腐败犯罪境外追逃措施探析

腐败犯罪的国际化的趋势要求中国必须借助外交和司法等多种途径抓捕外逃贪官。引渡是国际刑事司法协助的主要形式之一,引渡条约的签订受制于多种因素,这对国内司法产生一定影响;遣返作为一种行政手段,成为引渡的一种常规替代措施;劝返适用于境外追逃效果显著,但其存在合法性的质疑;异地刑事诉讼节省司法资源,不需要让渡法律的公正性;绑架、诱捕等西方国家经常适用的非常规手段中国尚未适用,其合理性有待认证。     

Trade and expropriation

We examine the effect of international trade on expropriation in a setting where law enforcement is costly. We show that, in general equilibrium, trade liberalization can reduce expropriation activities and have a first-order effect on the gains from trade. One interpretation of our results is that unskilled-labor abundant countries facing popular militia or rebel groups will experience amplified gains from trade, as expropriation levels and cost of enforcement decline with trade liberalization. However, the model also admits the possibility that globalization causes an increase in crime, particularly for skilled-labor abundant countries.     

Does private security affect crime?: a test using state regulations as instruments

Private security is employed to deter criminals from attacking specific targets, presumably not to produce general deterrence. Indeed, private security generates negative spillovers as criminals substitute non-protected targets for protected targets. Specific deterrence efforts may generate positive spillovers too, however, by raising the expected cost of committing crimes, thereby reducing crime in an area. The hypothesis that private security deters crime at the state level is tested. The demand for private security in an area is expected to be simultaneously dependent on the level of crime; so, an instrumental variables approach is employed in a panel-data fixed-effect model using state-level data from 1998 to 2010. Instruments for the amount of private security are state-wide licensing regulations for firms specializing in providing security, since these regulations should influence entry. Some state-level measures of violent and property crime are shown to be negatively and significantly related to increases in private security, suggesting that private security generates a general deterrence effect.     

Why conditional aid does not work and what can be done about it?

This paper studies a simple reform that introduces ex post incentives for the donor to reward good policies—contrary to existing practices. Instead of committing aid to each recipient ex ante and making aid conditional on reform, the donor centralizes the disbursement decision by committing aid to a group of countries. The actual amount disbursed to each individual country would depend on its relative performance. This explicit linkage of the allocation and disbursement decisions has two important advantages as compared to present practices. First, it raises the opportunity cost of disbursing aid ex post, thereby giving the donor stronger incentives to reward good policies. Second, competition among recipients allows the donor to make inferences about common shocks, which otherwise conceal the recipient's choice of action. This enables the donor to give aid more efficiently.     

Status‐Seeking in Criminal Subcultures and the Double Dividend of Zero‐Tolerance

This paper offers a new argument for why a more aggressive enforcement of minor offenses (zero‐tolerance) may yield a double dividend in that it reduces both minor offenses and more severe crime. We develop a model of criminal subcultures in which people gain social status among their peers for being “tough” by committing criminal acts. As zero‐tolerance keeps relatively “gutless” people from committing a minor offense, the signaling value of that action increases, which makes it attractive for some people who would otherwise commit more severe crime. If social status is sufficiently important in criminal subcultures, zero‐tolerance reduces crime across the board.     

Dynamic Law Enforcement with Learning

This article modifies a standard model of law enforcement toallow for learning by doing. We incorporate the process of enforcementlearning by assuming that the agency's current marginal costis a decreasing function of its past experience of detectingand convicting. The agency accumulates data and information(on criminals, on opportunities of crime), enhancing the abilityof future apprehension at a lower marginal cost. We focus onthe impact of enforcement learning on optimal compliance rules.In particular, we show that the optimal fine could be less thanmaximal and the optimal probability of detection could be higherthan otherwise. It is also suggested that the optimal imprisonmentsentence could be higher than otherwise.     

Migration,Foreign Aid and the Welfare State

Aspects related to the links between international migration, foreign aid and the welfare state are highlighted in this paper. Migration is modeled as a costly movement from an aid‐recipient developing country with low income and no welfare state, towards a rich donor, developed country with a well‐developed welfare state. Within this model, it is found, among other things, that the best response of the developed donor country is to increase aid as the co‐financing rate by the recipient country increases. When the immigration cost decreases, e.g. as a result of greater economic integration between the two countries, it is beneficial for the donor country to increase aid and the recipient country to increase the co‐financing rate.     

Should the police give priority to violence within criminal organizations? A personnel economics perspective

Even among themselves, criminals are not seen as trustworthy. Consequently, a criminal organization needs to incentivize its members, either by threats of violence or by rewarding good behavior. The cost of using violence depends on the resources police allocate to investigating intraorganizational violence. This means that the police may affect the choice of an incentive scheme by the criminal organization. The design of the optimal strategy for crime control has to take this into account. We develop a model of an infinitely repeated criminal labor market where (i) a criminal organization hires and incentivizes members, and (ii) peripheral crime (crime outside the criminal organization) is a stepping stone to a career in organized crime. We establish that there are two possible optimal strategies for the police. (i) There are situations in which the optimal strategy for the police is to use all of their resources to decrease the efficiency of criminals. (ii) In other situations, the optimal strategy for the police is to spend the minimum amount of resources to ensure that the criminal organization cannot punish disloyal criminals, and spend the rest of their resources to decrease the efficiency of criminals.     

