资本监管、银行信贷与货币政策非对称效应

本文通过对在单一约束的商业银行利润函数中植入监管当局惩罚函数的静态理论模型的分析得出：监管当局以提高资本充足率为核心的监管行为不仅有效地影响了商业银行的信贷行为和风险意识,而且强化了“逆风向行事”的货币政策的非对称效应,接着本文对我国1998年以来经历的两次经济波动进行了实证分析,其结论是：1998年以来,监管当局对商业银行以降低坏账率、提高资本充足率为核心的监管行为强化了我国货币政策非对称效应。     

资本监管、货币政策与商业银行效率非对称效应——基于面板门限回归模型的再检验

鉴于资本监管、货币政策对商业银行效率的重要影响,本文在Li和Wang(2012)的基础上从理论上详细论证了坏账率、资本充足率和准备金率影响商业银行效率的内生机制,并得出研究命题:坏账率与商业银行成本效率、利润效率存在着负相关关系;资本充足率、准备金率与商业银行成本效率、利润效率存在着非线性关系和非对称效应。根据上述研究命题,利用商业银行1998-2010年我国14家商业银行相关数据计算出了商业银行的成本效率、利润效率,证实了准备金率、资本充足率与商业银行的成本效率、利润效率呈非线性关系以及商业银行效率的非对称效应。上述研究事实表明:过分强调资本监管和货币政策对于商业银行绩效的改善是不合适的,其虽然能够有效地控制风险,但同时也会带来"利润创造能力"的减弱。因此,合理的资本监管和货币政策才是提高商业银行效率的明智之举。     

商业银行流动性创造与资本充足率关系研究——来自中国银行业的经验证据

文章基于1998-2012年我国113家商业银行的微观数据,采用联立方程模型实证检验了银行流动性创造与资本充足率之间的关系。研究结果表明:(1)资本充足率对流动性创造的影响在不同类型的银行中存在显著差异。对于大型国有银行,资本充足率对流动性创造的影响不显著;而对于全国性股份制银行和地方性商业银行,提高资本充足率会使流动性创造水平降低,这验证了"金融脆弱-挤压假说"。(2)流动性创造对资本充足率的影响在三类银行中均显著为负,即银行的流动性创造越大,其面临的流动性风险越高,但银行并没有相应地提高资本充足率。文章的结论为我国银行业监管当局制定合理的资本与流动性监管政策以及促进商业银行自身加强资本与流动性管理提供了重要的参考。     

KCC—LM模型：货币政策非对称效应分析的新框架——1997～2006年我国货币政策操作的实证和制度分析

本文在Bernanke—Blinder（1988）的CC—LM模型中纳入含资本监管约束和信贷配给因素的银行最优贷款供给方程,从银行贷款渠道的视角重构了用以分析货币政策非对称效应的分析框架,即KCC—LM模型,并利用我国1997～2006年货币政策的操作实践验证了KCC—LM模型在我国的适用性,最后从我国金融制度演进过程中出现的金融控制力目标与金融稳定性目标的对立统一的角度进一步阐释了资本监管强化的货币政策非对称效应的内在机理,也揭示了我国1998年以来稳健性货币政策的真正内涵。     

资本监管对商业银行信贷行为的影响研究

本文采用1998—2012年我国上市银行的年度面板数据,就资本约束对商业银行信贷行为的影响进行了分析。结果表明,在监管当局的最低资本要求约束下,银行普遍存在着紧缩信贷规模的倾向,资本充足率水平对银行贷款行为产生显著影响;这一影响存在滞后效应,且这一影响在2004年前后存在显著差异,2004年以后资本充足率对贷款增长率的影响小于2004年以前;大银行的资本充足率对贷款增长率的影响强于小银行,但这一差异在统计上不显著。     

中国货币政策和资本监管的协同作用——基于银行业的理论和实证分析

我国货币政策和资本监管是相对独立的两个体系,有必要讨论二者在维护宏观经济和金融稳定上的配合问题,而这个问题在后危机时代尤为重要。本文通过一个简单的信贷模型分析了货币政策和资本监管协同作用的微观基础,并用1998—2012年我国商业银行的数据进行实证检验,发现:我国严格执行资本监管之后,对信贷的扩张确实有制约作用,而且对货币政策的传导有显著影响;资本越充足的银行信贷规模扩张越快,资本充足率低于监管要求(8%)的商业银行即使在扩张性货币政策下也放缓信贷增速。这意味着货币政策和资本监管联合操作的微观机制是存在的,在逆周期调控和控制金融风险上应充分发挥二者的协同作用。     

