Farmers’ preferences for supermarket contracts in Kenya

With the modernization of global agri-food systems, the role of contract farming increases. This also involves smallholder farmers in developing countries. While previous studies have looked at economic impacts of contract schemes on smallholder farmers, little is known about farmers’ preferences for contracting in general, and for specific contract design attributes in particular. Better understanding farmers’ preferences and constraints is important to make smallholder contract schemes more viable and beneficial. This article builds on a choice experiment to analyze farmers’ preferences and preference heterogeneity for contracts in Kenya. In the study region, supermarkets use contracts to source fresh vegetables directly from preferred suppliers. However, farmer dropout rates are high. Mixed logit models are estimated to examine farmers’ attitudes towards critical contract design attributes. Having to deliver their harvest to urban supermarkets is costly; hence farmers require a significant output price premium. Farmers also dislike delayed payments that are commonplace in contract schemes. The most problematic contract attribute is related to unpredictable product rejection rates, substantially adding to farmers’ risk. Designing contracts with lower transaction costs, more transparent quality grading, and fairer risk-sharing arrangements could enhance smallholder participation in supermarket procurement channels.     

Contract farming configuration: Smallholders’ preferences for contract design attributes

While Contract Farming (CF) can enhance smallholders’ income in developing countries, empirical research on the motivation of smallholders to participate in CF is scarce. This paper explores farmer preferences for particular contract design attributes. We combined analytical hierarchy process and discrete choice experiments to investigate the importance of contract design attributes. On the basis of data collected among potato farmers in Ethiopia, we found that input market uncertainty is more important than output market uncertainty in smallholders’ decision to participate. Farmers tend to minimize their risk by opting for the buyer firm above the state and NGOs as providers of seed, inputs, and technical assistance. The results imply that the success of a CF scheme depends on the willingness of the firm to incorporate the preferred contract design attributes. Institutional intervention in the input market could induce agribusiness firms to offer attractive contracts for smallholders.     

Under a cloud of suspicion: trust,distrust, and their interactive effect in interorganizational contracting

Although considerable research has examined the role of trust in interorganizational relationship (IOR) contracting, scholars have devoted less attention to how trust and distrust jointly influence this process. We propose and test a model wherein trust, based on partner reliability, is constrained to the IOR exchange context where it develops and does not generalize to other contexts. Distrust, rooted in value incongruence, more readily generalizes across exchange contexts. Results support these predictions. In addition, our analysis shows that trust and distrust combine such that managers decrease their preferences for highly specific focal‐context contracts only when in‐context trust is high and distrust is low. We discuss how these findings may provide a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between trust‐based and contract‐based IOR governance. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Moral hazard in strategic decision making

This paper develops a theory of moral hazard in which the agent takes the role of strategic decision-maker. Career concerns give rise to preferences over risk, which in turn create an incentive for the agent to manipulate the project’s risk-return tradeoff to the disadvantage of the principal. The resultant moral hazard can be ameliorated by an incentive contract. The optimal non-decreasing wage involves granting ‘in-the-money’ options. In the context of academic tenure, the optimal tenure standard requires the agent to exceed expectations, and lies within one standard deviation of the expected outcome.     

心理契约违背、顾客满意与消费者非伦理行为——伦理意识的调节作用

消费市场竞争日益激烈,企业不能履行承诺的责任与义务时,则会形成心理契约违背,导致顾客产生不满意情绪,甚至出现非伦理行为。本文通过对328个样本数据的实证研究表明,交易型、关系型心理契约违背对消费者非伦理行为在部分维度上存在显著的正向影响;顾客满意在关系型心理契约违背与消费者非伦理行为之间的关系中起中介作用;相对主义伦理意识在关系型心理契约违背与无伤害行为之间具有显著的正向调节作用。为引导消费者进行伦理消费,企业应履行自身承诺维护顾客心理契约,提供个性化服务提升顾客满意度。     

Safeguarding or coordinating? Unfolding the dual-function of contracts in manufacturer-distributor relationships

By unfolding the simultaneous presence of the safeguarding function (i.e., contract monitoring) and coordinating function (i.e., joint action) of contracts, the current research operationalizes the dual-function of contracts and ascertains their effects on stimulating interfirm relationships. Analyzing the data collected from 512 manufacturers, we find that, first, contract specificity is positively associated with contract monitoring and joint action. Second, contract monitoring mediates the negative relationship between contract specificity and distributors' opportunistic behavior, while joint action mediates the positive relationship between contract specificity and channel cooperative performance. Third, while joint action directly improves channel performance, contract monitoring does not directly influence channel performance; rather, it promotes channel performance through inhibiting distributors' opportunism. In addition, contract monitoring and joint action substitute for each other in their influence on distributors' opportunism. Overall, we enrich and add insights into the literature on contractual governance by operationalizing the dual-function of contracts and investigating the underlying mechanisms of the dual-function in their influence over different channel outcomes     

