Macroeconomic conditions in the U.S. and congressional voting on environmental policy: 1970-2008

Using the Environmental Scorecard ratings of Congressmen and Senators published annually by the League of Conservation Voters, we explore empirically whether political support for pro-environment legislation, aggregated across each legislative body, is sensitive over time to changing economic conditions — that is, whether there is a political trade-off between economic conditions and the environment. Using LCV scorecard ratings from 1970 to 2008, we find evidence, consistent across both the House and Senate, that political support for the environment is related to per capita income, but this general tendency can be decomposed into sharp differences by party.     

An investment contest to influence environmental policy

In an investment contest for environmental policy, polluters and victims of pollution invest in an increase of their marginal benefits of pollution and environmental quality, respectively. These investments influence time-consistent environmental policy. Investments will exceed their optimal level. The more victims there are, the lower aggregate investment, the lower payoffs for the victims and the higher payoffs for the polluters. The more polluters there are, the higher aggregate investment and the lower payoffs for polluters and victims. Asymmetries between polluter and victim result in less overinvestment and bias environmental policy in favour of the less productive side.     

Using pre-EMU money market rates to assess monetary policy in the euro area

This note addresses the problems arising when using national pre-EMU interest rate data in the estimation of monetary policy reaction functions for the euro area. We provide evidence that failing to adjust for interest rate risk premia leads to an overestimation of the response of monetary policy both to inflationary pressures and to the output gap. A method for adjusting pre-EMU interest rate data for risk premia is proposed.     

Channels of transmission of environmental policy to economic growth: A survey of the theory

Economists generally hold that environmental regulations impose constraints on the production possibilities set and are therefore potentially harmful to economic growth. In recent years, however, it has been recognized that environmental regulation can enhance the prospects for growth if improved environmental quality increases the productivity of inputs or the efficiency of the education system. It is also held that environmental regulation promotes pollution abatement activity and can lead to the exploitation of increasing returns to scale in abatement. Furthermore, expectations of a better environment may encourage households to save. Finally, it has been conjectured that environmental regulations can stimulate innovation because R&D is a relatively clean activity and because the market share of clean innovations increases. Future empirical research should shed light on the relative importance of these different channels of transmission of environmental policy to the growth rate of the economy.     

The implications for households of environmental tax reform (ETR) in Europe

The paper discusses the distributional implications of environmental tax reform (ETR) for households, and presents new results from modelling the impacts of a major ETR for the European Union. The distributional effects arise from the new environmental taxes, any tax reductions made as part of the ETR, the wider macroeconomic impacts from the ETR, any special provisions in the ETR, and the environmental benefits from the ETR. The paper's literature review makes clear that while the impacts from taxes on the household use of energy are very often regressive, transport taxes tend not to be, although the impacts differ between urban and rural households. Moreover, the net distributional impact is often less regressive, or not at all, once the wider distributional effects are taken into account. Residual regressive effects can in principle be removed by further adjustments in the tax or benefits system. The modelling results suggest that an ETR in Europe will actually increase real incomes across the EU as a whole, and will not be generally regressive, although the results differ by country and for different socio-economic groups. The political acceptability of ETR may depend on the worst effects on these groups being mitigated in some way.     

Plant location and strategic environmental policy with inter-sectoral linkages

In recent debates on trade liberalisation the concern has often been expressed that with more competitive international trade governments will be worried that by setting tougher environmental policies than their trading rivals they will put domestic producers at a competitive disadvantage, and in the extreme case this could lead to firms relocating production in other countries. The response by governments to such concerns will be to weaken environmental policies (‘eco-dumping’). In competitive markets such concerns are ill founded, but there is a small amount of literature which has analysed whether governments will indeed have incentives for eco-dumping in the more relevant case of markets where there are significant scale economies; even here there is no presumption that the outcome will involve eco-dumping.In this paper we extend the analysis of strategic environmental policy and plant location decisions by analysing the location decision of firms in different sectors which are linked through an input-output structure of intermediate production. The reason why we introduce inter-sectoral linkages between firms is that they introduce an additional factor, relative to those already analysed in the literature, in the plant location decision, which is the incentive for firms in different sectors to agglomerate in a single location. This has a number of important effects. First, there is now the possibility of multiple equilibria in location decisions of firms. Following from this there is the possibility of catastrophic effects where a small increase in an environmental tax can trigger the collapse of an industrial base in a country; however there is also the possibility that a country which raises its environmental tax could attract more firms to locate in that country, because of the way the tax affects incentives for agglomeration. Finally, and again related to the previous effects, there is the possibility of a hysteresis effect where raising an environmental tax in one country can cause firms to relocate to another country, but subsequently lowering that tax will not induce firms to relocate back into the original country.We consider a simple model with two countries, two industries, an upstream and a downstream sector, and two firms per industry. The analysis proceeds through a three-stage game: in the first stage the governments of the two countries set their environmental policies; in the second stage the firms in both industries choose how many plants to locate and where; in the third stage firms choose their output levels, with the demand for the upstream firms being determined endogenously by the production decisions of the downstream firms. We assume that there are no limits to production capacity, so that firms do not build more than one plant in any country. However, firms may build plants in different countries because of positive transport costs. Although the model appears very simple, it cannot be solved analytically, so all the conclusions must be drawn from numerical simulations.     