资本监管、股权结构与银行核心资本调整——基于我国152家商业银行的面板数据分析

"中国版Basel III"的实施重新确立了普通股在资本监管中的主导地位。本文着眼于银行的权益资本融资,通过我国152家商业银行2001—2012年的年度非平衡面板数据,研究银行核心资本调整行为的特征及股权结构对其产生的影响,寻求未来资本监管机制的对策。研究结果显示,我国商业银行存在目标核心资本比率,当现实核心资本比率偏离目标水平时,向上调整的速度总是低于向下调整的速度,呈现明显的非对称性。民营控股或高度集中的股权结构会进一步强化这种非对称性,而中央政府控股或地方政府控股的股权结构则会弱化该特征。最后,本文从政府控制和银行内部治理的视角为监管当局在Basel III的框架下分阶段、分内容、分个体地实施差异化资本监管提出了政策建议。     

银行资本监管与货币政策非对称效应研究

本文基于全球危机背景,将银行贷款的自由度减小因素、监管当局对银行监管约束而产生的隐性成本因素及政治家因素等三类影响因素纳入单一约束的商业银行利润目标函数中,通过引入政治家因素的概念、简单的数学推导以及对银行利润函数和银行数量的数值模拟,得出了政治家因素具有强化货币政策的非对称效应的作用。最后本文又在前文研究的基础上提出了一些相关政策建议。     

银行资本监管作为逆周期调节工具的经济学解释——基于逆周期“资本缓冲”功能的视角

2008年全球金融危机发生以后,如何通过资本充足率监管缓释银行信贷行为的亲周期效应、增强银行业在经济周期波动中的稳健性成为理论界和学术界高度关注的议题。本文对宏观经济波动下银行资本缓冲的调整行为进行了理论分析．并采用1998～2011年全球100个国家1708家商业银行年度非平衡面板数据．对理论假说进行了实证检验。研究结果表明：第一,商业银行不具备逆周期调节资本缓冲的行为特征．其资本缓冲与宏观经济波动呈现负向变动关系;第二,银行资产风险承担水平在经济上行（下行）周期的提高（降低）,是造成资本缓冲呈现亲周期特征的主要原因;第三,商业银行所处地区的经济发达程度、自身的微观特征会显著影响资本缓冲的周期性调整行为：第四,巴塞尔资本协议Ⅱ的施行,强化了资本缓冲与经济周期的负向变动关系,从而加剧了宏观经济波动。基于上述结论,本文得出了监管当局科学运用逆周期资本缓冲工具的相关政策建议。     

资本充足率监管对银行稳健性的非线性影响——基于面板门槛模型的分析

本文采用我国2005~2013年64家商业银行的微观数据,运用Hansen发展的面板门槛模型,研究了不同资本充足水平下,资本充足率监管对银行稳健性的影响。研究结果表明,我国商业银行存在资本充足率监管与银行稳健性的单一门槛效应,二者是非线性关系。上市银行样本中,不论资本充足率位于高水平还是低水平,资本充足率监管与银行稳健性均呈现负相关;在非上市银行样本中,资本充足率监管与银行稳健性的关系不仅存在门槛特征,而且在高、低两种资本充足状态下,资本充足率监管对银行稳健性影响的方向不同。因此,相关政策要综合考虑我国商业银行上市与否及其已有的资本充足率水平。     

资产价格的波动与货币政策

文章主要论述了资产价格和货币政策目标及传导机制之间的关系,并提出了最优的货币政策选择,最后阐述了目前我国资产价格和货币政策之间的关系。     

How does capital regulation react to monetary policy? New evidence on the risk-taking channel

Before the subprime crisis, financial stability was a microprudential issue addressed by capital regulation and unrelated to monetary policy. The financial crisis put this paradigm to the test and turned the spotlight on the relationship between financial stability and monetary policy. Hence, the following question arises: how does capital regulation react to monetary policy? This article seeks to answer this question. We analyze the link involving monetary policy and capital regulation through the risk-taking channel in Brazil. The findings suggest that banks react to monetary policy by changing the amount of loan provisions as well as the capital adequacy ratio (CAR). An important novelty of the study is the evidence that there is no trade-off between provisions and CAR, which are important tools used by banking supervisors. The key result of the article is that banks react to the macroeconomic environment differently from what is expected by banking supervision, i.e., there exists a paradox between the microprudential view and the macroprudential view. Thus, in terms of practical implication, a banking supervision strategy for financial stability must take into account the effects of monetary policy.     

Cooperative Design for Central Banks versus Cooperative Implementation of Monetary Policy

The game-theoretic literature on monetary policy in open economies has traditionally concluded that central banks should implement monetary policy in a cooperative fashion. This paper considers an alternative mechanism for internalizing the external effects: in the first stage, governments cooperatively design central banks' objective functions; in the second stage, central banks implement monetary policy without cooperation. Although this regime lacks flexibility to deal with asymmetric shocks, it presents important advantages in relation to the former scenario: first, it enjoys more credibility; second, it entails lower coordination and information costs; and finally, it hampers unilateral manipulation of central banks' objectives.     