基于心理契约的企业员工行为选择博弈分析

不完全信息条件下,企业和员工间的心理契约与员工的行为选择之间呈现动态的博弈关系。运用演化博弈理论,研究企业和员工间的心理契约类型对员工行为选择产生的影响,将两者之间的心理契约分为交易型和关系型两类,把员工的行为选择策略分为合作与不合作两种,得到16种演化稳定策略,并对不同条件下的演化稳定策略进行分析。研究认为,建立关系型心理契约的企业应提高员工合作策略下的期望收益和实施弹性工作制度,以确保企业和员工均获得超额收益;建立交易型心理契约的企业在强调任务导向的同时更要重视对员工的人性化关怀。此外,员工也应注重培养心理契约感知能力,提升全面素质,以应对心理契约破裂风险。     

In Whose Interest? A First Look at National Survey Data on Interest‐Based Bargaining in Labor Relations

The first national survey data on interest‐based bargaining (IBB) in labor relations reveal broad awareness of IBB, contrasting union and management views, and variation by negotiator experience and gender. A majority of negotiators are aware of IBB, and approximately one‐third of management negotiators and nearly one‐half of union negotiators report using IBB in prior negotiations. An exploratory analysis of the relationships between IBB preferences and contract outcomes suggests that the process is producing more than a simple “mutual gains” pattern of outcomes. Based on these initial results, two hypotheses are suggested as the focus for future studies of the diffusion and sustainability of IBB in collective bargaining.     

Psychological contract breach's antecedents and outcomes in salespeople: The roles of psychological climate,job attitudes,and turnover intention

Salespeople develop expectations of their organization based on actual and perceived promises. When the organization does not fulfill these promises, psychological contract breach occurs. This study investigates the association between psychological climate aspects, psychological contract breach, job attitudes (job satisfaction and organizational commitment), and turnover intention in salespeople. Using a sample of 308 respondents, results indicate that (1) psychological climate dimensions of autonomy, involvement, performance feedback, and clarity of organizational goals affect psychological contract breach, (2) psychological contract breach mediates the impact of autonomy, involvement, performance feedback, and clarity of organizational goals on job attitudes, and (3) job attitudes mediate the impact of psychological contract breach on turnover intention. Findings support psychological contract breach as a critical framework for understanding salesperson–employer relationships.     

Measuring the consumer benefits of improving farm animal welfare to inform welfare labelling

Policy makers in the European Union are envisioning the introduction of a community farm animal welfare label which would allow consumers to align their consumption habits with their farm animal welfare preferences. For welfare labelling to be viable the market for livestock products produced to higher welfare standards has to be sufficiently segmented with consumers having sufficiently distinct and behaviourally consistent preferences. The present study investigates consumers’ preferences for meat produced to different welfare standards using a hypothetical welfare score. Data is obtained from a contingent valuation study carried out in Britain. The ordered probit model was estimated using Bayesian inference to obtain mean willingness to pay. We find decreasing marginal WTP as animal welfare levels increase and that people’s preferences for different levels of farm animal welfare are sufficiently differentiated making the introduction of a labelling scheme in the form of a certified rating system appear feasible.     

Supply chain differentiation,contract agriculture,and farmers’ marketing preferences: The case of sweet pepper in Thailand

There is an emerging body of literature analyzing how smallholder farmers in developing countries can be linked to modern supply chains. However, most of the available studies concentrate on farm and farmer characteristics, failing to capture details of institutional arrangements between farmers and traders. Moreover, farmers’ preferences have rarely been considered. Here, we address these gaps by analyzing different market channels for sweet pepper in Thailand. Using data from a survey and choice experiment with farmers, we find that there is a general preference for marketing options that do not involve a contract. Additional provision of inputs and credit can increase the attractiveness of contracts. Yet, the most important factor for farmers is to personally know the buyer they deal with, which may be related to issues of trust. Some policy implications are discussed.     

Contract,cooperation, and performance in international joint ventures

This study examines how contract, cooperation, and performance are associated with one another within international joint ventures (IJVs). We argue that contract and cooperation are not substitutes but complements in relation to IJV performance. An IJV contract provides an institutional framework guiding the course of cooperation, while cooperation overcomes the adaptive limits of contracts. Our analysis of 293 IJVs in a dynamic market demonstrates that previous cooperation bolsters contractual adaptability, which in turn nurtures current cooperation between the same partners. We find that contract completeness and cooperation drive IJV performance both independently and interactively. When contracts are more complete, cooperation contributes more to performance. Contract and cooperation differ in their quadratic effects such that the contribution of contract completeness to performance declines as completeness increases but the contribution of cooperation remains linear. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

消费契约的双重特性与大企业危机

消费契约具有长期契约特征，不但企业对消费者的购买激励具备投资特征，消费者也会在购买过程中形成专用性资产。通过转移成本壁垒，企业和消费者被封闭在一种双边的长期契约关系当中，这种关系造成了消费契约的相对稳定性。但同时由于契约的不完全性，一旦消费者预期专用性资产变为沉没成本，潜在消费者将转投其他企业，造成企业的迅速倒闭。如果大企业不能采取有效措施，小的失误可能会演变成大的危机；由于大企业存在着危机的外部性．因此需要相应的公共政策。     

The Electricity Contract Market in England and Wales

In England and Wales, wholesale electricity is sold in a spot market partly covered by long-term contracts which hedge the spot price. Two dominant conventional generators can raise spot prices well above marginal costs, and this is profitable in the absence of contracts. If fully hedged, however, the generators lose their incentive to raise prices above marginal costs. Competition in the contract market could lead the generators to sell contracts for much of their output. Since privatisation the generators have indeed covered most of their sales in the contract market.     

