Specific versus ad valorem Taxation and Externalities

Received December 15, 2000; revised version received September 10, 2001     

Comparing ad valorem and specific taxes with corporate social responsibility

This paper examines the welfare ranking of indirect tax systems with corporate social responsibility (CSR) in a duopoly. Findings show that the two firms' cost and CSR asymmetries both play important roles. If the cost-efficient firm has a higher CSR level, the standard result in traditional tax theory is sustainable. Namely, ad valorem tax (specific subsidy) policies are considered superior to specific tax (ad valorem subsidy) policies. However, if the cost-inefficient firm has a significantly higher CSR level, the standard result is reversed. This result remains robust in an oligopoly model or under a tax revenue constraint.     

Welfare‐ranking ad valorem and specific tariffs under monopolistic competition

Abstract.  Actual trade and tariff policy prefers ad valorem tariffs to specific tariffs. Yet in this paper we show that, in a setting of monopolistic competition, realizing a given restriction on imports via a specific tariff would generate more consumer utility than obtaining the same restriction via an ad valorem tariff. JEL classification: F12     

Unit versus ad valorem taxes: Monopoly in general equilibrium

We show that if a monopoly sector is imbedded in a general equilibrium framework and profits are taxed at one hundred percent, then unit (specific) taxation and ad valorem taxation are equivalent on the set of Pareto optima.     

Taxation and the sustainability of collusion: ad valorem versus specific taxes

Assuming constant marginal cost, it is shown that a switch from specific to ad valorem taxation that results in the same collusive price has no effect on the critical discount factor required to sustain collusion. This result is shown to hold for Cournot oligopoly when collusion is sustained with Nash-reversion strategies or optimal-punishment strategies. In a Cournot duopoly model with linear demand and quadratic costs, it is shown that the critical discount factor is lower with an ad valorem tax than with a specific tax that results in the same collusive price. However, in contrast to Colombo and Labrecciosa (J Public Econ 97:196–205, 2013) it is shown that the revenue is always higher with an ad valorem tax than with a specific tax.     

On the superiority of fixed fee over auction in asymmetric markets

It is well known that selling licenses for the use of a cost-reducing innovation by auction yields a higher revenue compared to fixed fee in a symmetric Cournot industry. In this note we show that this result can be reversed in an asymmetric Cournot industry, i.e., the fixed fee policy can generate a strictly higher revenue than the auction policy in an industry where prior to the innovation firms are cost-asymmetric.     

Fragmented property rights and royalty bargaining

We consider production by a firm that relies on the patent rights that are held by other actors. Before production can take place, bargains have to be struck with each patent holder over the royalty per unit produced. In the negotiations, a patent holder must be mindful of the fact that a large royalty will increase the product price and lower demand for the final product. Hence each patent holder would prefer to gain a large royalty at the expense of rivals. When the producer makes the first offer in an alternating offer framework, we analyze whether it should conduct negotiations sequentially with some grouping of patent holders or simultaneously. We demonstrate that the producer will prefer simultaneous negotiation. An individual patent holder would prefer to negotiate early with the producer, and then to see remaining rights holders negotiate simultaneously. A firm that holds several patents would want to negotiate royalties on each one sequentially and then have simultaneous negotiation of payments to other rights holders.     

Ad valorem tariff and spatial equilibrium models

The objectives of this article are to illustrate theoretically and empirically how to incorporate an ad valorem tariff in spatial equilibrium models and show the equivalence of three approaches (primal, dual and MCP) of spatial equilibrium trade modelling. The article lays out in detail the theory, empirical applications and the results for all three approaches so that trade modellers can easily follow and apply them in their work. The primal approach is commonly used by spatial equilibrium modellers, though the dual approach corresponds to the textbook depiction of consumer surplus, producer surplus and gains from trade. The Mixed Complementarity Problem (MCP) is not commonly used by spatial equilibrium modellers, though it is relatively simpler if the modeller knows the equilibrium conditions. This article also presents advantages and disadvantages of each approach.     

The equivalence of profit-sharing licensing and per-unit royalty licensing

In a duopoly with symmetric product differentiations, we prove that profit-sharing licensing and per-unit royalty licensing are equivalent to each other regarding both the profitability and the welfare influences.     

Interest and profit

This paper argues that it is important to distinguish between the real rate of interest on money and the profitability of business enterprise. The former is a purely financial or monetary phenomenon （as claimed by Keynes） and the latter is in the nature of a surplus over and above the costs of production, including financing costs. There is an inverse relationship between the real rate of interest on money and the average mark-up or profit share. A synthetic theory of profit illustrates these points.     

License auctions with royalty contracts for (winners and) losers

This paper revisits the licensing of a non-drastic process innovation by an outside innovator to a Cournot oligopoly. We propose a new mechanism that combines a restrictive license auction with royalty licensing. This mechanism is more profitable than standard license auctions, auctioning royalty contracts, fixed-fee licensing, pure royalty licensing, and two-part tariffs. The key features are that royalty contracts are auctioned and that losers of the auction are granted the option to sign a royalty contract. Remarkably, combining royalties for winners and losers of the auction makes the integer constraint concerning the number of licenses irrelevant.     

