Emission tax and optimal privatization in Cournot–Bertrand comparison

We compare a Cournot with a Bertrand duopoly in a differentiated mixed market when both emission tax and privatization policies are used together. We find that the optimal emission tax is always lower than the marginal environmental damage, and it is always lower under Cournot than under Bertrand. We also find that the optimal privatization is always a partial privatization, and it is always higher under Cournot than under Bertrand. The socially optimal combinations of emission tax and privatization will damage the environment most, but Cournot yields lower environmental damage and social welfare than those under Bertrand. Finally, we show that the environmental damage is non-monotone in the level of privatization under both Cournot and Bertrand competitions.     

Dynamic properties of a Cournot–Bertrand duopoly game with differentiated products

In this paper we consider a Cournot–Bertrand duopoly model with linear demand and cost functions and with product differentiation. We propose a dynamic framework for the study of the stability properties of this kind of mixed oligopoly game, a rather neglected topic in the existing literature despite its relevance. In particular, in this paper we highlight the role of best response dynamics and of an adaptive adjustment mechanism for the stability of the equilibrium.     

‘Just one of us’: consumers playing oligopoly in mixed markets

Consumer cooperatives represent a highly successful example of democratic form of enterprises operating in developed countries. They are usually medium to large-scale companies competing with the profit-maximizing firms in the retail sector. This paper describes this situation as a mixed oligopoly in which consumer cooperatives maximize the utility of consumer-members and, in return, refund them with a share of the profits corresponding to the ratio of their individual spending to the cooperative’s total sales. We show that when consumers possess quasi-linear preferences over a bundle of symmetrically differentiated goods, and companies operate using a linear technology, the presence of consumer cooperatives positively affects total industry output, as well as welfare. The effect of cooperatives on welfare proves to be even more significant when goods are either complements or highly differentiated, and when competition is à la Cournot rather than à la Bertrand.     

“A profit table or a profit calculator?” A note on the design of Cournot oligopoly experiments

We report on an experiment conducted to evaluate the effects of varying the way in which market information is presented to participants in laboratory Cournot duopolies. We find that the most standard variations, which are the use of a profit table or a profit calculator, yield indistinguishable performance. However, the addition of a best-response option to the profit calculator tends to increase aggregate output to the Cournot level and decrease the incidence of tacit collusion.     

Does timing of decisions in a mixed duopoly matter?

We determine the endogenous order of moves in a mixed price-setting duopoly. In contrast to the existing literature on mixed oligopolies we establish the payoff equivalence of the games with an exogenously given order of moves if the most plausible equilibrium is realized in the market. Hence, in this case it does not matter whether one becomes a leader or a follower. We also establish that replacing a private firm by a public firm in the standard Bertrand?CEdgeworth game with capacity constraints increases social welfare and that a pure-strategy equilibrium always exists.     

Locally consistent oligopolistic equilibria are Cournot–Walras equilibria

A kth-order locally consistent equilibrium is an imperfectly competitive general equilibrium point at which firms only perceive at kth-order Taylor expansion of their true demand curves. It is shown that the set of kth-order locally consistent equilibrium strategies coincides with the set of Cournot–Walras equilibria as soon as k >1, under simple regularity conditions.     

Chinese banking system： Peculiarities in a comparison with Italian case

The analysis of principal data on Chinese banks highlights how they are exposed to credit risk, primarily generated from loans to public companies. Chinese banks have a good capital provision; The analysis of economic data describes a system oriented towards relationship lending; The average profitability per employee shows wide margins of improvement in terms of efficiency and technological equipment. The comparison with the case of Italy, which like China can be considered an economy heavily oriented to banking intermediation, it is useful to highlight some peculiarities of the Chinese banking system.     

Trade flows in a spatial oligopoly: gravity fits well,but what does it explain?

Abstract .  Large distance and border effects on trade flows in some industries may result from the collusive division of geographic markets. In the Brazilian cement industry, traditional gravity equations fit the data well, yet limited regional flows are due to firms' strategic behaviour. Thanks to a unique institutional setting and an unusually rich data set, I directly control for trade costs, which – despite their importance – cannot account for the observed segmentation of local markets at current prices. The paper highlights how collusive behaviour can magnify the effects of distance, as firms use geography to coordinate on higher prices and less cross-hauling.     

The growth–distribution nexus in a mixed regime of education with a status motive: On the macroeconomics of the welfare state

We develop a growth model with human capital accumulation to study the effects of status-driven motivation on individuals' choice between public or private education. This choice interacts with and exacerbates the effects of status, with implications for growth and distribution. More motivated individuals work harder and choose private education. In a majority voting/median voter setup, individuals choose a public education size for which there is no trade-off between long-term growth and inequality. We also highlight the conflict of interest between individuals with respect to the size of the public education sector and the tax rate that supports it. We thus highlight important interactions between the macroeconomy, social attitudes and educational institutions and derive results of interest in a variety contexts. We end by drawing policy conclusions among which, the idea that in democracies, higher growth and lower inequality are mutually compatible when the government promotes public education.     

