Optimal trade,industrial, and privatization policies in a mixed duopoly with strategic managerial incentives

Abstract

This paper examines optimal trade, industrial, and privatization policies in a home-market model of mixed international duopoly with strategic managerial incentives. Under linear demand and constant marginal costs, the optimal degree of privatization is shown to depend crucially on cost and demand parameters and on the availability of strategic trade and industrial policies. If both firms are equally efficient, optimal trade and industrial policies drive out the foreign firm and the privatization policy loses its effect on national welfare; however, if the home firm is less efficient, then full privatization combined with an import tariff and a production subsidy is optimal for the home country, while an export subsidy is optimal for the foreign country. If trade and industrial policies are unavailable and if both firms are equally efficient, full state-ownership, which drives out the foreign firm, becomes optimal; however, if the home firm is less efficient, only partial privatization is optimal, The state-ownership share is increased if either the market size grows, the home firm's efficiency increases, or the foreign firm's efficiency decreases. Further, the paper demonstrates the potential conflict between privatization and trade liberalization policies.     

Optimal industrial policy in vertically related markets

This paper examines the optimal industrial policy for an industry with a vertical market structure. A home firm and a foreign firm both import an intermediate good from a third country to produce a final good. How the home country government sets the optimal industrial policy has to take account of both profit shifting between the two final good producers and between the intermediate good producer and the home firm. We explain how the optimal industrial policy depends on the slope of the demand curve, the levels of technology spillover and product differentiation. In particular, there exists a critical level of technology spillover at which investments of the firms are neither strategic substitutes nor complements and the optimal industrial policy is always investment tax.     

Do Partial Cross Ownership and Budget Constraints Matter for Privatization Policy?

We show that in the presence of cross-ownership associated with an improvement of production inefficiency of the public firm, the optimal privatization policy is full privatization whether budget constraints are imposed on the public firm. For reaching a higher level of social welfare, the government does not need to impose budget constraints on the public firm when the fixed cost is low.     

OPTIMAL DIVIDEND POLICY WITH MEAN-REVERTING CASH RESERVOIR

Motivated by empirical evidence and economic arguments, we assume that the cash reservoir of a financial corporation follows a mean reverting process. The firm must decide the optimal dividend strategy, which consists of the optimal times and the optimal amounts to pay as dividends. We model this as a stochastic impulse control problem, and succeed in finding an analytical solution. We also find a formula for the expected time between dividend payments. A crucial and surprising economic result of our paper is that, as the dividend tax rate decreases, it is optimal for the shareholders to receive smaller but more frequent dividend payments. This results in a reduction of the probability of default of the firm.     

Taxation of Foreign Profits with Heterogeneous Multinational Firms

This paper analyses optimal taxation of foreign profits using a model with heterogeneous multinational firms that serve a foreign market through exports or foreign direct investment (FDI). If a firm switches from exporting to FDI, domestic activity and tax payments may decrease, stay constant or even rise because of intra‐firm trade. It turns out that, in contrast to recent claims, in all three cases, the optimal tax system implies full taxation after deduction of foreign tax payments. If the country accounts for the effects of its policy on the foreign price level, the case for taxing foreign income becomes even stronger. However, the globally optimal tax system may require exemption of foreign income from tax.     

Do taxes influence the organizational boundaries of international firms? An incomplete-contracting model with empirical evidence

Firms that import intermediate goods choose between outsourcing and vertical integration. When corporate tax rates differ between the home country and the foreign country, the possibility of shifting income and reducing overall tax payments through transfer pricing makes integration more attractive than outsourcing. This paper develops an incomplete-contracting model in which an international firm facing tax rate differentials chooses whether or not to internalize intermediate transactions in order to trade off production efficiency and tax minimization. By shifting economic activities across borders, an integrated multinational enterprise establishes a proper transfer price and reaches the optimal profit-splitting arrangement that maximizes its total after-tax profit. This paper finds that cross-country differences in corporate tax rates and product intangibility play important roles in affecting firms’ internalization decision. Empirical analysis employing the US data also supports the theoretical findings. The positive correlation of the integration level of US firms and tax rate differentials between the US and foreign countries remains in the sample excluding tax havens.     

Wages,Health Insurance Benefits,and Worker Sorting Under Asymmetric Information

Abstract

Employer-sponsored health insurance is the single largest source of health insurance in the USA. In this paper, we explore a model that treats a firm as a de facto insurance company. More specifically, we model a firm as both a producer of goods for an output market and a health insurance company for their employees. The model accounts for the joint provision of wages and health insurance, including the possibility of asymmetric information in employee health status. With this structure, a firm can choose to pay their workers in some combination of cash wages and health insurance. We characterize optimal employment contracts and show that the Rothschild–Stiglitz model results under asymmetric information extend to employer provided insurance. We also find that employment-based insurance offers pooling options that are typically not available when insurance is sold as a standalone product, suggesting a stability to employer-based insurance that is not dependent on the tax system.     

