欧洲主要国家药品定价和补偿制度的比较分析

通过比较分析的方法深入探讨欧洲各主要国家药品定价和补偿制度的特点以及经济学评价的应用情况。如何评价新药的创新性已成为各国政府在规制药品市场时共同面临的关键性问题,而与创新水平评价密切相关的带有“双重定价”意味的定价体制值得我国政府在平衡控制药品费用和激发医药产业创新实力这一矛盾时借鉴学习。     

OECD unbundled local loop pricing

This study examines OECD fully unbundled and line sharing monthly wholesale prices for 2002–2008. The results are informative with economic analysis appearing to inform regulator decision making. However, with the cost proxy (viz., copper-wage relative price, population density, urbanisation and business line penetration), regulator costing methods (long run incremental and fully allocated cost), and time trend arguments only explaining approximately 40% of the price variation there remains ample unexplained variation, and political and institutional variables may help reduce this. Finally, both price series are subject to increasingly rapid value declines, although the patterns are somewhat distinct. This suggests that initial prices are truly transitory.     

Exploring the role of relationship pricing in industrial export settings: Empirical evidence from the UK

This paper sets out to shed initial empirical light on the role of relationship pricing in an industrial export context, by a) investigating the extent to which selected contextual variables shape the adoption of relationship pricing, and b) examining manifestations of relationship pricing in the process that industrial exporters use for levying their prices. Analyzing data from a stratified random sample of 243 UK exporters of industrial products, the results demonstrate that the adoption of relationship pricing is a) facilitated by the degree of an exporter's market orientation, export experience, and the level of formality in export price setting and b) hindered by firm age and export intensity. It is also shown that industrial exporting firms adopting relationship pricing tend to follow a more market-based export price decision-making process, as this is manifested in market-based export pricing information, objectives and policies. The practical implications of the findings are discussed and useful future research directions are highlighted.     

Airport deregulation: Effects on pricing and capacity

We use a model of vertical relations between two congestible airports and an airline oligopoly to examine, both analytically and numerically, how deregulation may affect airports prices and capacities. We find that: (i) unregulated profit-maximizing airports would overcharge for the congestion externality and, compared to the first-best, would induce large allocative inefficiencies and dead-weight losses. They would restrict capacity investments but, overall, would induce fewer delays; (ii) Welfare maximization subject to cost recovery performs quite well, achieving congestion levels similar to a private-unregulated airport but without inducing such large traffic contraction; this puts a question mark on the desirability of deregulation of private airports; (iii) Increased cooperation between airlines and airports provides some improvements, but the resulting airport pricing strategy leads to a downstream airline cartel; (iv) When schedule delay costs effects are strong and airline differentiation is weak, it may be optimal to have a single airline dominating the airports, but this happens only when airports' pricing schemes render the number of airlines irrelevant for competition.     

工程总承包商的内部转移定价问题探讨

工程总承包是大型工程项目建设组织的一个重要发展方向,工程总承包商内部不同单位分别完成设计和施工工作,选择合适的转移定价策略对于项目运作效率和项目优化设计实现程度具有十分重要的意义。论文通过介绍转移定价理论,并分析工程总承包商的结构类型和行业特点,重点讨论了不考虑税收因素的工程总承包商内部转移定价,并在此基础上讨论了基于税务筹划的工程总承包商转移定价,提出工程总承包商应采用成本加收益分成的转移定价方法。     

关于中国电信资费体系改革的基本看法

本文综述了电信资费的有关理论和方法，分析了中国电信资费体系的现状和问题，以及电信市场改革和加入WTO对电信资费体系的影响，总结了国外电信资源改革的经验，提出了分阶段推进中国电信资费体系改革的浅议及相应的政策措施。     

Auction hosting site pricing and market equilibrium with endogenous bidder and seller participation

This paper characterizes the payoffs and pricing policies of auction hosting sites when both the bidders’ and the sellers’ participation is endogenous. Sellers have heterogeneous opportunity costs and make a listing decision depending on the listing fee and the expected revenue from the sale. On the other side of the market, factors such as facility in navigating an interface layout and prior bidding experience result in bidder heterogeneity with respect to participation costs. Bidders participate if their ex ante expected payoff from searching the site exceeds their participation costs. The auction site earns revenue by setting positive listing fees, trading off the increased revenue per seller resulting from a higher fee with the revenue reduction from the loss of sellers. Though this appears to be a classic monopoly problem, there are important differences. The reduction in the number of sellers participating in a site has feedback effects, as it affects the number of bidders who choose to visit that site, which in turn again affects the attractiveness of the site to sellers, and thus further reduces seller participation. In this environment the monopolist’s ability to extract rents is severely limited, even if one considers rent extraction from the seller side of the market only. It is demonstrated that the inverse demand curve is flatter than the demand curve obtained from the (inverse) distribution of seller costs. Moreover, the inverse demand curve has at least one and possibly multiple flat segments, leading to discontinuities in the profit function. Thus, small changes in the environment can lead to large changes in the optimal fee and market participation.     

