EU Migration to and from the UK After Brexit

In the 2016 referendum over the UK’s membership of the EU, the question of how Brexit would impact migration to the UK was a major point of contention. Those leading the campaign to leave the EU promised lower levels of immigration and the introduction of an “Australian type points based system” to regulate future inflows of EU nationals to the country, while at the same time maintaining access to the EU single market. At the same time, the status of EU nationals already living in the UK was not a key topic in the debate. The leaders of the campaign to leave the EU suggested that EU nationals already residing in the UK would be granted some form of residence permit and would retain most of their current rights. Likewise, there was little concern about the legal status of UK nationals in other EU countries and the argument that the “EU would be obliged to grant permanent settlement rights to Britons living in Ireland and mainland Europe”.     

Macroprudential Risk Management Problems in Brexit

Brexit is not only a historical chapter of the British — EU relationship, but it also carries immense challenges for fi nancial market stability in the short and medium run for the 28 member states of the European Union. The scale of these challenges depends heavily on the outcome of EU-UK negotiations. The European Systemic Risk Board plays a critical role in macroprudential supervision, a crucial policy challenge for the EU. However, there are doubts as to whether it will fulfill its mandate. The EU27 faces major problems in terms of prudential supervision after Brexit since a very large part of their wholesale banking markets are in the UK and thus will not be regulated by the EU after 29 March 2019. Indications point to a considerable risk of a new transatlantic banking crisis in the future.     

Brexit und die Zukunft Europas – eine spieltheoretische Einordnung

After the Brexit referendum’s leave outcome last summer, the new relationship between the UK and the EU has to be shaped institutionally. For the two bargaining parties the question now is which negotiation strategy to take. In order to choose the optimal strategy, the players have to factor in their time preferences. A game theoretical approach yields that the EU — no matter what is economically feasible in the short run — has to play a tough negotiation strategy if they care about the long run. This result is not a question of punishment but of pure economic rationale.     

Financial systems in financial crisis — An analysis of banking systems in the EU

This Forum aims to systematically describe and analyse the evolution of national financial systems within the EU over the past three decades. It analyses the processes of financialisation that have dominated this period as well as the causes and consequences of the financial crisis from the perspectives of five individual member states — Germany, France, the UK, Italy and Spain. Furthermore, policy proposals which could change the role of the financial system to better serve economic and social objectives are also put forward.     

The New Political Economy of EU State Aid Policy

Despite its importance and singularity, the EU’s state aid policy has attracted less scholarly attention than other elements of EU competition policy. Introducing the themes addressed by the special issue, this article briefly reviews the development of EU policy and highlights why the control of state aid matters. The Commission’s response to the current economic crisis notably in banking and the car industry is a key concern, but the interests of the special issue go far beyond. They include: the role of the European Commission in the development of EU policy, the politics of state aid, and a clash between models of capitalism. The special issue also examines the impact of EU policy. It investigates how EU state aid decisions affect not only industrial policy at the national level (and therefore at the EU level), but the welfare state and territorial relations within federal member states, the external implications of EU action and the strategies pursued by the Commission to limit any potential disadvantage to European firms, and the conflict between the EU’s expanding legal order and national.     

EU Financial Market Access After Brexit

Brexit means Brexit, or out means out — and that includes the UK’s exit from the single financial market. With financial services accounting for about eight per cent of the country’s GDP, it is understandable why the UK attaches immense importance to retaining access to the EU’s single market. But putting a mutually acceptable regime in place will take years of negotiations, and the final agreement will clearly allow much less access than UK-licensed firms enjoy today.     

Wie geht es mit dem Brexit weiter?

The UK’s 2016 EU referendum may account for great income losses in the UK. Gabriel Felbermayr et al. use a “new” quantitative trade model to assess various Brexit scenarios. The results broadly show that all EU member states lose, and the relative losses in the UK are about five times those of the average remaining EU country. These findings have important implications for the EU’s negotiation strategy. The outcome depends largely on the decisions about trade relations. Michael Hüther thinks that the UK is heading for an extremely hard Brexit and that it already shows. Therefore, the UK government should work out a consistent industrial policy and make up its mind about its preferences on its future economic relationship with its neighbours. In light of the currently very close and mutually welfare-enhancing business relations between the EU27 and the UK, one of the central tasks and challenges of the Brexit negotiations is undoubtedly the creation of a new supportive post-supranational legal framework governing these economic transactions in the future. Andreas Grimmel argues that the EU’s crises are largely the result of a certain mode of integration that is based on actors’ interests rather than on a comprehensive constitutional framework.     

