Herding and bank runs

Traditional models of bank runs do not allow for herding effects, because in these models withdrawal decisions are assumed to be made simultaneously. I extend the banking model to allow a depositor to choose his withdrawal time. When he withdraws depends on his consumption type (patient or impatient), his private, noisy signal about the quality of the bank's portfolio, and the withdrawal histories of the other depositors. Some of these runs are efficient in that the bank is liquidated before the portfolio worsens. Others are not efficient; these are cases in which the herd is misled.     

Bank incentives, contract design and bank runs

We study the Diamond-Dybvig [Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity, J. Polit. Econ. 91 (1983) 401-419] model as developed in Green and Lin [Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation, J. Econ. Theory 109 (2003) 1-23] and Peck and Shell [Equilibrium bank runs, J. Polit. Econ. 111 (2003) 103-123]. We dispense with the notion of a bank as a coalition of depositors. Instead, our bank is a self-interested agent with a technological advantage in record-keeping. We examine the implications of the resulting agency problem for the design of bank contracts and the possibility of bank-run equilibria. For a special case, we discover that the agency problem may or may not simplify the qualitative structure of bank liabilities. We also find that the uniqueness result in Green and Lin [Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation, J. Econ. Theory 109 (2003) 1-23] is robust to our form of agency, but that the non-uniqueness result in Peck and Shell [Equilibrium bank runs, J. Polit. Econ. 111 (2003) 103-123] is not.     

Private money and bank runs

Abstract This paper studies bank runs in a model with private money. We show that allowing claims on demand deposits to circulate as a medium of exchange can help prevent bank runs. In our model, there exists a unique banking equilibrium where no one demands early withdrawals of real goods and agents in need of liquidity use private money to finance consumption. With private money, the unique equilibrium not only eliminates bank runs but also improves banking efficiency. The implications of our model are consistent with the evidence from the banking history of the United States.     

Borrower runs

Microfinance institutions and other lenders in developing countries rely on the promise of future loans to induce repayment. However, if borrowers expect that others will default, and so loans will no longer be available in the future, then they will default as well. We refer to such contagion as a borrower run. The optimal lending contract must provide additional repayment incentives to counter this tendency to default.     

Endogenous growth, monetary shocks and nominal rigidities

We introduce endogenous growth in a standard NK model with staggered prices and wages. We find that the source of nominal rigidities, the shock persistence and the type of Taylor rule affect the relationship between monetary volatility and growth.     

Non linear and asymmetric linkages between real growth in the Euro area and global financial market conditions: New evidence

This paper deals with transition mechanisms through which financial market conditions affect real economic growth in the Euro area. The informational content of financial variables for predicting real economic growth is assessed, allowing for asymmetric responses to shocks. A nonlinear framework is developed based on a smooth transition model for which the effects of shocks can vary across business cycles when financial indicators modify both the endogenous and state variables. Global financial variables are shown to significantly affect real growth in the Euro area, particularly during periods of recession. Changes in stock market index and yield slope have asymmetric effects on real growth. In recessionary periods, the slope of the US yield curve does not have a significant impact on growth in the Euro area.     

Last bank standing: What do I gain if you fail?

Banks attitude towards speculative lending is typically regarded as the result of trading-off the short-term gains from risk-taking against the risk of loss of charter value. We study the trade-off between stability and competition in a dynamic setting where charter value depends on future market competition. Promoting the takeover of failed banks by solvent institutions results in greater market concentration and larger rents for the surviving incumbents. This converts banks’ speculative lending decisions into strategic substitutes, granting an additional incentive to remain solvent. Entry policy may subsequently serve to fine-tune the trade-off between competition and stability.     

Activity strategies,information asymmetry,and bank opacity

Using a large panel of US bank holding companies from 2001 to 2015, we investigate the association between functional diversification and bank earnings management. We document a positive relationship between bank earnings management and bank diversification. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that diversification increases the asymmetric information of banks, leading to greater discretionary power by bank managers. This effect is most prevalent in smaller banks and non-dividend paying banks. The impact of diversification on earnings management is less pronounced during the crisis. Our study is of interest to regulators and other stakeholders who examine factors which affect behavior of bank managers.     

