Multiproject team assignments

We consider expected profit maximizing mechanisms for a principal who has to allocate a group of agents among a number of projects, assuming that the principal has incomplete information about each agent's ability type, and the agents follow the Bayes-Nash or the dominant strategy equilibrium behavior. We find that while expected profit maximizing mechanisms are similar to the optimal auction (Myerson, 1981), the incentive compatibility constraints are much more restrictive. Interestingly, these constraints are satisfied if each agent's characteristics change in a consistent manner not only with types, but also from project to project. Received: 30 April 1997 / Accepted: 22 December 1998     

Sad-Loser contests

We consider asymmetric winner-reimbursed contests. It turns out that such contests (Sad-Loser) have multiple internal pure-strategy equilibria (where at least two players are active). We describe all equilibria and discuss their properties. In particular, we find (1) that an active player is indifferent among all her non-negative choices and her expected payoff is zero in any internal equilibrium, (2) that a higher-value (stronger) player always spends less than a lower-value (weaker) player and therefore always has a lower chance to win a Sad-Loser contest in any internal equilibrium, and (3) a sufficient condition for a net total spending to be higher in a Sad-Loser contest than in the corresponding asymmetric contest.     

Inefficiency and complementarity in sharing games

A sharing game is a very simple device for partially reconciling an organization’s goal with the interests of its members. Each member chooses an action, bears its cost, and receives a share of the revenue which the members’ actions generate. A (pure-strategy) equilibrium of the game may be inefficient: surplus (revenue minus the sum of costs) may be less than maximal. In a previous paper, we found that for a wide class of reward functions, no one squanders at an inefficient equilibrium (spends more than at an efficient profile) if the revenue function has a complementarity property. In the present paper, we examine the “opposite” of the complementarity property (Substitutes) and we study a class of finite games where squandering equilibria indeed occur if Substitutes holds strongly enough. Squandering equilibria play a key role when one traces the effect of technological improvement on a sharing game’s surplus shortfall. We then turn to the question of choice among reward functions in a principal/agents setting. We find that if we again assume complementarity then strong conclusions can be reached about the reward functions preferred by “society”, by the players (agents), and by the principal.     

“Reverse” nested lottery contests

This paper proposes a multi-prize “reverse” nested lottery contest model, which can be viewed as the “mirror image” of the conventional nested lottery contest of  Clark and Riis (1996a). The reverse-lottery contest model determines winners by selecting losers based on contestants’ one-shot effort through a hypothetical sequence of lotteries. We provide a microfoundation for the reverse-lottery contest from a perspective of (simultaneous) noisy performance ranking and establish that the model is underpinned by a unique performance evaluation rule. We further demonstrate that the noisy-ranking model can be interpreted intuitively as a “worst-shot” contest, in which contestants’ performances are evaluated based on their most severe mistakes. The reverse-lottery contest model thus depicts a great variety of widely observed competitive activities of this nature. A handy closed-form solution for a symmetric equilibrium of the reverse-lottery contest is obtained. We show that the winner-take-all principle continues to hold in reverse-lottery contests. Moreover, we find that a reverse-lottery contest elicits more effort than a conventional lottery contest whenever the prizes available to contestants are relatively scarce.     

Information Sharing in Contests

We study the incentives to share private information ahead of contests, such as markets with promotional competition, procurement contests, or research and development (R&D). We consider the cases where firms have (i) independent values and (ii) common values of winning the contest. In both cases, when decisions to share information are made independently, sharing information is strictly dominated. With independent values, an industry‐wide agreement to share information can arise in equilibrium. Expected effort is lower with than without information sharing. With common values, an industry‐wide agreement to share information never arises in equilibrium. Expected effort is higher with than without information sharing.     

Platform market competition with endogenous side decisions

This paper develops a framework to analyze platform competition in two‐sided markets in which agents endogenously decide on which side of a platform to join. We characterize the equilibrium pricing structure and perform a comparative statics analysis on how the distribution of agents’ preferences affects the platforms’ profits. We also show that the market equilibrium under profit‐maximizing platforms leads to the first best social surplus, which illustrates the importance of the price mechanism to induce more balanced participation across the two sides. This framework can be applied to analyze market competition for “rental” or “sharing” platforms. In addition, we extend our analysis to consider an initial investment stage, which makes participants the owner of some durable goods to rent out.     

Contests over joint production on networks

We consider a network of heterogeneous agents where each edge represents a two‐player contest between the respective nodes. In these bilateral contests, agents compete over an endogenous prize jointly produced using their own contest efforts. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of Nash equilibrium and characterize the equilibrium total effort for every agent. Our model has insightful results regarding the network type, that is, depending on whether the network is bipartite or nonbipartite. Finally, considering the sum of all expected utilities as an efficiency notion, we investigate the optimal network structure.     

