Externalities, expectations, and growth

Summary. The paper studies a model of accumulation and growth where a continuum of heterogeneous firms play dynamically optimal strategies along a (rational expectations) equilibrium. The key feature of the model is that firms' technological decisions are assumed subject to both friction and external effects. This gives rise to a wide multiplicity of equilibrium behavior, any path of sustained growth requiring that the economy tackle a never-ending chain of fresh coordination problems. This setup is modelled as a (non-atomic) dynamic game, suitable conditions being provided that partially characterize when sustained growth is a possible (never the unique) equilibrium outcome. Received: May 25, 1995; revised version: March 25, 1998     

NATURAL DISASTERS,DAMAGE TO BANKS,AND FIRM INVESTMENT

This article investigates the effect of banks’ lending capacity on firms’ investment. To identify exogenous shocks to loan supply, we utilize the natural experiment provided by Japan's Great Hanshin‐Awaji earthquake in 1995. Using a unique data set that allows us to identify firms and banks in the earthquake‐affected areas, we find that the investment ratio of firms located outside the earthquake‐affected areas but having a main bank inside the areas was significantly smaller than that of firms located outside the areas and having a main bank outside the areas. Our findings suggest that loan supply shocks affect firm investment.     

Ecosystems,externalities, and economies

This paper incorporates an ecosystem model into a model of a simple economy. The decisionmaking agents in the ecosystem are individual organisms aggregated to the species level. A species may provide utility directly to humans, or it may provide utility indirectly because it is used either as a raw material in goods fabrication or as sustenance for other species. We describe a comparative static equilibrium of the ecosystem where species' demands for other species are equal to the supplies of those other species, and energy is conserved. The ecosystem is then embedded in the economy so that the effects of human intervention can be traced through both the ecosystem and the economy. Human intervention creates ecosystem externalities such that ecosystem equilibria are shifted and the new equilibria affect the utility or the production processes of other humans. This framework allows us to describe in principle which ecosystem services can be efficiently usurped by humans, which waste flows can be efficiently allowed into ecosystems, and which ecosystem organisms and physical attributes can be efficiently maintained.     

Government size, composition, volatility and economic growth

This paper analyses the effects in terms of size and volatility of government revenue and spending on growth in OECD and EU countries. The results of the paper suggest that both variables are detrimental to growth. In particular, looking more closely at the effect of each component of government revenue and spending, the results point out that i) indirect taxes (size and volatility); ii) social contributions (size and volatility); iii) government consumption (size and volatility); iv) subsidies (size); and v) government investment (volatility) have a sizeable, negative and statistically significant effect on growth.     

The social cost problem,rights, and the (non)empty core

We revisit the “Coase theorem” through the lens of a cooperative game model which takes into account the assignment of rights among agents involved in a problem of social cost. We consider the case where one polluter interacts with many potential victims. Given an assignment or a mapping of rights, we represent a social cost problem by a cooperative game. A solution consists in a payoff vector. We introduce three properties for a mapping of rights. First, core compatibility indicates that the core of the associated cooperative games is nonempty. Second, Kaldor‐Hicks core compatibility indicates that there is a payoff vector in the core where victims are fully compensated for the damage once the negotiations are completed. Third, no veto power for a victim says that no victim has the power to veto an agreement signed by the rest of the society. We then demonstrate two main results. First, core compatibility is satisfied if and only if the rights are assigned either to the polluter or to the entire set of victims. Second, there is no mapping of rights satisfying Kaldor‐Hicks core compatibility and no veto power for a victim.     

Communication, Risk, and Efficiency in Games

This paper uses curb sets to study the evolution of effective pre-play communication in games where a single communication round precedes a simultaneous-move, complete-information game. It is shown that the effectiveness of one-sided pre-play communication is inversely related to risk in the underlying game, and to the size of the message space. If messages have somea prioriinformation content, then multi-sided communication is more effective than one-sided communication; i.e., risk and the size of the message space play no role.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C72.     

