A panel data analysis of the effect of corruption on tourism

This study empirically tests the hypothesis that corruption has a negative effect on tourism. Having to pay bribes while on holiday or a business trip increases the costs of travelling to a country where corruption is prevalent. Tourists are thus more likely to travel to countries where these additional costs do not need to be incurred. This hypothesis is tested using a panel data set of over 100 countries and 16 years. The results indicate that a 1-point increase in the Corruption Perception Index (implying a decrease in corruption) results in a 2% to 7% increase in tourist inflows. In addition, tourist inflows rise with GDP per capita, openness and growth and are higher in countries with a temperate climate.     

Exploring differences in corruption: the role of neighboring countries

The aim of this paper is to study whether corruption spreads across neighboring countries. Spatial econometric techniques are used to analyze corruption interactions, testing whether the perception of corruption in neighboring countries affect a country’s own corruption once other variables are controlled for. For a given country it is found that corruption varies neither with the behavior of its neighbors (there is no endogenous interaction) nor with their exogenous characteristics (there is no contextual interaction). Corruption is therefore not contagious, but neighboring countries tend to show similar levels of corruption because they face similar characteristics and similar institutional environments.     

Capital accumulation of a firm facing an emissions tax

In this paper we consider the dynamic behavior of a firm that is subject to environmental regulation. It is assumed that, in order to prevent firms from polluting the environment excessively, the government imposes an emissions tax. We determine how an emissions tax influences the firm's decisions concerning investments and abatement efforts. In the model we incorporate the realistic property that a given abatement expenditure leads to more pollution reduction when pollution is large. This property implies increasing returns to scale with respect to pollution reduction. It turns out that, together with the usual assumption of decreasing returns to scale with respect to production, this property leads to the occurrence of history-dependent equilibria in case the pollution tax rate is sufficiently large. It is possible to derive an explicit formula for the threshold tax rate above which these history-dependent equilibria can occur. We show that an investment grant by the government can influence the firm so as to approach the equilibrium with a higher capital stock. Finally, we compare our results with those of a related model where the firm faces a strict pollution standard rather than an emissions tax. Among other things, we show that growth is more suppressed under a tax than under a standard when the firm is small.     

论国家权限与政府腐败

马克思主义者认为,国家是超出其他一切以维持和维护阶级统治和剥削为职能的一种机构。国家征税是权力当做资本的结果。国家通过征税参与剩余价值的分配,但国家权力资本分配财富不是无限的。在市场经济中,政府对于维护国家经济安全负有重要的责任。制度的腐败导致官员生活的腐化,对官员权力寻租的批判不应当脱离人的本性。     

也说腐败发展的库兹涅茨曲线

在经济发展的过程中,腐败现象存在一种倒U型的发展轨迹。制度建设的滞后,一方面导致了有害于社会发展的腐败的盛行,另一方面也使得腐败成为了改革和发展的润滑剂。而到了经济增长成熟的阶段,随着制度建设的完善,腐败会逐渐下降。     

Political corruption and capture of the minority

This article presents a model of political corruption in which a briber can choose either to bribe only the incumbent party or to capture also the opposition party to sterilize its monitoring role. The analysis also explores interparty collusion, media independence, and political contestability. The model suggests that policies aiming to strengthen the role of minorities can produce ambiguous effects as they may induce bribers' avoidance behavior. Reputational sanctions appear to be less effective than criminal ones, although political contestability increases their deterrence effect. Paradoxically, harsh criminal sanctions may induce tacit collusion because minorities highly regard their outcomes once in power.     

Political contributions and corruption in the United States

The empirical evidence presented in this study indicates that political contributions and corruption are complements, rather than substitutes. Based on panel data for seven election cycles, regression results show that in the United States, political contributions and federal corruption convictions are positively correlated. Accordingly, we propose an alternative explanation for the relationship between political contributions and corruption: two components of a comprehensive strategy for rent-seeking. As long-term investments, political contributions influence legislators to change the rules of the game; as short-term investments, corruption influences public officials to sidestep the existing rules, in order to maximize the rent collected.     

