Optimally biased Tullock contests

This paper examines optimally biased Tullock contests. We consider a multi-player Tullock contest in which players differ in their prize valuations. The designer is allowed to impose identity-dependent treatments – i.e., multiplicative biases – to vary their relative competitiveness. The literature has been limited, because a closed-form solution to the equilibrium is in general unavailable when the number of contestants exceeds two, which nullifies the usual implicit programming approach. We develop an algorithmic technique adapted from the general approach of Fu and Wu (2020) and obtain a closed-form solution to the optimum that addresses a broad array of design objectives. We further analyze a resource allocation problem in a research tournament and adapt Fu and Wu’s (2020) approach to this noncanonical setting. Our analysis paves the way for future research in this vein.     

Risk preference heterogeneity in group contests

We analyze the first model of a group contest with players that are heterogeneous in their risk preferences. In our model, individuals’ preferences are represented by a utility function exhibiting a generalized form of constant absolute risk aversion, allowing us to consider any combination of risk-averse, risk-neutral, and risk-loving players. We begin by proving equilibrium existence and uniqueness under both linear and convex investment costs. Then, we explore how the sorting of a compatible set of players by their risk attitudes into competing groups affects aggregate investment. With linear costs, a balanced sorting (i.e., minimizing the variance in risk attitudes across groups) always produces an aggregate investment level that is at least as high as an unbalanced sorting (i.e., maximizing the variance in risk attitudes across groups). Under convex costs, however, identifying which sorting is optimal is more nuanced and depends on preference and cost parameters.     

On evolutionarily stable behavior in contests

It is argued in this paper that the solution concept of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) is an adequate analysis tool for contest theory. Moreover, it is shown that in a contest ESS always differs from Nash equilibrium, the hitherto dominant solution concept in contest theory. Finally, an interpretation of finite population ESS contest behavior in terms of Nash behavior is supplied.Received: 10 February 2002, Accepted: 8 July 2002, JEL Classification: C79, D72, D 74Wolfgang Leininger: I have benefited from the comments and suggestions of Burkhard Hehenkamp and two anonymous referees.     

Deadlines in stochastic contests

We consider a two-player contest model in which breakthroughs arrive according to privately observed Poisson processes. Each player’s process continues as long as she exerts costly effort. The player who collects the most breakthroughs until a predetermined deadline wins a prize.We derive Nash equilibria of the game depending on the deadline. For short deadlines, there is a unique equilibrium in which players use identical cutoff strategies, i.e., they continue until they have a certain number of successes. If the deadline is long enough, the symmetric equilibrium distribution of an all-pay auction is an equilibrium distribution over successes in the contest. Expected efforts may be maximal for a short or intermediate deadline.     

Contingent capital,capital structure and investment

We examine the interaction between investment and financing policies in a dynamic model for a firm with existing assets-in-place and a growth option, of which investment cost is financed with equity and contingent convertible bonds (CoCos). We attempt to clarify how CoCos impact on investment timing, capital structure and inefficiencies arising from debt overhang and asset substitution. We show that there is a conversion ratio (the fraction of equity allocated to CoCo holders upon conversion) to eliminate the inefficiencies. Our conclusions predict that debt leverage decreases with investment option payoff factor and the average appreciation rate of the cash flow. In contrast to traditional corporate finance theory saying that a firm's value decreases globally with business risk, our model indicates that it might first decrease and then increase with asset volatility.     

Innovation contests with entry auction

We consider innovation contests for the procurement of an innovation under moral hazard and adverse selection. Innovators have private information about their abilities, and choose unobservable effort in order to produce innovations of random quality. Innovation quality is not contractible. We compare two procurement mechanisms—a fixed prize and a first-price auction. Before the contest, a fixed number of innovators is selected in an entry auction, in order to address the adverse selection problem. We find that–if effort and ability are perfect substitutes–both mechanisms implement the same innovations in symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium, regardless of whether the innovators’ private information is revealed or not. These equilibria are efficient if the procurer is a welfare-maximizer.     

