关于不动产税征收管理的一些浅析

"税收征管是税收政策",这是发展中国家和转轨经济国家财政研讨中的一个共识。对于不动产税而言,这句话尤其是真理,因为没有其他哪种税比不动产税更依赖于征管。不动产税征管的效果不仅影响到一国的财政收入,也影响公平和效率。在许多国家薄弱的税收征管是执行不动产税的一道障碍。地方当局通常没有能力去管理税收。许多征管工作是通过人工而不是通过计算机完成的。     

财政体制变迁与地方政府竞争

在我国体制转轨的初期 ,由于国有经济比重较大 ,中央政府对地方政府实行的以“分权让利”为核心的一系列不规范的财政体制改革 ,使得地方政府成为独立的利益主体 ,地方政府在追求财政收入上的竞争必然是所有制的竞争 ;在我国体制转轨的后期 ,非国有经济居于主导地位 ,如果地方财政分权进一步深化 ,那么地方政府在追求财政收入最大化上的竞争必然形成民主制度建设的竞争。     

分级财政体制下纵向税收外部性研究

相对于横向税收外部性强调同一层级政府间税收调整所造成的相互影响,纵向税收外部性强调不同层级政府间税收调整由于税基交迭所导致的交互作用。传统理论认为中央和地方政府间纵向税收外部性呈反向关系,实际上它也可能成正向关系,这取决于政府征收的是从量税还是从价税以及税收缴纳主体处于竞争市场的哪一边即是劳动力或商品的供给方还是需求方。如果中央与地方政府都对劳动力供给从量征收工薪所得税或者都对生产者从价征收消费税,都有可能导致政府间纵向税收外部性成正向关系。     

实体资本流动、地方保护主义管制与产出效率改善的非均质

本文对国内资本流动、地方政府对资本流动的管制及其属地总体产出效率改善间的关系进行了经验研究。研究发现:国内实体资本的充分流动能够提高所涉及地区的总体产出效率,但此效应只在长期得以体现。财政分权与"晋升锦标赛"制度安排下的短期收益-成本决策成为地方政府管制资本流动的行为逻辑。地方政府旨在促进属地资本自由流动的顺市场力量干预能够逐渐提升资本流动的边际产出效率改善;地方政府逆市场力量管制资本自由流动则在一定程度上降低了属地资本流动的边际产出效率改善。     

税收竞争、财政支出压力与地方非税收入增长

继"税收超经济增长"之后,地方政府非税收入规模的超常增长已成为新的财税研究热点。本文以此为分析对象,在中国式分权模式下构建地方政府财政收支决策模型,探讨地方税收竞争、公共支出压力与非税收入增加之间的内在关系,继而利用2000—2011年省际动态面板数据验证相关推论。结论表明,政府间税收竞争强度、以及地方财政支出压力的增加,均会导致非税收入规模的扩大;而通过提高财政收入分权水平,提升地方收入自给率,则能够抑制地方对非税收入的依赖。最后,本文就合理管控地方非税收入规模提出了相关的建议。     

地方政府间过度竞争的影响及其战略伙伴关系构建

在区域经济发展过程中,各地方政府之间的竞争既是发展的动力,又是发展的阻力。为了促进区域经济的共同发展,必须抑制各地方政府间的过度竞争,开展基于共赢基础上的有序竞争。本文分析了地方政府间过度竞争的影响及其根源,提出借鉴美国经验,从政绩考核制度、构建地区间协调组织结构体系、加强公众参与等方面构建地方政府间的战略性伙伴关系,以规范地方政府竞争。     

瑞士地方政府间税收竞争研究

国际财政学界普遍认为地方政府间税收竞争是一把双刃剑:一方面,适度的税收竞争有助于发展经济、限制政府规模无限制扩大等;另一方面,过度的税收竞争会导致地方政府财政收入明显下降,从而影响政府职能的有效履行。本文对瑞士的地方政府间税收竞争现状及其产生的后果进行了分析,并指出了其对我国当前进一步的财政分权以及我国地方政府间税收竞争模式构建的启示性意义。     