医疗行业腐败的根源与对策

医疗行业的腐败是一个全球性的问题,其产生的根源既存在一定的共性,也与各国的医疗体系自身特点有关。在发展中国家和转型国家,医疗行业腐败现象显得尤为严重。本文回顾了与医疗腐败相关的经济学文献,分析了医疗行业产生腐败现象的根源,并特别指出,转型国家中的医疗腐败现象具有鲜明的时代特征;对医疗腐败具体行为进行了分析,着重研究了转型国家中常见的非正式支付现象;最后,结合我国的特点提出了相关政策建议。     

Corruption and Age

In recent years the topic of corruption has attracted a great deal of attention. However, there is still a lack of substantial empirical evidence about the determinants of corruption. The major aim in the paper is to investigate empirically the correlation between age and justifiability of corruption. We use data on eight Western European countries from the World Values Survey and the European Values Survey that span the period from 1981 to 1999 to distinguish between an age effect (the changing attitudes of the same cohort over time) and a cohort effect (the differences in attitudes among similar age groups in different time periods). The results suggest that there is a strong age effect and no cohort effect.     

腐败的预警预控体系分析

分析了在我国建立腐败预警预控体系的紧迫性和必要性,界定了腐败预警预控体系的定义和内涵,建立了腐败预警预控体系的结构,并详细阐释了腐败预警预控体系的运用流程,为我国腐败的预警预控工作提供参考和借鉴。     

A contribution to the empirics of press freedom and corruption

We test the relationship between aggregate press freedom and corruption performing a modified extreme bounds analysis. We also test the relation among different forms of restrictions to press freedom using previously unexplored disaggregated data. Our results support the theoretical view that restrictions to press freedom leads to higher corruption. Furthermore, we obtain that both political and economic influences on the media are strongly and robustly related to corruption, while detrimental laws and regulations influencing the media are not. In all cases the evidence indicates, although not conclusively, that the direction of causation runs from a freer press to lower corruption.     

Climate,diseases, and the origins of corruption

It has been commonly observed that tropical countries tend to suffer from intense corruption and underdevelopment. This study provides an explanation for this long-standing disparity across the world based on variation in the intensity of ultraviolet radiation (UV-R). The central hypothesis is that UV-R is positively associated with the (historical) prevalence of eye diseases, which significantly shortens work-life expectancy as a skilled worker. This helps shape the worldwide distribution of corruption by affecting the incumbents' window of opportunity. Using data for up to 139 countries, I consistently find empirical support for the positive relationship between UV-R and corruption. The main findings withstand accounting for numerous alternative explanations for international differences in corruption levels. Employing individual-level data from the World Values Survey, I document suggestive evidence that exposure to UV-R is linked to surveyed respondents' tolerance towards corrupt activities. Furthermore, a subnational analysis for China lends credence to the cross-country evidence.     

The role of corruption and risk aversion in entrepreneurial intentions

The literature on entrepreneurship has suggested that an individual’s entrepreneurial intention depends on three types of factor: personal characteristics, the individual’s expertise and professional background, and external factors. Our study investigates how corruption, an external factor, and risk aversion, a personal characteristic, may simultaneously affect individuals’ entrepreneurial intentions. With data on 76 203 individuals in 53 countries, our estimation results indicate that risk aversion decreases the individual’s probability of having an entrepreneurial intention by 6.67 percentage points. In addition, an increase in 1 SD in the perceived level of corruption in a country decreases the individual’s probability of having an entrepreneurial intention by 0.96 percentage points.     

Political decentralization and corruption: Exploring the conditional role of parties

This study investigates how national levels of corruption are influenced by the interaction of two factors in political decentralization: the presence of local elections and the organizational structure of national parties. Previous studies have focused primarily on the role of fiscal decentralization on corruption and have mostly ignored the institutions of political decentralization. Using new data in a series of expansive models across multiple countries and years, we find that corruption will be lower when local governments are more accountable to and more transparent toward their constituents. This beneficial arrangement is most likely to occur when local elections are combined with nonintegrated political parties, meaning that party institutions themselves are decentralized from national control. Such an institutional arrangement maximizes local accountability by putting the decision to nominate and elect local leaders in the hands of those best in a position to evaluate their honesty—local electors.     