A statistical equilibrium model of competitive firms

We find that the empirical density of firm profit rates, measured as returns on assets, is markedly non-Gaussian and reasonably well described by an exponential power (or Subbotin) distribution. We start from a statistical equilibrium model that leads to a stationary Subbotin density in the presence of complex interactions among competitive heterogeneous firms. To investigate the dynamics of firm profitability, we construct a diffusion process that has the Subbotin distribution as its stationary probability density. This leads to a phenomenologically inspired interpretation of variations in the shape parameter of the Subbotin distribution, which essentially measures the competitive pressure in and across industries. Our findings have profound implications both for the previous literature on the ‘persistence of profits’ as well as for understanding competition as a dynamic process. Our main formal finding is that firms' idiosyncratic efforts and the tendency for competition to equalize profit rates are two sides of the same coin, and that a ratio of these two effects ultimately determines the dispersion of the equilibrium distribution.     

When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in conflict

This paper analyzes secession and group formation in the general model of contests due to Esteban and Ray (1999). This model encompasses as special cases rent seeking contests and policy conflicts, where agents lobby over the choice of a policy in a one-dimensional policy space. We show that in both models the grand coalition is the efficient coalition structure and agents are always better off in the grand coalition than in a contest among singletons. Individual agents (in the rent seeking contest) and extremists (in the policy conflict) only have an incentive to secede when they anticipate that their secession will not be followed by additional secessions. Incentives to secede are lower when agents cooperate inside groups. The grand coalition emerges as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a sequential game of coalition formation in rent seeking contests. Received: March 2004, Accepted: October 2004, JEL Classification: D72, D74 We thank Joan Maria Esteban, Kai Konrad, Debraj Ray, Stergios Skaperdas and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on the paper. We also benefitted from comments by seminar participants in Barcelona, Istanbul, Paris and WZB Berlin.     

The optimal entry fee-prize ratio in Tullock contests

We analyze a three-stage game where an organizer sets an entry fee for a Tullock contest event, and a finite population of homogeneous agents simultaneously decide whether to participate or not. We show that in the unique symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, the larger the population size, the lower the probability the agents enter the contest, but the organizer’s optimal entry fee-prize ratio could either increase or decrease with the population size. When the population size approaches infinity, the number of contestants converges to a Poisson distributed random variable.     

Do strategic factors affect adoption of profit sharing? Longitudinal evidence from Canada

Despite the growing interest in strategic human resource management and strategic compensation, the firm's strategic context has rarely been examined as a possible predictor of profit sharing adoption, especially in longitudinal research, nor have all three possible strategic alignments (internal, horizontal, and vertical) been included in the same study. Based on three panels of longitudinal data from Canadian establishments drawn from three consecutive time periods, this paper finds strong support for internal (within compensation strategy) alignment, as a high-wage compensation policy is a significant predictor of profit sharing adoption in all three time periods. At the same time, significant support for a diffusion or institutional perspective on profit sharing adoption is also noted. These findings highlight the importance of including both strategic factors (particularly those that may be associated with internal alignment) and institutional factors in studies seeking to understand profit sharing adoption.     

The relationship between product market competition and unemployment with profit sharing

We investigate the implications of product market imperfections on negotiated wages and equilibrium unemployment under profit sharing. We show that intensified product market competition reduces equilibrium unemployment in a strictly monotonic way when the trade union's bargaining power exceeds the profit share. If the profit share exceeds the trade union's bargaining power, the effect of product market competition is ambiguous: there is a threshold for the benefit–replacement ratio above (below) which intensified product market competition increases (decreases) equilibrium unemployment. The profit share and the union's bargaining power affect the wage mark-up, and thereby equilibrium unemployment, in different directions.     

Testing the purchasing power parity through I(2) cointegration techniques

This paper contributes to the empirical literature on the purchasing power parity (PPP) over the post‐Bretton Woods period by providing a time‐series based interpretation of the controversial evidence characterizing the dynamics of real exchange rates. It is shown that the persistence of deviations from the PPP between a set of European countries and the United States may be empirically attributed to the presence of I(2) stochastic trends in prices using Consumer Price Indices. Interestingly, the slow adjustment towards the equilibrium can be modelled through ‘integral‐proportional’ equilibrium correction models and this evidence can be partly reconciled with theories where the inflation rate reduces the markup of profit‐maximizing firms acting on imperfectly competitive markets. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Optimal Licensing Contracts and the Value of a Patent

We extend Kamien and Tauman's (1986) analysis of the value of a patent. We find that an inventor can always design a fixed fee plus royalty contract such that his revenue is equal to the profit a monopoly endowed with the innovation could make on the market. This implies that the social value of a patent can be strictly negative whenever the patented innovation is of bad quality. We also explain why a principal can have an interest in using performance-based contracts although the principal and the agents are risk-neutral, information is symmetric, and agents' actions are verifiable.     