Target pricing: Demand-side versus supply-side approaches

The practice of target pricing has been a key factor in the success of Japanese manufacturers. In the more commonly known demand-side approach, the target price for the supplier equals the manufacturer's market price less a percent margin for the manufacturer but no cost-improvement expenses are shared. In the supply-side approach, cost-improvement expenses are shared and the target price equals the supplier's cost plus a percent margin for the supplier. Using a general oligopoly and Cournot duopoly models, we characterize the equilibrium and optimal policy for each approach under various conditions. We find that sharing cost-reduction expenses allows the manufacturer using the supply-side approach to attain competitive advantage in the form of increased market share and higher profit, particularly in industrial conditions where margins are thin and price sensitivities are high.     

On access pricing in telecoms: theory and European practice

This paper discusses European legislation concerning interconnection between telecommunications operators. An important and distinct element of regulatory policy in the European Union is that operators with significant market power are required to provide cost-based interconnection whereas other operators are not required to provide such cost-based interconnection. It analyzes the consequences of different interconnection charges for competition and investments. Using recent insights from the theoretical literature on competition in telecommunications, it finds that the socially optimal regulatory policy concerning interconnection has the same characteristics as that adopted in the European Union.     

银行卡定价理论的新发展--兼论对我国银行卡POS交易价格形成机制的启示

本文通过对银行卡定价理论新发展以及国外POS交易价格的研究．结合我国银行卡产业发展的实际情况。对我国银行卡POS交易价格形成机制进行了研究。研究表明：银行卡产业具有的双边市场特征和网络外部性特征使得银行卡POS交易的定价将是成本、竞争、双边市场需求等多种因素的综合反映。就中国银行卡产业发展现状而言，我国银行卡POS交易定价应该与国际接轨．由现有的单一定价模式转变为三级差别定价和二级差别定价相结合的差别定价模式。差别定价模式有利于建立科学合理的利益分配体系，促进和保障银行卡产业的持续健康稳定发展。     

Dynamic pricing models for ERP systems under network externality

Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems vendors face great challenges to enhance their market position and maximize their profits. Being able to simultaneously predict the diffusion of an ERP and to determine the right price to charge to a customer is a complex task. Earlier work has demonstrated evidence of network effect in the diffusion of ERP software in industries. In light of this evidence, we investigate in this paper the benefit of a dynamic pricing strategy for ERP systems vendors in a business network governed by a quantitative diffusion model. Based on a real scenario in the automotive industry, those quantitative models are integrated into a simulation-based optimization approach to tackle the problem. Our findings are promising and establish the foundation of a powerful decision support tool for ERP systems vendors.     

List pricing and discounting in a Bertrand–Edgeworth duopoly

List, or retail, pricing is a widely used trading institution where firms announce a price that may be discounted at a later stage. Competition authorities view list pricing and discounting as a procompetitive practice. We modify the standard Bertrand–Edgeworth duopoly model to include list pricing and a subsequent discounting stage. Both firms first simultaneously choose a maximum list price and then decide whether to discount, or not, in a subsequent stage. We show that list pricing works as a credible commitment device that induces a pure strategy outcome. This is true for a general class of rationing rules. Further unlike the dominant firm interpretation of a price leader, the low capacity firm may have incentives to commit to a low price and in this sense assume the role of a leader.     

Optimal pricing and advertising strategy for introducing a new business product with threat of competitive entry

The problem of optimal joint pricing and advertising decision making for a new product facing potential competitive entry has received inadequate attention. We propose a model that attempts to find the optimal price-advertising frontier in the face of potential competitive entry that maximizes total discounted profits for pre- and post-entry periods. We find that a firm would charge the price that equates price elasticity to marginal revenue product of advertising (as predicted by [Dorfman, R. and Steiner, P.O. (1954), Optimal Advertising and Optimal Quality, American Economic Review, 44(5), 826-836.]) only when the potential effects of pricing and advertising on its market share are not considered. Under optimal conditions, aware that market share is subject to erosion, the firm charges a somewhat lower price than the profit maximizing price, and sets an advertisement expense that is somewhat higher than the profit-maximizing advertising level as predicted by Cournot's monopolistic setting. We illustrate the applicability of our model using business product examples taken from several industries including operating systems, software, pharmaceutical, and telephone switching. Directions for future research with implications for B2B managers (for example, the possible effects of preannouncement to forestall competitive entry) are discussed.     