评西方马克思主义者与斯拉法主义者关于利润确定模型的争论

西方马克思主义者赖特回应了各种非马克思主义的利润确定观点,但是却受到斯拉法主义者的进一步批评。实际上,赖特对于马克思主义利润确定模型的辩护,是在错误理解马克思价值转型理论的基础上做出的。他完全没有真正理解马克思的价值分析所使用的方法,因此对于不能提供因果解释的批判不知所措;他没有理解马克思价值到生产价格的转型理论,从而不理解马克思的劳动价值论作为一种价值理论体系如何揭示了利润在质和量上的确定。赖特对马克思利润确定模型的修改实际上放弃了利润是剩余价值转化形式的马克思主义基本观点,不仅不能有效回击斯拉法主义对马克思主义分析方法的批评,反而损害了马克思原本的理论。     

Minimum Memory for Equivalence between Ex Ante Optimality and Time-Consistency

I give a necessary and sufficient condition on memory of a player in an extensive game for equivalence between ex ante optimality and time-consistency (for all payoff assignments). The condition is called A-loss recall and requires that each loss of a player's memory can be traced back to some loss of memory of his own action. A-loss recall is also shown to be a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a time-consistent strategy (for all payoff assignments) if the player is conscious-minded. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D80.     

Demonstrating the Equivalence between Two Methods of Measuring Excess Burden

Excess burden is a key concept in the field of public economics, and the authors of most public finance textbooks describe more than one way to measure it. Excess burden can, for example, be viewed as the area of a triangle underneath a demand curve or as the value of a mathematical formula. To emphasize that these approaches measure the same concept, an instructor can show that changing any relevant variable has the same effect on excess burden in both representations. In so doing, instructors must take particular care when drawing the demand curves associated with changes in price and quantity.     

Franchise fee, competition and economic growth

This paper introduces the different kinds of franchise contract bargaining into a macroeconomic model and accordingly researches the relationship between competition and economic growth. In Nash bargaining model/vertical integration we find an inverted-U shaped or a monotonically increasing relationship between the competitive degree of the intermediate goods market and economic growth. In bargaining of the right to manage model/vertical non-integration our result shows an inverted-U shaped or a monotonically decreasing relationship between the competitive degree of the intermediate goods market and economic growth. In addition, there is an overall negative relationship between the competitive degree of the final goods market and economic growth. Especially, our interesting findings that the pricing rule for intermediate goods firm depends not only on market power but also bargaining power are more general. Therefore, we can further explain the firms' vertical control strategy.     

绿色营销与中国服装企业的可持续发展——一场成本与收益之间的博弈

随着全球范围内对环境问题的日益重视，绿色营销的概念正逐渐兴起。本文通过对服装企业实施绿色营销在短期和长期内的成本、收益分析，总结出了绿色营销对中国服装企业可持续发展的积极影响。实施绿色营销在短期内成本会有所增加，但从长期来看，通过采用高科技降低成本、打破绿色壁垒增加出口、建立企业的绿色形象、开拓市场等途径，收益必然会超出成本，使服装企业获得长远利润，从而实现可持续发展。     

Duality of welfare and profit maximization

Many economists are aware that the conditions for the efficiency and monopolization in a partial equilibrium framework are the extremes of the Ramsey–Boiteux formula when the Lagrange multiplier for the budget varies. We formalize the duality existing between the welfarist and monopolist constrained maximization programs by proving the following “folk theorem”:      

Tax enforcement and corporate profit shifting

We present empirical evidence suggesting that weak tax enforcement proxied by the extent of tax evasion in a country acts like a lower corporate tax rate in attracting profits of multinational corporations.     

Ad valorem versus unit taxes: monopolistic competition, heterogeneous firms, and intra-industry reallocations

Real-world industries are composed from heterogeneous firms and substantial intra-industry reallocations take place, i.e. high productivity firms squeeze out low productivity firms. Previous tax-tool comparisons have not included these central forces of industry structure. This paper examines a general equilibrium monopolistic competition model with heterogeneous firms and intra-industry reallocations. We show that the welfare superiority of ad valorem over unit taxes under imperfect competition is not only preserved but amplified. The additional difference between the tools arises because unit taxes distort relative prices, which in turn reduces average industry productivity through reallocations (the survival and increased market share of lower productivity firms). Importantly, numerical solutions of the model reveal that the relative welfare loss from using the unit tax increases dramatically in the degree of firm heterogeneity.     

市盈率与市红率--关于股市合理市盈率问题的探讨

股票市盈率的高低是衡量股票是否有投资价值的重要指标，它关系到投资者能否从上市公司获得满意的投资回报。目前流行的55倍市盈率提法既混淆了市盈率与“市红率”的概念，又没有考虑到股票投资的风险问题，因此，建立一个新的概念即“市红率”，实在有其必要性。