Trade liberalization and credit constraints: Why opening up may fail to promote convergence

This paper examines credit constraints as one channel held responsible for hampering economic convergence between countries. Specifically, we extend a Melitz and Ottaviano ( 2008 ) type trade model with variable mark‐ups to allow for endogenous technology adoption. We consider a framework with two countries that potentially differ with respect to credit market development. Firms have the option to adopt a more efficient technology by paying some fixed cost that is more costly to finance for financially constrained firms. We find that technology adoption increases in both countries after trade liberalization but more so in the financially more developed country: the productivity gap widens. Simulations show that the welfare gap widens too. Opening up without sufficient access to external funding thus fails to promote convergence.     

Urban Crime and Labor Mobility

Two municipalities within a metropolitan statistical area (MSA) determine the level of local law enforcement. Enforcement reduces and diverts crime. The former confers a spillover benefit; the latter a spillover cost. When labor is mobile, welfare necessarily declines: if enforcement is too high (low) under labor immobility, it is raised (reduced) further under mobility. If municipalities have different enforcement costs, mobility reduces welfare for the high‐cost municipality and for the MSA, but the effect is ambiguous on the low‐cost municipality. Finally, when residents choose between productive and criminal activities, enforcement is more likely to be overprovided.     

Transnational crimes: how nations should cooperate and why they don't*

Chain-form crime partnerships and intelligence sharing by national authorities to detect cross-border partners create multiple externalities in the combat against transnational crimes and illicit trafficking. Cooperative enforcements that minimize global harms prioritize the country with lower intelligence production and/or superior detection capability. In equilibrium, as in practice, national enforcements are underbudgeted and might prioritize the wrong side – predominantly the high-budget, high-harm country. Governments might not share intelligence out of fear of importing enforcement burden, and harmonizing criminal sanctions alone might not be effective. Shocks on crime deterrence in a target country are first absorbed by source countries, implying weaker horizontal crime transfer effects than projected.     

Credit rationing, interest rates and capital accumulation

A simple endogenous growth model is developed to characterize credit rationing through the capital accumulation process. The model shows that credit rationing on investment loans decreases as capital accumulates and the enforcement cost decreases. We find that the evolution of the interest rate factor (lending interest rate/depositing interest rate) has a similar pattern to the credit rationing probability. However, simulations show that the evolution of the interest rate spread through the capital accumulation process depends on the degree of the enforcement cost. In the empirical part of the paper, we consider fifty-two countries, at different stages of development, over the period 1995–2005. We confirm the theoretical findings relative to the evolution of the interest rate spread and interest rate factor with capital accumulation. These results suggest that, for economies endowed with costly contract enforcement, the interest rate factor could be a better proxy of credit rationing than the interest rate spread.     

外商直接投资、知识产权保护与发展中国家的社会福利--兼论发展中国家的引资战略

本文在一个由发达国家企业和发展中国家企业所构成的寡头垄断的产量竞争模型中 ,考察了在发达国家企业所进行的产品创新型R&D投资具有溢出效应的情况下 ,发达国家企业对发展中国家的外商直接投资 (FDI)所产生的福利效果。本文发现 ,即使发展中国家拥有生产成本相对低廉的优势 ,发达国家企业对发展中国家的FDI也只有在溢出效应较小时才可能发生。但这种情况下的FDI也可能损害发展中国家的同类竞争企业 ,甚至损害发展中国家的社会福利。当然 ,以上结论并不意味着引进外资必然损害发展中国家的利益 ,外资引进对发展中国家所产生的福利效果 ,在很大程度上取决于FDI的性质 (产品市场的所在国 )、发展中国家成本优势的大小以及它对知识产权的保护力度等因素。     

FDI and pollution havens: Evidence from the Norwegian manufacturing sector

This is an empirical study of the firm and country determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) and how it is affected by the stringency of environmental regulations in host countries. We employ disaggregated data on sales by Norwegian multinationals' affiliates from 1999 to 2005 that allow such affiliates to be categorized as either efficiency-seeking (vertical) or market-seeking (horizontal) FDI. While the environmental stringency of a host country and its enforcement are found to have no effect on the average investment, we find a significant negative effect on multinationals with vertical motives. Compared to those located in lenient countries, the efficiency-seeking affiliates in more environmentally regulated countries receive less investment from their parent companies in terms of (i) equity capital, (ii) capital stock, and (iii) assets. We further find that the total exports from affiliates to parent companies in Norway decrease with the level of enforced environmental stringency in the host countries.     