Peer‐to‐Peer File Sharing and the Market for Digital Information Goods

We study competitive interaction between two alternative models of digital content distribution over the Internet: peer‐to‐peer (p2p) file sharing and centralized client–server distribution. We present microfoundations for a stylized model of p2p file sharing where all peers are endowed with standard preferences and show that the endogenous structure of the network is conducive to sharing by a significant number of peers, even if sharing is costlier than freeriding. We build on this model of p2p to analyze the optimal strategy of a profit‐maximizing firm, such as Apple, that offers content available at positive prices. We characterize the size of the p2p network as a function of the firm's pricing strategy, and show that the firm may be better off setting high prices, allowing the network to survive, and that the p2p network may work more efficiently in the presence of the firm than in its absence.     

Performance feedback in a group contest: A field experiment on electricity conservation

We conduct a field experiment on electricity conservation to study whether revealing both the competitive state and the social state in a group contest affects individual beliefs and efforts. Our experiment randomizes group composition, participation, and types of information received in the contest. We find that contestants without feedback about relative performance had difficulty assessing their group's competitive status, and laggards within a group tended to be overconfident about their relative contribution. In addition, we find that contestants receiving both competitive and social information were more likely to have correct beliefs about their positions during the contest and exerted the most effort. Meanwhile, contestants receiving no performance feedback did not behave differently from those who did not participate in the contest. Overall, contestants reduced their energy use by 10% during the contest. Our results support the notion that providing feedback is important in a group contest.     

Using profit sharing to enhance employee attitudes: A longitudinal examination of the effects on trust and commitment

The ability of profit sharing to increase organizational performance via positive changes in employee attitudes has yielded mixed results. Drawing on principal agent, expectancy, and organizational justice theories, we assess how perceptions of profit sharing (capacity for individual contribution and organizational reciprocity) alter organizational commitment and trust in management using longitudinal data provided by 141 engineering employees. Favorable perceptions of profit sharing served to increase organizational commitment while only organizational reciprocity predicted trust in management. The relationship between organizational reciprocity and commitment was partially mediated by trust in management. Implications for the design of profit sharing initiatives are noted. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

THE LIMITS TO EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT: PROFIT SHARING AND DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION

This article seeks to exsplore the ways in which profit sharing is used by employers as a means of securing more employoee involvement. Although this is the main reason employeras have gilven for introducing profit sharing, and has been a principal objective of the government's recent initiative over profitrelated pay, the evidence suggests that little so far has been achieved. By examining employers’deeep seated concerns about some of the implications of profit sharing, particularly those that involve disclosure of information, this article argues that employers are reluctant to pursue such a strategy of involvement because of the risk of stimulating employees to demand greater influence in how the enterprise is managed. This prompts a consideration of the conceptual ambiguity surrounding the notion of employee involvement, and the article concludes that the contradicatory implications this entails for employers renders it largely impotent except at the level of rhetoric     

Pay knowledge,pay satisfaction and employee commitment: evidence from Finnish profit‐sharing schemes

Knowledge of the pay system has been identified as one of the key elements affecting the success of the reward system. In this paper, the aim is to study how communication, performance feedback and membership length are related to profit‐sharing knowledge, and how profit‐sharing knowledge is related to profit‐sharing satisfaction and organisational commitment. The data is collected from Finnish personnel funds, which are deferred profit‐sharing schemes. Survey data from over 753 employees in 30 companies in different sectors were used. In studying the antecedents of profit‐sharing knowledge, we found strong evidence that better profit‐sharing communication and higher membership length increase profit‐sharing knowledge. Furthermore, we find strong evidence that the relationship from profit‐sharing knowledge to commitment is mediated by profit‐sharing satisfaction. We discuss the implications for management.     

Equity and Adverse Selection

We introduce concerns with inequity into the canonical adverse selection model. We find that aversion to ex post inequity is not constraining for the principal if the two agents are identical ex ante, but generally is constraining when the agents differ ex ante. Constraining equity concerns can lead to output levels that are either above or below standard levels, and can result in only one agent experiencing systematic inequity in equilibrium.