浅谈如何加强监管杜绝财务腐败

财务腐败是指一个单位因资金监管不到位出现漏洞,或单位的财务管理混乱、不规范而产生的奢侈浪费、挪用公款、贪污、国有资产流失等财务腐败行为。一个国家要保持政治稳定和经济发展,就必须认真解决腐败问题。要杜绝财务腐败的产生,就要从财务人员的自身素质建设、财务制度的建设、加强审计工作的力度等方面进行全面预防。     

Whistleblower laws and exposed corruption in the United States

This research creates a unique internet-based measure of awareness about state-level whistleblower laws and provisions to examine their effects on observed corruption in the United States. Are whistleblower laws complementary or substitutes for other, more direct, corruption control measures? Placing the analysis within the corruption literature, the findings show that greater whistleblower awareness results in more observed corruption and this finding holds across specifications. Internet awareness about whistleblower laws seems relatively more effective at exposing corruption than the quantity and quality of state whistleblower laws themselves.     

政府规模、市场化与地区腐败

Using a panel data at the provincial level during the period of 1989–2004, this paper examines the effects of social and economic factors such as government scale, privatization, openness, and education on regional corruption. Applying a fixed-effect model and IV estimation, we find that government size positively affects the incidence rate of corruption, and the effect becomes larger with the increase in the size of the core department of the government. 1% increase in the core department of the government leads to a 0.68%–1% increase in the number of corruption cases. While the proportion of FDI is positively associated with the corruption of regional officials, the ratio of the import and export trade to GDP is negatively associated with corruption. The impact of privatization on corruption is ambiguous. We also identify the significant impacts of the size and structure of the government expenditure on corruption. __________ Translated from Jingji Yanjiu 经济研究 (Economic Research Journal), 2008, (11): 16–26     

The effects of corruption on the human capital accumulation process: Evidence from Vietnam

This study aims to identify the effects of corruption on the human capital accumulation process in Vietnamese provinces/cities. I employ labour quality assessments of firms as a proxy for human capital and divide human capital accumulation into the following two processes: an educational process and a process through which educational outcomes and worker training transform into labour quality. The estimation results have some notable implications for the Vietnamese context. Corruption has both negative and positive effects on human capital. On the one hand, corruption reduces the positive effect of local government spending on educational achievements and worsens labour quality. On the other hand, the prevalence of corruption in provinces/cities increases the advantages of local schools in the competition to obtain funds from the central government; hence, corruption enhances educational achievements in those regions. The results of this study indicate that corruption adversely affects human capital overall.     

Distortions in oil contract allocation and environmental damage in the presence of corruption

This article investigates how distortions in oil contract allocation can alter a government official’s decisions and shows that corruption enlarges the parameter space over which multinational oil companies win the contract against the smaller companies. It is found that corruption superficially creates an equilibrium outcome that looks efficient even when it is not, and diminishes the official’s concern for environmental damage by weighing damage to the public less and oil revenues more. Sensitivity analyses show that for all levels of environmental damage and corruptibility, multinational oil companies always win the contract. An important policy implication is that corruption distorts optimal decisions and causes oil contract allocation decisions to be based primarily on monetary benefit than social welfare.     

Obesity of politicians and corruption in post-Soviet countries

We collected 299 frontal face images of 2017 cabinet ministers from 15 post-Soviet states (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan). For each image, the minister's body-mass index is estimated using a computer vision algorithm. The median estimated body-mass index of cabinet ministers is highly correlated with conventional measures of corruption (Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, World Bank worldwide governance indicator Control of Corruption, Index of Public Integrity). This result suggests that physical characteristics of politicians such as their body-mass index can be used as proxy variables for political corruption when the latter are not available, for instance at a very local level.