analysis.     

Monetary policy with heterogeneous households and imperfect risk-sharing

This paper considers a sticky-price model with heterogeneous households and financial frictions. Financial frictions lead to imperfect risk-sharing among households with idiosyncratic labor incomes. I study implications of imperfect risk-sharing for optimal monetary policy by documenting its impacts on the monetary transmission mechanism, the inflation–output tradeoff faced by the central bank, the policy objective function, and the resulting targeting rule. The main finding is that while the central bank continues to have the conventional dual mandate — the output gap and inflation stabilization — it should place a greater weight on the later as the degree of financial frictions increases because price stability provides the additional benefit of reducing undesired consumption dispersion.     

The election cycle in the inflation bias: evidence from the G-7 countries

This paper derives and evaluates empirical implications which separate the naive voters view [Nordhaus, W.D., 1975. The political business cycle. Review of Economic Studies 42, 169–190.] from the rational-voters view [Barro R., Gordon, D., 1983. Rules, discretion, and reputation in a model of monetary policy. Journal of Monetary Economics 12, 101–121.] under rational expectations. The observational equivalence of the two approaches obtained under a natural rate vanishes as output persistence is introduced. An analysis of inflation in the G-7 countries reveals election patterns supporting the joint hypothesis that demand shocks persist and that monetary policy courts retrospective voters. Patterns turn weaker as central banks become more independent, but do not disappear. Reducing inflationary bias not only requires more central bank independence, but as well less persistence.     

A classroom experiment in monetary policy

The authors propose a classroom experiment implementing a simple version of a New Keynesian model suitable for courses in intermediate macroeconomics and money and banking. Students play as either the central bank or members of the private sector. The central banker sets interest rates to meet twin objectives for inflation and the output gap or to meet only an inflation target. In both settings, private sector agents are concerned with correctly forecasting the inflation rate. The authors show that an experiment implementing this setup is feasible and yields results that enhance understanding of the New Keynesian model of monetary policy. They propose alternative versions where the central bank is replaced by a policy rule and provide suggestions for discussing the experimental results with students.     

Are monetary policy shocks causal to bank health? Evidence from the euro area

Despite considerable efforts of the European Central Bank (ECB) to support bank intermediation after the 2008 financial crisis, the recovery of euro area banks remained incomplete. Although many studies indicate that central banks can influence the stock prices of firms through their policy actions and communication, a knowledge gap exists as to whether the ECB's monetary policy can influence bank health. Through a high-frequency identification approach, this study reveals that the causal effect of conventional monetary policy action and communication by the ECB on bank stock prices differed over time, whereas its influence on bank financing costs was robust. This study provides new evidence showing that information effects related to policy easing surprises in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis hampered the ECB efforts to improve bank health and that its Odyssean communication signals (related to forward-looking announcements of policy easing) supported bank health during this phase. Local projections suggest that the response of banks to monetary policy shocks displayed some persistence, where ECB policy surprises and communications that shifted up (down) the yield curve were normally positive (negative) for bank health. The findings solicit a new perspective when assessing the influence of the ECB's monetary policy measures on euro area banks.     

Sectoral inflation persistence and optimal monetary policy

This paper examines optimal monetary policy in a new Keynesian model with sectoral inflation persistence. It focuses on the welfare differential between timeless perspective (TP) and a purely discretionary monetary policy. Sectoral inflation persistence renders the central bank’s optimization problem more complicated under both cases of constant elasticity of substitution consumption index and generalized rule-of-thumb price setting. We find that there are substantial gains from employing a TP policy. This paper addresses the fact that this gain is robust with any changes in key structural parameters.     

Asymmetric effects in the Polish monetary policy rule

In this paper we investigate whether the reaction function of the National Bank of Poland (NBP) is asymmetric according to the level of inflation gap and the level of output gap. Moreover, we test whether these asymmetries might possibly stem from nonlinearities in the Phillips curve. Threshold models are applied and two cases of unknown and known threshold values are investigated. Our results show that the Polish central bank responds more strongly to the level inflation when the level of inflation is relatively high. We find very weak evidence that the level of inflation reacts more strongly to the output gap when the output gap is relatively high. Thus, the asymmetries in the monetary policy rule seem to indicate asymmetric preferences of the central bank.     

A regime-switching approach to estimating the nonlinear quantity-based monetary policy rule in China

This article focuses on the quantity-based monetary policy rule in China. The article applies a Markov regime-switching approach to estimate the nonlinear policy rule using quarterly data from 1997Q1 to 2015Q2. Overall, the performance of the estimated two-state rule is significantly better than the performance of the linear rule. The regime-switching estimation suggests that the quantity-based policy tool displays a countercyclical response to the inflation gap but a pro-cyclical response to the output gap during recessions. In addition, this article provides notable evidence of the fact that China’s central bank has been targeting inflation over the gradual course of financial liberalization.     