Precarious postdocs: A comparative study on recruitment and selection of early-career researchers

This paper investigates how the recruitment and selection for project-based postdoc positions are organised in the current academic landscape characterised by increasing temporary research funding and how principal investigators construct the ‘ideal’ postdoc. Our findings are based on a qualitative comparative multiple-case study in Social and Natural Sciences departments of universities in four European countries. This study contributes to the literature on the neoliberal university and academic staff evaluation by using a systemic, power-sensitive approach that examines how postdocs enter the academic system and how manifestations of precarity are exacerbated. Our critical analysis reveals three manifestations of precarity that the current academic system creates for postdocs, related to control, contracts, and careers. We discuss the effects for individual postdocs and their careers and the quality of knowledge production in public funded higher education institutions.     

货运配送中心最新分拣系统

采用货运配送中心最新分拣系统使系统的维护更加容易,处理货物范围更广,适用于集装箱自动搬运。     

管理教练、权变奖励、组织公民行为与B2B顾客满意

本文构建了一个有关主管行为、组织公民行为和B2B顾客满意的概念模型并加以检验。研究发现（1）销售人员的组织公民行为对于B2B顾客满意具有显著正向影响;（2）销售人员组织公民行为对B2B顾客满意的影响受环境不确定性的正向调节;（3）感知的管理教练行为和权变奖励均对销售人员的情感性组织承诺和组织公民行为具有正效应;（4）情感性组织承诺是主管行为对员工组织公民行为影响的中介变量;论文最后阐述了研究的管理内涵以及未来的研究方向。     

Fairness reactions to personnel selection techniques in Singapore and the United States

This study investigates reactions to personnel selection techniques from the perspectives of working adults in the United States and Singapore, and provides a comparison of the two samples. Differences in the cultural values of the two countries are used to generate hypotheses. Working adults in Singapore (N = 158) and the United States (N = 108) rated the process favourability of eleven selection procedures and then indicated the bases for their reactions on seven procedural dimensions. Implications for selection in Singapore, the United States and in international contexts are discussed.     

The coffee-machine system: how international selection really works

The literature on expatriate selection tends to present lists of criteria, with the implicit assumption that the process is formal and rational. The limited empirical work there is in this area suggests that these criteria have little impact on selection in practice. This paper argues that a deeper understanding of selection systems is needed and presents research showing the outcomes of different kinds of systems, suggesting that closed, informal systems predominate and outlining the practical and research implications of such systems.     

Elections and selection: The role of political ideology in selection decisions

Political ideology is a central belief that drives individuals' behavior not just in the voting booth but also in other aspects of life. As political divisiveness in society has increased, the ramifications of this shift may permeate organizations ultimately affecting how individuals interact with one another. Through the lens of social cognition and person-organization fit, this paper considers the effect of political ideology of job applicants in selection decisions by discussing 1) the definition of political ideology and subsequent stereotyping, 2) the increasing divisiveness rooted in political ideology, 3) the implication in selection decisions influenced by political ideology, and 4) the consequences for firm level diversity. Further, a model is provided to illustrate the relationship of political ideology to various phases of the selection process. Propositions to foster further study of these phenomena are provided within.     

On the natural selection rule in general linear models

We consider a problem of selecting the best treatment in a general linear model. We look at the properties of the natural selection rule. It is shown that the natural selection rule is minimax under to “0–1” loss function and it is a Bayes rule under a monotone permutation invariant loss function with respect to a permutation invariant prior for every variance balanced design. Some other condition on the design matrix is given so that a Bayes rule with respect to a normal prior will be of simple structure.     

Optimal information exchange in contests

We study optimal exchange of private information in a two-player all-pay auction contest with independent private binary values. A benevolent information center who is informed about the players’ values facilitates the exchange of information by disclosing a signal publicly. The informativeness of the signal determines the monotonicity of the unique symmetric equilibrium and the players’ expected payoff. We characterize the upper bound of players’ expected payoff and the corresponding optimal signals utilizing such a relation between the informativeness and the payoff. When the players are ex ante sufficiently heterogeneous, the optimal signals work through an information-rent channel by inducing allocative efficient contests. When the players are ex ante sufficiently homogeneous, the optimal signals work through an unlevel-playing-field channel by inducing asymmetric contests. In order to guarantee efficient allocation, a regulator can punish any exchange of information when the players are sufficiently homogeneous and impose no restrictions when they are sufficiently heterogeneous.     

