The relation between earnings management and financial statement fraud

This paper provides new evidence on the characteristics of firms that commit financial statement fraud. We examine how previous earnings management impacts the likelihood that a firm will commit financial statement fraud and in doing so develop three new fraud predictors. Using a sample of 54 fraud and 54 non-fraud firms, we find that fraud firms are more likely to have managed earnings in prior years and that earnings management in prior years is associated with a higher likelihood that firms that meet or beat analyst forecasts or that inflate revenue are committing fraud. We further find that fraud firms are more likely to meet or beat analyst forecasts and inflate revenue than non-fraud firms are even when there is no evidence of prior earnings management. This paper contributes to the fraud detection literature and the earnings management literature, and can help practitioners and regulators develop better fraud detection models.     

Is There a Link between Executive Equity Incentives and Accounting Fraud?

We compare executive equity incentives of firms accused of accounting fraud by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) during the period 1996–2003 with two samples of firms not accused of fraud. We measure equity incentives in a variety of ways and employ a battery of empirical tests. We find no consistent evidence that executive equity incentives are associated with fraud. These results stand in contrast to assertions by policy makers that incentives from stock‐based compensation and the resulting equity holdings increase the likelihood of accounting fraud.     

Corporate Bankruptcy and Managers' Self-Serving Behavior

We investigate whether insiders of bankrupt firms hold less stock or reduce their stockholdings compared to what we observed for insiders of similar firms that do not go bankrupt. We find little evidence of such time-series and cross-sectional differences in spite of the fact that the stock value of bankrupt firms falls by more than ninety percent in the five years preceding bankruptcy. One implication of our results is that the amount of stock owned and the magnitude of the trades undertaken by corporate insiders of both bankrupt and nonbankrupt firms appear to provide no information about firm value.     

When LIBOR becomes LIEBOR: Reputational penalties and bank contagion

We study whether commonality of incentives and opportunity to commit fraud trigger reputational contagion from culpable firms to nonculpable firms. Relying on a sample of 30 banks involved in fixing the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and a control sample of 30 banks, we find that banks' reputations suffered substantial damage upon the announcement of their involvement in the scandal. We also document reputational contagion spread from banks that manipulated LIBOR to banks that shared the same incentives and opportunity to commit the fraud. The reputational contagion is more pronounced for large derivatives dealers who have had the strongest incentive to commit the fraud.     

Managerial Incentives,Fraud, and Monitoring

In response to equity compensation contracts that encourage managers to commit fraud as well as provide productive effort, owners may choose to monitor the manager to limit the fraud. We examine the firm owners’ incentives to perform both ex ante monitoring, such as internal controls, and ex post monitoring, such as audits, in a model that includes the reputational damages caused when a fraud is discovered. We provide conditions under which the owner prefers either more or less monitoring, and examine the effect of additional monitoring on the optimal equity package and equilibrium level of fraud.     

有效预警上市公司违规的递延所得税异动指标和人工智能模型

2000-2017年,3434家A股上市公司样本中的47.79%至少有一次违规记录,每年平均有17%的公司违规,而监管机构平均需要2.7年查证并通告违规行为。我们用当年数据构建递延所得税异动指标,可有效预判违规,并发现监管机构未能识别这一指标的警示作用,实际激励了违规公司通过操纵递延所得税提高财务指标以规避稽查。进一步构建决策树模型,对违规事件实现样本外精准判别。本文揭示了A股公司大面积违规而稽查过程冗长迟缓这一重要现象,并分析了违规机制,指出了所得税数据在稽查违规中可以发挥的预警作用,为监管者和投资者提供有效预警上市公司违规行为的新指标和方法。     

有效预警上市公司违规的递延所得税异动指标和人工智能模型

2000-2017年,3434家A股上市公司样本中的47.79%至少有一次违规记录,每年平均有17%的公司违规,而监管机构平均需要2.7年查证并通告违规行为。我们用当年数据构建递延所得税异动指标,可有效预判违规,并发现监管机构未能识别这一指标的警示作用,实际激励了违规公司通过操纵递延所得税提高财务指标以规避稽查。进一步构建决策树模型,对违规事件实现样本外精准判别。本文揭示了A股公司大面积违规而稽查过程冗长迟缓这一重要现象,并分析了违规机制,指出了所得税数据在稽查违规中可以发挥的预警作用,为监管者和投资者提供有效预警上市公司违规行为的新指标和方法。     

Corporate Capital Structure,Agency Costs,and Ownership Control: The Case of All-Equity Firms

This paper provides evidence that all-equity firms exhibit greater levels of managerial stockholdings, more extensive family relationships among top management, and higher liquidity positions than a matched sample of levered firms. Further, top managers of all-equity firms with family involvement in corporate operations have greater control of corporate voting rights than managers of all-equity firms without family involvement. These findings are consistent with the interpretation that managerial control of voting rights and family relationships among senior managers are important factors in the decision to eliminate leverage.     

