International Environmental Agreements,Fiscal Federalism,and Constitutional Design

In this paper, we analyze how the prospect of international negotiations over trans‐boundary pollution shapes intracountry transfer schemes when the governments of the countries' polluting regions are in charge of environmental policy and negotiations. Federal governments can implement compensation payments between domestic regions and matching grants prior to the international negotiations between the polluting regions. The subgame‐perfect transfer schemes fail to fully internalize the environmental externality, leading to an inefficient international environmental agreement. As the international spillover increases, the intracountry compensation rates increase while the matching rates decline, distorting the incentives for the regional governments in opposing directions. We also show that decentralization of environmental decision making arises endogenously.     

The Determination of Common Law Awards to Injured Workers

Prior to changes in the Western Australian legislation in 1993 an injured worker could sue his or her employer for damages at common law irrespective of the seriousness of injury or size of damages. A common law action is conditional on the personal injury being sustained during the course of employment, and caused by the negligence or breach of statutory duty of the employer. In recent years there has been concern expressed about the efficacy of the common law process in providing injured workers with awards that match their pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses. We address this issue by developing a model of the determination of common law awards in which we assume pre-trial settlement. We find that the economic mechanisms which bring plaintiff and defendant to a pre-trial settlement will not necessarily produce an award settlement consistent with the size of pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses. The model is subjected to an empirical examination using a sample of 384 plaintiffs whose cases were closed in Western Australia in 1990. Our results indicate that in practice the common law process fails to determine an individual assessment of injured workers' losses. In particular, awards represent an inadequate compensation for the losses suffered by severely incapacitated plaintiffs.     

Contingency Fees, Settlement Delay, and Low-Quality Litigation: Empirical Evidence from Two Datasets

Although flat fees are common for divorces, wills and trusts,and probate, lawyers in personal injury cases generally arepaid by contingency fee or at an hourly rate. Arguments havebeen made that contingency fees increase low-quality, "frivolous"litigation but counterarguments suggest that contingency feesactually limit such litigation and instead it is hourly feesthat increase low-quality litigation. Using a difference indifferences test and data on a cross section of states in 1992,we test whether legal quality is lower under contingency orhourly fees. We also examine medical malpractice claims in Floridausing a time series centered around a law change that limitedcontingency fees. We also examine the impact of fee arrangementson the expected time to settlement. We find that hourly feesencourage the filing of low-quality suits and increase the timeto settlement (i.e., contingency fees increase legal qualityand decrease the time to settlement).     

我国科技奖励制度的结构问题及优化措施

我国科技奖励制度在结构上存在人物奖缺乏、奖励对象狭窄、缺乏国际性奖励、单项奖太少、缺乏基础科学奖励等问题。相应地提出,以奖励科技人员为主、拓宽科技奖励对象、增设国际性奖励、重视基础科学奖励、调整政府奖与民间奖的侧重点等优化措施。     

Risk compensation in wages – a replication

We use data from Germany, The Netherlands, Portugal and Spain to test for the effect of earnings variation on individual earnings. We replicate estimates for the USA and find that the variance of earnings in an occupation affects individual wages positively while the skewness of earnings has a negative effect. Both results are in conformity with wage compensation for risk averse workers. First version received: March 2001/Final version received: July 2002 We are grateful to two anonymous referees for valuable comments.     

Runaway judges? Selection effects and the jury

Reports about runaway jury awards have become so common thatit is widely accepted that the U.S. jury system needs to be'fixed'. Proposals to limit the right to a jury trial and increasejudicial discretion over awards implicitly assume that judgesdecide cases differently than juries. We show that there arelarge differences in mean awards and win rates across juriesand judges. But if the types of cases coming before juries aredifferent from those coming before judges, mean award and winrates may differ even if judges and juries would make the samedecisions when faced with the same cases. We find that mostof the difference in judge and jury mean awards can be explainedby differences in the sample of cases coming before judges andjuries. On some dimensions, however, there remain robust andsuggestive differences between judges and juries.     

Economists and the ARC Large Grants Scheme: A Brief Report

We examine awards to economics in recent years under the Australian Research Council (ARC) Large Grants Scheme and speculate briefly on the effects of the new National Competitive Grants Programme. The primary determinant of number of awards by panel is number of applications. While no ARC rule guarantees panels will preserve success-to-application ratios by discipline, this seems a good approximation for economics and many other Social Science panel disciplines, though limited evidence suggests economics assessors give somewhat lower scores. Economics ARC award rates per staff member resemble those in other social sciences but are significantly smaller than those in philosophy, history, biology and chemistry.     