Foreign bank entry,bank efficiency and market power in Central and Eastern European Countries1

This article analyses the implications of the recently observed sharp expansion of foreign banks in the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) as measured by equity ownership. We show that the mode of foreign entry has a pivotal impact on the post‐entry performance of banks in CEECs. Foreign greenfield banks are characterized by superior cost efficiency, compared with domestic and foreign‐acquired banks. The efficiency of foreign‐acquired banks deteriorates in the initial year of acquisition, but improves thereafter. Banks acquired by foreigners have less market power relative to domestic and foreign greenfield banks. Overall, the CEEC banking sectors have benefited from the increased foreign bank participation, both in terms of higher efficiency and more competition.     

Economic growth, labor market and demographic patterns

This study addresses the dynamic interaction between income growth, patterns of demographic variables, and characteristics of the labor market. We attempt to provide an endogenous explanation for the origin and nature of long-run sustained oscillations in the population and in economic variables. First, we develop an economic growth model containing unemployment. The resulting dynamics reveal that the emergence of irregular sustained oscillations is related to the lack of sensitivity in wage growth to changes in the employment rate. Next, labor force growth is endogenized in the basic model through micro-founded fertility choices of individuals. By introducing the endogenous fertility rate into the basic model, we generate a demographic transition. Next, consistent with Malthusian cycle literature, the inevitable time lag between individual reproductive decisions and subsequent market needs, in conjunction with a highly specialized labor force, appear to be the primary source of such long-run oscillations. Finally, the model predicts that raising the age of entry into the labor force increases economic growth.     

Asset bubbles,banking stability and economic growth

This paper examines the relationships between the asset bubble and the banking stability from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. The theoretical analysis demonstrates that the moral hazard caused by the deposit insurance and limited liability might facilitate the banks to hold bubble assets for the purpose of risk premium. Meanwhile the supervisory intensity, leverage ratio and credit spread provide the conditions for banks to hold bubble assets through their effects on risk premium. Once the banks hold the bubble assets, their stability will deteriorate because of four types of effects, namely internal leverage, cash withdrawal, credit friction and network effects. This paper also utilizes the BMA-PVAR model to test the theoretical findings by employing the data from 26 representative economies for a period between 2000 and 2014. The empirical evidences are consistent with the theoretical findings that the equity bubbles will lower the banking stability. The empirical evidences also suggest that the banking instability will be detrimental to the economic growth.     

Welfare cost of inflation in a stochastic balanced growth model

There is a large and growing literature on the welfare cost of inflation. However, work in this area tend to find moderate estimates of welfare gains. In this paper we reexamine welfare costs of inflation within a stochastic general equilibrium balanced growth model paying a particular attention to recursive utility, portfolio balance effects, and monetary volatility and monetary policy uncertainty. Our numerical analysis shows that a monetary policy that brings down inflation to the optimum level can have substantial welfare effects. Portfolio adjustment effects seem to be the dominant factor behind the welfare gains.     

Uninsured idiosyncratic risk, liquidity constraints and aggregate fluctuations

Summary. I study the role played by uninsured idiosyncratic risk and liquidity constraints in the propagation of aggregate fluctuations. To this purpose, I compare the aggregate fluctuations of two model economies that differ in their insurance technologies only. In one of these model economies liquidity constrained households vary their holdings of a nominally denominated asset in order to buffer an uninsured idiosyncratic shock to their individual production opportunities. In the other economy every idiosyncratic component of risk can be costlessly insured. I find that the limited insurance technology implies fluctuations in output that are 20% larger, fluctuations in hours relative to output that are 9% larger, fluctuations in consumption relative to output that are 18% smaller, and a correlation of hours and productivity that is 15% smaller than those that obtain under the full insurance technology. Received: March 6, 1996; revised version August 15, 1996     