Global environment and dynamic games of environmental policy in an international duopoly

This paper examines a differential game model of international pollution control in which polluting oligopolists compete in a third country market. Two alternative policy instruments (emission taxes and command-and-control regulations) are considered. A tougher emission policy in the home country enhances the foreign firm’s competitiveness because of the static “rent-shifting” effect. The foreign country also enjoys a future improvement of the global environmental quality by “free riding” on the home country’s emission reduction effort. Because of these strategic effects, the levels of environmental policy determined in the noncooperative policy game are distorted away from the socially optimal level. Moreover, the emission tax game produces a more distortionary outcome than that in the command-and-control game; it generates more pollution and lower welfare.      

Rethinking wage policy in the face of the Euro crisis. Implications of the wage-led demand regime

Ten years after its introduction, the Euro is in an existential crisis. The crisis is the outcome of economic policies that have aimed at labour market flexibility and financial integration. This paper argues, firstly, that the aggregate demand regime in the Euro area is wage led. While an increase in wages (other things equal) does have a negative effect on investment and on net exports, it does have a positive effect on consumption. As the Euro area is a relatively closed economy, the consumption effect overpowers the investment effect and the export effect. Secondly, we argue that in the Euro area two growth models have emerged: a credit-led and an export-led model. These have given rise to the imbalances that are at the heart of the Euro crisis. Wage flexibility has proven insufficient to prevent these imbalances. Thirdly, we advocate a system of coordinated wage bargaining that aims at wages rising in line with productivity growth and a substantially upward-revised inflation target. If the project of European economic integration is to survive, it needs a drastic change in direction. An important building block of this redirection is a rethinking of the role of wage policy.     

Performance of European insurance firms in the single insurance market

The deregulation and liberalization process towards establishing a single European financial market has some important implications for the insurance industries. Due to the increased competition, insurance firms have to adjust their costs and operate efficiently to survive in this new environment. This paper attempts to analyze the cost efficiency and scale economies in the single European insurance market. Considering the ongoing enlargement process of the EU, our sample includes the insurance industries of the major EU‐15, four new members and a candidate country, Turkey, over the period 1995–2005. We use the firm‐level financial data and estimate a stochastic cost frontier that controls for differences in environmental conditions. All insurance systems display significant levels of cost inefficiency. The results further indicate that there are significant economies of scale, particularly for small‐ and medium‐size insurance firms. Finally, the analyses suggest similar results for major EU countries, new members and the candidate.     

Harnessing the political economy of environmental policy: David Pearce’s contribution to OECD

During 34 years, David Pearce made major contribution to OECD work on environmental economic issues, with a particular focus on cost–benefit analysis, economic instruments, biodiversity and distributive issues. This article provides a brief review of David Pearce’s contributions. This work was particularly useful in enhancing the political economy of environmental policy which is at the core of OECD work. The opinions expressed in this paper reflect the author’s perception of this long history of the development of environmental economics at OECD; it does not necessarily reflect the views of the OECD and its member countries. Many thanks to Jonathan Fisher, Nick Johnstone and Michel Potier for their comments on an earlier draft.     

K. William Kapp's theory of social costs and environmental policy: Towards political ecological economics

The paper analyzes the contribution of K. William Kapp, widely considered one of the founders of Ecological Economics. This paper will demonstrate how K. William Kapp developed his theory of social costs into a framework for environmental policy development, i.e. the basis for Political Ecological Economics. The latter provides the most comprehensive and non-utilitarian alternative to the main neoclassical approaches provided by Arthur Pigou and Ronald Coase. Kapp determined basic human needs to be necessary values operational for policymaking via politically derived and scientifically determined social minima (criteria) and socio-ecological indicators. This “rational humanism” was inspired by Weber's concept of substantive rationality and informed by John Dewey's pragmatic instrumentalism. The paper concludes that Kapp's contribution is important enough to cement its place in the broader school of Ecological Economics.     