地方政府竞争过程中的双重效应问题探讨

摘要：在社会经济发展过程中，地方政府间的竞争应是正负效应同时存在的。正效应的存在，说明了地方政府间竞争存在的必要性与现实意义；而负效应的存在，则反映了在引导和发挥地方政府竞争优势的同时，仍需下大力气去规范各种竞争行为。依靠直接推动投资、增加优惠政策、实施地方保护等不合理与不正当的竞争手段在竞争中确实可以取得一定的成效，然而从长远的角度来分析，只有通过制度创新来形成一个更有效率的制度安排，才能取得真正的并具有持续生命力的竞争优势。     

哈大齐工业走廊发展循环经济的税收政策支持研究

税收政策对哈大齐工业走廊发展循环经济具有重要作用.目前,哈大齐工业走廊发展循环经济的现行税收政策支持状况还不科学、不合理,主要体现在资源税设计不合理,对增值税支持不力,消费税改革不够深入,对所得税优惠力度不够,缺乏专门的环保税种等方面.政府应调整与发展循环经济有关的资源税、增值税、消费税与所得税等税种,开征专门的环境保护税;完善中央和地方的税收分配体制,加强税收精细化、科学化管理,从而做好哈大齐工业走廊循环经济发展,实现哈大齐工业走廊可持续发展的战略目标.     

转轨时期的中国价税财改革:争论与启示

转轨时期价税财改革是中国自主改革的起点,是经济体制改革的核心,是推动经济迅速发展的关键,也是建立有中国特色改革理论的现实基础.通过发挥价格信号作用和财税组织收入分配的职能,中央政府快速建立起对地方政府和企业的物质激励机制,焕发经济机体的活力,促进经济迅速发展.转轨时期经济体制改革的成功,得到国内外的认同和赞扬.以至于诸多研究呼吁,应借鉴转轨时期价税财改革的思路,解决当前困扰经济发展的问题.本文通过回顾转轨时期价税财改革的历程、学术争论和经验教训,指出转轨时期的经济体制改革具有明显的渐进性和局部性特征.在经历最初的成功之后,各项改革措施之间的不兼容性日益明显,并积累了很多悬而未决的难题,加大了深化改革的难度.未来应明确改革的主线,建立整体改革的思路,健全和完善符合经济发展规律的社会主义市场经济体制.     

Tax competition,imperfect capital mobility and the gain from non-preferential agreements

The gain to competing governments from entering into binding non-preferential tax agreements (that prevents discriminatory taxation in favor of mobile capital) depends on the extent of capital mobility between jurisdictions. In particular the gain is increasing in the cost of relocation of capital and the fraction of the domestic tax base which is relatively immobile. We show this in a symmetric model of tax competition between two governments where all capital is imperfectly mobile and differ only in their cost of relocation.     

Why do most countries set high tax rates on capital?

We consider tax competition in a world with tax bases exhibiting different degrees of mobility, modeled as mobile and immobile capital. An agreement among countries not to give preferential treatment to mobile capital results in an equilibrium where mobile capital is nevertheless taxed relatively lightly. In particular, one or two of the smallest countries, measured by their stocks of immobile capital, choose relatively low tax rates, thereby attracting mobile capital away from the other countries, which are then left to set revenue-maximizing taxes on their immobile capital. This conclusion holds regardless of whether countries choose their tax policies sequentially or simultaneously. In contrast, unrestricted competition for mobile capital results in the preferential treatment of mobile capital by all countries, without cross-country differences in the taxation of mobile capital. Nevertheless our main result is that the non-preferential regime generates larger expected global tax revenue, despite the sizable revenue loss from the emergence of low-tax countries. By extending the analysis to include cross-country differences in productivities, we are able to resurrect a case for preferential regimes, but only if the productivity differences are sufficiently large.     

Developing countries in competition for foreign investment

This study analyzes the competition for foreign direct investment (FDI) among countries at different stages of development. It is assumed that domestic companies in a more-developed country use more capital in production and that wages in a less-developed country are lower. Countries can compete for FDI by increasing the supply of public inputs in the economy, in addition to (or instead of) offering subsidies or tax reliefs to foreign investors. The results reveal that if governments of competing countries are not allowed to discriminate between domestic and foreign firms, there may be situations in which a less-developed economy will attract FDI depending on the labor cost differential and the responsiveness of foreign investor's and domestic companies' output to changes in the supply of public inputs. If tax discrimination between domestic and foreign firms is permitted, both countries will optimally raise the supply of public inputs, but the more-developed country will always win the foreign investment despite higher labor costs. Thus, governments of less-developed countries may have an incentive to work on an international agreement to disallow tax discrimination.     