Settling Utility Rate Cases: An Alternative Ratemaking Procedure

The U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has long relied on settlement procedures to resolve its cases, and since the mid-1980s many state regulatory commissions have also adopted this utility ratemaking procedure. This paper examines the settlement practice at FERC to show that the flexibility of the settlement process could lead to settlement outcomes that Pareto dominate the litigation outcome. Negotiated settlements improve welfare because the players can make tradeoffs across the issues during the settlement negotiations. Rate moratorium, for example, arises endogenously as a settlement provision in about half of the major interstate natural gas pipeline rate cases.     

Skewness,short interest and the efficiency of stock prices

We examine the association between return skewness, short interest and the efficiency of stock prices. Since preferences for skewness have been shown to impact asset prices, we examine how skewness relates to market efficiency. We find that stocks with positive skewness are less efficient, which might be explained by investor preferences for positive skewness. Next, we document that short interest reduces both total skewness and idiosyncratic skewness. Finally, while research has shown that short selling can improve the efficiency of markets generally, we show that short interest’s ability to improve market efficiency is strongest in stocks with the highest skewness.     

Delay and Settlement in Litigation

Delay in litigation is a policy concern in many jurisdictions. Little evidence is available on the causes of such delay, however. We present a version of Spier's (1992) bargaining model of litigation and derive directly a functional form for the conditional probability of case settlement. We then estimate this and test predictions about the effects of legal costs and uncertainty over damages and liability on the conditional probability of settlement, using data from negligence claims against several NHS Trusts. Our results provide a direct test of the model and shed light on the causes of settlement delay in England.     

中国科技奖励制度存在的问题与建议

科学、完善的科技奖励体制,对于促进科技事业发展、激励科技创新十分重要。随着中国科技体制改革的不断深入,中国的科技奖励制度出现了新的问题。为了充分发挥科技奖励的积极作用,需要进一步完善中国的科技奖励制度。     

Optimal litigation strategies with observable case preparation

This paper investigates the strategic effects of case preparation in litigation. Specifically, it shows how the pretrial efforts incurred by one party may alter its adversary's incentives to settle. We build a sequential game with one-sided asymmetric information where the informed party first decides to invest in case preparation, and the uninformed party then makes a settlement offer. Overinvestment, or bluff, always prevails in equilibrium: with positive probability, plaintiffs with weak cases take a chance on investing, and regret it in case of trial. Furthermore, due to the endogenous investment decision, the probability of trial may (locally) decrease with case strength. Overinvestment generates inefficient preparation costs, but may trigger more settlements, thereby reducing trial costs.     

A Merchant Mechanism for Electricity Transmission Expansion

We propose a merchant mechanism to expand electricity transmission based on long-term financial transmission rights (FTRs). Due to network loop flows, a change in network capacity might imply negative externalities on existing transmission property rights. The system operator thus needs a protocol for awarding incremental FTRs that maximize investors’ preferences, and preserves certain currently unallocated FTRs (or proxy awards) so as to maintain revenue adequacy. In this paper we define a proxy award as the best use of the current network along the same direction as the incremental awards. We then develop a bi-level programming model for allocation of long-term FTRs according to this rule and apply it to different network topologies. We find that simultaneous feasibility for a transmission expansion project crucially depends on the investor-preference and the proxy-preference parameters. Likewise, for a given amount of pre-existing FTRs the larger the current capacity the greater the need to reserve some FTRs for possible negative externalities generated by the expansion changes.     

The Efficiency of Direct Public Involvement in Environmental Policymaking: An Experimental Test

In collaborative negotiation, stakeholder representatives are charged with the development of a mutually acceptable set of public policies. Although this approach has become popular in environmental negotiations, little is known about the characteristics of the outcomes that are reached. In this paper, we employ an Edgeworth box framework to investigate the nature of bargaining over public goods (environmental policies) that have multiple attributes. We then design and conduct laboratory experiments within this framework to test whether negotiated outcomes satisfy standard axiomatic bargaining predictions under a variety of conditions. Specifically, we test whether two parties with Pareto inefficient endowments of two goods will trade to Pareto improving and Pareto efficient outcomes, and to the Nash bargain in particular. We vary whether the Nash bargain coincides with or diverges from the outcome that maximizes the joint payoff, or the outcome that equalizes payoffs, and whether subjects are provided full or partial information. We find that bargainers reach Pareto improving and efficient outcomes across treatments, but withdraw support for the Nash bargain when it generates unequal payments or when payoff information is private. We conclude that this experimental framework offers a promising method for studying multi-attribute negotiations.     

