Policy Representation of a Parliament: The Case of the German Bundestag 2013 Elections

Since voters are often swayed more by the charisma, personal image and communication skills of the individual candidates standing for election than by the parties’ political manifestos, they may cast votes that are actually in opposition to their policy preferences. Such a type of behavior, known as ‘irrational voting’, results in the election of representatives who do not correspond exactly to the voters’ own views. To illustrate this, we consider the 28 German parties that took part in the 2013 Bundestag (federal) election and compare their positions on 36 topical issues with the results of public opinion polls. Then we construct the party and coalition indices of popularity (the average percentage of the population represented) and universality (frequency in representing a majority). In particular, we find that the 2013 election winner, the conservative union CDU/CSU with their 41.5 % of the votes, was the least representative among the 28 parties considered. The representativeness of the Bundestag is about 50 %, as if the correspondence with the electorate’s preference on every policy issue had been decided by tossing a coin, meaning that the Bundestag’s policy profile is independent of that of the electorate. The next paper, ‘An election method to improve policy representation of a parliament’ (Tangian 2016), suggests a possible way to surmount the problems revealed by our analysis. An alternative election procedure is proposed and hypothetically applied to the 2013 Bundestag, producing a considerable gain in its representativeness.     

The Third Vote Experiment: Enhancing Policy Representation of a Student Parliament

Since voters are often swayed more by the personal image of politicians than by party manifestos, they may cast votes that are in opposition to their policy preferences. This results in the election of representatives who do not correspond exactly to the voters’ own views. An alternative voting procedure to avoid this type of election failure is prompted by the approach implemented in internet voting advice applications, like the German Wahl-O-Mat, which asks the user a number of questions on topical policy issues; the computer program, drawing on all the parties’ answers, finds for the user the best-matching party, the second-best-matching party, etc. Under the proposed alternative election method, the voters cast no direct votes. Rather, they are asked about their preferences on the policy issues as declared in the party manifestos (Introduce nationwide minimum wage? Yes/No; Introduce a speed limit on the motorways? Yes/No, etc.), which reveals the balance of public opinion on each issue. These embedded referenda measure the degree to which the parties’ policies match the preferences of the electorate. The parliament seats are then distributed among the parties in proportion to their indices of popularity (the average percentage of the population represented on all the issues) and universality (frequency in representing a majority). This paper reports on an experimental application of this method during the election of the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology Student Parliament on July 4–8, 2016. The experiment shows that the alternative election method can increase the representativeness of the Student Parliament. We also discuss some traits and bottlenecks of the method that should be taken into account when preparing elections.     

Direct Election of Group Decision-Makers Can Facilitate Cooperation in the Public Goods Game

Research on social dilemma has shown that the delegation of decision-making to group leaders can increase cooperation in the collective action problem. In this paper, we show that the voting scheme used for the election of leaders could make a difference to the emergence of cooperation. We design a public goods game experiment in which actors elect leaders to make decisions on their behalf in the contribution to public goods. In particular, we compare the leadership elected from direct and indirect election systems. In direct election, a leader is elected directly by majority-votes from a group, whereas in indirect election the group is divided into smaller subgroups and a leader is elected from the elected subgroup leaders. We run a simulation model to show that direct election would choose a more cooperative leader than indirect election when voters’ preferences of leadership are not homogenous. A laboratory experiment with human subjects further indicates that people hold stronger preferences for cooperators as leaders in direct election than in indirect election, suggesting that the voting scheme has an effect not only on the processing of actors’ preferences, but also on the shaping of their preferences of leadership in the public goods dilemma.     

Measuring Representativeness in Different Electoral Systems,Using Italian and Dutch Data

I use power indices to assess the level of representative efficiency of different electoral systems. A representative democracy should “give voice” to as many people’s preferences as possible. This paper evaluates how close a given electoral system is to mirroring the distribution of votes cast in an election. To this goal, both power indices and differences between shares of votes received and seats gained are used. The distribution of power is also compared with both the share of seats of parties in the assembly and the share of votes obtained in the election. The results show that proportional systems and run-off majority are more efficient in terms of representativeness than first-past-the-post methods. Moreover, as the total number of seats in a parliament decreases, representative efficiency tends to increase. The analysis is conducted through simulations using conditional and real (Dutch and Italian) data.     