The cost of capital,asset prices,and the effects of monetary policy

The primary objective of this paper is to study the interaction between monetary policy, asset prices, and the cost of capital. In particular, we explore this issue in a setting where individuals face idiosyncratic risk. Incomplete information also provides a transactions role for money so that monetary policy can be studied. In contrast to standard monetary growth models which focus on the transmission of monetary policy to the demand for capital goods, we incorporate a separate capital goods sector so that the supply response to monetary policy is taken into account. Consequently, in contrast to the standard monetary growth model, monetary policy plays an important role in investment activity through the relative price of capital goods. Moreover, different sources of productivity can affect the degree of risk sharing. Although the optimal money growth rate falls in response to an increase in productivity in either sector of the economy, monetary policy should react more aggressively to the level of productivity in the capital sector.     

货币政策、民营企业投资效率与公司期权价值

本文首先考察了货币政策对民营企业融资约束和投资效率的影响。研究发现,宽松的货币政策减少了民营企业的融资约束,但对投资效率的影响则呈现非线性关系。本文进一步从实物期权的角度考察了货币政策对公司增长与清算期权价值的影响,结果表明:高盈利能力公司的增长期权价值在宽松货币政策时期更大,而低盈利能力公司的清算期权价值在紧缩货币政策时期更高。本文的研究结论有助于理解在不同的货币政策状态下,资本逐利这一经济规律的表现形式;同时,本文的经验证据还有助于从投资效率和公司价值的角度评价宏观经济政策对微观经济实体的影响,从而为决策部门制定恰当的经济政策、促进宏观经济体系的良好运转提供政策性建议。     

中央银行的宏观监管职能:经济效果与影响因素分析

文章以跨国数据为基础,对中央银行是否应分离银行监管职能这一问题进行了系统的实证分析。结果表明,在中央银行未分离或未完全分离银行监管职能的国家,其金融稳定性通常更高,经济增速更快,而且未出现明显的"通货膨胀倾向"。这意味着金融监管的独立性并不是简单地将监管职能从中央银行分离的问题,中央银行的独立性也并不必然排斥其继续实施金融监管职能。通过将货币政策和金融监管的兼容性置于政治经济学框架下加以解读,文章发现真正影响金融监管实际独立性的并非监管主体的设置问题,而是更广泛地依赖于不同的政治制度条件。上述结论表明,如何在既定的政治制度和政策框架下切实加强货币政策和金融监管的协调与配合才是问题的核心和关键。     

What Do Data Say About Monetary Policy,Bank Liquidity and Bank Risk Taking?

This paper tests empirically the linkage between banks' investment and interbank lending decisions in response to interest rate changes. We draw conclusions for the monetary policy, which uses the interest rate as its main tool. Across European countries we find that the risk-free (i.e. monetary policy) interest rate negatively affects the liquidity retained by banks and the decision of a bank to be a lender in the interbank market. Instead, the interbank interest rate has a positive impact on these decisions. We also find that banks who lend show less risk-taking behaviour and tend to be smaller than those who are borrowers. Most importantly, the risk-free interest rate is positively correlated with loans investment and bank risk-taking behaviour.     

Capital Controls,Global Liquidity Traps,and the International Policy Trilemma*

The zero bound on interest rates introduces a new dimension to the trilemma in international policy. The openness of the international financial market might render monetary policy ineffective, even within a system of fully flexible exchange rates, because shocks that lead to a liquidity trap in one country are propagated through financial markets to other countries. However, the effectiveness of monetary policy can be restored by the imposition of capital controls. We derive the optimal response of monetary policy to a global liquidity trap in the presence of capital controls. We show that, even though capital controls might facilitate effective monetary policy, capital controls are not generally desirable in terms of welfare.     

The Credit Channel at Work: Lessons from the Financial Crisis in Korea

We demonstrate that the credit channel of transmission of monetary/financial shocks appears to have aggravated Korea's economic crisis. We use micro-data gathered at the individual bank level to identify this channel of transmission. Our major findings are as follows: i) consistent with banks' autonomous retrenchment in loan supply, monetary tightening broadens the spread between marginal bank lending rates and corporate commercial paper rates; ii) credit limits on overdrafts – arguably a proxy identifying shifts in loan supply – react negatively to the monetary squeeze; iii) large negative capital shocks induce banks to disproportionately slow-down both lending and deposit taking and to disproportionately raise their lending rates. Our findings lend unequivocal support to the hypothesis that banks' autonomous contraction restricted the availability of credit and magnified the increase in its cost. In turn, this compounded the Korean crisis by aggravating liquidity constraints for the vast majority of agents who rely only on bank credit as an external source of funds.     

Optimal monetary policy and the lag structure of disturbances

The paper extends Poole's analysis of optimal monetary policy by linking monetary policy to the lag structure of the model's disturbances. A Keynesian framework which also assumes rational expectations and information lags is used. The paper finds that in this framework monetary policy is determined by the rates at which real sector and money-demand disturbances dissipate. Dynamic analogs of the familiar rules linking optimal monetary policy to the stability of the IS and LM curves are then developed.