Cross-border pollution,public pollution abatement and capital tax competition

We analyze the case where governments have to use income tax revenue to finance public pollution abatement and relate the results to the existing literature on capital tax competition. We show that the impact of public pollution abatement on Nash taxes on mobile factor income is non-trivial and the standard results from the tax competition literature can be reversed. When the two countries are identical, the Nash equilibrium capital income taxes converge to the tax on immobile factors income as the degree of cross-border pollution converges to one. When countries are asymmetric and pollution is local the presence of public pollution abatement lowers the capital tax for the capital exporting country, while the impact on the capital tax of the capital importing country is ambiguous.     

逆周期资本账户管制对宏观经济稳定与社会福利改善的作用

资本管制能否有效抵御外部冲击实现宏观经济稳定存在争论,本文通过构造开放经济的DSGE模型研究投资限制和逆周期金融交易税等资本管制工具对于实现宏观经济稳定和改善社会福利的作用。通过比较不同政策安排下主要宏观经济变量的波动性和脉冲响应函数可以发现,采用逆周期金融交易税作为资本管制工具在抵御外部冲击、维持宏观经济稳定方面具有比较优势。设置投资限制的资本管制促进了货币政策的独立性,可以使货币政策专注管理国内的经济增长和通货膨胀问题。通过不同政策安排下的福利分析可知,增加投资国外资产的限制对社会福利的增进起到负面作用,增加逆周期金融交易税的资本管制却可以减轻由投资限制导致的资源配置扭曲,从而放松投资国外资产的限制从根本上提高社会福利。所以,在资本管制工具的选择上,采取逆周期金融交易税可能比采用投资限制更优。随着资本账户开放的基本条件不断成熟,用金融交易税取代投资限制更符合浮动汇率制和自由兑换的资本账户的需求。     

欧盟各国税收制度竞争与协调现状分析

伴随着欧洲经济一体化的不断扩大,欧盟各国普遍采用税收竞争的手段来吸引外来投资,改善本国企业竞争力,对于这种税收竞争所带来的后果,各国评价不一.文章试图通过对欧盟各国税收既有竞争又希望协调的现状进行分析,来探讨如何在欧盟内部消除有害税收竞争,实现税收协调的目标.     

"营改增"的经济效应与增值税制度完善:一个文献综述

本文全面地阐述了"营改增"的经济效应,着重分析"营改增"对企业税负变化、 财税体制改革与收入分配的影响,及其在供给侧结构性改革背景下的作用.剖析了已有研究成果的观点、 分歧与原因.结合文献及改革趋势,认为需通过减并税率、 清理税收优惠,以进一步发挥增值税中性作用;针对部分行业对过渡性政策表现出的不适或政策缺位,未来应逐步完善立法、 慎发过渡性政策;此外,结合国内外税制变动趋势应加强征管、 增强国际竞争力.     

Tax Competition and Tax Revenues

It is often feared that tax competition might lead to a “race to the bottom” and that the consequence of a reduction in tax rates on capital income would be shrinking capital income tax revenues and difficulties for national governments to perform their usual tasks. The following paper analyses what happened to tax revenues in a number of OECD countries. It turns out that taxes on capital income contribute to the financing of public expenditure to a more or less unchanged extent; nor are there significant changes in the level and structure of total tax revenues.      

On tax competition, public goods provision and jurisdictions' size

In this paper, we analyze competition among jurisdictions to attract foreign capital through low taxes and public inputs that enhance firms' productivity. The competing jurisdictions are different in size and mobility of capital is costly. We find that for moderate mobility costs, small economies can attract foreign capital by supplying higher levels of public goods than larger jurisdictions, without practicing tax undercutting. The classical result that small jurisdictions are attractive because they engage in tax dumping is recovered only for high mobility costs of capital.     

论国际税收竞争与竞争性的中国税制

本文从国际税收竞争基本概念入手,明确国际税收竞争与有害税收竞争的区别与联系.运用实证分析的方法,说明世界各国税收竞争的发展与现状,指出税收竞争是经济全球化发展的历史必然.通过比较,认为我国税制具有一定的竞争力,但仍存在一些不足.为了完善税制,本文提出建立竞争性中国现代税制的初步设想.