Managing the reputation of the banking industry after the global financial crisis: Implications of public anger,processing depth and retroactive memory interference for public recall of events

The global financial crisis of 2007/2008 devastated the reputation of the UK banking industry. This paper examines possible connections between the depth of an individual's cognitive processing of information about the banking industry's role in the onset of the crisis obtained from UK media (and elsewhere) and the subsequent extent and accuracy of the person's memory of events. Depth of processing was posited to depend on the level of an individual's feelings of anger at the banks' reported behaviour before and during the crisis and on the degree to which a person had suffered financially as a consequence of the crisis. A number of hypotheses were developed on the basis of Nabi's (1999) cognitive functional model and were tested via a survey of 413 members of the public in Greater London. It was further hypothesised that, because media coverage of the banks' involvement in the crisis was largely hostile, many members of the public attributed blame for the crisis mainly to the banks, resulting in extensive feelings of anger and hence deeper cognitive processing.     

The Impact of the Recession on Competition Policy: Amending the Economic Constitution?

The strengths of the European competition regime are outlined before identifying challenges presented by the financial crisis. The argument moves from enforcement to systemic threats to the credibility of the economic models on which modern competition policy is based. It then turns from banking failures to the crisis in the European motor industry. It suggests that competition policy comprises an ‘economic constitution’ for the EU which is under threat, but registers the relative complacency of the competition agencies, and argues for a redefinition of policy. The conclusion suggests that the regulatory relationship between the state and the private sector will reflect scepticism about the market and that political changes in the UK and Europe offer radical choices between a reinforced or a marginalised competition policy which the competition policy ‘community’ needs to confront.     

Accounting for the Mexican banking crisis

The Mexican banking crisis of 1994–1995 has widely been interpreted as the victim of the balance-of-payments crisis, rather than its cause. After all, Mexican banks had been enjoying high capitalization ratios, deemed to be more than sufficient to deal with the increased risk of non-performing loans. This paper, however, suggests that to a large extent Mexican accounting practices — rather than sound principles — were responsible for the apparent good health of the banking system. The role of banks in causing the Mexican crisis may therefore have been greater than previously thought.     

Multinational companies in the EU and European Works Councils

In June the EU Council of Ministers (excluding the UK) took up a common position concerning European Works Councils. The establishment of such Councils would grant certain information and consultation rights to the workers of multinational companies. The following paper looks at the importance of MNCs in the EU and tries to assess the extent to which European Works Councils could cope with the social problems arising in these MNCs.     

A quest for “transparency” in the Spanish timeshare market. What will EU Directive 94/47 bring?

Timeshare should be viewed more as a consumer product than as a real estate transaction. It is not, however, a single product. The many schemes may ultimately be grouped into two categories: proprietary and non-proprietary. In Spain, there are co-ownership formulas with access to the Land Registry and contractual schemes, mostly international, governed by the conflicts rules of the Rome Convention. As yet no final draft has been submitted to implement the new EU Directive 94/47. In the paper, special consideration is given to this Directive developed in the context of Article 100A and aimed at the completion of the internal market. It refers only to certain aspects of the timeshare contract — duties of disclosure and how they are carried out, and the “cooling-off” period with withdrawal rights — and, even in these cases, only minimum standard rules have been set up, leaving further regulation to individual states. Steps are to be taken by Member States to ensure that the protection afforded by the Directive is not lost by an exotic choice of law. Consumer protection should restore freedom of contract. Additional tourist information and local supervisory activities should increase the “transparency.”     

New impetus for EU taxation policy

The financial crisis has exposed all EU Member States ??to different degrees ??with a double economic policy challenge: to foster sustainable economic growth and to consolidate public finances. Can the governments in the EU afford to forego the benefits of targeted tax measures at EU level ??tapping the growth potential of the internal market by reducing tax obstacles and improving tax collection on cross-border activities within the EU? This paper provides a short review of the varying tax structures in the EU Member States, discusses the interdependencies as well as the EU dimension of their tax policies and gives an overview on current and future tax initiatives at EU level.     

The CAP in disarray: EU commission proposes basic direct payments to EU farmers

Direct payments were originally justified as a mechanism to compensate farmers for the income loss incurred due to reduced intervention prices. However, this rationale is not valid any more, and a new justification for basic income support by granting basic decoupled direct payments has been proposed by the EU Commission. The following paper identifies a number of problems related to this proposal.     