Monetary policy,fiscal policy and cross signal jamming

This paper considers the issue of rule versus discretion when the central bank and the government share private information but have different preferences over inflation and output. We demonstrate that if the monetary policy is rule-based, Intuitive Criterion selects the unique separating equilibrium in which the central bank signals a low supply shock by a low interest rate. Interestingly, discretion may be better than the rule for the central bank, contrary to the case of complete information. Also, we examine the effect of information asymmetry on the monetary and fiscal policy mix. We show that cross signal jamming whereby the monetary authority and the fiscal authority successfully jams an unfavorable signal of each other does not occur in equilibrium.     

State‐Dependent Forward Guidance and the Problem of Inconsistent Announcements

Forward guidance can be provided as an unconditional promise, i.e. commitment to a specific low policy rate. Alternatively, the promise may include an escape clause, i.e. a condition defining the state of the economy under which the central bank would not keep such a low rate and, instead, it would revert to setting policy under discretion. The escape clause can be expressed as a threshold in terms of a specific variable. The present paper shows that, when such a threshold is expressed in terms of an endogenous variable (e.g. output, inflation), there are cases where it becomes impossible for the central bank to act in a way that is consistent with its promise. Consistency imposes limits on the policy rate that can be set since reverting immediately to the optimal discretionary rate can be incompatible with exceeding the threshold.     

Output gaps and monetary policy in the EMU area

Several considerations suggest that the ECB may respond to EMU-wide output gaps in setting policy: estimated reaction functions indicate that central banks respond to output gaps; a Taylor rule in which the central bank responds to inflation and the gap accounts for recent movements in interest rates in the EMU-area; and optimal control exercises conducted in estimated econometric models suggest that reacting to the gap may be optimal, even if the central bank cares solely about inflation. In this paper, we obtain point estimates with associated confidence bands of the EMU-wide output gap using UC models.     

Inflation contract,central bank transparency and model uncertainty

Using a New-Keynesian model subject to misspecifications, we examine how the robust monetary policy could be modified by a linear inflation contract when a central bank is opaque about its preference for model robustness. It is shown that a central bank must limit this preference and opacity about it to ensure the dynamic stability of the economy. An optimal inflation contract with a zero penalty rate provides no incentive for a central bank to be opaque. The latter must rebalance the benefit of avoiding very bad outcomes in worst case scenarios and the economic costs due to higher macroeconomic volatility.     

房地产价格、泰勒规则与宏观经济调控——基于2000-2010年我国宏观经济数据的检验

央行是否应该针对房地产价格制定货币政策进行调控,一直是学者们关注的焦点,但研究结果仍存在分歧。基于2000-2010年我国季度经济数据,对比检验了融入房地产价格的泰勒规则与标准泰勒规则对我国制定货币政策调控宏观经济的适用性。实证结果表明,依据标准泰勒规则所制定的利率政策,可以降低央行损失函数值,提高利率政策有效性。这一结果意味着,在房地产价格波动不影响物价稳定和经济增长的情况下,央行不应针对房地产价格进行调控。也就是说,央行需考虑房地产价格波动与通货膨胀和产出之间的相关关系,判断其对政策目标的潜在影响,制定利率政策对宏观经济进行调控。     

Asymmetric monetary policy rules for the euro area and the US

We analyse the implications of asymmetric monetary policy rules by estimating Markov-switching DSGE models for the euro area (EA) and the US. The estimations show that until mid-2014 the ECB’s response to inflation was more forceful when inflation was above than below the central bank’s aim. Since then, the ECB’s policy can be characterised as symmetric, and we quantify the macroeconomic implications of this policy change. We uncover asymmetries also in the Fed’s policy, which has responded more strongly in times of crisis. We compute optimal simple rules for the EA and the US in an environment with the effective lower bound and a low neutral real rate, and find that it prescribes a stronger response to inflation and the output gap when inflation is below target compared to when it is above target. We document its stabilisation properties had this optimal rule been implemented over the last two decades.     

Even more on monetary policy in a small open economy

It is well known that in a small open economy with full capital mobility and a fixed exchange rate, monetary policy is ineffective in influencing real output (e.g. the works of Fleming [Int. Monetary Fund Staff Pap. 9 (1962) 369.] and Mundell [Can. J. Econ. Polit. Sci. 29 (1963) 475.]). However, Wu [Int. Rev. Econ. Finance 8 (1999) 223.] finds that when the credit channel is added to this model, monetary policy can have real effects under a fixed exchange rate system. This conclusion hinges on the assumption that open market operations have no effect on foreign exchange reserves of the central bank when evaluating how a change in monetary policy affects the loan market. This assumption is incorrect because under a fixed exchange rate regime, the quantity of foreign reserves becomes endogenous in the model. It is shown that when this assumption is relaxed, monetary policy is still ineffective in influencing output under a fixed exchange regime, even with an operative credit channel.