Strategic instruments: legal structure and political games in administrative law

This article presents models of strategic behavior by agenciesand courts where the ability to manipulate the instruments ofdecision making, rather than merely selecting policy choices,allows actors to insulate their policy choices from higher levelreview. The theory is based on the notion that decision instruments(for example, rulemaking and adjudication for agencies, statutoryinterpretation and reasoning process review for courts) posedifferential costs and payoffs for both the initiating and reviewingactors, each of whom have resource constraints. Because theinitiating actor has the choice among instruments to make adecision (and to which a higher level reviewing actor is tied),the initiating actor can manipulate decision costs in a strategicfashion (choosing high-cost instruments to discourage higherlevel review, in particular). This article adds new insightinto how judges and agencies engage in strategic decision making.     

Did political constraints bind during transition?Evidence from Czech elections, 1990–20021

Many theoretical models of transition are driven by the assumption that economic decision making is subject to political constraints. In this paper we test whether the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of economic reform influenced voting behaviour in the first five national elections in the Czech Republic. We propose that voters, taking stock of endowments from the planning era, could predict whether they would become winners or losers of transition. Using survey data we measure the degree to which regions were ‘not afraid’ or ‘afraid’ of economic reform in 1990. We define the former as potential ‘winners’ who should vote for pro‐reform parties and the latter as potential ‘losers’ who should support left‐wing parties. Using election results and economic indicators at the regional level, we demonstrate that there is persistence in support for pro‐reform and communist parties which is driven by prospective voting based on initial conditions in 1990. We find that regional unemployment rates in 2002 are good predictors of voting patterns in 1990 and provide empirical evidence that political constraints bind during transition.     

Ambient-based pollution mechanisms: A comparison of homogeneous and heterogeneous groups of emitters

Over the last two decades, ambient-based tax mechanisms have been offered as a potential solution to the problem of nonpoint source water pollution. Previous theoretical analyses suggest that the performance of ambient-based tax mechanisms does not depend on firm characteristics, such as size, whilst policy discussions advocate that such mechanisms are best suited for regulating relatively homogeneous firms. Using controlled laboratory experiments, we provide empirical evidence that the distribution of firm sizes does have a significant impact on observed group decision making and further that heterogeneity has the potential to generate both some relatively desirable outcomes as well as some outcomes that are not attractive. These results suggest that richer theoretical models that capture important strategic interactions and social preferences are needed to better describe laboratory behavior and, by extension, behavior in potential policy settings.     

Tests of Income Pooling in Household Decisions

Using the Progresa data from Mexico, we investigate intrahousehold decision making using a variety of outcomes. We exploit both the experimental nature and the (short) panel dimension of the data to measure the impact of exogenous changes in the intrahousehold distribution of resources on household decisions. We test for global pooling of resources within households, which would correspond to the unitary model of household decision making. We also exploit a set of questions about power and the decision making process in the household to investigate aspects of strategic interactions between household members. Our findings confirm previous rejections of income pooling. We also cannot reject that the wife's relative income share is a significant determinant of the wife's decision making power in the household, with a higher share of income associated with more decision making power. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: J12, D13, H31.     

Caveat innovator: Strategic and structural characteristics of new product introductions

The assumptions underlying models of strategic behavior by incumbents are evaluated using a case study of a ground coffee product introduction. The assumption underlying earlier strategic models, that the entrant does not know the incumbent's payoffs after strategic have been tested, does not appear to apply. Instead, strategic behavior is observed to hinge on ex ante uncertainty about the structure of the payoff matrix and the incremental decision making which this uncertainty spawns. In this environment, strategies which create noise can slow learning and delay entry.     

Do reputation feedback systems really improve trust among anonymous traders? An experimental study

Feedback systems are claimed to be a crucial component of the success of electronic marketplaces like eBay or Amazon Marketplace. This article aims to compare the effects of various feedback systems on trust between anonymous traders, through a set of experiments based on the trust game. Our results indicate that trust is significantly improved by the introduction of a reputation feedback system. However, such mechanisms are far from being perfect and are vulnerable to strategic ratings and reciprocation. Our findings indicate that some changes in rating rules may significantly improve the efficiency of feedback systems, by avoiding strategic rating or reciprocation, and hence stimulate trust and trustworthiness among traders. In particular, a system in which individuals are not informed of their partner's rating decision before making their own decision provides better results, both in terms of trust and earnings.     

Saving behavior and cognitive abilities

Experiments on saving behavior reveal substantial heterogeneity of behavior and performance. We show that this heterogeneity is reliable and examine several potential sources of it, including cognitive ability and personality scales. The strongest predictors of both behavior and performance are two cognitive ability measures. We conclude that complete explanations of heterogeneity in dynamic decision making require attention to complexity and individual differences in cognitive constraints.     