Capitalism Unleashed: Finance,Globalization, and Welfare

Andrew Glyn, who died from a brain tumour in December 2007, aged 64, had been a key figure in socialist political economy since the 1970s. His seminal book with Bob Sutcliffe, British Capitalism, Workers and the Profits Squeeze, published in 1972, inspired a generation of political economists. It offered an arresting empirical analysis of the predicament of British capitalism, and occasioned a fierce and wide-ranging debate among socialist economists over its empirical accuracy, its theoretical approach and its political implications. It was one of the first and most important expressions of Ricardian Marxism in the 1970s, emphasising the importance of distributional struggles for the future economic and political development of capitalism.

He was actively engaged in politics and he was always ready to put his intellectual skills to practical use, as during the British miners' strike in 1984–5, when he provided a detailed critical analysis of the economic case being advanced by the employers and the Government against the union. At the same time he sought to understand the trends that were shaping the development of capitalism, and wrote two very influential books, Capitalism Since World War II: the Making and Breakup of the Great Boom (1984, with Philip Armstrong and John Harrison), and Capital Unleashed (2006), his analysis of the recent neoliberal phase of capitalist development.

He will be remembered for his skills as a teacher, his humane and tolerant approach to intellectual debate, and his lasting contributions to our understanding of contemporary capitalism.     

TRAINING,TURNOVER, AND SEARCH*

This article explores a model of firm‐specific training in a job search environment with labor turnover. The main substantive finding is a positive association between training and wages (when dispersed). The article then precisely characterizes how both wage dispersion and firm profitability depend on the flow value b≥ 0 of workers' unmatched time. It is shown that: (i) for all high values b, no equilibrium exists; (ii) for intermediate values b, multiple equilibria arise, where firms earn zero profits, and choose from a general wage distribution; (iii) for all lower values b, there is a unique equilibrium, with firms earning positive profits, and choosing from an atomless set of wages.     

Economic Performance, Trade Restrictiveness, and Efficiency

The paper addresses the question of whether trade restrictiveness impacts economic performance, via a trade restrictiveness index that is decomposable into a trade distortion and a domestic distortion component. The paper builds on the Anderson and Neary price index measure of trade distortion, in evaluating trade restrictiveness via a distance function approach. This is accomplished by adding a “dual” version to their trade restrictiveness price index, based on distance functions that scale output quantities. The authors compute the trade restrictiveness quantity index (TRQI) using a parametric frontier approach to model the production side of the economy, and a panel of information on the agricultural sector of a set of European Community countries. The results suggest that the use of TRQI makes a considerable difference to interpretations of the efficiency impact of agricultural trade policies in EC countries, as compared to policy‐oriented aggregates or result‐oriented measures of trade restrictiveness.     

Higher Education in the United States: Laissez-Faire,Differentiation, and Research

The U.S. higher education system stands out in three dimensions. First, it has the highest number of leading research universities. Second, it displays significant differentiation: multiple types of institutions offer services that differ in cost, prestige, etc. Third, it has a laissez-faire/free-market orientation: private and public entities are free to open schools and compete; essentially all schools enjoy substantial autonomy. This paper makes the case that these features are systematically related. The development of the American higher education market—which allowed market forces to operate and lacked centralized planning—contributed to the emergence of differentiation and a set of leading research universities.     

Tobin's q, investment, and the endogenous adjustment of financial structure

Should q theory be modified to take account of financial structure? This paper analyzes a general equilibrium q model where financial structure affects firm value. Agency costs and taxes combine to yield an interior solution for the endogenous debt–equity ratio. Although q is still a ‘sufficient statistic’ for investment, the endogenous adjustment of financial structure alters the relation between the interest rate and investment. In this model an increase in the corporate tax rate could either raise or lower the steady-state capital stock. Furthermore, both q and investment could jump in opposite directions to that of their steady-state values.     