Competition policy and market leaders

We study the potential loss in social welfare and changes in incentives to invest in R&D that result when the market leading firm is deprived of its position. We show that under plausible assumptions like free entry or repeated market interactions there is a social value of market leadership and its mechanical removal by means of competition policy is likely to be harmful for society.     

On the design of incentive mechanisms in environmental policy

The objective of this paper is to present environmental policy as a simple game in two stages within a principal-agent framework. At the outset the authority adopts a transfer payment rule. Then the firms react by carrying out abatement activities, based on their chosen levels of emission and output. Next the authority measures the emissions (and residual profit of the industry) and revises the level of its instrument. Then the game starts again. Our purpose is to narrow the scope of ad hoc incentive schemes by characterizing families of optimal linear schemes.We thank two anonymous referees for their valuable suggestions. We have also benefited from comments from I.-M. Andréasson, J. B. Opschoor, H. Verbruggen and the other members of the Task Force II: Environmental Policy instruments of the European Science Foundation Programme: Environment, Science and Society. Wang acknowledges support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG).     

A change in market responses to the environmental management ranking in Japan

This article investigates stock price reactions to the release of the environmental management ranking issued by Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Nikkei newspaper) from 1998 to 2005, by using a standard event study methodology. An examination of stock price movements of the top 100 manufacturing companies reveals that stock prices during the sample period did not respond significantly to the release of the ranking within a 3-day event window. However, market responses became significantly positive after 2003, while they were significantly negative in 1999 and 2000. The stock prices of upgraded companies in particular reacted negatively before 2000, but positively after 2002. These results indicate that market reactions were changed between 2001 and 2002, when the Japanese government showed its strong commitment to environmental policies by establishing the Ministry of the Environment and signing the Kyoto Protocol, following a number of legislations.     

Designing environmental policy: lessons from the regulation of mercury emissions

In its waning days, the Clinton administration decided that it was appropriate to regulate mercury emissions from power plants. The incoming Bush administration had to decide how best to regulate these emissions. The Bush administration offered two approaches for regulating mercury emissions from power plants. The first was to establish uniform emission rates across utilities, as mandated by the 1990 Amendments. The second was to establish a cap on mercury emissions while allowing emissions trading in order to reduce the cost of achieving the goal. This paper presents the first cost-benefit analysis of this issue that takes account of IQ benefits. We find that the benefits of the mercury regulation are likely to fall short of the cost. This assessment is based on a number of assumptions that are highly uncertain. The finding of negative net benefits is robust to many, though not all, reasonable variations in the model assumptions. We also find that the emissions trading proposal is roughly $15 billion less expensive than the command-and-control proposal. Mr. Gayer is associate professor of public policy at Georgetown University and a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. Mr. Hahn is co-founder and executive director of the American Enterprise Institute-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies and a scholar at AEI. We would like to thank Mary Jo Krolewski, Leonard Levin, Joel Schwartz, Anne Smith, Nik Wada, and Chris Whipple for helpful comments and Jordan Connors, Laura Goodman and Molly Wells for valuable research assistance. The views expressed in this paper represent those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the institutions with which they are affiliated.     

Redistribution policy: A European model

Following the rationale for regional redistribution programs described in the official documents of the European Union, this paper studies a simple multicountry model built around two regions: a core and a periphery. Technological spillovers link firms' productivity within each of the two regions, and each country's territory falls partly in the core and partly in the periphery, but the exact shares vary across countries. In line with the official view of the European Union, we find that the efficient regional allocation requires both national and international transfers. If migration is fully free across all borders, the optimal redistribution policy results from countries' uncoordinated policies. However, if countries have the option of setting even imperfect border barriers, then efficiency is likely to require coordination on both barriers and international transfers (both of which will be set at positive levels). The need for coordination increases as the Union increases in size.     

Models in evolutionary economics and environmental policy: Towards an evolutionary environmental economics

In this paper we review evolutionary economic modelling in relation to environmental policy. We discuss three areas in which evolutionary economic models have a particularly high added value for environmental policy-making: the double externality problem, technological transitions and consumer demand. We explore the possibilities to apply evolutionary economic models in environmental policy assessment, including the opportunities for making policy-making endogenous to environmental innovation. We end with a critical discussion of the challenges that remain.     

Determinacy, stock market dynamics and monetary policy inertia

We study equilibrium determinacy in a New-Keynesian model where the Central Bank responds to asset prices growth. Unlike Taylor-type rules that react to asset prices, the proposed alternative does not harm dynamic stability and in certain cases promotes determinacy by inducing interest-rate inertia.