产权、股东制衡与高管薪酬

本文利用2001--2008年中国上市公司的高管薪酬数据,对大股东与高管薪酬之间的关系进行了实证研究.结果发现我国上市公司大股东确实存在"支持"效应,大股东可以对高管薪酬实施有效的监管和制约;国有股和私人股的第一大股东会采用不同的高管薪酬策略:国有股第一大股东一般对高管采用低薪策略,并且与公司业绩相关度不大;私人股第一大股东则制定相对较高的高管薪酬,并且注意与公司经营业绩的结合.此外,第一大股东如果兼任公司高管,则会削弱大股东的"支持"效果,甚至会转变为"掏空"行为.     

简析高级管理人员薪酬与股东财富关系

在公司制企业制度下,高层管理人员显现出越来越重要的作用,而如何有效地对高层管理人员进行激励,是公司治理机制中非常重要的一环。同时,高级管理人员过高的工资已经饱受世人诟病。因此,如何合理地实现股东利润最大化,又能合理安排高管薪酬成为理论界研究的热点。本文试图探究高管薪酬与股东财富的关系,进而通过股东利润确定高管报酬,旨在发现一条在公司中激励高管努力工作的可持续发展之路。     

高管薪酬存在同伴效应吗？

以2007—2017年间沪深A股非金融类上市公司为研究样本,重点探讨了高管薪酬同伴效应的存在性、情景因素以及经济后果。研究发现,高管薪酬同时存在行业和区域同伴效应。而且,上述薪酬同伴效应在环境不确定性程度和非国有控股程度高的公司中更为显著。此外,高管薪酬同伴效应与企业发展的关系因时而异,即短期内可促进企业的发展,但中长期则抑制了企业的发展。进一步发现,模仿是解释薪酬同伴效应的内在逻辑。另外,薪酬同伴效应降低了薪酬业绩敏感性。研究不仅在理论上丰富了高管薪酬的研究内容,同时为高管薪酬方案的制定以及同伴效应外部性的运用提供了指导和借鉴。     

高管控制权、薪酬与盈余管理

以2008-2011年度我国沪深两市的A股上市公司为对象,从管理层权力视角考察薪酬激励与盈余管理问题的内在联系。研究发现:在全流通时代公司完全有可能诱使管理层为满足激励函数而操纵会计盈余,以实现股票期权收益;在薪酬业绩挂钩的激励机制下,管理层权力大的公司其盈余管理行为更加明显,说明管理层权力的大小确实能够影响企业的盈余管理行为。同时,从公司和监管层的角度分别提出建立更为合理的与业绩挂钩的长效薪酬管理体系和进一步完善强制性高管薪酬披露制度等相关建议。     

公司绩效与高管薪酬关联性分析

公司制下的公司治理对现代经济社会有着至关重要的影响,公司价值最大化的目标即是充分满足各方利益,增加公司财富,从而使企业有长期稳定的发展。在这其中公司绩效的获得与评定又受到多个因素的影响也牵动着各方利益。因此,通过选取2009至2013年中一些上市房地产公司的年报等数据,进行了描述分析,进而对公司绩效与高管薪酬之间的关系形成了结论。结论表明,在房地产企业中,公司绩效与高管薪酬之间的关系显著,呈正相关,并且公司绩效与高管薪酬差距也成正相关关系。     

上市公司风险与高管薪酬关系分析

文章以我国2015—2020年61家不同行业公司为例,进行多变量面板模型设计研究和描述性统计分析,分析了高管薪酬与风险之间的关系。从不同的角度讨论了高管薪酬对公司风险的影响,研究结果表明,高管薪酬与公司风险呈负相关;同时,高管薪酬的变化会影响公司的风险。文章提出基于风险补偿的激励对我国资本市场不同部门公司的影响的观点,特别是考虑到管理者可以从其决策中选择影响公司风险项目公司的运营。     

管理层权力、TMT网络与高管薪酬

文章基于管理层权力理论和社会网络理论,以2010〖KG-*4〗-〖KG-*6〗2014年我国A股上市公司为样本,实证检验了管理层权力对高管薪酬的影响,并考察TMT网络的调节作用。研究发现：管理层权力显著提高了高管薪酬水平,但显著降低了高管薪酬业绩敏感度;而TMT网络显著增强了它们之间的相关关系。研究为管理层权力与高管薪酬之间关系的研究提供了增量证据,为完善我国高管薪酬激励制度、抑制管理层权力、规范高管之间的兼任行为提供了参考和借鉴。     