Allocating bank regulatory powers: Lender of last resort, deposit insurance and supervision

We examine the optimal institutional allocation of bank regulation. We find that centralizing the lending of last resort and deposit insurance functions in a regulator leads to excessive forbearance. It also leads the bank to invest suboptimally in loans. Giving this regulator supervision improves on both problems, but it still does not lead to the efficient outcome. In the multi-regulator arrangement, we find that it is beneficial to give supervision to the deposit insurer. The choice between the unified-regulator arrangement and the multi-regulator arrangement involves a trade-off: The multi-regulator arrangement reduces the forbearance problem at high levels of liquidity shortage but may exacerbate it at low levels. These results assume the absence of information frictions. When banks are better informed than regulators, we show that regulators may have an incentive not to share private information, suggesting it is important to consider regulators’ informational advantages when deciding on the allocation of regulation.     

The impact of bank competition and concentration on industrial growth

This paper studies whether bank competition affects growth of non-banking industries. We find that non-cooperative bank competition and stability promote industrial growth robustly. Bank concentration may also affect growth positively; the latter effect increases for higher levels of competition.     

Financial distress,bank debt restructurings,and layoffs

We develop a model of a financially distressed firm to analyze the implications of a bank debt restructuring when the operational characteristics of the firm's project for the post-distress period are endogenously determined as part of the workout. We establish a formal link between the debt restructuring and operational actions such as employee layoffs, and show how these actions are affected by the firm's capital structure, the ordering of absolute priorities, and the allocation of control rights and residual claims after reorganization. Finally, we discuss the implications of our analysis for the design of reorganization law.     

Inflation and economic growth in Latin America: Some panel time-series evidence

In this paper we investigate the role of macroeconomic performance, mainly in terms of rates of inflation, in determining economic growth in four Latin American countries which suffered hyperinflationary bursts in the 1980s and early 1990s, but that also differ in terms of development levels. The data set covers the period between 1970 and 2007, and the empirical results, based on panel time-series data and analysis, confirm the anecdotal evidence which suggests that inflation has had a detrimental effect to growth in the region. All in all, we highlight the fact that excessive inflation has clearly offset the Mundell–Tobin effect and consequently the high costs that inflation has had on economic activity in the region.     

Fiscal leadership and central bank design

Abstract.  This article investigates the impact, on economic performance, of the timing of moves in a policy game between the government and the central bank for a government that has both redistributional and stabilization objectives. It is shown that both inflation and income inequality are reduced without sacrificing output growth if the government assumes a leadership role compared with a regime in which monetary and fiscal policy are determined simultaneously. Further, it is shown that government leadership benefits both the fiscal and monetary authorities through the enhanced coordination that this arrangement implies.     

Growth, habit formation, and catching-up with the Joneses

When habits are introduced multiplicatively in a capital accumulation model, the consumers’ objective function might fail to be concave. In this paper, we provide conditions aimed at guaranteeing the existence of interior solutions to the consumers’ problem. We also characterize the equilibrium path of two growth models with multiplicative habits: the internal habit formation model, where individual habits coincide with own past consumption, and the external habit formation (or catching-up with the Joneses) model, where habits arise from the average past consumption in the economy. We show that the introduction of external habits makes the equilibrium path inefficient. We characterize in this context the optimal tax policy.     

Financial liberalization,private investment and portfolio choice: Financialization of real sectors in emerging markets

Using firm level panel data, we analyze the impacts of rates of return gap between financial and fixed investments under uncertainty on real investment performance in three emerging markets, Argentina, Mexico and Turkey. Employing a portfolio choice model to explain the low fixed investment rates in developing countries during the 1990s, we suggest that rather than investing in irreversible long-term fixed investments, firms may choose to invest in reversible short-term financial investments depending on respective rates of returns and the overall uncertainty in the economy. The empirical results show that increasing rates of return gap and uncertainty have an economically and statistically significant fixed investment reducing effect while the opposite is true with respect to financial investments.