Bringing science to market: commercializing from NIH SBIR awards

We offer empirical information on the correlates of commercialization activity for research projects funded through the US National Institutes of Health's (NIH's) Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) award program. Based on this analysis we suggest possible recommendations for improving this aspect of the performance of NIH's SBIR program. Specifically, we estimate a model of the probability of commercialization as a function of the project's ability to attract additional developmental funding, along with other control variables. We find that additional developmental funding from non-SBIR federal sources and from own internal sources are important predictors of commercialization success, relatively more so than additional developmental funding from venture capitalists. We also find, among other things, that university involvement in the underlying research increases the probability of commercialization. Thus, these factors should be considered by NIH when making awards, if increased commercialization is an objective.     

Selective Acceptance and Inefficiency in a Two-Issue Complete Information Bargaining Game

This paper explores the effects of a “selective acceptance” rule on the outcome of two-issue negotiations. The alternating-offer game introduced here allows for the possibility that settlement may be reached on one issue while negotiation continues about the other. This model captures features of laws that are generally believed to increase efficiency. The analysis shows that if one issue is indivisible, there are inefficient subgame perfect equilibria with no Pareto-improving alternative equilibria. With opposing valuations, rapid communication guarantees inefficiency. These are unique examples of this strong form of inefficiency in an alternating-offer bargaining game with complete (and perfect) information. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, J30.     

IMMEDIATE SETTLEMENT OR ENDURING A STRIKE: THE CHOICE OF SIGNALS

Some labour contract negotiations involve strikes while most conclude with immediate settlement. This article offers a model of union‐firm negotiation with private information to show that either strikes or immediate settlement will take place in the equilibrium. Different from most signalling literature where the signals are exogenously given, this article endogenizes the choice of signals. We compare two signals, the employment level and the strategic delay. We show that the low‐revenue firm will choose the signal which gives it higher payoff while separating itself from the high‐revenue firm.     

Revealed preferences for portfolio selection – does skewness matter?

In this article, we consider the portfolio selection problem as a Bayesian decision problem. We compare the traditional mean–variance and mean–variance–skewness efficient portfolios. We develop bi-level programming problem to investigate the market’s preference for risk by using observed (market) weights. Numerical experiments are conducted on a portfolio formed by the 30 stocks in the Dow Jones Industrial Average. Numerical results show that the market’s preferences are better explained when skewness is included.     

Court Efficiency and Procurement Performance

Disputes over penalties for breaching a contract are often resolved in court. A simple model illustrates how inefficient courts can sway public buyers from enforcing a penalty for late delivery in order to avoid litigation, thereby inducing sellers to delay contract delivery. By using a large dataset on Italian public procurement, we empirically study the effects of court inefficiency on public work performance. Where courts are inefficient, we find the following: public works are delivered with longer delays; delays increase for more valuable contracts; contracts are more often awarded to larger suppliers; and a higher share of the payment is postponed after delivery. Other interpretations receive less support from the data.     

SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS AS A RETIREMENT RESOURCE FOR U.S. NEAR-RETIREES

This paper analyzes Social Security benefits as a retirement resource (wealth and income) for U.S. near-retirees. We look at how the average values of several measures of benefits such as Social Security wealth and earnings replacement rates have changed from earlier cohorts to today's near-retirement cohort, examine differences among demographic and socioeconomic groups within cohorts, and discuss reasons for these changes and differences. We use improved data (actual earnings history data) to produce more accurate measures of benefits. The paper also uses some new benefit measures. Three key findings are: (1) average real Social Security wealth increases markedly as we move to later cohorts primarily because of increases in average real lifetime earnings; (2) replacement rates fall as we move from the cohorts of persons reaching 61 in 1993–97 to later cohorts primarily because of the phase-in of increases in the age of eligibility for full benefits and the increasing labor market activity of women; and (3) median Social Security wealth is much higher for women than for men because women live longer.