Opportunism and menus of two-part tariffs

We show that a menu of two-part tariffs can solve the opportunism problem identified by McAfee and Schwartz (1994) [McAfee, R.P., Schwartz, M., 1994. Opportunism in multilateral vertical contracting: nondiscrimination, exclusivity, and uniformity. American Economic Review, 84 210–230] in vertical games with sequential contracting, provided the sunk costs incurred by the first firm to invest are not too large. If the seller were to engage in opportunism with a second firm in an attempt to shift rents from the first firm, the first firm could mitigate the dissipation of its rents by choosing from its menu of contract options the tariff with the higher marginal price and lower fixed fee. The prospect of the first firm's choosing the ‘wrong’ two-part tariff in the event of opportunism is, in some environments, sufficient to make opportunism unprofitable for the seller.     

Contestability and creative destruction: Two approaches to monopoly

The theory of contestability ’attempts to base a model of economic efficiency on oligopolistic markets, thereby justifying adoption of laissez-faire policies in the absence of atomistic competition. The analysis is similar to Schumpeter’s condemnation of government intervention in the theory of creative destruction: both theories claim that superior economic performance is associated with concentrated rather than competitive market structures. Yet in many respects the contestability analysis is less convincing than Schumpeter’s. Whereas Schumpeter admitted the existence of short rum profits and restrictive strategies, arguing that these inefficiencies, are outweighed in the long run, the theory of contestable markets is based on short run efficiency and cannot accommodate evidence of excess profits nor many of the existing models of oligopolistic strategies, including collusion and predatory pricing. Furthermore, the theory lacks a logical explanation of investment, by entrants and convincing empirical support for its claim that concentrated markets maximize consumer welfare.     

Financial planning issues concerning funding, pricing and organization of corporate R&D activity: A case study

This paper is a case study of financial planning issues concerning funding, pricing, and the organization of corporate research and development (R&D) activity faced by American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T) after the break up of the Bell System. The paper concludes that from the standpoint of financial planning, and in the context of firms similar to AT&T, a variant of the predivestiture model, rather than a profit centre model or a market model, appears to be the most efficient way of funding, pricing and organizing corporate R&D activity.     

An integrated product planning model for pricing and bundle selection using Markov decision processes and data envelope analysis

When bundling products during the product planning stage, there are a number of possible combinations that can be offered to customers. Consider a firm that offers N distinctive products, then there are 2^N−(N+1) possible bundling combinations. Now, if we wish to make pricing and bundle selection decisions, keeping in my mind limited inventory and a finite time horizon, then the size of the state space could be very large and finding an optimal solution could be impossible. To tackle this issue, we formulate an integrated model that utilizes a Markov decision process and data envelope analysis. Bundle selections are made using data envelope analysis in each decision epoch. Once the efficient bundles are selected they are priced by solving a Markov decision process using dynamic programming. Numerical examples are solved to exhibit the model's potential in solving real-world problems.     

Sunk Costs,Market Contestability,and the Size Distribution of Firms

In this paper we offer a new economic explanation for the observed inter-industry differences in the size distribution of firms. Our empirical estimates based on three temporal (1982, 1987, and 1992) cross-sections of the four-digit US manufacturing industries indicate that increased market contestability, as signified by low sunk costs, tends to reduce the dispersion of firm sizes. These findings provide support for one of the key predictions of the theory of contestable markets: that market forces under contestability would tend to render any inefficient organization of the industry unsustainable and, consequently, tighten the distribution of firms around the optimum.     

New printing technology and pricing

This case study analyzes five Swedish printing houses' pricing with respect to their investments in new printing technology. The new printing technology made it possible for the printing houses to market new products and services to meet the demand for shorter delivery times and full service solutions. Although this demand was apparent, the printing houses' opportunities to capitalize on their investments depended on the characteristics of the market segment that they served. Findings indicate that the new printing technology made it possible to change prices when the new services reduced delivery time and costs, and when there were substantial differences between the new services and available substitutes. Thus, customers accepted new pricing when the utilization of the new technology resulted in financial gains and time reductions.