Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games

We conduct double-anonymous dictator experiments to explore the role of altruism in motivating subjects' behavior. We vary the extent to which an anonymous recipient is deserving of aid and investigate its effect on the allocation of a fixed pie by student subjects. This is accomplished by including as treatments: (1) an anonymous student subject and (2) an established charity. We find that a significant increase in donations occurs when we increase the extent to which a donation goes to a recipient generally agreed to be “deserving.” We conclude that subjects are rational in the way they incorporate fairness into their decisions.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: A13, C91, D64.     

Choquet Rationality

Consider a decision problem under uncertainty for a decision maker with known (utility) payoffs over prizes. We say that an act is Choquet (Shafer, Bernoulli) rational if for some capacity (belief function, probability) over the set of states, it maximizes her “expected” utility. We show that an act may be Choquet rational without being Bernoulli rational, but it is Choquet rational if and only if it is Shafer rational. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D81.     

Player Types and Self-Impression Management in Dictatorship Games: Two Experiments

Recent experimental research on dictatorship games shows that many dictators share their outcomes with unknown, anonymous others. The data suggests that dictators can be “typed” as rational (taking the maximum), equal (splitting outcomes equally), or “other.” This paper experimentally tests the self-impression management model, which predicts that individuals act to show themselves in a positive light, even when they are the only observer of their own behavior. The model predicts that the “other” type of dictator will avoid being greedy by taking more only as their choices are increasingly restricted. Results from two experiments support the model's predictions. The conclusion advocates differentiating basic psychological motivations in modeling individual behavior. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, C91, D63.     

Rational Choice and the Condorcet Jury Theorem

In a recent paper, Austen-Smith and Banks (1996,Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev.90, 34–45), criticize the current literature on the Condorcet jury theorem as neglecting the behavioral underpinnings of decision-making. They leave open the question whether allowing mixed strategies would sustain the conclusions of the Condorcet jury theorem. In this paper, it is shown that these conclusions can hold in equilibrium. In other words, “a rational choice foundation for the claim that majorities invariably ‘do better’ than individuals” is derived. (Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: D72.     

Of mice and men: Within gender variation in strategic behavior

We study behavioral differences across and within genders in a family of ultimatum and dictator games. We find these differences are due not only to altruistic preferences but also beliefs about the strategic behavior of others. The behavior of men in strategic situations is not significantly more aggressive than women on average. But this average masks wide variation in intra-gender behavior. In particular, a sizable minority of males are “mice,” behaving timidly in strategic environments. Our experimental design shows that the standard ultimatum game can mask significant inter- and intra-gender differences in strategic behavior. These behavioral patterns in strategic environments are shown to be correlated with preferences for altruism in non-strategic settings. Such gender differences could well manifest themselves in real-world large-stakes transactions, such as salary negotiations.     

Forecasting money demand with Jorgenson's Lag and Tobin's q

The poor forecasting record of time-series money-demand equations is generally attributable to shifts in public behavior, to the omission of important arguments, and to the inadequate specification of the functional form of the relationship. This paper explores the latter two problems by deriving the demand function from Tobin's model of asset markets, by incorporating Tobin's “q” as an argument, and by basing the adjustment process on Jorgenson's rational distributed-lag model. These modifications produce reasonably stable equations that forecast well throughout the 1970s.     

Reference Points and Negative Reciprocity in Simple Sequential Games

We investigate experimentally whether preferences over an outcome depend on what other possible outcomes of the situation under consideration are, i.e., whether choices are “menu dependent.” In simple sequential games we analyze whether reactions to a certain benchmark outcome are influenced by changes in the payoffs of another outcome, not attainable at that time, called the “reference point.” Our data provide evidence that is favorable to the notion of menu dependence. Alterations of the reference point can lead to quantitatively significant changes in behavior at the benchmark outcome. The behavior we observe can be interpreted in terms of negative reciprocity. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C91, C92, C72.     

Learning to Learn, Pattern Recognition, and Nash Equilibrium

The paper studies a large class of bounded-rationality, probabilistic learning models on strategic-form games. The main assumption is that players “recognize” cyclic patterns in the observed history of play. The main result is convergence with probability one to a fixed pattern of pure strategy Nash equilibria, in a large class of “simple games” in which the pure equilibria are nicely spread along the lattice of the game. We also prove that a necessary condition for convergence of behavior to a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is that the players consider arbitrarily long histories when forming their predictions.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D83.     