对外担保、掏空与外部审计治理效应

外部审计对大股东利用担保对上市公司进行掏空的行为是否发挥了应有的治理作用一直备受社会的关注。运用Logistic回归方法,以2006年中国上市公司的对外担保为视角,研究了对外担保与非标准审计意见的相关性,探讨外部审计的治理效应。研究表明:对外担保越多的公司越有可能被出具非标准审计意见;注册会计师对上市公司为除控股子公司以外的公司提供担保反应敏感;注册会计师对上市公司为股东、实际控制人及其关联方提供担保反应显著;高风险担保金额越大,上市公司被出具非标准审计意见的概率越高。     

企业业绩与高管薪酬的关系研究

随着委托代理理论的逐渐深化,越来越多的上市公司开始将高管薪酬与公司业绩挂钩,以解决管理层与所有者之间的利益冲突。高管薪酬的支付是否能为企业带来相应的业绩?将高管薪酬和企业业绩挂钩能否激励管理层?本文以2010年-2012年沪深A股上市公司为样本,实证检验了高管薪酬与企业业绩之间的相关性,研究表明高管薪酬和企业业绩之间存在显著的正相关关系,即业绩越好的企业,高管薪酬越高。     

基于上市公司薪酬数据的董事高管共谋现象研究

所有权与控制权分离带来的代理问题,一直是影响公司效率的核心问题,其中董事对高管的监督是否有效尤为关键。本文采用2005-2012年上市公司董事及高管的薪酬数据进行实证分析,以董事获得与企业业绩不对称的高薪酬为切入角度,得出我国上市公司存在董事高管之间共谋的结论。     

职业经理人薪酬实证研究述评

职业经理人薪酬是近年来国内外理论界关注的热点问题.本文对职业经理人薪酬的实证研究进行了全面回顾,并对今后我国职业经理人的薪酬研究作出了展望.     

An Examination of the Structure of Executive Compensation and Corporate Social Responsibility: A Canadian Investigation

We explore the extent to which Boards use executive compensation to incite firms to act in accordance with social and environmental objectives (e.g., Johnson, R. and D. Greening: 1999, Academy of Management Journal 42(5), 564–578 ; Kane, E. J.: 2002, Journal of Banking and Finance 26, 1919–1933.). We examine the association between executive compensation and corporate social responsibility (CSR) for 77 Canadian firms using three key components of executives’ compensation structure: salary, bonus, and stock options. Similar to prior research (McGuire, J., S. Dow and K. Argheyd: 2003, Journal of Business Ethics 45(4), 341–359), we measure three different aspects of CSR, which include Total CSR as well as CSR Strengths and CSR Weaknesses. CSR Strengths and CSR Weaknesses capture the positive and negative aspects of CSR, respectively. We find significant positive relationships between: (1) Salary and CSR Weaknesses, (2) Bonus and CSR Strengths, (3) Stock Options and Total CSR; and (4) Stock Options and CSR Strengths. Our findings suggest the importance of the structure of executive compensation in encouraging socially responsible actions, particularly for larger Canadian firms. This in turn suggests that executive compensation can be an effective tool in aligning executives’ welfare with that of the “common good”, which results in more socially responsible firms (Bebchuk, L., J. Fried and D. Walker: 2002, The University of Chicago Law Review 69, 751–846; Zalewski, D.: 2003, Journal of Economic Issues 37(2), 503–509). In addition, our findings suggest the importance of institutional context in influencing the association between executive compensation and CSR. Further implications for practice and research are discussed.Lois. Mahoney is an Assistant Professor at Eastern Michigan University. Her research is focused in the areas of ethics and accounting information systems. She has published in ethics and accounting journals including Journal of Business Ethics, Business Ethics Quarterly, Research on Professional Responsibility and Ethics in Accounting, Information and Organization. Dr. Mahoney has received several research awards, including Best Paper award at the Seventh Symposium on Ethics Research in Accounting. Dr. Mahoney is also actively involved in the American Accounting Association.Linda Thorn is an Associate Professor at York University in Toronto Ontario. Her research focuses on ethical decision making, the ethics of accountants and accounting students and ethical aspects of accounting information. She has published in ethics and accounting journal including among others, Business Ethics Quarterly, Journal of Business Ethics, Contemporary Accounting Research, Behavioral Research in Accounting and Audit: A Journal of Practice in Theory.     