Approval voting in scientific and engineering societies

Approval voting is a system in which members can vote for as many candidates as they like in multicandidate elections. In 1987 and 1988, four scientific and engineering societies, collectively comprising some 350,000 members, used this election reform for the first time. Their reasons for adoption varied but centered around efforts to elect consensus candidates. Approval voting has indeed elected so-called Condorcet candidates, who can defeat all other candidates in pairwise contests. Moreover, these winners generally enjoy support among different classes of voters, so they are not merely lowest common denominators, as some analysts had feared. In at least one instance, approval voting would have led to a different winner from plurality voting (in which voters can vote for exactly one candidate); arguably, this winner would have been the better social choice because he had wider support than his closest opponent. On another occasion, approval voting led to ideological voting—in which the voting patterns reflected an underlying ordering of the candidates—but voting in most societies tends to be nonideological. Overall, the recent experimentation with approval voting has shown that it not only may make a difference but also elects broadly acceptable candidates.     

The Effects of Current Income Attributes on Nonprofessional Investors’ Say-on-Pay Judgments: Does Fairness Still Matter?

The say-on-pay (SOP) regulation in the Dodd-Frank Act (Public L. no. 111–203, H.R. 4173 2010) requires publicly-traded U.S. firms to hold a nonbinding, advisory shareholder vote on executive compensation. Advocates claim that SOP voting gives shareholders a mechanism to hold managers and boards more accountable. Critics contend that SOP votes may simplistically reflect shareholders’ reactions to the overall value of CEO compensation or the firm’s net income. However, based on prior research, we contend that market participants’ SOP votes are likely to consider current income attributes. For example, the market punishes firms that do not meet or beat benchmarks such as analyst earnings expectations, and that shareholders scrutinize the quality of the income sources of firms that consistently meet/beat analyst expectations. We thus expect that more shareholders will provide ‘agree’ SOP votes for a firm that consistently meets/beats analyst forecasts and does so when net income does not include (rather than includes) nonrecurring gains. Further, we consider whether perceptions about the fairness of CEO compensation play a mediating role in the relationship between the interaction of these two current income attributes and SOP votes. Results from an experiment using evening MBA students as participants indicates that the two current income attributes significantly interact with respect to the percentage of agree SOP votes, and that compensation fairness perceptions fully mediate this relationship. Further, the mediating effect of compensation fairness perceptions is robust to including CEO-level and other determinants found in prior research. We conclude with a discussion of our findings and their implications for public policy and research.     

Computer-assisted constrained approval voting

Approval voting, proposed independently by several analysts in the 1970s, is a voting system in which voters can vote for as many candidates as they like in multicandidate elections. Recently, S.J. Brams modified this system, introducing so-called constrained approval voting. It is designed for a professional association to ensure equitable representation of different interests. In his new system approval voting is combined with the constraints on the number of persons that can be elected from different categories of members. In the present paper the problem of constrained approval voting is formulated (following the work of R.F. Potthoff) as an integer programming problem. Some computational aspects of this problem are discussed. The paper presents a numerical example illustrating a possibility to apply the discussed voting procedure in the election of members of the Committee for Organization and Management Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences.     

No Show Paradox in Condorcet <Emphasis Type="Italic">k</Emphasis>-voting Procedures

In this paper we extend the negative known results about No Show Paradox in Condorcet voting functions and correspondences to the contexts of k-functions and k-correspondences, in which the outcome of the voting process is a unique k-committee (set of k candidates) or a family of k-committees. The main result of the paper states that for every Condorcet k-function and for every Condorcet k-correspondence, there are situations in which every optimistic or pessimistic voter with some specific preferences could manipulate the election by abstaining.     