The informational role of supermajorities

We study a collective decision making environment where an agenda setter makes strategic proposals to privately informed voters who vote strategically. We show that, consistent with empirical evidence, it can be optimal for the agenda setter to propose supermajorities. Due to an informational role that we unveil, optimal supermajorities can be less costly than minimum winning coalitions, even though more voters are awarded a positive share. We also examine consequences in terms of quality of decision making. We show that the introduction of a strategic agenda setter can lead to socially suboptimal decisions.     

Discretionary enforcement and strategic interactions between enforcement agencies and firms: a theoretical and laboratory investigation

This paper presents a game theoretic morphological analysis of the strategic interactions between environmental enforcement authorities and polluting firms. The models explore the role of discretion that such authorities enjoy, either in deciding how to pursue environmental violations (investigative and prosecutorial discretion) or in judging them (judicial discretion). The purpose is to identify both the optimal firms’ behaviour in terms of compliance, and the enforcement authorities’ optimal strategies in terms of enforcement actions to undertake. Consistent with the setting of the game theoretic models, the role of the enforcement agencies in deterring firms from polluting is, then, empirically tested by means of laboratory experiments. Laboratory evidence on compliance behaviour of firms when faced with enforcement conditions predicted by the theoretical models set up is discussed for the different experimental treatments performed. Overall, we suggest that making environmental enforcement less predictable for the firms, and thus creating a degree of uncertainty for the violators, can actually encourage deterrence and, thus, improve compliance. Thus, a partly unpredictable enforcement strategy may generate more compliance than an environmental policy that is known with certainty in advance.     

On the governmental use of multi-criteria analysis

Public decision making, especially about our natural environment, is inherently exposed to a high conflict potential. The necessity to capture the complex context has led to an increasing request for decision analytic techniques as support for the decision process. Multi-criteria analysis (MCA) is deemed to overcome the shortcomings of traditional decision-support tools used in economics, such as cost-benefit (CBA) or cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA). This is due, among other, to its ability of dealing with qualitative criteria (e.g. sensitive ecological factors), as well as with uncertainties about current or future impacts. Unlike CBA or CEA, MCA is rarely required by national laws or directives. Nonetheless, a number of recent MCA applications were supported by public authorities who either initiated or directly participated in such analyses. Given the theoretical assumptions about MCA's potential to support complex decision problems, as is often the case for environmental or sustainability policies, the key concern in our paper is to evaluate whether this potential has already been recognised in public decision making. For limitation purposes, the present work focuses on real-life case studies reported during the last decade with an insight in the initiation, the actors involved and the importance of the MCA results in the decision process. We argue that the significance and role played by MCA so far reaches beyond its current legal requirements.     

Investment decisions and coordination problems in a market with network externalities: An experimental study

We study decision-making and the associated coordination problems in an experimental setting with network externalities. Subjects decide simultaneously in every round how much to invest out of a fixed endowment; the gain from an investment increases with total investment, so that an investment is profitable iff total investment exceeds a critical mass. The game has multiple, Pareto-ranked equilibria; we find that whether first-round total investment reaches critical mass predicts convergence towards the Pareto optimal full-investment equilibrium. Moreover, first-round investments and equilibrium convergence vary with critical mass and group size in a complex way that is explicable by subtle effects of strategic uncertainty on decision making.     

A typology of strategic choice

There is an incredible paucity of studies focusing on what it takes to produce a successful strategic decision. The purpose of this paper is to advance the body of knowledge in this most important area. Using a two-dimensional typology of strategic choice, twelve real-world cases of strategic decision making are classified and evaluated. The results of these evaluations tend to confirm the typology of strategic choice and to suggest a need for additional research to validate the hypothesis that a formal decision-making process is conducive to successful strategic decision outcomes. This paper is intended for both professors and practioners of strategic choice.     

Environmental uncertainty,foresight and strategic decision making: An integrated study

This paper explores how the foresight practices and techniques that might be used for coping with environmental uncertainty are coordinated throughout large corporations and how their results are used for supporting strategic decision making. Based on an in-depth and multiple study of several companies, we analyse the main characteristics of environmental uncertainty - complexity and dynamism - that shape companies’ approaches to strategic foresight and uncertainty management. We explore the impact of growing complexity and dynamism on these approaches and the role of prediction and control in their design and implementation. We outline a conceptual framework for strategic foresight activities - and their relationships with decision making under uncertainty - as a planned learning process about the future which enables managers not to know opportunities and threats in advance, but to detect them more promptly and to react more effectively as soon as they start emerging.     