House Allocation with Transfers

We consider the Shapley–Scarf house allocation problem where monetary transfers are allowed. We characterize the class of mechanisms that are strategy-proof, ex post individually rational, ex post budget-balanced, and “collusion-proof.” In these mechanisms, the price of each object is fixed in advance, and the objects are reallocated according to the (unique) core assignment of the Shapley–Scarf economy associated with the prices. The special case in which all prices are zero is the core mechanism studied by Shapley and Scarf. Our mechanisms are compelling alternatives to the Groves mechanisms, which satisfy neither budget balance nor our condition of collusion-proofness. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C78, D71, D78, D89.     

Congestion games with malicious players

We study the equilibria of non-atomic congestion games in which there are two types of players: rational players, who seek to minimize their own delay, and malicious players, who seek to maximize the average delay experienced by the rational players. We study the existence of pure and mixed Nash equilibria for these games, and we seek to quantify the impact of the malicious players on the equilibrium. One counterintuitive phenomenon which we demonstrate is the “windfall of malice”: paradoxically, when a myopically malicious player gains control of a fraction of the flow, the new equilibrium may be more favorable for the remaining rational players than the previous equilibrium.     

Combining stated and revealed choice research to simulate the neighbor effect: The case of hybrid-electric vehicles

According to intuition and theories of diffusion, consumer preferences develop along with technological change. However, most economic models designed for policy simulation unrealistically assume static preferences. To improve the behavioral realism of an energy–economy policy model, this study investigates the “neighbor effect,” where a new technology becomes more desirable as its adoption becomes more widespread in the market. We measure this effect as a change in aggregated willingness to pay under different levels of technology penetration. Focusing on hybrid-electric vehicles (HEVs), an online survey experiment collected stated preference (SP) data from 535 Canadian and 408 Californian vehicle owners under different hypothetical market conditions.Revealed preference (RP) data was collected from the same respondents by eliciting the year, make and model of recent vehicle purchases from regions with different degrees of HEV popularity: Canada with 0.17% new market share, and California with 3.0% new market share. We compare choice models estimated from RP data only with three joint SP–RP estimation techniques, each assigning a different weight to the influence of SP and RP data in coefficient estimates. Statistically, models allowing more RP influence outperform SP influenced models. However, results suggest that because the RP data in this study is afflicted by multicollinearity, techniques that allow more SP influence in the beta estimates while maintaining RP data for calibrating vehicle class constraints produce more realistic estimates of willingness to pay. Furthermore, SP influenced coefficient estimates also translate to more realistic behavioral parameters for CIMS, allowing more sensitivity to policy simulations.     

Subgame perfection in ultimatum bargaining trees

In typical experiments on ultimatum bargaining, the game is described verbally and the majority of subjects deviate from subgame-perfect behavior. Proposers typically offer significantly more than the minimum possible and Responders reject “unfair” offers. In this work, we show that when the ultimatum bargaining game is presented as an abstract game tree, the vast majority of behavior is consistent with individualistic preferences and subgame-perfection. This finding raises doubts about theories that ignore the potential influence of social context and experiments that do not control for social context.     

Consumption dynamics under information processing constraints

This paper studies how “rational inattention” (RI)—a type of information processing constraint proposed by Sims [Sims, C.A., 2003. Implications of rational inattention, Journal of Monetary Economics 50 (3), 665–690]—affects the joint dynamics of consumption and income in a permanent income model with general income processes. Specifically, I propose an analytical approach to solve the multivariate permanent income model with RI and examine its implications for optimal consumption, saving, and welfare. It is shown that RI can affect the relative volatility of consumption and provide an endogenous propagation mechanism that disentangles the short-run and long-run responses of consumption to exogenous income shocks. I also explore how aggregation reduces the impact of the RI-induced endogenous noise on consumption and thus increases the smoothness of aggregate consumption. Finally, I compare RI with four alternative hypotheses (habit formation, signal extraction, robustness, and inattentiveness) by examining their implications for the joint behavior of consumption and income.     