Environmental Policy,North-South Trade and FDI

We analyze trade between two countries, called the North and the South. There is one firm in each country and production costs are lower in the South. To serve foreign markets firms may export or engage in FDI. Both countries set tariffs on imported goods. We find that the implementation of an environmental policy by the South may affect the location decision of the Southern firm. When only the North sets an environmental tax, firms engage in FDI if the difference in costs between the two countries is low, otherwise the South exports and the Northern firm engages in FDI. If the South also sets an environmental tax, this does not restrict FDI by Northern firm, encourages FDI by the domestic firm, reduces its environmental damage and increases joint welfare. Finally, in equilibrium the South decides to implement an environmental policy and both firms engage in FDI.     

Subcontracting bargaining power and the trade policy

In this paper, we consider that the split of surplus from a subcontracting deal depends on the relative bargaining powers of domestic and foreign firms. The finding shows that a domestic optimal export policy is a tax (subsidy) if the bargaining power of the domestic firm is sufficiently small (large). We also demonstrate that a domestic firm’s higher bargaining power increases (may decrease) domestic profit if the export policy is exogenous (endogenous). In the presence of an outsider option, the domestic optimal export policy will be threatened by the outsider option if the domestic firm’s bargaining power is sufficiently small, and thus a large bargaining power increases the optimal export tax. At the same time, the foreign firm may still subcontract to the domestic firm even if the domestic firm has a higher total marginal cost of the intermediate good than the outsider option.     

Capital Structure Choices and Taxes: Evidence from the Australian Dividend Imputation Tax System

The introduction in 1987 of a dividend imputation tax system in Australia represented a significant change to the tax framework. To the extent that tax incentives influence the use of debt financing, changes in tax laws that alter these incentives will lead to changes in corporate capital structures. This paper examines the changes in corporate capital structure around the introduction of a dividend imputation tax system. The introduction of dividend imputation provides an incentive for firms to (a) reduce the level of debt financing utilized where this incentive varies across firms depending on the firm’s effective corporate tax rate, and (b) increase the level of external equity financing. The results present evidence consistent with these incentives.     

Optimal hedging under nonlinear borrowing cost,progressive tax rates,and liquidity constraints

Empirical research using optimal hedge ratios usually suggests that producers should hedge much more than they do. In this study, a new theoretical model of hedging is derived. Optimal hedge and leverage ratios and their relationship with yield risk, price variability, basis risk, taxes, and financial risk are determined using alternative assumptions. The motivation to hedge is provided by progressive tax rates and cost of bankruptcy. An empirical example for a wheat and stocker‐steer producer is provided. Results show that there are many factors, often assumed away in the literature, that make farmers hedge little or not at all. Progressive tax rates provide an incentive for farmers to hedge in order to reduce their tax liabilities and increase their after‐tax income. Farmers will hedge when the cost of hedging is less than the benefits of hedging that come from reducing tax liabilities, liquidity costs, or bankruptcy costs. When tax‐loss carryback is allowed, hedging decreases as the amount of tax loss that can be carried back increases. Higher profitability makes benefits from futures trading negligible and hedging unattractive, since farmers move to higher income brackets with near constant marginal tax rates. Increasing basis risk or yield risk also reduce the incentive to hedge. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 20: 375–396, 2000     

Strategic Trade Policy through the Tax System

If conventional instruments of strategic trade policy are unavailable, the system of foreign profit taxation and transfer price guidelines may serve as surrogate policy instruments. In this paper, I consider a model where firms from two countries compete with each other on a market in a third country. Both firms have affiliates in the third country where (part of) the production takes place. I analyse optimal policy choices of the firms' residence countries aiming at strategically manipulating the competitiveness of their firms. I show that, first, countries prefer the tax exemption system over the tax credit system if there is no intra‐firm trade. Second, if the headquarters provide inputs for production in the affiliate, countries prefer the tax exemption system if the transfer price for these inputs is close to the headquarters' variable cost and if the residence country's tax rate is high. However, if transfer prices are high and the residence country's tax rate is low, I show that the tax credit system is an optimal tax policy choice for both countries. From a policy perspective, the view that the tax exemption system is generally the best policy response if domestic firms' competitiveness is a policy goal has to be qualified.     

混合所有制企业的民营化程度如何影响高管薪酬-业绩敏感性？

在中国深化改革、推进转型的特殊背景下，探索出一条适合中国混合所有制企业实际情况的高管薪酬制度改革路径是现阶段中国国有企业改革亟待解决的问题之一。高管的薪酬-业绩敏感性是判断薪酬激励契约有效性的主要指标，基于此，文章首先构建一个委托-代理框架下的寡头市场模型，从理论上分析混合所有制企业的民营化程度与高管薪酬-业绩敏感性之间的关系；其次选择2007—2016年沪深两市A股经过民营化的国有控股上市公司数据进行实证检验。结果发现：总体上，提高混合所有制企业的民营化程度会显著增强高管薪酬-业绩敏感性；进一步分析发现，混合所有制企业中非国有股比例小于67%时，提高民营化程度会降低高管的薪酬-业绩敏感性；非国有股比例介于67%~75%之间时，提高民营化程度对高管薪酬-业绩敏感性没有显著影响；非国有股比例大于75%时，提高民营化程度会提升高管的薪酬-业绩敏感性。     