The Effects of Fraud and Lawsuit Revelation on U.S. Executive Turnover and Compensation

This study investigates the impact of fraud/lawsuit revelation on U.S. top executive turnover and compensation. It also examines potential explanatory variables affecting the executive turnover and compensation among U.S. fraud/lawsuit firms. Four important findings are documented. First, there was significantly higher executive turnover among U.S. firms with fraud/lawsuit revelation in the Wall Street Journal than matched firms without such revelation. Second, although on average, U.S. top executives received an increase in cash compensation after fraud/lawsuit revelation, this increase is smaller than that of matched non-fraud/lawsuit firms. Third, fraud/lawsuit firms were more likely to change top executive when chief executive officer (CEO) was not the board chairman and CEO had been on the board for a short time. Fourth, fraud/lawsuit firms were more likely to reduce their executive cash compensation when profitability was low, firms were involved in fraud, the compensation committee size was small, and the board met more often. These findings indicate that although, in general, U.S. fraud/lawsuits firms did not reduce their executive cash compensation, those involved in fraud were more likely to reduce their executive cash compensation than to change their top executives. The finding, that ethical standards is not a significant factor for U.S. executive turnover nor compensation reduction, suggests that ethics appears to play no part in the board’s decisions, and that U.S. firms may have ethical standards in writing but they do not implement nor enforce the standards.     

经理人报酬与公司业绩之间的相关性检验

以我国上市公司2000、2001、2002年年报数据为主要分析对象,运用线性回归的方法对经理人报酬与公司资本成本及公司业绩之间的相关性进行实证研究,并得出如下结论:经理人报酬与ROA呈显著的线性相关性,与ROE、△SMVA非线性相关,与SEVA存在较强的线性相关性。通过实证研究,还发现经理人报酬主要激励当前业绩和未来业绩,当期激励效果直接影响下期业绩水平。     

现金股利与控股股东的利益输送行为研究——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

在存在控股股东的情况下,大股东的利益输送通常会造成对中小股东利益的侵犯,进而对资本市场的有效性造成影响。本文认为现金股利发放在中国上市公司中是作为控股股东利益输送的一种重要手段,对此的实证结果表明大股东的持股比例与公司发放现金股利的多少呈明显正相关关系;第二大股东和第三大股东不能对大股东利用现金股利转移现金进行监督;机构投资者的作用尚不明显。     

产权残缺与农民利益受损及补偿

我国农民利益受损的本质在于产权残缺;对农民利益补偿能否进行的关键在于补偿成本与收益的权衡。由于利益公共补偿在降低补偿成本方面具有优势,故宜以政府为中介对农民进行政府公共补偿。     

The Nature of the Firm, Agency Theory and Shareholder Theory: A Critique from Philosophical Anthropology

Standard accounts on the nature of the firm are highly dependent on explanations by Coase, coupled with inputs from agency theory and shareholder theory. This paper carries out their critique in light of personalist and common good postulates. It shows how personalist and common good principles create a framework that not only accommodates business ethics better but also affords a more compelling understanding of business as a whole.Joan Fontrodona is Assistant Professor of Business Ethics and Academic Director of the Center for Business in Society at IESE Business School. He is member of the Academic Board of EABIS and member of the Executive Committee of EBEN-Spain.Alejo José G. Sison is the Rafael Escolá Chair of Professional Ethics (TECNUN) with appointments from the Philosophy Department and the Institute of Enterprise and Humanism of the University of Navarra.     

农业污染防治的财政与市场补偿机制

农业污染防治的补偿机制涉及财政与市场两个方面。文章全面分析了农业污染防治补偿机制的内涵以及补偿资金来源、补偿标准、被补偿者识别和补偿方式,为我国农业污染防治的补偿机制建设提供了决策参考。