Corporate social responsibility and the wealth gains from dividend increases

This study examines whether corporate social responsibility (CSR) influences the stock price response to dividend increase announcements and changes in subsequent operating performance. We find that dividend increasing firms with lower CSR scores elicit higher abnormal announcement returns and greater improvements in industry‐adjusted operating performance. These findings support the argument in the literature that socially responsible firms are more transparent and commit to higher ethical standards than other firms, suggesting that they suffer fewer agency and informational problems (Kim, Park, & Wier, 2012). Consequently, larger dividend payouts reduce agency costs in firms with lower CSR commitments, thereby generating higher wealth gains for shareholders.     

Go before the whistle blows: an empirical analysis of director turnover and financial fraud

This study investigates whether outside directors are aware of financial fraud. Our analysis focuses on the abnormal turnover of these directors during the fraud committing period, before fraud is discovered and before lawsuits are filed. Our empirical analysis shows that, during the fraud committing period, outside directors in fraud firms exhibit an abnormal level of turnover. Examining the characteristics of outside directors and boards at these fraud firms, we find strong evidence that female directors, directors who have greater stock ownership in the firm, and directors with multiple directorships at other firms are more likely to depart fraud firms. We also find some evidence that board size, number of meetings, and fraction of financial experts are related to abnormal turnover in fraud firms during the fraud committing period. We show that abnormal director turnover is significantly higher for fraud that is considered more egregious (i.e., involving fictitious transactions and disclosure problems). Lastly, directors are more likely to depart fraud firms with more serious fraud, as proxied by higher ex-post settlement amounts and longer fraud duration.     

Tax Aggressiveness and Accounting Fraud

There are competing arguments and mixed prior evidence on whether firms that are aggressive in their financial reporting exhibit more or less tax aggressiveness. Our research contributes to resolving this issue by examining the association between aggressive tax reporting and the incidence of alleged accounting fraud. Relying on several proxies for tax aggressiveness to triangulate our evidence, we generally find that tax aggressive U.S. public firms are less likely to commit accounting fraud. However, we caution that our results are sensitive to how tax aggressiveness is measured. More specifically, four (two) of the five (three) proxies for firms’ effective tax rates (book‐tax differences) load positively (negatively) during the 1981–2001 period, implying that fraud firms are less tax aggressiveness. Our inferences persist when we isolate the 1995–2001 period in which accounting impropriety steeply rose and corporate tax compliance steeply fell. Moreover, we continue to find that tax aggressive firms are less apt to fraudulently manipulate their financial statements when we apply factor analysis to identify tax avoidance with a common factor extracted from the underlying proxies and match on propensity scores to ensure that the fraud and nonfraud samples have very similar nontax characteristics.     

Accountability of independent directors: Evidence from firms subject to securities litigation

We examine which independent directors are held accountable when investors sue firms for financial and disclosure-related fraud. Investors can name independent directors as defendants in lawsuits, and they can vote against their reelection to express displeasure over the directors’ ineffectiveness at monitoring managers. In a sample of securities class action lawsuits from 1996 to 2010, about 11% of independent directors are named as defendants. The likelihood of being named is greater for audit committee members and directors who sell stock during the class period. Named directors receive more negative recommendations from Institutional Shareholder Services, a proxy advisory firm, and significantly more negative votes from shareholders than directors in a benchmark sample. They are also more likely than other independent directors to leave sued firms. Overall, shareholders use litigation along with director elections and director retention to hold some independent directors more accountable than others when firms experience financial fraud.     

Fraud commitment in a smaller world: Evidence from a natural experiment

This study examines the effect of proximity on corporate fraud commitment using the introduction of high-speed rail (HSR) as an exogenous shock to travel time. We find that firms commit less corporate fraud after the introduction of an HSR route. A dynamic difference-in-differences (DiD) analysis shows that the effect of HSR introduction on fraud only occurs after the HSR route is launched, supporting the parallel trends assumption and confirming the causal relationship. Further analysis shows that the negative impact of HSR introduction on corporate fraud is more pronounced for firms that have higher information asymmetry or weaker monitoring mechanisms in the pre-HSR period. In addition, we find that HSR introduction increases corporate site visits by external monitors and that visits significantly reduce corporate misbehavior. Overall, our findings suggest that HSR introduction increases proximity and thereby reduces the information acquisition costs for outside monitors. As a result, outside monitors are in a better position to oversee firms, leading to decreased fraud commitment.     