Outsourcers’ control mechanisms,vendors’ contract schemas,and project performance in cross-border IT outsourcing: A vendor’s perspective

Relational conflicts are likely to occur in cross-border IT outsourcing between partners with different cultural backgrounds. Extant literature diverges on the role of contract and trust as control mechanisms in managing relational conflicts. Prior studies have examined the effectiveness of the control mechanisms primarily from the outsourcer’s perspective, with little consideration of how vendors interpret outsourcers’ control mechanisms. Based on psychological contract theory, this study addresses the effects of contract-based and trust-based control mechanisms on relational conflicts from the vendor’s perspective and further explores the contingency of the effects on vendors’ psychological contract schemas (transactional contract schema and relational contract schema) towards their relationships with outsourcers. Based on survey data from 180 offshore outsourcing IT projects, the results show that vendors’ transactional contract schema reduces the effect of trust-based control whereas vendors’ relational contract schema strengthens the effect of outsourcers’ contract-based control on relational conflict. Relational conflicts, in turn, exhibit a negative impact on project performance. The findings offer new insights into the role of outsourcers’ contract-based control and trust-based controls in relationship management from a vender’s perspective. The findings also extend the outsourcing governance literature by illustrating the contingency of the control mechanisms on vendors’ psychological contract schemas.     

The Causes of Impasses in Labor Disputes

Using data on teacher contract negotiations under final-offer arbitration, this paper investigates the causes of impasses in contract negotiations and finds some support for each of three perspectives: game-theoretic, psychological, and political. The large number of "consent awards" suggests that negotiators frequently wish to avoid the political costs of a compromise settlement, preferring to blame arbitrators for the outcome. The positive correlation between the probability of an impasse and the variance in comparable negotiated settlements suggests that the parties base their judgments of fairness using evidence most consistent with their own position.     

Contractual arrangements and enforcement in transition agriculture: Theory and evidence from China

This paper empirically investigates the relationship between contractual arrangements and their enforcement in Chinese agriculture. Based on an analysis of a survey of 100 agribusiness firms engaged in contract farming in Zhejiang province of China, we find that private contract enforcement mechanisms play an important role in influencing smallholders’ decisions to breach or fulfill contracts. Contract arrangements such as floor pricing, or requiring smallholders to make specific investments facilitate self-enforcement and significantly improve the smallholder’s contract fulfillment rate. This is particularly important in Chinese agriculture since the business environment is characterized by an absence of effective public enforcement institutions.     

Consumers’ valuation for food traceability in China: Does trust matter?

Food safety is a very important topic in China. We investigate Chinese consumers’ preferences and willingness to pay (WTP) for food traceability using a choice experiment. Given that consumers’ trust in the food system may affect their preferences and WTP, we also assess the interaction between consumers’ trust in government’s supervision of food safety and food labels and consumers’ preferences for traceable food products. Using data collected from a choice experiment on Fuji apples in a face-to-face survey in six Chinese cities, the results show that (i) consumers are willing to pay for traceable food but their valuations can differ upon the degree of their trust in government’s supervision of food safety and food labels; (ii) consumers are willing to pay for traceability with strong evidence of preference heterogeneity; (iii) government is not the most trusted safety inspection and certificate authority as found in prior studies using animal food products in China.     

Identifying consumer preferences for nutrition information on grocery store shelf labels

Nutrition labels can potentially benefit consumers by increasing product knowledge and reducing search costs. However, the global increase in obesity rates leads one to question the effectiveness of current nutrition information formats. Alternative formats for providing nutrition information may be more effective. Shoppers at a major grocery chain participated in choice experiments designed to identify preferences for nutrition information provided on grocery store shelf labels. Shoppers demonstrate a strong affinity for shelf-label nutrition information and the presentation of the nutrition information significantly affects their preferences as well. Several demographic variables help to explain differences in preferences.     

Trading between agents for a better match

This paper studies externalities that arise when agents can trade outcomes ex post. I show that when agents can trade outcomes ex post, principals are incentivized to contract with agents ex ante to reduce ex post transfers to outside agents with whom the principals do not directly contract. This causes principals to offer agents piece-rates that are inefficiently low and lower than the piece-rates they would offer if trading was not allowed. Although trading reduces an agent's effort and could increase the agent's outside option of rejecting a principal's ex ante contract, principals ultimately gain from allowing ex post trading because such trading results in outcomes that better match their tastes.