Dutch Disease,factor mobility,and the Alberta Effect: the case of federations

Do reduced costs of factor mobility mitigate Dutch Disease effects to the extent that they are reversed? The case of federations provides an indication they do. We observe resource blessing (curse) effects at the provincial (federal) level, and argue the difference in outcomes stems from the difference in factor mobility costs. We construct a simple tax competition model which shows that if factor mobility costs are sufficiently low, a resource‐boom triggers an Alberta Effect that mitigates, and possibly reverses, Dutch Disease symptoms. The paper concludes with empirical evidence for the main implications of the model.     

Ranking Committees,Income Streams or Multisets

Multisets are collections of objects which may include several copies of the same object. They may represent bundles of goods, committees formed of members of several political parties, or income streams. In this paper we investigate the ways in which a linear order on a finite set A can be consistently extended to an order on the set of all multisets on A of some given cardinality k and when such an extension arises from a utility function on A. The condition of consistency that we introduce is a close relative of the de Finetti’s condition that defines comparative probability orders. We prove that, when A has three elements, any consistent linear order on multisets on A of cardinality k arises from a utility function and all such orders can be characterised by means of Farey fractions. This is not true when A has cardinality four or greater. It is proved that, unlike linear orders that can be represented by a utility function, any non-representable order on the set of all multisets of cardinality k cannot be extended to a consistent linear order on multisets of cardinality K for sufficiently large K. We also discuss the concept of risk aversion arising in this context.A significant part of this work was written when both authors were visiting professors at Bilkent University, Ankara. Slinko thanks Semih Koray and Mefharet Kocatepe for making this possible and Serguei Stepanov for discussion about Farey fractions. Sertel thanks the Institut des Hautes Etudes Scientifiques (IHES), Bures-sur-Yvette, France, for a couple of invitations, in 1999 and 2000, during which he had a chance to elaborate on some of the questions addressed in this paper. The authors thank students of The University of Auckland Irene Peng and Mark Lui who participated at an early stage of this project and Marston Conder for checking the result of Theorem 6 with MAGMA and correcting it. Murat Sertel was deceased (1942 – 2003).An erratum to this article is available at .     

In search of an evolutionary edge: trading with a few, more, or many

Consider a population of farmers who live around a lake. Each farmer engages in trade with his m adjacent neighbors, where m is termed the “span of interaction.” Trade is governed by a prisoner’s dilemma “rule of engagement.” A farmer’s payoff is the sum of the payoffs from the m prisoner’s dilemma games played with his ^m/₂^m/_2 neighbors to the left, and with his ^m/₂^m/_2 neighbors to the right. When a farmer dies, his son takes over. The son who adheres to his father’s span of interaction decides whether to cooperate or defect by considering the actions taken and the payoffs received by the most prosperous member of the group comprising his father and his father’s m trading partners. Under a conventional structure of payoffs, it is shown that a large span of interaction is detrimental to the long-run coexistence of cooperation and defection, and conditions are provided under which the social outcome associated with the expansion of trade when individuals trade with a few is better than that when they trade with many. Under the stipulated conditions it is shown, by means of a static comparative analysis of the steady state configurations of the farmer population, that an expansion of the market can be beneficial in one context, detrimental in another.     

Creative capital,information and communication technologies,and economic growth in smart cities

ABSTRACT

We study aspects of economic growth in a stylized smart city with two distinct features. First, the modeled inhabitants of this city are smart because they possess skills. Using the language of Richard Florida, these inhabitants comprise the city’s creative class and hence they possess creative capital. Second, the city is smart because it uses information and communication technologies (ICTs) and we model one specific kind of ICT use. In this setting, we first derive expressions for three growth related metrics. Second, we use these metrics to show that the economy of smart city A converges to a balanced growth path (BGP). Third, we compute the growth rate of output per effective creative capital unit on this BGP. Fourth, we study how heterogeneity in initial conditions affects outcomes on the BGP by introducing a second smart city B into the analysis. At time t?=?0 two key savings rates in city A are twice as large as in city B. We compute the ratio of the BGP value of income per effective creative capital unit in city A to its value in city B. Finally, we compute the ratio of the BGP value of skills per effective creative capital unit in city A to its value in city B.     