Still Silent – Political Market Segmentation and the Case of Ethnic Women

This paper considers not only the nature of segmentation, but in particular political segmentation. It suggests that currently political parties utilise a simplistic type of segmentation and that they need to be more aware of the complexities of the electorate. In particular, the political parties need to be aware of the preferences of those who make up 52% of the population – women. The literature on attracting women voters is explored indicating that women have different perceptions of politics and politicians. To illustrate the point a discussion group with black and Asian women is presented. The campaigns and the results of the 2005 election are also explored to further illustrate the point. The paper concludes that the issues of importance to politicians are not in line with the aspirations and requirements of the female voters.     

Parental Gate-keeping in Diasporic Indian Families: Examining the Intersection of Culture,Gender and Consumption

Current debates within studies of election campaign management focus on the extent to which the process has evolved, becoming more centrally-orchestrated and professional, over the last two decades. The normative account is that election campaigns focus on news management and elevate the status of party leaders; mediatised pseudo-events have replaced direct interaction with the voter. However marketing literature, as well as work on local campaigning, suggests an alternative model is more successful for electoral systems such as the UK. This promotes a more disparate set of individually tailored campaigns focusing on issues relevant to constituencies. In 2005 it seems that parties were promoting this more localised approach, however do voters value this more postmodern approach, or is it the national campaign that counts. Research among voters within three marginal constituencies finds that both national and local factors are influential upon voter behaviour; furthermore however, a not insignificant group of voters make their choice based on the service provision of their local representative.     

Grey Power,School Gate Mums and the Youth Vote: Age as a Key Factor in Voter Segmentation and Engagement in the 2005 UK General Election.

This paper seeks to examine attempts by the main political parties in the UK general election of 2005 to segment the electorate according to their age and position within the life cycle. Particular attention is given to product adjustments and the party campaigns for the votes of older people, the "grey vote", as the political market shifts profoundly driven both by demographics, the ageing of the population, as well as by electoral behaviour, the declining participation of younger voters. Consideration is also given to segmentation of voters in the first age, the "youth vote", and the second age, "Generation Jones" and "school gate mums". The paper moves on to discuss age and segmentation in the context of elections remaining essentially mass communications campaigns, and the responses within civil society to the apparent power allocated to sub-groups identified as priority targets.     

Extrinsic Cues and the Evaluation of Political Candidates

In a political landscape where the content of politics is getting more and more complex and political parties less and less different, voters often base their voting behavior on extrinsic rather than intrinsic cues, a bundle of extrinsic cues constructed as an image and based on perceived personal traits. Based on survey data from a sample of Norwegian voters, this paper tests how a political candidate's credibility, charisma, and physical attractiveness are related to voters’ judgments of suitability for a leading political position. Across three different politicians, the results show that credibility plays a significant role in the evaluations performed by voters. More surprisingly, charisma does not have the expected effect, and to voters, physical attractiveness is found to be more important than charisma.     

Political Opinion Leadership and Electoral Behavior

SUMMARY

A micro-model that focuses on political opinion leadership within an extended nomological network is developed and tested. Data were gathered from a sample of voters in an election. The results indicate that political opinion leadership played a central role in the voting behavior. Key antecedents to opinion leadership were voter involvement, subjective knowledge, and indirectly, information seeking behavior. Important consequences were voting stability, perceived risk and political satisfaction.     

Searching for a Compromise in Multiple Referendum

We consider a multiple referendum setting where voters cast approval ballots, in which they either approve or disapprove of each of finitely many dichotomous issues. A program is a set of socially approved issues. Assuming that individual preferences over programs are derived from ballots by means of the Hamming distance criterion, we consider two alternative notions of compromise. The majoritarian compromise is the set of all programs supported by the largest majority of voters at the minimum utility loss. A program is an approval compromise if it is supported by the highest number of voters at a utility loss at most half of the maximal achievable one. We investigate the conditions under which issue-wise majority voting allows for reaching each type of compromise. Finally, we argue that our results hold for many other preferences that are consistent with the observed ballots.     

Does Political PR Enhance or Trivialise Democracy? The UK General Election 2001 as Contest between Presentation and Substance

Modern UK general election campaigns cannot be fully understood without assessing the role of political public relations by the major parties. They seek voter attention and commitment through the three 'P's of policy, personality and presentation. But presentation carries a health risk for democracy: does it illuminate or obscure policy and personality?