Endogenous coalition formation in contests

This paper analyzes coalition formation in a model of contests with linear costs. Agents first form groups and then compete by investing resources. Coalitions fight for a prize that is assumed to be subject to rivalry, so its value is non-increasing in the size of the group that obtains it. This formulation encompasses as particular cases some models proposed in the rent-seeking literature. We show that the formation of groups generates positive spillovers and analyze two classes of games of coalition formation. A contest among individual agents is the only stable outcome when individual defections leave the rest of the group intact. More concentrated coalition structures, including the grand coalition, are stable when groups collapse after a defection, provided that rivalry is not too strong. Results in a sequential game of coalition formation suggest that there exists a non-monotonic relationship between the level of underlying rivalry and the level of social conflict.

“If men were supplied with every thing in the same abundance, justice and injustice would be equally unknown among mankind.” David Hume (1740), A Treatise of Human Nature

I thank Luis Corchón, Joan Esteban, Michelle Garfinkel and József Sákovics for their comments and suggestions on the paper.     

城市居住与就业的空间配合研究——以北京市为例

随着中国社会经济的发展,近年来很多地区都经历着快速的城市化,一些大中城市出现了普遍的非自然性产业演替过程,这个过程中又伴随着城市人口的迅速膨胀和城市面积的急剧扩张,多种因素的共同作用使得中国一些大城市面临着不同程度的人口空间失配问题.论文通过对北京市不同区域内3个社区进行实地调研,在考察了各个社区内部居民通勤方式和工作可通达度之后得出关于北京市空间失配情况的结论,建议规划部门和房地产开发企业对新出现的空间失配现象给予足够重视,调整按照旧有城市发展进程设定的规划或开发选址思路.     

供应链中考虑隐性知识转化的供应商选择

文中主要讨论考虑隐性知识转化时的供应商选择,并建立相应的模型进行应用分析。通过有无采购商参与两种情况下利润的比较,得出采购商参与的情况下可以提高供应链的整体效率的结论,给出供应链环境下供应商选择的新思路。     

浅谈科技研究选题的方法和技巧—以质量管理为例

在科技研究中,有时"提出问题"比"解决问题"更有意义,科技研究选题是科研工作中面临的一个重要问题。结合质量管理领域常见科学问题对科技研究选题的方法和技巧进行思考和总结,提出了科技研究选题中五种策略和思路:将现实问题提炼为科学问题;基于理论和现实的差距分析;将现有方法应用于新的领域;对现有研究成果进行拓展研究;将不同的思想方法进行融合。对不同的方法给出了相关研究实例和分析,最后简要指出了科技研究选题应避免出现的几种问题。     

On optimal favoritism in all-pay contests

I analyze the optimal favoritism in a complete-information all-pay contest with two players, whose costs of effort are weakly convex. The contest designer could favor or harm some contestants using one of two instruments: head starts and handicaps. I find that any given player’s effort distribution is ranked in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance according to how (ex post) symmetric the players are in terms of competitiveness. Consequently, as long as the designer values effort from both contestants, “leveling the playing field” is optimal regardless of which instrument is used.     

Integrated environmental assessment of the location selection with fuzzy analytical network process

Owing to the complexity of a construction project, the fuzzy ANP is helpful to deal with interdependent relationships within a multi-criteria decision-making model. This paper uses the Porter’s diamond model that influences how competitive advantages, which is a matrix providing a conceptual model for the main framework, as a construct for selecting the location of a regional hospital in Taiwan to determine its effectiveness. The applicability of our proposed fuzzy ANP model is demonstrated with a case study that summarizes an intervention in which the model’s framework and basic concepts were applied.