欧洲债务危机对中国经济的影响分析

随着希腊经济危机的加剧,成为全球关注的热点。由于,欧盟在处理希腊债务危机的问题上没有得到有效的解决,使得希腊债务危机进一步蔓延,导致银行危机与债务危机并发,逐渐扩散的整个欧元区,大致欧洲出现了严重的债务危机。本文通过对欧洲债务危机的分析,着重研究欧洲债务危机对中国经济的影响。     

Financial Instruments and Promotional Banking in the EU are Growing — But is this Justified?

Institutions and the European Investment Bank are at the forefront of EU investment policy. Their role is expanding and it is now a widely-held position that an improvement in the economy will not eliminate the need for their intervention. The proposals for the 2021–2027 MFF launch more financial instruments and present ‘InvestEU’ as a larger more powerful version of the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI). However, promotional banking is often misunderstood and so is the actual size of promotional banking in Europe in which InvestEU will operate.     

The cyclical impact of EU cohesion policy in fast growing EU countries

Most of the newly acceded central and east European EU countries are among the main beneficiaries of EU Cohesion Policy. The main objective of this policy is to improve the long-term growth and employment prospects of the supported regions, and thereby to support convergence towards higher levels of per capita income. In the short run, however, EU Cohesion Policy may at times amplify macroeconomic challenges for supported countries. In periods of a downturn of the economy it can have a stabilising impact. During periods of unsustainably fast economic growth, however, its short-term demand effects may contribute to internal and/or external macroeconomic imbalances. Economic policymakers should thus ensure that EU Cohesion Policy enhances long-term productivity, while avoiding, in times of overheating, an increased risk of unsustainable developments as a result of the additional demand stimulus from EU Cohesion Policy. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Central Bank. The authors are grateful to Martin Bijsterbosch, Gesa Miehe-Nordmeyer, Ad van Riet, Philipp Rother and Desom Weller for their helpful comments.     

Brexit Poker — Wer hat die besseren Karten in den Austrittsverhandlungen?

The political, economic and legal situation of Great Britain vis-à-vis European Union in the aftermath of the membership referendum and awaiting the commencement of withdrawal negotiations is interesting. The authors summarise the legal controversy in the UK over the powers and procedures needed to be complied with in order to duly trigger the Brexit. They then sketch the legal framework as provided by the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to reconstruct the decision-making architecture under which parties to the upcoming negotiations will have to make their choices. After outlining the opportunity cost for Great Britain associated with leaving the Union, in particular those regarding the financial institutions and foreign direct investments, they conclude that decision-making architecture governing the upcoming withdrawal negotiations puts Brussels in pole position vis-à-vis London. It is likely that Britain will have to accept transfer payments to the EU similar to, if not higher than the net transfers that have been due so far. Some degree of the compliance with the acquis communautaire, at least with regard to the treaty’s fundamental freedoms (goods, workers, services, establishment and capital) will most likely also be expected from London, if it wants to benefit from access to the European market after the termination of its EU membership.     

Incentive pay and bank risk-taking: Evidence from Austrian,German, and Swiss banks

We use payroll data in the Austrian, German, and Swiss banking sector to identify incentive pay in the critical banking segments of treasury/capital market management and investment banking for 67 banks. We document an economically significant correlation of incentive pay with both the level and volatility of bank trading income—particularly for the pre-crisis period 2003–2007, in which incentive pay was strongest. This result is robust if we instrument the bonus share in the capital market divisions with the strength of incentive pay in unrelated bank divisions like retail banking. Moreover, pre-crisis incentive pay appears too strong for an optimal trade-off between trading income and risk, which maximizes the net present value of trading income. Further analyses indicate that the bonus moderation during the crisis has removed excessive pre-crisis incentive pay.     

E-coli,Repo Madness,and the Financial Crisis

All bond prices plummeted (spreads rose) during the financial crisis, not just the prices of subprime-related bonds. These price declines were because of a banking panic in which institutional investors and firms refused to renew sale and repurchase agreements (repos)—short-term, collateralized, agreements that the U.S. Federal Reserve rightly used to count as money. Collateral for repos was, to a large extent, securitized bonds. Firms were forced to sell assets as a result of the banking panic, reducing all bond prices and creating losses. There is nothing mysterious or irrational about the panic. There were genuine fears about the locations of subprime risk concentrations among counterparties. This banking system (the “shadow” or “parallel” banking system)—repos based on securitization—is a genuine banking system, as large as the traditional, regulated banking system. It is of critical importance to the economy because it is the funding basis for the traditional banking system. Without it, traditional banks will not lend and credit will not be created.