Unproductive immigrants: A socially optimal policy for rational egalitarians

Large parts of the population of third-world immigrants to rich countries have not been successfully integrated into domestic labor markets and so are not productively employed. A potential “immigration surplus” has therefore not been realized. These circumstances have been explained with reference to irrational behavior by natives (acting out of racism) and/or malevolent motives of either natives or immigrants, or both. In this paper, I propose an explanation for labor-market exclusion of immigrants as the optimal outcome of objectives of rational egalitarianism: that is, all people are rational and behave solely in accord with ethical socially irreproachable motives. The explanation fits the stylized facts of the Danish case. The predictions are also consistent with observed inter-country differences in labor-market exclusion of immigrants.     

War and peace: Third-party intervention in conflict

This paper develops a simple sequential-move game to characterize the endogeneity of third-party intervention in conflict. We show how a third party's “intervention technology” interacts with the canonical “conflict technologies” of two rival parties in affecting the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium outcome. From the perspective of deterrence strategy, we find that it is more costly for a third party to support an ally to deter a challenger from attacking (i.e., to maintain peace or acquiescence), as compared to the alternative case when the third party supports the ally to gain a disputed territory by attacking (i.e., to create war), ceteris paribus. However, an optimally intervening third party can be either “peace-making”, “peace-breaking”, or neither depending on the characteristics of the conflict and the stakes the third party holds with each of the rival parties.     

Determinants of demand for green products: An application to eco-label demand for fish in Europe

In this paper, we confront the theoretical motivations of the consumption of eco-friendly products and the factors influencing the European perceptions regarding the fact that “fish caught using an environmentally friendly technique may carry a special label”. We take advantage of the recent integration of non-economic elements in the microeconomic analysis of consumers' behavior in order to highlight the factors leading to their demand for green products. Thanks to an original European survey on seafood product carried out on more than 5000 consumers, we test the influence of intrinsic motivation, information, localization and socio-economic factors on the demand for an eco-label for fish.Our results show a significant connection between the desire for eco-labeling and seafood features, especially the freshness of the fish, the geographical origin of the fish and the wild vs farmed origin of the fish. Moreover, we prove the major role played by the fish price. We also demonstrate that the ecological issue regarding fisheries is highly connected to consumer information, intrinsic motivation and socio-economic status: the typical “green fish consumer” is a young woman, well educated, well informed on the state of marine resources and not very trusting of the regulation of the fisheries. Consumers who are aware of the importance of marine resource preservation have the same profile.     

Government spending, capital accumulation and the optimal policy rule: The role of public service capital

In this paper, we modify the Djajić [Djajić, S., 1987. “Government Spending and the Optimal Rates of Consumption and Capital Accumulation,” Canadian Journal of Economics 20, 544–554.] model in such a way that government consumption expenditure provides utility to households via the total stock of government services rather than the government consumption flow alone. By using such a framework, we show that the optimality condition for the public service capital stock is the marginal rate of substitution between public service capital and consumption that equals the intertemporal marginal rate of transformation between the two goods. In addition, we show that the relationship between private consumption and public service capital in a household's utility plays an important role in determining the transitional behavior of relevant variables. We also examine the second-best government consumption expenditure policy. By contrast, in the standard flow specification, e.g., Turnovsky and Brock [Turnovsky, S.J. and Brock, W.A., 1980. “Time Consistency and Optimal Government Policies in Perfect Foresight Equilibrium,” Journal of Public Economics 13, 183–212.], Ihori [Ihori, T., 1990. “Government Spending and Private Consumption,” Canadian Journal of Economics 23, 60–69.], and Turnovsky and Fisher [Turnovsky, S.J. and Fisher, W.H., 1995. “The Composition of Government Expenditure and its Consequences for Macroeconomic Performance,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 19, 747–786.], the second-best government consumption expenditure is decided on the basis that the marginal utility of consumption is equal to the discounted sum of the marginal utility of the government's flow spending.     

On fair allocations

This paper examines the effects of fairness on economic behavior and allocations, where fairness is defined as the absence of envy among consumers. We use the benefit function to investigate the welfare cost of fairness. We show how fairness generates a form of altruism, captured by a “fair expenditure” function that depends on the distribution of welfare. We define the most efficient fair allocations and explore the implications of fairness for economic behavior, pricing and redistribution policies.     

Healthy food, unhealthy food and obesity

We examine whether the latent behavioral mechanisms embedded in two “price effects” explanations of the obesity problem are operative. Our findings lend support to the hypothesis that falling food price is one likely cause of the obesity epidemic.