Cooking the books: Recipes and costs of falsified financial statements in China

We examine the causes and consequences of falsified financial statements in China. Using bivariate probit regression analysis, we find that firms with high debt and that plan to make equity issues are more likely to manipulate their earnings and thus have to restate their financial reports in subsequent years. We also find that corporate governance structures have an effect on the occurrence and detection of financial fraud. There are significant negative consequences to fraudulent financial statements. Restating firms suffer negative abnormal stock returns, increases in their cost of capital, wider bid-ask spreads, a greater frequency of modified audit opinions, and greater CEO turnover. We also find that firms located in highly developed regions suffer more severe consequences when they manipulate their accounts.     

Required CEO stock ownership: Consequences for risk-taking and compensation

In response to corporate governance concerns, SEC disclosure rules, and pressure from Institutional Shareholder Services, most large U.S. public firms have adopted executive stock ownership requirements (‘SORs’) in recent years. Compared to CEOs already in compliance, CEOs who have not yet fulfilled the requirement at adoption subsequently increase stockholdings, exposing themselves to more company-specific risk, potentially providing risk-reduction incentives and diminishing their subjective valuation of firm equity. We find that these CEOs on average subsequently reduce firm risk through diversifying M&A, less financial leverage, and smaller R&D investment. They experience a deterioration in firm performance and valuation, each associated with firms that do reduce risk, but receive significantly increased stock grants. Our evidence suggests that boards should exercise judgment when adopting this popular governance initiative.     

Booms, Busts, and Fraud

Firms sometimes commit fraud by altering publicly reported informationto be more favorable, and investors can monitor firms to obtainmore accurate information. We study equilibrium fraud and monitoringdecisions. Fraud is most likely to occur in relatively goodtimes, and the link between fraud and good times becomes strongeras monitoring costs decrease. Nevertheless, improving businessconditions may sometimes diminish fraud. We provide an explanationfor why fraud peaks towards the end of a boom and is then revealedin the ensuing bust. We also show that fraud can increase iffirms make more information available to the public.     

Corporate Scandals and Household Stock Market Participation

We show that, after the revelation of corporate fraud in a state, household stock market participation in that state decreases. Households decrease holdings in fraudulent as well as nonfraudulent firms, even if they do not hold stocks in fraudulent firms. Within a state, households with more lifetime experience of corporate fraud hold less equity. Following the exogenous increase in fraud revelation due to Arthur Andersen's demise, states with more Arthur Andersen clients experience a larger decrease in stock market participation. We provide evidence that the documented effect is likely to reflect a loss of trust in the stock market.     

Option Expensing and Managerial Equity Incentives

We examine the impact of mandatory option expensing on managerial equity incentives. Though effective only after June 15, 2005, there is evidence that U.S. firms begin preparing for option expensing as early as 2002 by making changes to their equity incentive plans. We find that (1) CEO option incentives exhibit a sharp reversal during the period 1993-2005, with the median CEO option incentives increasing 25% a year before 2002 but declining 17% a year after 2001; (2) the reduction in option incentives after 2001 is larger for firms that use excessive levels of equity incentives prior to 2002; (3) firms make similar reductions to options granted to CEOs, other top executives and lower-level employees; (4) CEO stock incentives increase throughout the entire 13-year period, rising at an even greater rate after 2001; and (5) the increase in stock incentives after 2001 is far from offsetting the corresponding decrease in option incentives. These findings are robust to controls for firm and CEO characteristics and for concurrent regulatory, business and market events such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the option backdating scandal, and the 2000 stock market crash. We also provide a theoretical explanation for the documented changes in option incentives.     

Executive Option Repricing, Incentives, and Retention

While many firms grant executive stock options that can be repriced, other firms systematically restrict or prohibit repricing. This article investigates the determinants of firms' repricing policies and the consequences of such policies for executive turnover and retention. Firms that have better internal governance, that use more powerful stock-based incentives, or that face less shareholder scrutiny are more likely to maintain repricing flexibility. Firms that restrict repricing are more vulnerable to voluntary executive turnover following stock price declines. When share price declines are severe, restricting firms appear to award unusually large numbers of new options.     

Characteristics Associated with the Corporate Decision to Adopt Long‐term Performance Plans

This study investigates why firms adopt long‐term performance plans. The results provide evidence that firms that adopt long‐term performance plans have higher risk as measured by Beta, have lower percentages of managerial stockholdings, have higher levels of investment in research and development expenditures two years prior to adoption of a long‐term performance plan, and experience increases in the ratio of debt to total assets in the two year period prior to long‐term performance plan adoption. Also, firms increase their investments in research and development and capital expenditures following adoption of long‐term performance plans.