Birth,Death, and Consumption: Overlapping Generations and the Random Walk Hypothesis

This paper studies the time-series behavior of consumption in a model that incorporates birth, death, and a precautionary motive for saving. Consumption of an individual agent is a random walk. However, aggregate consumption is a random walk if and only if the sum of the death rate and population growth rate is zero. Failure of the random walk hypothesis should not be attributed to finite horizons perse, but rather to inter-generational transfers caused by birth and death. Unlike certainty-equivalent models, the expected growth of consumption depends on financial wealth, rather than wage income or human capital. [D91, E21]     

Human Fallibility, Complementarity, and Fiscal Decentralization

This paper examines economic growth properties under alternative fiscal organizations when a bureau's decisions are fallible. A country consists of J jurisdictions, which need a public service. In a centralized government, one authority decides on services in every jurisdiction. In a decentralized government, J authorities are in charge of each public service. An authority can have high ability or low ability, and an authority with high ability draws a good project with higher probability. We first show that the decentralized government provides the same average quality of public services, with lower variance, than does the centralized government. We then apply this result to an economic growth model where the value of the Solow residual is a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function of public services. We show that there is a critical value of the degree of complementarity below which fiscal decentralization is more desirable than fiscal centralization for an expected economic growth, and the decentralized government has a lower variance of GDP growth.     

Hayek,Mach, and the re-ordering of mind

This paper argues that Friedrich A. v. Hayek's theory of mind and the relation between mental and physical events, most systematically presented in his 1952 book, The Sensory Order, is indebted to Ernst Mach's theory, and, in particular, to his Analysis of Sensations, above and beyond what Hayek himself along with multiple admirers of his work ever cared to admit. By highlighting a number of important similarities between Mach's and Hayek's theories of the psychical/phenomenal and physical world/order, the paper aims to show that key aspects of Hayek's theory of mind can be traced to Mach's theoretical foundations. The paper further argues that some of the criticisms Hayek levels against Mach concern nonessential points, arise from the uncritical acceptance of common misinterpretations of Mach's theory, or are plainly wrong.     

Trust in triads: effects of exit, control, and learning

This paper provides theoretical background for some effects of social networks on trust. We study the implications of a model with rational actors in two settings with three actors. In the first setting, there are two trustees who are involved in transactions with one truster implying that the truster has an exit option. In the second setting, two trusters play with one trustee, which gives the trusters options for voice, i.e., complaining and informing each other about the trustee's behavior. We compare these models with a baseline model in which there is only one truster and one trustee. It turns out that the opportunities for placing and honoring trust do not change for the exit model compared to the baseline model. The opportunities for trust in the voice model differ from the baseline model only if both trusters inform each other at a rate that is high enough. Only if the possibilities for receiving information and transmitting information are large enough for both trusters, trust will increase due to the information exchange possibilities in the voice model.     

TAXES,HEALTH INSURANCE,AND WOMEN'S SELF‐EMPLOYMENT

I examine whether the availability of health coverage through the spouse's health plan influences a married woman's decision to become self‐employed. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) introduced a tax subsidy for the self‐employed to purchase their own health insurance. I test whether this “natural” experiment induced more women without spousal health insurance coverage to select into self‐employment. The most conservative difference‐in‐difference estimates based on an analysis of employed women indicate that the incidence of self‐employment among single women rose by 10% in the post‐TRA86 period, while a multinomial specification based on a sample of both employed and nonemployed women suggests that the increase was about 13%. (JEL J0, J3, I1)