Sovereign Risk, FDI Spillovers, and Growth

This paper studies the effect of sovereign risk on capital flows from rich to poor nations in the context of a two-country model, where Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) creates positive externalities in domestic production. We show that if externalities are large, a developing country never expropriates foreign assets, and behaves as under perfect enforcement of foreigners' property rights, jumping to the steady state in one period. If externalities are absent, a developing country always expropriates foreign assets and, then, there are no capital flows in equilibrium, as occurs in autarky. If externalities are of a medium size, our model can account for scarce capital flows from rich to poor nations, as well as other key features of the data, such as rising-over-time patterns of foreign capital and FDI in developing countries. In addition, the model offers an economic rationale for the FDI restrictions observed across nations.     

Taxing multinationals: The scope for enforcement cooperation

Policymakers seeking to raise more tax revenues from multinational enterprises have two alternatives: to raise tax rates or to devote more resources to improve tax compliance. Tougher tax enforcement increases the cost of profit shifting, and thus mitigates tax competition. We present a tax-competition model with two policy instruments (the corporate tax rate and the tightness of tax enforcement). In line with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's Base Erosion and Profit Shifting project, we analyze the scope for enforcement cooperation among asymmetric countries, considering that taxes are set noncooperatively. We show that the low-tax country may fail to cooperate if asymmetry is large enough and that tax havens would never agree to cooperate. Then we identify two drivers for enforcement cooperation. The first driver of cooperation is the complementarity of enforcement actions across countries. This is because the efficiency loss from enforcement dispersion is greater under complementarity. The second driver of cooperation is tax leadership by the high-tax country, which acts as a level-playing field in the tax competition and reduces the extent of disagreement on enforcement.     

Transit migration

Unauthorized international migration to the advanced countries has become increasingly more costly and indirect. The hazardous land and sea routes that pass through one or more transit countries offer liquidity‐constrained individuals an opportunity to economize on the pecuniary cost of migration as well as to work along the way to pay for the next leg of the journey. This paper analyzes the optimal behavior of transit migrants and examines its implications for the effectiveness of immigration control measures of the transit and final‐destination countries in deterring unauthorized migration. Strengthening of border controls at the final destination is shown to increase the relative effectiveness of internal enforcement measures of the transit countries, while tougher internal enforcement in the transit countries increases the relative effectiveness of border controls at the final destination.     

The social cost of foreign exchange reserves

Abstract

There has been a very rapid rise since the early 1990s in foreign reserves held by developing countries. These reserves have climbed to almost 30% of developing countries' GDP and 8 months of imports. Assuming reasonable spreads between the yield on reserve assets and the cost of foreign borrowing, the income loss to these countries amounts to close to 1% of GDP. Conditional on existing levels of short-term foreign borrowing, this does not seem too steep a price as an insurance premium against financial crises. But why developing countries have not tried harder to reduce short-term foreign liabilities in order to achieve the same level of liquidity (thereby paying a smaller cost in terms of reserve accumulation) remains an important puzzle.     

Withstanding financial crises: would trade partners help or hurt?

This article provides new empirical evidence on the losses of real activity caused by various financial shocks. Spillover effects due to foreign trade linkages deserve special attention. To this end, we estimate a modify auto-regressive process and a Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equations estimator is used to account for the dependency of one’s country growth on its trade-weighted partners growth. We run estimations on a set of currency collapses, banking crises and sovereign defaults in 49 advanced and developing countries from 1978 to 2011. The trade-weighted foreign demand effect mitigated the economic downturn following a banking or a sovereign debt crisis in all countries, while only the advanced ones benefited from it after a currency collapse. Trade-based spillover effects make banking crises more costly in the developing countries, in those that liberalize their financial account. It contrasts with what is observed during currency or sovereign debt crises.     

Governance Structures, Insider Status, and Boundary Maintenance

If legal enforcement of contracts were omnipresent, omniscient, and costless, the identity and history of one's partners would be irrelevant, since any problems caused by unreliable partners could be remedied effectively. However, when legal enforcement is localized, imperfect, and costly, different governance structures for contracts carry implications for the sets of acceptable contracting partners. When legal enforcement for contracts is based on national law, whose reach is coterminous with a state's territory, acceptable partners tend to be defined territorially. When state enforcement of contract law is weak or nonexistent or when a contract is so vulnerable to nonperformance that it requires auxiliary support, actors must devise an alternative or supplement to state enforcement. The most relevant contracting boundaries then will be ones defining groups that can efficaciously create and maintain intertemporal, inter-issue, and inter-actor linkages. We examine just three of many possibilities: family-based, function-based, and ethnicity- or religion-based groups. These different systems of governance affect which entities are recognized as members in the club of actors, as well as how actors define their contracting boundaries and distinguish between those with whom they contract relatively freely and those with whom their contracting is more circumscribed.