Contagion of Self‐Interested Behavior: Evidence from Group Dictator Game Experiments

We examine how group decision‐making affects other‐regarding behavior in experimental dictator games. In particular, we assess whether the effects of iterated games differ for group and individual decision‐making and whether the difference in decision‐making style (individual or group) changes the perception of social identity. We make two findings on group decision‐making. First, group decisions become more selfish when repeating the game after changing group members. Second, a dictator group donates more to a recipient group at the same university than to a recipient group at a different university. These findings are not true for individual decision‐making.     

Uncertainty, human action and scenarios

The “scenario method,” “scenario building,” or “multiple futures analysis” emerged during the last decades as a premier instrument for strategic planning and decision making in conditions of uncertainty. This article demonstrates that there is an intrinsic link between the scenario method and Austrian theory not only at the level of basic epistemological principles but also at the methodological and applied levels. The article also argues that the scenario method could easily be embraced as a part of the Austrian family of ideas and more precisely as one of the key policy applications or decision support tools informed by that school of thought. Blending explicitly and systematically the scenario method with the Austrian ideas and forcefully making the case for the scenario approach as a policy and business administration tool, is thus one of the most effective ways of reasserting the importance of Austrian insights in areas such as business studies, public policy, and organizational theory, areas that currently have a limited exposure to Austrian ideas.     

Bioeconomic modeling for control of weeds in natural environments

When a weed invasion is first discovered a decision has to be made on whether to attempt to eradicate it, contain it or do nothing. Ideally, these decisions should be based on a complete benefit-cost analysis, but this is often not possible. A partial analysis, combining knowledge of the rate of spread, seedbank longevity, costs of control and techniques of economic analysis, can assist in making a good decision. This paper presents a decision model to determine when immediate eradication of a weed should be attempted, or more generally whether weed control should be attempted at all. The technique is based on identifying two ‘switching points’: the invasion size at which it is no longer optimal to attempt eradication but where containment may be an option; and the invasion size at which it becomes optimal to apply no form of control at all. The model is applied to a woody perennial weed in a natural environment. The results show that seedbank longevity is the main constraint on the maximum eradicable area and spread rate is the main constraint on the maximum containment area. Stochastic simulations are undertaken to derive probability distributions of costs which are than used to evaluate the effect of budget constraints on areas that can be eradicated. We find that, in the absence of a budget constraint, it may be desirable to eradicate invasions from areas as large as 8000 ha, but when budget constraints typical of those faced by agencies in Australia are introduced, feasible eradicable areas are less than 1000 ha.     

Experienced versus decision utility: large-scale comparison for income–leisure preferences*

Subjective well-being (SWB) data are increasingly used to perform welfare analysis. Interpreted as “experienced utility”, it has recently been compared to “decision utility” using small-scale experiments most often based on stated preferences. We transpose this comparison to the framework of non-experimental and large-scale data commonly used for policy analysis, focusing on the income–leisure domain where redistributive policies operate. Using the British Household Panel Survey, we suggest a “deviation” measure, which is simply the difference between actual working hours and SWB-maximizing hours. We show that about three-quarters of individuals make decisions that are not inconsistent with maximizing their SWB. We discuss the potential channels that explain the lack of optimization when deviations are significantly large. We find proxies for a number of individual and external constraints, and show that constraints alone can explain more than half of the deviations. In our context, deviations partly reflect the inability of the revealed preference approach to account for labor market rigidities, so the actual and SWB-maximizing hours should be used in a complementary manner. The suggested approach based on our deviation metric could help identify labor market frictions.     

The Role of Capacity Management in Manufacturing Strategy: Experiences from the Australian Wine Industry

There has been little research focused on identifying the position and role of capacity management in strategic manufacturing decision making. This research presents the findings of a major investigation into strategic capacity management in the Australian wine industry. The research found that advanced processing technology is being used as part of a strategy for increasing capacity in this industry. It was also found that supply dependability and product cost/price were the most important competitive priorities for wine production, after product quality. All three of these were found to be directly influenced by the level of capacity management. The importance of capacity management varied, depending on the category of wine producer (32 different categories were identified). It was also determined that the strategic position of capacity management in the manufacturing decision making process is linked to production planning and control, quality control and assurance and plant and equipment.     

Circadian effects on strategic reasoning

The ability to strategically reason is important in many competitive environments. In this paper, we examine how relatively mild temporal variations in cognition affect reasoning in the Beauty Contest. The source of temporal cognition variation that we explore is the time-of-day that decisions are made. Our first result is that circadian mismatched subjects (i.e., those making decisions at off-peak time of day) display lower levels of strategic reasoning in the p<1 Beauty Contest but not in the p>1 game. This suggests that a cognitively more challenging environment is required for circadian mismatch to harm strategic reasoning. A?second result is that choice adaptation or mimicry (i.e., a?more automatic type of responding than what is typically considered to be “learning”) during repeated play is not significantly affected by circadian mismatch. This is consistent with the hypothesis that automatic thought is more resilient to cognitive resource depletion than controlled-thought decision making.