Does home bias affect firm value? Evidence from holdings of mutual funds worldwide

This study finds strong evidence that home bias affects firm valuation at both country and firm levels. At the country level, increasing the bias of domestic investors toward home equity lowers the market valuation of home equity. At the firm level, firm value increases as the compositions of local equities held by domestic and foreign investors tend toward the firms' global market capitalization weights, but decreases as their weights deviate from global weights. Overall, the evidence is consistent with the optimal global risk-sharing hypothesis that the greater risk sharing between domestic and foreign investors in international capital markets reduces the cost of capital and hence enhances market valuation.     

分工视角下的公共支出及其功能的实现

在分工的视角下,公共支出具有改进交易效率、提高生产效率和直接提升福利水平这三个方面的功能。本文通过建立新兴古典经济学模型并使用超边际分析发现:在不考虑税收与公共支出的差别时,公共支出在上述三个方面的作用力大小决定了最优的分工结构和最优税率,人们会基于政府设定的税率选择特定的分工结构以尽可能地提高效用水平,于是政府的工作目标即是以合理的公共支出规模和结构来引导最优分工结构的实现。     

非上市中小企业资本结构的决定因素分析

本文利用11723家非上市中小企业的财务数据,分析反映企业特征的因素与财务杠杆之间的关系。研究发现,在全体中小企业、国有中小企业以及民营中小企业,企业规模对长期负债率和总负债率产生正的影响,盈利性对长期负债率和总负债率产生负的影响,资产的有形性对长期负债率具有正的影响,而与总负债率之间呈负相关关系。成长性仅对全体企业和民营企业的资本结构具有一定的影响,而非债务税盾的影响较弱。企业规模、盈利性和资产的有形性是中小企业资本结构的重要影响因素。研究结果基本上支持权衡理论和优序融资理论的观点。     

环境税对企业竞争力的影响——基于面板分位数的研究

开征环境税将对重污染企业产生何种影响? 重污染企业对环境规制政策的敏感性是否使得环境税的"优胜劣汰"作用在重污染企业上体现得更加明显?本文基于沪深两市A股重污染行业上市公司2008～2014年的数据,采用面板分位数回归方法研究了环境税的企业竞争力效应.研究显示: 环境税与企业竞争力之间正相关,且存在分位数异质性,即对于竞争力处于低分位的企业,环境税对其企业竞争力效应为正,但未通过显著性检验;对于中分位的企业,环境税对其企业竞争力有显著的正向影响,且这种正向影响随企业竞争力的增加呈递增趋势;对于高分位的企业,环境税对其企业竞争力的正向作用呈递减趋势.本研究发现了环境税对企业竞争力的分位数异质性,为环境税效应研究提供了新的视角.     

Welfare and quality improvement in an international market

This paper analyzes the optimal uniform and discriminatory quality requirements under Cournot competition when two firms produce high-quality and low-quality products, respectively, in an international market. The quality requirements in our paper are not set for the foreign firm but are set to regulate products of different qualities, since in the real world a domestic firm could be a high- or low-quality producer. We find that whether the government should raise the quality requirements depends on the type of competition in which firms engage and the adopted quality requirements. By and large, the government should always set quality requirements raising both firms’ quality directly or indirectly, regardless of the quality of the product of the domestic firm. However, if the domestic firm is a high-quality producer, the government should set a quality requirement that enables the domestic firm to monopolize the market when a discriminatory quality requirement is adopted, and should not set any quality requirement when a uniform quality requirement is adopted. Moreover, we show that the quality requirement can actually improve global welfare in most cases.     

Foreign environments: The internationalisation of environmental producer services

The ‘greening’ of manufacturing firms has created new markets for environmental producer services. Environmental service providers from industrialised countries are more and more forced to internationalise, often due to the international activities of their client firms or to an insufficient offer of such services in the host countries. While knowledge-intensive services in general face problems entering foreign markets, environmental producer services are particularly confronted with specific non-tariff barriers. The latter are not only related to regulatory frameworks, accreditation problems (‘neo-protectionism’) or missing cultural skills, but also to specific aspects such as confidence between service provider and client firm.     

宏观税收政策与居民消费水平新探

宏观税率直接关系到社会的宏观经济政策和社会的整体经济运行,也关系到居民的日常消费与投资行为。基于经典的宏观经济分析理论,从宏观经济协调发展平衡系统出发,从理论上借助于税收收入的科学计算模型,得出有关动态均衡经济系统的最优税率的一个比较优良的估值模型。该结果表明宏观税率的确定主要决定于社会经济发展的水平和政府支出的规模,取决于社会固定资本存量的规模,而与居民消费水平没有直接的因果关系,从而为宏观税收政策的制定与优化提供一个切实的理论模型。