Monitoring and content analysis of the 2001 election suggests mixed benefits from political PR for politicians, voters and media but one firm conclusion for the latter two groups: making elections an informed and rational choice requires continuous scrutiny to see through the presentational trellis of political PR. Of all PR forms, political PR is the most influential because of its proximity to state and regulatory power: even so, its use in general elections cannot reverse declining electoral participation.     

Advertising competition in presidential elections

Presidential candidates purchase advertising based on each state’s potential to tip the election. The structure of the Electoral College concentrates spending in battleground states, such that a majority of voters are ignored. We estimate an equilibrium model of multimarket advertising competition between candidates that allows for endogenously determined budgets. In a Direct Vote counterfactual, we find advertising would be spread more evenly across states, but total spending levels can either decrease or increase depending on the contestability of the popular vote. Spending would increase by 13 % in the extremely narrow 2000 election, but would decrease by 54 % in 2004. These results suggest that the Electoral College greatly increases advertising spending in typical elections.     

Public Bad Prevention by Majority Voting on Redistribution – Experimental Evidence

We present an experimental study on voting behavior in groups of seven persons where public bad prevention depends on redistributing income by qualified majority voting. Although a payoff-maximizing voting pattern exists which guarantees a qualified majority – thus maximizing both individual and group payoffs – the qualified majority is failed in 27% (relatively costly public bad), respectively 46% (relatively cheap public bad) of all decisions. Controlling for different degrees of social distance when casting votes (i.e. anonymous versus with identification) we find that social distance matters when stakes are relatively low, inducing less efficient outcomes for the group when voting behavior is revealed. The endogenously determined status of subjects with respect to redistribution (unlucky subjects lose, lucky subjects win) systematically influences subjects' voting strategies and the collective outcomes, such that a higher number of unlucky subjects leads to less efficient outcomes for the group.     

Voting Paradoxes and MCDM

Many, if not most, problems in group decision making can be translated into MCDM problems by substituting criteria for voters. Yet, there has been very little discussion about the implications of various types of voting paradoxes to MCDM. The classic voting paradoxes, viz. Borda's and Condorcet's, have obvious implications for certain MCDM situations. The latter implies that the notion of the best alternative, given a set of criteria and information about the ordinal ranking of the alternatives on those criteria, can be essentially arbitrary. The former, in turn, demonstrates a particularly clear case of conflict between reasonable intuitions. Completely unexplored are implications of compound majority paradoxes to MCDM. The paper deals with Ostrogorski's and Anscombe's paradoxes which result from non-bisymmetry and non-associativity of the majority relation. Moreover, we shall discuss the implications of paradox of multiple elections which is a situation where the result of multiple-item election may be a policy alternative that nobody voted for.     

Marketing the British Conservatives 1997-2001

During 1997-2001 the Conservative Party utilised many concepts and techniques from marketing but this yielded little success in the general election. This article explores the story behind this result: the attempts made by the leader William Hague to use political marketing and make the Party more responsive to voters, the obstacles he faced in changing the Conservatives at all levels; the final product they offered to voters in 2001, and the Party's communication efforts in the years before the election and the campaign. Overall, analysis indicates the difficulty but also the importance of marketing political parties.     

Market Segmentation and Product Differentiation in Political Campaigns: A Technical Feature Perspective

The perceived importance of five technical service qualities (Gronroos 1984) or features (i.e. national and local policies, leaders, values and candidates), and voters’ ratings of the Labour and Conservative Parties’ competence on each of these parameters, were investigated during the 2001 British General Election using an a priori segmentation method and the classification tree statistical technique for data analysis. Voter ratings of the technical service features were found to be indicators of intention to vote. A product differentiation approach is most likely to influence voting intention, because the technical service features are more readily manipulated through marketing programmes than demographic and customer characteristics (Bucklin and Gupta 1992). Ratings of technical service features are stronger indicators of voting intention than voter demographics and characteristics. A product differentiation approach, based around technical service features, would be the most effective focus for strategy development in future political marketing campaigns.