Cyclical growth in a Goodwin–Kalecki–Marx model

This paper presents a disequilibrium macrodynamic model that incorporates certain elements from Goodwin (the dynamics of the rate of employment and income distribution), Kalecki (an investment function independent of savings, and mark-up pricing in oligopolistic goods markets), and Marx (the reserve-army and reserve-army-creation effects). The model has a system of differential equations for the rate of utilization, profit share, and rate of employment. We show that there exist limit cycles that depend on the sizes of the reserve-army effect and reserve-army-creation effect. This implies that there exists a situation in which the economy experiences endogenous and perpetual growth cycles. Moreover, we show that if the stable long-run equilibrium corresponds to the profit-led growth regime, an increase in the bargaining power of workers increases the rate of unemployment; conversely, if the equilibrium corresponds to the wage-led growth-regime, an increase in the bargaining power of workers decreases the rate of unemployment.     

Markups in the Euro area and the US over the period 1981–2004: a comparison of 50 sectors

This article provides estimates of price–marginal cost ratios or mark-ups for 50 sectors in eight Euro area countries and the US over the period 1981–2004. The estimates are obtained applying the methodology developed by Roger (J Polit Econ 103:316–330, 1995) on the EU KLEMS March 2007 database. Five stylized facts are derived. First, perfect competition can be rejected for almost all sectors in all countries; markup ratios are generally larger than 1. Second, average markups are heterogeneous across countries. Third, markups are heterogeneous across sectors, with services having higher markups on average than manufacturing. Fourth, services sectors generally have higher markups in the euro area than the US, whereas the pattern for manufacturing is the reverse. Fifth, there is no evidence that there is a broad range change in markups from the 1980s to the 1990s.     

How does a mixed ownership firm license a patent?

This paper demonstrates that a cost disadvantaged innovator increasingly relies on licensing with a fixed fee as its public ownership share grows. Moreover, when the innovation is drastic, a cost disadvantaged innovator frequently licenses by fixed fee when it has a public share even as a fully private firm will never use a fixed fee. As the fixed fee improves welfare, these results suggest that the licensing method of a partial public firm helps correct the market failure of imperfect competition.     

Hospital utilization in mixed public–private system: evidence from Australian hospital data

This article investigates whether patients who used a mixture of private and public hospital care have higher total hospital utilization than those who exclusively used either public or private hospital care. Using Australian hospital administrative data of heart disease patients, we found that those who used a mixture of private and public care had the highest total hospital utilization. Our findings are robust to how utilization is measured and endogeneity between utilization and hospital type choice.     

Explicit vs. tacit collusion—The impact of communication in oligopoly experiments

We explore the difference between explicit and tacit collusion by investigating the impact communication has in experimental markets. For Bertrand oligopolies with various numbers of firms, we compare pricing behavior with and without the possibility to communicate among firms. We find strong evidence that talking helps to obtain higher profits for any number of firms, however, the gain from communicating is non-monotonic in the number of firms, with medium-sized industries having the largest additional profit from talking. We also find that industries continue to collude successfully after communication is disabled. Communication supports firms in coordinating on collusive pricing schemes, and it is also used for conflict mediation.     

Economies of scale in school operation–a reply

In addition to pointing out that Kumar (1983) omits Hough (1981) and Knight (1983) from its list of reference, Hough (1983) raises two issues of largely statistical nature. ^{1 1} Omissions are clearly inadvertant. The time lag between publication and the general availability makes ther reference list look more subjective than it actually is. These are:

1. the use of an average (AC) rather than a total (TC) cost curve as the correct statistical device for examining economies of scale, and

2. estimation problems arising from possible heteroscedasticity of the error term in the estimating relation.

Exactly the same issues are also raised in Hough (1981). Notwithstanding our earlier disclaimer (p. 324) that ‘no new grounds are broken on the methodological front’ as well as a clear mention of both problems (Footnotes 1 and 2), Hough is quite correct that the implications of these issues for our results were not spelled out. We take this opportunity to offer some clarifications with respect to the results in Kumar (1983).     

Disinflationary boom in a price–wage spiral model

This paper analyses the impact of the disinflation policy timing on the sign and the magnitude of the sacrifice ratio in a modified price and wage staggered model of Blanchard (1986). When wages are updated every four quarters and prices every two quarters, we show that a “cold-turkey” disinflation is associated to an output boom when the policy is implemented during the last period of life of the wage contract and a recession in the other quarters.     

Measuring altruism in a public goods experiment: a comparison of U.S. and Czech subjects

This paper compares contributions to an experimental public good across the United States and Czech Republic, using a design that allows us to distinguish between altruism and decision error. Czech subjects contribute significantly more than American subjects, and further analysis reveals that this result cannot be attributed to the confounding effects of gender or decision error. Instead, preferences for altruism appear to differ across groups: Czechs are more altruistic than Americans and men are more altruistic than women.     

Income–happiness paradox in Australia: Testing the theories of adaptation and social comparison

This paper investigates whether the theories of adaptation and social comparison can explain the income–happiness puzzle (Easterlin Paradox) in Australia. Alternative specifications of happiness model that incorporate adaption, comparison incomes and other relevant variables are estimated using the panel data from the five waves (2001–2005) of the Household Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) surveys. The statistical tests provide no support for the adaptation effect on happiness. However, we find strong support for the theory of social comparison as an explanation for the happiness paradox. An increase in peer group income hurts the poor more than the rich, suggesting that a redistribution of income is likely to enhance the overall wellbeing of society. A sensitivity analysis is conducted to check the robustness of results.